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ABSTRACT 
Abstract for the thesis "Towards an Integrated Regime for the Prosecution of 
International Crimes" presented by Robert Cryer to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, September 2000. 
This thesis investigates the extent to which there is an integrated system of 
prosecution of international crimes, involving the prosecution of international 
crimes by national and international criminal tribunals operating in tandem. It also 
seeks to investigate the extent that the values protected by international criminal 
law have been accepted into the structure of international society and how they 
have altered it. It does these things by looking at two different aspects of the 
prosecution of international crimes. First, how international criminal tribunals 
have overcome the problems encountered by national courts and the structural 
inadequacies of the bilateral, inter-State model of the nature of the international 
system. Secondly, it investigates whether or not international criminal tribunals 
have managed to avoid the criticism that the actual enforcement of universal crimes 
has been selective, and primarily directed against suspects who are not affiliated 
with the regime that is prosecuting them. It concludes that international criminal 
tribunals have, to differing extents overcome the problems of national courts and 
the supposed bilateral nature of international system. Selectivity, both in terms of 
who is prosecuted, and what they are prosecuted for, remains a problem. Although 
the coming into being of the ICC will alleviate some of the jurisdictional selectivity 
rationae personae, particularly as it creates a powerful national interest for States to 
prosecute offences by their own officials, nationals, or occurring on their territory, 
VII 
the definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute mean that selectivity in relation to the 
law applied remains, to some extent, problematic. 
VIII 
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INTRODUCTION 
PRELIMINARIES 
This is a thesis about the enforcement of international criminal law. Having started so 
baldly, some explanations are in order. It is the purpose of this introduction to provide 
them. The basic idea of this thesis is that there are the beginnings of a system of 
international criminal law enforcement integrating both national and international 
mechanisms. The bulk of the thesis is taken up by an analysis of the extent to which this 
system does, or does not, represent an improvement over the pre-existing system of 
national enforcement. Most previous discussions of the prosecution of international 
crimes have separated treatment of what Bassiouni describes as the direct and indirect 
enforcement systems. ' This is despite the fact that Bassiouni recognises that "the ideal 
enforcement system for ICL [international criminal law] is a combination of a direct 
enforcement system, one in the form of a permanent international criminal tribunal... and 
an effective indirect enforcement system... the two approaches are complementary and 
necessary to one another". 2 Since the creation of the two UN tribunals (the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICIY) and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR)) and the promulgation of the Rome Statute, the study of the interlinkages 
between the two structures of prosecution has become imperative. The best way to see 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) (which the Statute will create when it enters into 
force) is as a back-stop designed to operate when national courts do not, and as an 
incentive for States to prosecute international crimes diligently. From an institutional 
1 See M. C. Bassiouni, "The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework", 
in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), International Criminal Law Vol I. " Crines (NY: Transnational, 1999) 3, pp. 13-14. The 
"direct enforcement system" "applies when an internationally created organ enforces the rationae materiae 
(norms) of ICL [international criminal law] to the rationae personae (subjects) of ICL", iläd The "indirect 
enforcement system" "relies on the voluntary cooperation of states for investigation, prosecution, 
adjudication and punishment of those who are sought, accused or convicted of international crimes by 
interested national criminal justice systems" (ihiL, p. 14). The essential split is international/national 
prosecution. Bassiouni's own collection separates the two "systems" see M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ) Int 
. 
ional 
Criminal Law Vol III: En, not (New York Transnational, 1999) passen. 
2 Ibid p. 14. 
1 
perspective, it is preferable, in many ways, for national courts to deal with these crimes, as 
national courts are part of a system of enforcement which includes the police and the 
prison service. 
As a result of the above factors, this study will attempt to provide a conceptual 
analysis, discussing both national and international responses to international crimes. 
Each conceptual heading will contain a discussion of an issue that has arisen in the 
national (or "indirect") enforcement mechanism, then move on to whether (or not), how 
and why the international (or "direct") enforcement mechanisms have transcended the 
problems that have arisen. It will also attempt to show the effect that the existence of 
international criminal tribunals has had on the enforcement of international criminal law. 
PRECEPTS 
All theses have to have precepts, or be impossibly long and cumbersome. That being 
a given, it is best to be as open about those precepts as possible. The purpose of this 
section is to elaborate upon those precepts, and explain why they have been selected. 
Precept 1: There is a Body of International Criminal Law 
The first precept is that there is such a thing as international criminal law 3 What this 
means is that there are certain rules of international law that impose criminal 
responsibility directly upon the individual, without the necessary mediating influence of 
national legislation (although that may be necessary for the purposes of national 
prosecution). This was something accepted by the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg IM'T) in its famous pronouncement that "crimes against 
3 For support, se G. O. W. Mueller & D. J Berashetov, "Evolution and Enforcement of International Criminal 
Law" in Bassiouni, supra n. 1,257; E. Greppi, "The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under 
2 
international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commits such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced... individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations 
of obedience imposed by the individual state. "4 This position has considerable historical 
pedigree, 5 and has received no convincing academic challenge for half a century. 6 Critics 
of international criminal law are now limited to castigating statesmen for their invocation 
of the concept, which they feel will fail on malpnlitik grounds, rather than being able to 
wholly reject the concept.? Debates are now more fruitfully centring on the contours of 
the concept, rather than its existence. 8 
Limiting the discussion in this thesis to those rules of international law that directly 
impose criminal responsibility on individuals involves the exclusion of two other types of 
rules sometimes referred to under the general rubric of "international criminal law". The 
first of these is the controversial concept of international crimes of States, exemplified in 
International Law" (1999) 335 LR. R. C 531. 
4 "Nuremberg DvIT: Judgment and Sentence" reprmti in (1947) 41 A. J. I. L. 172, p. 221. References to the 
Nuremberg IMT's judgment in this thesis will be made to this (unofficial) version rather than the official 
transcript, as the reprint is by far the most widely available for reference. 
5 See H. Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Criminals" (1944) 21 B. YB. LL. 58, 
p. 61 for reference to acceptance of this in the "classical" writers of international law. It is arguable that an 
English Court, as far back as 1796 applied international law to secure a conviction for distributing unfit food 
to Prisoners of War, Tiu 's Case (27th April 1796), (1803) 2 Pleas of the Crown 821. Zoller, though considers the 
principle to have fallen into desuetude by this century, E. Zoller, "The Status of Individuals Under 
International Law" in G. Ginsburgs & V. N. Kudriavtsev, The Nuran1 g Trial in Intematinal Law (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 99, p. 100. This fails to take into account not only the law of piracy, but also the 
acceptances of the concept in the Leipzig Trials and the 1919 Commission. 
6 The most serious challenge to the existence of international criminal law in this sense of the word was G. 
Schwarzenberger, "The Problem of an International Criminal Law" (1950) 3 C. L. P. 263. Schwaxzenberger 
was in a minority at the time, and proceeded on the basis that war crimes were only national crimes over 
which, exceptionally, international law granted wider jurisdictional competence to States than was usually the 
case. As will be seen, international law does more than that. 
7 See Alfred P. Rubin's Jeremiad Ethics and Autx ity in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1997) for an 
example of this. His criticisms (for example of the hypocrisy of States) are well founded, but do not 
undermine the legality of the concept of individual responsibility. As Colin Warbrick points out, there is no 
principled reason in international law why there cannot be individual responsibility for crimes under 
international law, and enforcement by international courts C. W. Warbrick, "The UN System: A Place for 
International Criminal Courts? " (1995) 5 Tranwatiortal L. and Gonterpurary Pmblens 237, p. 261. 
8 See, for example, F. Malekian, "Individual Criminal Responsibility" in Bassiouni, supra n 1,153; K. Ambos, 
"Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law" in G. K. McDonald & 0. Swaak-Goldman 
(eds. ), Substmthe and Piocalrrral Aspects of International Criminal Law Vol I. " Carwivitary (The Hague: Kluwer, 
2000) 1. 
3 
Article 19 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 9 Although the types of 
conduct covered by Article 19 are similar to those discussed in this thesis, the 
transposition of criminality onto a collective entity like the State is still highly 
controversial, and has little likelihood of being accepted in the immediate future. b0 The 
main reason it falls outside the scope of this work is that it does not relate to individual 
criminal responsibility, but to State responsibility. 
The second exclusion is those crimes set up by treaty regimes which require States to 
prohibit conduct as part of their national law. Treaties of this nature, such as the Vienna 
Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances" do not create individual responsibility under international law, but place a 
duty on the State to criminalise the conduct municipally. Therefore they are conceptually 
different to the international crimes under discussion herein, as international law does not 
criminalise such crimes in and of itself. However, the two types of crime have certain 
aspects of national enforcement in common, so when reference to national suppression is 
made, it is worth utilising examples from the "treaty crimes" as they were called in the 
1993 ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. 12 As will be seen, the treaty 
crimes were excluded from the ambit of the international criminal court. 13 This was 
probably the correct approach to take. International crimes in the sense in which the term 
is used in this thesis are extremely serious crimes, of such a nature that they are 
considered to be a matter of concern to all States, and are so serious international law 
takes the drastic step of directly imposing liability. They are violations of rules which are 
9 For the first reading see, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth 
Session UN. GAOR 51n Sess. Supp No 10, p. 131. See generally G. Gilbert, "The Criminal Responsibility of 
States" (1990) 391 C. L. Q 345; K. Marek, "Criminalising State Responsibility" (1978-1979) 14 R. B. D. L 460; S. 
Rosenne, "State Responsibility and International Crimes: Further Reflections on Article 19 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility" (1997-1998) 30 N Y. U. J. I. L, & Politics 145. 
10 At least not in their present form, see J. Crawford, "Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility" 
(1999) 10 E. J. I. L. 485, Crawford is the ILC Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility. 
11 1019 UNTS 175. 
12 Report of the ILC on the Work of its forty fifth Session, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute 
for an International Criminal Court UN GAOR 48th Sess. Supp 10 pp. 100-132, UN Doc. 
A/48/CN. 4/Ser. A/1993/Add. 1. For an attempt to rationalise both types of international crime into one 
taxonomy see B. Yarnold, "Doctrinal Basis for the International Criminalisation Process" (1994) 4 Te ple L 
& Camp. L. J. 85. 
13 Alfra pp. 280-281. 
4 
universally accepted as a matter for concern of the international community as a whole, as 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognised. 14 The same cannot be 
said for all treaty crimes, such as, for example, interference with submarine cables-" Also 
treaty crimes are often controversial, and not universally accepted, such as drug 
trafficking. 16 The lack of consensus on treaty crimes was what led to their exclusion from 
the Rome Statute. As will be seen, the consequences of conduct being prohibited by 
international criminal law are manifold, and it is far from evident that it is appropriate for 
all treaty based crimes to be part of this regime. 
These exclusions leave only four categories of crime to be discussed: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. These four remain as 
they have been accepted in the latter half of the 20th century as the "core" international 
crimes which international law itself criminalises. This choice is also supported by the fact 
that to the present day they are the only crimes which have been punished before 
international criminal tribunals. As will be seen, all four are present in some form in the 
Rome Statute. 17 They are also the crimes which comprised the streamlined ILC Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 18 The Draft Code declared 
(in Article 1) that "Crimes against the peace and security of mankind are crimes under 
international law and punishable as such, whether or not they are punishable under 
national law", which shows that they were looking at international crimes in the sense 
that this thesis does. 
14 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (hereinafter "Rome Statute") A/CONF. 183/9, (1998) 
37 I. L. M. 999 preamble. 
15 Contrary to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 516 UNIS 205, Article 113. 
16 1988 Vienna Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Other Psychotropic Substances, 
Article 1. 
17 Rome Statute, Article 5. 
18 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of The International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, UN Doc. A/51/10, Articles 16-20. This study treats 
crimes against UN Personnel (Article 19) as the Rome Statute does, as war crimes. The Commentary to 
Article 1 of the Draft Code (paragraph 2) claims that it was no intended to suggest that the list in the draft 
was exhaustive. That must be read in the light of the fact that their previous attempts to expand the 
list, for 
example in the 1991 met with controversy and, ultimately, rejection. For a study of the fate of the crimes 
suggested in the 1991 Code, see L. S. Sunga, Y he Emerging System of Intenntional Gininal Law 
(The Hague: 
Kluwer, 1997). 
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Precept 2: Prosecution is Usually the Correct Response to Violations of International 
Crrininal Law 
The second precept comes from the acceptance of the existence of international 
criminal law. This is that by setting up a body of international criminal law, States have 
accepted that, at least in the abstract, the usual response to violations of that law should 
be prosecution. A similar position can be inferred from the portion of the Nuremberg 
IMT judgment cited above (p. 3) That is not to deny the possibility of other responses, 
but to assert the primacy of a penal response. After all, criminal law is distinguishable 
from civil law on the ground that the sanctions imposed are primarily penal in nature, 
rather than compensatory. Activities like truth commissions, civil remedies and 
reparations also have a place in responding to violations of international criminal law (as 
they do in relation to violations of national criminal law). As will be seen, there is no all- 
encompassing duty to extradite or prosecute persons suspected of such violations, and 
where there is no such duty, it may be possible to use other responses in substitution for 
prosecutions, and use amnesties. 19 However, this must be seen as a deviation from the 
normal response, and a derogation from what is the most appropriate response in most 
situations, prosecution. 20 
19 See, for example, M. P. Scharf,; "The Amnesty Exception to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court" (1999) 32 C, oindl I. L. J. 507; J. Dugard, "Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience" (1998) 8 Transnational L. & Contemporary Problens 277. For a defence of the South African approach see K. 
Asmal, "Truth, Reconciliation and Justice The South African Experience in Perspective" (2000) 63 M. L. R. 1, 
for a philosophical defence of the Argentine approach see C. S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale 
U. P., 1996). A recent, primarily utilitarian appraisal of the various methods of dealing with atrocities is M. 
Minow, Betuen Veng and Foigizo s (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). For a superb discussion of some of the 
moral problems in this area see M. Osiel, "Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity" (2000) 
22 H. RQ 118. Much of the literature advocating the use of amnesties, it must be noted, relates to the 
situation where the abuses of a past (presumed non-democratic regime) fall to a new (democratic) regime, and 
that an amnesty may be the price of democracy. This excludes the situation where democracies must punish 
their own offences, or non-democratic regimes come into power. For an argument that there is a moral duty 
on democracies to punish Nazi crimes see A. Rosenbaum, ßvs Nazi War Criminals (Boulder: Westview, 
1993). 
20 As Solzenitsyn said in The Gulag An fago (London: Harvill, 1999) "It is unthinkable in the twentieth 
century to fail to distinguish between what constitutes an abominable atrocity that must be prosecuted and 
what constitutes the `past' which `ought not to be stirred up'" (p. 81) "Fie!, What naturalism. Why keep talking 
about all that? And that is what they usually say today, those who did not themselves suffer, who were 
themselves the executioners, or who have washed their hands of it, or who put on an innocent expression: 
Why rake over all that? Why rake over old wounds (Their wounds!! )" (i&d, p. 228). Mark Osiel expresses the 
sentiment, in a different context to Solzhenitsyn, "The harm wrought by state sponsors of mass atrocity is so 
colossal that even skeptics of the criminal law's coherence and defensibility find themselves longing for their 
6 
As prosecution is considered, for the most part, the most appropriate response, the 
central focus of this thesis is the extent to which we have a regime that is effective and 
credible, as it is only such a regime that can fully vindicate the laws in question. 
Precept 3: The International System is Value Based, but These Values are not 
Immutable 
The third precept relates to the nature of international society. The precept is this: the 
international system is capable of embodying values, and those values may change to 
reflect the current status of international society (or community). As George Abi-Saab 
makes clear, the debates about whether we have an international society or an 
international community are not discussing the right questions, a more fruitful topic of 
inquiry is the "degree of intensity of the sense of the community prevailing among the 
members of international society... rather than referring to a group as a community in 
general, it is better, for the sake of precision, to speak of the degree of community 
existing within the group in relation to a given subject, at a given moment". 21 The rise of 
new values may have an impact on the content of the law, as for example the necessities 
of international trade caused a rejection of the absolute theory of State immunity, which 
was based on the absolute sovereignty ideal. 22 What the rise of new values does not do is 
change the law, but they provide impetus for change within the system. 
It would be unforgivably myopic to see the pure positivist, Statist idea of 
international law as value-neutral. As Phillip Allott recognises, the alleged Hobbesian state 
of nature which exists between States in the international realm serves the interests of the 
doubts to be allayed, at least for perpetrators such as these. In the face of such monstrous wickedness, 
retributive impulses emerge powerfully even in the most critical of our practices of punishment and their 
underlying assumptions. If ever there were an `easy case' (in the moral sense, at least) for criminal 
punishment, surely this is it. Or so one would suppose" (did p. 118) Osiel devotes the rest of the article to a 
qualified rebuttal of arguments against prosecution. 
21 G. Abi-Saab, "Whither the International Community? " (1998) 9 E. J. I. L. 248, pp. 248-249. 
22 See e. g. M. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Grotius, 4thed, 1997) pp. 490-499. 
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powerful, thus has their freedom as a value. 23 Feminist critiques of international law have 
also shown how the traditional conception and structure of international law privileges 
certain interests they identify as male. 24 In addition, the pure Statist version of the 
international system consisting entirely of States with supreme authority over all in their 
territory and the type of international law that entailed no longer25 reflects reality. 26 
Positivism has had to alter from this view to maintain its claim to be reflective of 
actuality. Positivists have come to accept that the nature of the international system is not 
immutable, and new values may be being reflected within it. 27 These positivists include 
some of the staunchest critics of attempts to alter the international systen128 Many of the 
works traditionally considered Utopian are best read as proposals for a reorientation of 
the values accepted in the system29 Their Utopianism, if that is what it is, does not relate 
to the possibility of a change in values, 30 but the extent of the change they advocate. The 
prohibitions involved in international criminal law as the term is used here protect values 
23 P. Allott, Eunamia, (Oxford: OUP, 1990) pp. 248-249, "Such was, and is, the Vattel tradition and the Vattel 
reality flowing from it. It is a reality which was welcome to the ruling classes of western Europe... like the 
ruling classes who had led the way along the same path. The ruling lasses of the so called nerv states also 
welcomed a theory which could give such supersocializing explanation of their own personal power. 
Misconceived international society became... a world fit for governments", see also P. Jessup Modem Law cf 
Nations (New York Macmillan, 1948), pp. 40-41, "the function of sovereignty as a legal concept was to protect 
the state in a world devoid of any alternative to self protection. The gradual development of adequate 
modernized law and organization should provide such an alternative". 
24 See H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin &S Wright, "Feminist Approaches to International Law" (1991) 85 
A. J. I. L. 613; H. Charlesworth & C. Chipkin, The Bow7darks of International Laze. A Fonvu'st Analysis 
(Manchester: MUP, 2000). 
25 See B. Simma & A. L. Paulus, "The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflicts: A Positivist View" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 302, p. 306. 
26 See O. Schachter, "The Decline of the Nation State and, its Implications for International Law" (1997) 37 
Cf. TL. 7, p. 7. 
27 The two extended discussions of this from avowed positivists are B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest in International Law" (1994) VI 250 RcLC 217 and C. Tomuschat, "Obligations Arising 
for States Without or Against Their Will" (1993) IV 241 RdC 195. 
28 Rubin, for example, supra n. 7, p. 145 accepts that the international order contains values, but that we have to 
be very certain of the costs and benefits before advocating change. Prosper Wiel, who is widely known for his 
critique of the ideas of a hierarchy of norms in international law "Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law" (1983) 77 A. J. I. L. 413 has, more recently accepted not only that the system can change, 
but has done so. Although the old law "favoured the State and its sovereignty, the international community, 
of which modern international law is so fond, puts the stress on what brings together rather than on what 
separates. Reference to the international community transcends the effect of style and fashion: behind the 
semantic shift what is emerging is evolution in the very conception of the international system" (1992) VI 237 
RcLC 9, p. 309, as translated in J. A. Carrillo Salcedo, "Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms 
in International Law" (1997) 8 E. J. I. L. 583. 
29 Allott, for example advocated a reconceptualisaton of international law, and Phillip Jessup was express that 
his work was written de lege fevnda (supra n. 23, p. 9 1). 
30 It cannot be forgotten that both Jessup and Allott were practising Statesmen prior to writing, so cannot be 
accused of being unaware of the realities of inter-State affairs. 
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currently in ascendency in the international community 31 The rules have effectively 
universal acceptance amongst States in the abstract, although in practice their application 
is controversial. As Marcella David puts it: "there is general consensus as to the broad 
parameters of these norms... A poll of the heads of national governments would elicit 
statements in agreement with these principles-albeit subject to wildly varying 
interpretations of their application". 32 
It would be overly optimistic, to say the least, that the values enshrined in 
international criminal law have fully superceded the older order of sovereignty-based 
values, and the tension between these values will be shown by this thesis. It is a more 
realistic claim to suggest that the newer values are beginning to become visible in the 
modern international society. 33 Further developments in the acceptance of these values 
will not come about without more concrete action. One method of ensuring values are 
inculcated into a system is institutionalisation, i. e. the setting up of institutions reflecting 
those values. 34 Courts can be one of the institutions that can perform this function. 35 The 
criminal law is another mechanism of value promotion and protection. 36 It is an aim of 
this thesis to investigate to what extent institutionalisation has occurred in international 
31 Tomuschat, supra n. 27, p. 225, "one may legitimately take the recognition of crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind as another due for the assumed existence of an international community, whose vital 
interests it is intended to secure". 
32 M. David, "Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International Criminal Court and the 
Commitment to International Law" (1999) 20 Mich. J. I. L. 337. In the survey of national opinions on the ICC 
given in R. S. Lee (ed. ), The Intemaziawl Cr-bn»ud Court (The Hague: Kluwer 1999) pp. 573-639 no State 
expressed dissent from the idea of international crimes, or that they existed. Disagreement centred on 
definitions (in the case of war crimes) and the inclusion of aggression, without a definition (not that 
aggression was an international crime). See also L. Fisler-Damrosch, "Enforcing International Law Through 
non Forcible Means" (1997) VIII 269 Rc. C 9, p. 197. 
33 See, for example Simma, supra n. 27, p. 234. 
34 See Simma, ibid, p. 235 "By sheer necessity, the quest to realize community interests has led to an ever 
stronger institutionalization, or organization, of international society", (ild p. 249) "there is reason to be 
concerned about new conceptions being grafted upon universal international law without support through, 
and serious attempts at, adequate institution building", ibid p. 285 "The realization of community interests 
depends not only on the creation of norms positing an `international community' but also on the existence of 
an institutional structure providing for the promotion as well as protection of these interests. " 
35 The example of the European Union will serve to show there is truth in this assertion. The level of 
acceptance of European law in member States and their legal systems would be unthinkable without the 
recognition of the doctrine of "direct effect", which was a creation of the European Court of Justice. See also 
P. Allort, "The International Court and the Voice of Justice" in A. V. Lowe & M. Fitzmaurice (eds. ), Fifty 
yeah of the International Court of Justice Essays in Honour of Sir Rol rt Jeimings (Cambridge: Grotius, 1996) 17, p. 17 
"a court makes a specific contribution to the general social task out of that society's past, as it acts in society's 
continuous present". 
36 See D. Garland, Pu isl non and Modem Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) Ch. 11. 
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criminal law, and the effect that institutionalisation has had on the acceptance of that 
law j7 
Precept 4: Method- The Emeience of New Values Does Not Alter the Sources of 
International Law 
Although this thesis accepts that there are values in the international system, and there 
can be legitimate enquiries taking them into account, the epistimology of this thesis, in 
relation to rules, is positivist. 38 The sources of international law are still those listed in 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. These two positions need not be a contradiction in terms. 39 
What would raise issues of coherence would be to draw normative conclusions from the 
values that appear to be emerging. Christian Tomuschat eloquently expresses the most 
appropriate position: "it would, of course amount to a deceitful trick to derive a whole 
series of specific legal consequences from a general concept such as the international 
community... However it would appear legitimate to have recourse to the idea of a 
collective interest of mankind, embodied in the international community and its 
constitution, when controversial legal issues have to be addressed". 40 This avoids the 
37 As will be seen, the acceptance of the values of international criminal law as part of community interest will 
build on Simma's definition of community interest as "a consensus according to which respect for certain 
fundamental values is not to be left to the free disposition of States individually or inter se, but is recognized 
and sanctioned by international law as of concern to all States", supra n. 27, p. 233. 
38 As Simma & Paulus, note, supra n. 25, p. 303, Positivism is "a label for a whole array of differing 
approaches. " The author would, thus, identify himself, with some hesitation, (labels can only ever provide a 
"broad-brush" description of a method) as what Simma and Paulus describe as the "modem positivist" 
approach. This approach accepts that the reality in which international law operates both can and is 
changing, the evidence of State practice is now broader than was accepted in the period of "classical 
positivism" and decisions of international tribunals, despite only being a subsidiary source, "their importance 
for the clarification of rules nowadays can hardly be overestimated" ibid pp. 306-307. 
39 In Simma's words "The rise and recognition of community interests is one thing, their impact on the real 
world quite another" ibid, p. 247. 
40 Tomuschat, supra n. 27, p, 236. The approach is similar to that of Higgins, who states, in her Probl®ns and 
josses (Oxford: OUP, 1994) pp. 5-7, "Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the policy-directed choice can 
properly be made... Even if policy concerns are entirely ignored, the law will fail in its ambition of neutrality 
for even such a refusal... is not without political and social consequences". 
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crude antinomianism and wide ranging deduction from abstract value of McDougalism. 41 
What this means in practice is that this thesis will attempt to avoid any such wide ranging 
deductions, and accepts that not only will the traditional State-based system survive, 42 but 
that this is not, of itself, a bad thing. 43 Any changes in the law have to occur by the 
traditional methods of law creation, 44 not drawn down from the ether or inferred solely 
from value changes. Pretending that there have been changes in the nature of law creation 
where there have not been has no more practical effect than claiming it is sunny when it 
rains. Simma & Paulus express the point thus: "only when linked to formal sources 
recognized as binding by the international community does law serve the decision maker 
in the search for a balance between idealism and realism, common values and ideological 
neutrality, apology and utopia. "45 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will investigate whether or not there is an incipient, integrated system of 
enforcement of international criminal law that is effective and credible, and also the 
41 For criticisms of McDougalism see N. Duxbury, Patterns of Amerirmz Jun4mcemx (Oxford: OUP, 1995) 
pp. 191-203; M. Koskenniemi, Fn m Apology to Utopia. " The Stnjw v of Intonational Legal Ai zon it (Helsinki: 
Finnish Lawyers' Publishing, 1989) pp. 170-178 and G. Fitzmaurice, "Vae Iluzis or Woe to the Negotiators, 
Your Treaty or Our Interpretation of it? " (1971) 65 A. J. LL. 358. Although Higgins is often thought of as a 
McDougalite, her approach is far less open to these criticisms, on the ground that she limits invocation of 
value to areas of real ambiguity or uncertainty, without accepting the radical rule-scepticism of the traditional 
McDougalite approach. This position is actually similar to the modem positivist position adopted by Herbert 
Hart, see H. L. A. Hart, 71 Corxrpt of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 2nd ed, 1994), p. 135, "the open texture of law 
means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts or officials 
striking a balance, in the light of the circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight from 
case to case. " Similar criticisms relating to deduction from value can be made of modem "Kantian" liberal 
theories of international law such as F. R. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder: Westview, 1998). 
42 See S. Sur, "The State Between Fragmentation and Globalization" (1997) 8 E. J. I. L. 42; Simma, supra n. 27, 
p. 230. 
43 See B. Kingsbury, "Sovereignty and Inequality" (1998) 9 E. J. I. L. 599; P-M. Dupuy, "International Law: 
Torn Between Coexistence, Cooperation and Globalization: General Conclusions" (1998) 9 E. J. I. L. 278. 
44 See Jessup, supra n. 23, p. 17, "The inescapable fact is that the world today is organized on the basis of the 
coexistence of states, and that fundamental changes will take place only through state action, whether 
affirmative or negative"; Simma, supra n. 27, p. 246. As Simma says, ibid p. 348, "wishful thinking can spill over 
into legal argumentation with impunity only to a degree", a sentiment similar to that expressed by Derek 
Bowett, reviewing F. R. Teson, Hunvniar m In oition: An Inquiry into Lazy and Morality (1988) 59 B. YB. LL. 
263, pp. 263-264, "Professor Teson's book is a brave attempt at wishful thinking. He assumes that if the 
philosophical basis for humanitarian intervention can be established, its legal validity follows. Unfortunately, 
State practice does not conform to this kind of logic, and the question remains: does the practice of States in 
the post-Charter era support such a right? ". As will be seen, many of the debates relating to humanitarian 
intervention also have analogies in debates in international crimes. 
45 Supra n. 25, p. 308. 
11 
extent to which the values inherent in international criminal law have been accepted by 
the international system. To do so, the thesis will proceed as follows. 
First, the international criminal tribunals will be introduced, and their international 
status shown. This is to differentiate them from national courts, and because an 
understanding of their genesis is a necessary precondition to a full understanding of their 
operation and effects. Then, a discussion of their powers and jurisdiction will be entered 
into. It is not possible to understand the difference between the powers and functions of 
the international courts and the national court system without understanding the powers 
and jurisdiction that have been granted to international criminal tribunals. This is 
particularly relevant to the later discussion of the general legal regime for the prosecution 
of international crimes. 
The main body of the thesis is taken up by an analysis of two of the obstacles to the 
achievement of an effective and credible system of enforcement. These are the nature of 
the international system and the bilateral model of criminal co-operation, and 
selectivity/non prosecution. This is not to suggest that there are no others, 46 but in the 
author's view, these are the most fundamental. The first is the most fundamental of all, as 
it could be that the traditional international system is structurally unable to come to terms 
with the existence of international crimes, and the problem, being of such a systemic 
nature, cannot be overcome. It may be that the traditional system has difficulties with 
international crimes, but, this thesis hopes to show that the problem is not insoluble, and 
institutionalisation may have helped, or, to some extent, the system has changed. The 
second problem, that of either selective enforcement, or no enforcement at all threatens 
to undermine the system. Universal crimes which are not enforced in a universal manner 
are a contradiction in terms. The point of a universal crime is that it is applicable to all 
46 Other possible obstacles that could be discussed are the "limits of legalism" when dealing with large scale 
criminality, see for example G. J. Bass, "War Crimes and the Limits of Legalism" (1999) 97 Mid. L. R. 2103, 
pp. 2106-2107. The author's response to this particular issue is that given the incommensurability of the harm, 
no response could be entirely adequate, but that as lawyers, we have to use the tools and concepts available to 
us to do what we can. See also Osiel, supra n. 19, pp. 144-147. 
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persons everywhere, when it is not enforced in a similar manner, the promise of a 
universal crime is not kept. Also, if international crimes are thought to protect 
foundational values, the sporadic enforcement of those crimes implies that those values 
are not so important after all, and the law is more rhetorical than real. 
THEE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
This part of the thesis will discuss the practical manifestations of the tension between 
the nature of the decentralised, bilateral inter-State system and the evolving regime of 
international crime, which clashes with that regime, but has, in some areas, altered it. It 
will proceed to discuss certain aspects of the system, and how, if at all, the creation of the 
international criminal tribunals has overcome the problems that are identifiable in the 
"indirect" enforcement method. It will begin by focusing on State jurisdiction, and the 
immunities from that jurisdiction which have traditionally been accepted. It will then 
discuss the regime of extradition, which is both the cornerstone of the system and, in its 
bilateralist mode, a microcosm of the system, which brings to the fore many of the 
problems in the area. The possibility of a duty to extradite or prosecute offences, which 
could be a way around some of the difficulties, and have an important effect on the 
treatment of international crimes in peace settlements is also discussed. From there, the 
thesis will move on to note some of the inconsistencies in interpretation of international 
criminal law that have occurred, as a result of there being, until recently, few detailed 
definitions of international crimes, and even fewer authoritative judgments on them. The 
problems will show the advisability of some centralisation and increased co-operation. At 
all stages the aspects mentioned here will be put into context by reference to the 
problems as they have arisen in practice, and how, if at all, they have been overcome by 
the relevant international criminal tribunals. 
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SELECTIVITY 
This is a criticism that has a large degree of currency not only in the question of the 
invocation of humanitarian intervention, 47 but also in the application of international 
criminal law. This should not be a surprise, as both of them involve, albeit in different 
ways, enforcement of fundamental norms of international law; the difference is in the 
forcible or pacific nature of the mechanism. Selective application is not an argument 
alleging illegality, 48 but one that not only undercuts the universal nature of the crimes, but 
also the justifications of punishment. Deterrence is undermined by selective 
enforcement. 49 Retributivist justifications are based on the requirement that all persons 
performing prohibited acts require some form of punishment. When enforcement is 
selective, some of those people are left unpunished for reasons unrelated to the nature of 
their acts. This creates a dissonance with the requirements of deserts-based explanations 
of the idea of punishment. As far back as Aristotle discomfort with taking externalities 
into account can be seen. 50 Particularly in relation to criminal law, its claims to legitimacy 
must be undermined when the law is neither general, nor applied evenhandedly. As 
Martin Loughlin avers; "legal rules must be general. Generality in rule making reflects the 
aspiration that law should establish a common framework to which all must be bound. 
Generality thus expresses a belief that justice should be blind, or that the rules should not 
select particular individuals or groups for specific benefits or burdens". 51 As Loughlin 
notes, this can be traced back to Blackstone, who believed that law should be 
470n which, see for example, D. Kritsiotis "Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention" 
(1998) 19 Mich J. I. L. 1005, pp. 1026-1034. 
48 "Unless the law can be seen to apply to George Bush (who ordered the invasion of Panama) as well as 
Saddam Hussein (who ordered the invasion of Kuwait)... it will seem hypocritical again" A. P. Rubin, 
"International Crime and Punishment" (Fall 1993) 34 77 National Interest 73, p. 74. Note that Rubin, no fan of 
the idea of international crimes does not term selective application illegal, but hypocritical. 
49 See David, supra n. 32, p. 351. 
50 See Aristotle, Nicc, nad cm Ethics (Hannondsworth: Penguin 1976) p. 181 "all the law considers... is the 
difference caused by the injury". 
51M. Loughlin, Szw d and Scales (Oxford: Hart, 2000) p. 79. 
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"permanent, uniform and universal". 52 This is particularly relevant for the "core" crimes 
under consideration, crimes which are universally applicable throughout the globe. 
Selectivity undercuts the universal nature of the crimes, and gives rise to the suspicion 
that the values they protect in theory are considerably different to those they are used to 
vindicate in practice. Loughlin explains: "as an operative system of rules, legal judgment is 
quite distinct from political decision-making". 53 Selective enforcement blurs the 
difference between the two, as it fails to focus on the acts alone, making actors relevant, 
and undercutting the universal applicability of the law. 
Selectivity comes in two forms: jurisdiction, and incorporation/criminalisation. As 
Timothy McCormack puts it, "the history of war crimes reveals a dual selectivity on the 
part of the international community. This selectivity is first found in relation to the acts 
the international community is prepared to characterise as `war crimes' and secondly, in 
relation to the particular alleged atrocities the international community is prepared to 
collectively prosecute". 54 The extent to which this statement is borne out in relation to 
national and international criminal prosecutions is investigated in this part of the thesis, as 
are possible reasons for the selectivity, and the extent to which international tribunals 
have overcome the problems of selectivity raticviaemateriae nd razionae personae. 
52 Ibid See W. Blackstone, Qnrneraries on the Law of England (Oxford: Clarendon, 1765) p. 44. Lest charges be 
made that this is Anglocentric, it is worth bearing in mind that Blackstone was one of the writers most 
enamoured of the reality of international crimes, see M. Janis, "Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of 
International Law" (1984) 78 A. J. I. L. 405, p. 407. The requirement of generality can also be seen in Hart's 
C, oi ept of Law, supra n. 41, p. 124 "In any large group general rules... must be the main standard of social 
control, and not particular directions given to each individual separately. " 
53jbid 
54T. L. H. McCormack, "Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International 
Criminal Law" (1997) 60 AlLwiy L. R 681, p. 683. 
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From the above analysis, this thesis hopes to draw some tentative conclusions about 
the existence or otherwise of an integrated system for the enforcement of international 
criminal law. 
16 
PART 1: INTRODUCING 
THE COURTS 
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CHAPTER 1: THE COURTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the rich history of international tribunals, ' and perhaps as a result of the 
freedom of States to create, dissolve and structure international courts effectively as they 
please, 2 there has been little research into the criteria a court must fulfil to be considered 
international. As most international courts are concerned with State, not individual, 
responsibility, 3 what literature there is has not concentrated on the specific features of 
international criminal courts. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to evaluate the 
international or national nature of such courts, and apply this to the five courts this 
century that have traditionally been considered intematiaial criminal courts. 4 The purpose 
of this distinction between national and international courts is to emphasise that although 
we are moving towards an integrated scheme of prosecution of international crimes, the 
mechanisms are still distinct, and have unique features. Discussion of their nature will 
also assist understanding of some of the later parts of the thesis, where selectivity and the 
nature of the system of enforcement are at issue. 
1 Hudson, as long ago as 1944, referred to "hundreds" of international tribunals M. O. Hudson, Inteinathnal 
TriLwials (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944) p. 17), see also R. P. Anand, 
International Cum and Contenprn-ary Co rcu (New York Asia Publishing, 1974) p. 85. 
2 See Hudson, ibid; Anand, ibid 
3 See Anand ibid., p. 87, and H. Schermers & N. Blökker, International Institý Law (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 3d ed., 1995) p. 407. 
4 These are the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals ("Nuremberg IMT" and "Tokyo 
IMT" respectively), the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICIY"), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") and the Court to be created by the Rome Statute for an International Criminal 
Court, ("ICC"). 
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NATIONAL COURTS 
There are far too many national courts to give more than a smattering of examples. 
The most well known of such courts in the West are probably the United Kingdom's 
House of Lords, the US Supreme Court, and the French Cair d' Cassation. Their common 
feature is that they are set up under the national constitutional structure of the state in 
which they operate. The legal basis of their constitution does not he in the international 
sphere, although their jurisdictional competence may, as a matter of international law, be 
limited by it. They may, at times apply international law, either indirectly or directly. 5 
Sometimes they may even apply international law as part of their primary functions, as is 
the case of prize courts, 6 but their competence to implement international law does not 
rest on an inter-state agreement, but the State's internal legislation or structure? National 
criminal courts can be civilian or military, and their composition is not directly regulated 
by international law (although certain human rights standards may be pertinent). 8 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
There are many international courts, with diverse functions and structures. Examples 
of international courts include the International Court of Justice, European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. There are two common features which 
differentiate international courts from their national brethren. These are their basis, and 
the law they must apply. There are three other candidates that have been asserted as 
criteria for an international court. These are permanence, proceeding by way of rules of 
5 See, for example the US Supreme Court in ex pane Quinn 317 US 161. 
6 See A. P. Rubin, Ethics and Autlxrity in Intenu6wal Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1997)p-90, discussing The Paquette 
Habma, The Lola 175 US 677 (1900). 
7This should not be confused with international agreements that certain matters should be subject to the 
adjudicative jurisdiction of certain states, (one contemporary example being the jurisdiction over torture 
conceded inter partes by the parties to the 1984 Convention on Torture (GA Resolution 39/46, UN Doc. 
A/39/51)). In these agreements the jurisdiction is conferred on the state, who is free to designate which of its 
courts is to assert such jurisdiction by national law. 
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procedure, and the binding nature of the decision. 9 The criterion of permanence is 
unnecessary, as it relates not to the classification of something as a judicial body or not, 
but to the legitimacy it has. 10 International law does not prohibit ad hoc courts. I I In the 
international law of occupation, for example, an occupant is permitted to set up 
occupation courts to enforce any laws it promulgates-12 These cannot continue in 
operation after an occupation, and thus, by necessity are temporary, yet by definition (in 
Article 66 of the Fourth Geneva Convention), they are "courts". It is difficult to disagree 
with Schwarzenberger though, who stated that a permanent court is of greater 
international standing. 13 The other criteria, proceeding by rules of procedure and a legally 
binding outcome are irrelevant to the distinction between national and international 
courts. 
BASIS 
This is the fundamental difference between a national and an international court. 
Whereas a national court is a creature of its local municipal order, an international court 
must have an international legal basis. 14 As restrictions on States in the creation of courts 
and institutions cannot be presumed, there are various ways that this may occur. Clearly 
1 
8 See, for example, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Article 14. 
9 See C. Romano, "The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle" (1999) 31 
N Y. U. J. I. L. & Politics 709, pp. 711-718; J. G. Merrils, International Dispute Settlement (Cambridge: Grotius, 3rd ed. 
1997) p. 121 seems to adopt the requirements of permanence and legally binding outcome. 
10 Romano, ibii-p. 718 accepts that although the ICTY and ICTR do not fulfil the test of permanence, they 
should be accepted as international judicial bodies. 
11 V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, An Insiders Guide to the International Cronriral Tri17o7al for Yugaslavia (New York: 
Transnational, 1995) pp. 38-9. 
12 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 75 UNTS 287, 
Article 66. 
13 G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Coum and Tribamals Vol 1. (London: Stevens, 
3rd ed. 1957) p. 30. There are various reasons for this. Permanence gives a court the chance to develop its own 
jurisprudence, thus gain authority and prestige with uniform pronouncements of the law. Another reason is 
that there is a long-standing hostility to special criminal tribunals in many legal cultures. This is because they 
are seen as the tools of a vindictive executive rather than a vindication of the law they apply. Also ad hoc 
bodies are often seen as discriminatory, as they are a short-term response to an individual set of 
circumstances, passing over previous, unprosecuted violations of the law. 
14 This is without prejudice to any domestic implementing legislation required for the court to effectively 
function. The question at issue here is the basis upon which the court rests. 
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the "most authoritative"15 way of creating a court is a treaty. With this there is clear 
evidence of state consent, and the treaty method is the normal mechanism for bringing an 
international body into being. 16 It is clear, though, that it is not the sole method of 
creating a judicial body. Courts may also be created by a decision of an organisation (or 
organ of one) that has the power to create a judicial body. This is clear from the decision 
of the ICJ in the Effet of Awards Case. 17 In this, the debate was centred solely on whether 
the General Assembly had, in fact, been empowered by the UN Charter to set up an 
international tribunal, 18 not whether it is possible to set up such a body by a resolution of 
a properly mandated body. 19 The matter is one of the extent to which States have ceded 
to the body in question the right to decide whether or not to create a court. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
As noted above, purely national courts do sometimes apply international law, so the 
power to apply international law is not necessarily determinative of status. What is clearer, 
however is that "[with regard to]... the question of applicable law... an international 
judicial body cannot render a judgment on the basis of domestic law, even though that 
law may recapitulate the rule of general international law". 20 This is not only with regard 
to the applicable rules of substantive law, but also procedure-" 
15 C. L. Blakesley, "Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and Triggering Mechanism" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ) The 
International Cnmznal Cour, Obsenaiians and Issues Bom dx 1997 8 Prep raza y Carin&t and Ac nstrame and 
fmmazial bnplications (Chicago, Eres: AMP, 1997) 177 at p. 180. 
16 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), European Court of Justice, & European Court of Human Rights, 
for example are all treaty based entities. 
17 Eff rt of Au nis of C onpeisatian Made by the United Nations Acbnviistratrce Trilwial (1954) I. CJ. Rep. 47. 
18 That it is not a national court is clear from the decision of the ICJ itself (ibd. p. 56) as they note Article 105 
ensures immunity for UN staff from national jurisdictions. 
19 See ibid pp. 55-56. 
20 Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations 
Addressed to the Secretary General, UN Doc. S/25266, para 57. See also pars 52 where the possibility of 
applying "national rules that are specific to a given State or States" is described as "unthinkable". 
21 Ibid para 52. 
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BASIS 
NUREMBERG IMT 
The first court to fall for discussion is chronologically the earliest (at least this 
century) 22 This is the Nuremberg IMT, created in 1946. During the war, the Allies issued 
many statements relating to violations of the law of war and promising punishment for 
such offences. 23 The most important of these was the Moscow declaration of 1 
November 1943. In this "the... [US, UK and USSR]... speaking in the interests of the 32 
United Nations... declared]... at the time of the granting of any armistice to any 
government that may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and 
members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting 
part in the atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in 
which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished 
according to the laws of the liberated countries and of the free governments which will be 
erected therein... the abo e ctlaratzan is wzth perdue to the case of the major cthi als wise 
off s har, no particular geographical Lxatkn and ui wrll he punished by a joint do Lzratim of the 
22 In 1474, Peter von Hagenbach was tried before a tribunal that was arguably international or "at least 
functionally transnational". (H. McCoubrey "The Concept and treatment of War Crimes" (1996) 1 J. A. CL. 
121 at p. 123. ) See generally G. Schwarzenberger "The Judgment of Nuremberg" (1947) 31 TuLL. R. 329 at 
p. 331; G. Schwarzenberger, Intern rl Law As Applied by Inxemadawl Caum and Trihwial Vol II. - The Law of 
Annas C ut (London, Stevens & Co, 1968) pp. 462-466; T. McCormack "From Sun Tzu to the Sixth 
Committee: The Evolution of an International Criminal Law Regime" in T. L. H. McCormack & G. J. Simpson 
(eds. ), The Law of War Crvn5: National and International Approaches (rhe Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 31 at pp. 37-39. It 
is excluded from further discussion because it's status as a legal precedent for the present day is nugatory, it 
having occurred before 1648, thus when the structure of international law was fundamentally different. See 
D. Kennedy, "Primitive Legal Scholarship" (1986) 27 Hanwd I. L. J. 1 at pp. 1-5. This is not to denigrate its 
historical interest. 
23 See, for example the statements of Roosevelt and Churchill 25.10.1941, Pumsl narr for War Cri'n, the Inter 
Allied Declaration Signal at St Ja nes's Palace in 136 January and Relating Docý (London: HMSO, 1942) p. 15 
Declaration of St James' Palace 13.1.1942, Ibid p. 1.144 B. F. S. P. 1072; See generally the documents 
mentioned and quoted in UNWCC, History of the Unital Nations War Crim Genremission and the L 
dopnoit of the 
Laws of War (London: HMSO, 1948) pp. 87-94. In October 1943 the Allies also set up the UNWCC, on which 
see, UNWCC, ibicL; W. Bathurst, "The UN War Crimes Commission" (1943) 37 A. J. I. L. 565; A. Tusa & J. 
Tusa, The Nurenlvg Trial (Macmillan: London, 1983) pp. 22-23; T. Taylor, The Antony of the Nunmbag Tiials 
(London: Little, Brown & Co., 1992) pp. 26-28; A. Kochavi, l'reliýde to Nuranl Allies War Crones Policy and the 
n of Pun sh'nent (Durham North Carolina U. P. 1998) pp. 104-107. The last three of these were critical of 
the UNWCC, as they claim it did little practical work, being hobbled by a lack of State co-operation. On the 
attitude of the Allies at this time see Taylor, ibicý, pp. 21-55, Tusa & Tusa, iýid, pp. 20-32,50-67; Kochani, ibrl 
passim; B. F. Smith, Readrirtg Judýnýrt ai Nuronlýrg (London, Andre Deutsch, 1977) Ch. 2; H. Levie, Terarivn in 
War the Law of War Crin, (N. Y: Oceana, 1992) Ch. 2. 
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guarts of the Allies" [emphasis added]. 24 This was not a legally binding commitment to 
punish the "major criminals" by judicial process, for two reasons. First, it is unlikely 
(albeit not impossible) that the Moscow Declaration could be considered a treaty between 
the Allied powers. 25 More importantly, by its own terms it did not apply to these "major 
criminals", who would be punished by a "joint declaration of the Allies". The Declaration 
was not seen by the Allies as ruling out an executive decision to punish them. 26 This did 
not prevent the Moscow declaration providing the political backdrop to the creation of 
the Nuremberg IMT, and was cited in its founding instrument. 27 
The real basis of the Nuremberg IMT is the London Agreement and Charter. 28 This 
agreement was negotiated by the US, UK, the USSR and France between June and 
August 1945.29 This was a treaty, and thus it could be thought that this was determinative 
of the international basis. Things are not quite so simple. It could be thought that it was 
merely an agreement by the joint occupants to set up a joint tribunal under the authority 
of the Control Council, i. e. the body exercising sovereign authority over Germany. This 
would make the court akin to a national court, as it would be under the legal system of 
one sovereign authority (the Control Council), albeit one consisting of representatives of 
more than one State. 
The first port of call to determine the status of the Nuremberg IMT must be the 
treaty and the annexed Charter. The Charter itself is slightly ambiguous on the nature of 
the Nuremberg IMT. Schwelb notes, "it contains such features as to make the court a 
24 Declaration of Moscow 1.11.1943,9 (US) Dept of State Bull 310 (No. 228,6.11.1943). See UNWCC, illd 
pp. 107-8. 
25 As the law stood at the time (and now), for a treaty to be created the parties to it have to intend for it to be 
binding. See A. D. McNair, The Lawof Treaties (Oxford: OUP, 1938) p. 48. There is no conclusive evidence that 
the Allies saw the Moscow declaration in this way. On the Moscow declaration see L. Gross "The 
Prosecution of War Criminals: the Nuremberg Trial" in L. Gross, Sell Essays on International Law and 
Organization (N. Y: Transnational, 1984) 136 pp. 136-140. 
26 See, e. g. Tusa & Tusa, supra n. 23, p. 24,50-5 1; Taylor, supra n. 23, Smith, supra n23, pp. 23-24. For Russian 
statements see G. Ginsburgs, "The Nuremberg trial: Background" in G. Ginsburgs & V. Kudriavatsev (eds), 
71. Nunenbe g Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) 9 at p. 28. 
27 1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
Power and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279. Preamble. 
28 Ibid. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annex. [hereinafter "Nuremberg IMT Charter" or 
"London Charter"] Article 1, "In pursuance of the agreement signed on the 8th day of August... there shall be 
established an International Military Tribunal". 
29 On the London Conference, see Taylor, supra n. 23, Ch. 4 and Smith, supra n. 23, Ch. 3. 
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judicial organ of the international community, and such as to make it appear a tribunal of 
considerably less standing, hierarchically subject to the Control Council for Germany and 
therefore being, in substance, an occupation court for Germany". 30 In favour of its 
international status, the fact of its designation in the Charter as an "international" tribunal 
may be called in aid. 31 Secondly, Schwelb notes the Preamble of the London agreement, 
in which the four powers stated that they were acting "in the interests of all the United 
Nations". 32 Care must be taken here though, as the Charter states that it was "in the 
interests of', notably not "with the authority of' those States. Still, Article 5 of the 
Charter partially rectifies this problem, as it gave other "governments of the United 
Nations" the right to "adhere" to the instrument. Nineteen other States did this, thus 
adding their authority to it, and giving it a basis of State consent wider than the 
membership of the Control Council. Other provisions that could be mentioned are 
Articles 2 and 14. These gave the four powers, not the Control Council, the right to 
appoint their judges and prosecutors. 33 
Against these provisions can be placed certain other aspects of the Charter. The most 
important of these could be Article 1, which provides that the Tribunal was to be created 
"after consultation with the Control Council". In reality this is ambiguous. It could easily 
refer to the Control Council in its capacity as local authority over Germany, in a similar 
way that the Netherlands is the local authority for the ICJ. 34 Schwelb opines that this 
cannot explain Article 22 of the Charter, which gave the Control Council the unilateral 
right to the location in the permanent seat of the Tribunal (Berlin) that the Tribunal was 
to meet 35 This seems a very narrow basis upon which to imply subjugation to the 
Control Council. The Tribunal only formally sat in Berlin, and given the situation in 
Germany at the time, it was not entirely unreasonable that the Control Council was 
30 E. Schwelb, "Crimes Against Humanity" (1946) 23 B. YB. I. L. 178 at p. 208. 
31 Ibid., referring to Article 1. 
32 Ibid, referring to the Preamble. 
33 The US had originally intended the Control Council to appoint the judges, R. H. Jackson, Report of Robert H 
Jackson, US Repwse tatxe to thie International Conference on Military Trials, to doe Pn3idar of the USA (Washington 
D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1945), pp26,56. See also Gross, supra n. 25, p. 142. 
34 Supra n. 30. 
35 
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empowered to determine its local seat. This power is a far cry from creating the 
Nuremberg IMT under the legal authority of the Control Council. 
Schwelb also mentions Article 28 of the Charter. 36 This provides that if the Court 
confiscated goods it could order their delivery to the Council. This is a power for the 
court, not the Control Council, so the argument that this involves subordination is 
unconvincing. Similarly unconvincing is his argument on Article 30,37 which made the 
Control Council pay the Tribunal's costs. This does not relate to its international status. 
States have to pay for the UN, but that does not render the UN a national institution. 
More convincing, is the proposition that Article 29 reduces its status. Article 29 
demanded that the sentences the Tribunal imposed were to be served subject to the rules 
decided by the Control Council which also had the power to reduce or alter the 
sentences, save that they could not increase their severity. 38 On the other hand, third 
parties frequently carry out the enforcement of courts' judgments. Non-compliance with 
a judgment of the ICJ, for example, is to be reported to the Security Council, who can 
recommend action or take measures to enforce it 39 This is not generally considered to 
subordinate the ICJ to the Security Council. 
Still it could be thought that the Charter is ambiguous, so it is worthwhile checking 
the trawux prtýxaratoires. 40 Prior to the drafting of the London Charter there were 
memoranda from the US and UK referring to the Nuremberg IMT as an "inter-Allied" 
body, which is not entirely helpful. 41 By the London conference, though, the negotiators 
were seemingly decided on its international nature. A US proposal for the Control 
36 Ibyd 
371bid 
38 Article 29 Charter, which is mitigated by Article 26, which states that the judgment itself is "final and not 
subject to review". This makes it clear that it is enforcement alone that is of interest to the Control Council. 
39 Article 94(2) UN Charter. 
40 This was acceptable at the time, McNair, supra n. 25, pp. 262-270. It remains so, see 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 32. 
41 See UK Memo 28th May 1945, US Memo 6thJune 1945, although a US draft of April 1945 was already 
differentiating the "International" tribunal from occupation courts. See Gross supra n. 25, p. 140. 
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Council to set up the tribunal was rejected, the UK representative stated that it "would be 
a mistake to place it under the Control Council". 42 
In the Trial itself, Francois de Menthon, the French Chief prosecutor, discussed the 
basis of the Tribunal. He argued that as the offences had no geographical location, any 
single State could not have tried the offences, but "only an international Tribunal, 
emanating from the combined United Nations" could do so, these states having 
transferred "their juridical power to an international court". 43 
This argument was not repeated in the Nuremberg IMT Judgment. The Nuremberg 
IN4T Judgment claimed: "[t]he making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign 
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally 
surrendered... The signatory powers created this tribunal... In doing so, they have done 
together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that 
any nation has the right to set up special courts to administer law". 44 
It could be thought, particularly if emphasis is put on the first part of the Nuremberg 
IlVff's judgment, which implies that the Allies set up the Nuremberg IMT as legislators 
for Germany, that the Nuremberg IMT was thus a mere occupation court45 There are 
problems with this view. It is not entirely clear that the Allies had sovereignty over 
Germany. On 5 July 1945 the Allies issued the "Declaration concerning the defeat of 
Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany. "46 The 
precise legal effect of this declaration is contested. Some, for example Kelsen, consider 
42 Jackson, supra n. 33, p. 97. See generally, Gross, ibid pp. 140-142. 
43 4 The Trial of the Major Germ ,= War Cr als Ptxr ngs of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nwvnbeig 
(London: HMSO, 1946) p. 340. His argument seems to be that they pooled their jurisdiction over war crimes 
this way. 
as Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, ibid Reprintal in (1947) 41 A. J. I. L. 172 at p. 216. 
45 See O. Kranzbühler, "Nuremberg as a Legal Problem" in W. Benton & G. Grimm, (eds. ) Nuranhig 
C*w7um Views of the War Trials 1955 (Southern Methodist UP: Dallas) 107 at p. 107. Schwarzenberger also 
takes the view that the basis of the Tribunal was the Allied co-imperium over Germany, supra n. 22, p. 467, 
469. 
46 Declaration of Berlin, Cmd. 6648. As R. Y. Jennings points out, "Government in Commission" (1946) 23 
B. Y. B. I. L. 112, p. 121, it studiously avoids the term "sovereign". 
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that the Allies had assumed a supreme authority. 47 Others claim that the Allies had no 
international legal right to go beyond the rights of a belligerent occupier. 48 It is 
unnecessary to end the controversy here (although the supporters of the former view are 
far more numerous in the English speaking world) for two reasons. In the London 
Agreement, the Allies did not base themselves on their authority over Germany, if this 
was their basis, it might be thought it would be mentioned. In addition, the argument that 
the Nuremberg RVIT was based on Allied sovereignty over Germany fails to take into 
account Article 6 of the Charter, which gave the tribunal the right to try offenders from 
any of the "European Axis" countries. If they based themselves purely on their power 
over Germany, then they could have only asserted themselves over Germans. 49 
This provision perhaps points towards the strongest base for the Tribunal, and one 
alluded to by de Menthon. This is that the Tribunal was based on a pooling of the 
jurisdiction of the four powers (and the adherents) over the offences over which it 
exercised jurisdiction. 50 The main problem with this argument lies in whether the Allies 
had the right to exercise (thus confer on the Tribunal) universal (or co-belligerent) 
jurisdiction over the offences in the Charter. 51 In relation to war crimes, this right was 
beyond doubt. For the other two offences, the position is dubious, as they were not 
generally recognised as being subject to universal jurisdiction at the time. 52 The Tribunal, 
however, was of the opinion that they were offences against international law which 
entitled the Allies to assert jurisdiction over them. 53 This, in addition to the assertion in 
47H. Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin" (1945) 39 A. J. I. L. 518; 
Q. Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial" (1947) 41 A. J. I. L. 38, p. 51; Schwarzenberger, supra n. 22, 
p. 334; Jennings ibicL, pp. 133-140; F. Mann, "The Present Legal Status of Germany" (1947) 33 Trmzsactiom of 
the Gmtius Society 119. N. Ando, Surmider, Om#wtion and Priwte Pmp. ny in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 
1991) pp. 74-6 claims that the Allies were entitled to subjugate Germany, thus had sovereignty. 
48 R. K. Woetzel, The Nuranleg Trials in International Law (London: Stevens, 1962) pp. 78-81, he bases their 
rights on the dubious claim that the world community has mandated the Allies as "caretakers" of Germany 
jW, pp. 87-8. H. Kraus, "The Nuremberg Trial of the Major German War Criminals: Reflections After 
Seventeen Years" (1963) 14 De Paul L. R. 233 at pp. 242-3 and Gross, supra n. 25, p. 162 both note that in their 
opinion, there was no unconditional surrender, as only the armed forces surrendered. 
49 W. B Simons, "The Jurisdictional Bases of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg" in Ginsburgs 
& Kudrivatsev, supra n. 26,39 at pp. 51-2. 
so Simons, ibid, p. 45. 
51 These were war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 
6. 
52 See pp. 217-220,224-227. 
53 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 44, p. 186. 
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the Nuremberg IMT Judgment that the Allies had jointly done what they could have done 
individually could represent the strongest basis for the tribunal. 54 The Nuremberg IMT's 
position differed from de Menthon's though, as the judges were of the opinion that any 
State could have tried the offences itself. 
There has been another basis suggested, and some consider it to be "perhaps the 
single theory of jurisdiction that best fits the known facts, certainly as they are viewed in 
retrospect". 55 This theory is that the "authority to create the Charter and the 
Tribunal... was granted... [to the Allies]... by a majority of the world community", 56 thus 
creating a tribunal which exercised the jurisdiction of all of them to punish the 
defendants. This would consider the Allies creating the Tribunal, not as themselves, but 
as the representatives of the wor1d. 57 
Simons implies this from certain statements of Soviet writers claiming that the 
Charter was binding on all states of the world. 58 These writings could also be read as 
relating to the customary content of the crimes contained in the Charter rather than an 
assertion that all States were bound by the provisions of the Charter. The writings also 
relate to a period after the judgment had been passed, and other actions relating to the 
Charter and judgment had been taken. 59 
Simons also bases his assertion on paragraph 5 of the Moscow declaration. There is 
nothing in the Moscow declaration to support his thesis. 60 He fu ther claims that the 
repetition of "acting in the interests of" in the London Agreement, in conjunction with 
the invitation to United Nations states to adhere to the agreement, shows that the World 
54 The Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia thought this was the basis of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
Interim report of the Independent Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780, UN Doc. S/25274, para 73. This also seems to be the basis accepted by 
Lord Millett in Rv Mebvpolitan StienAvy Magistrats ex garte Pinodo Ugarte [No. 31, [199913 W. L. R. 827, p. 908. 
He is incorrect, however, to infer from the joint nature that it was merely a national court, as he ignores that 
they agreed to cede their jurisdiction to the Nuremberg IMT (not the Control Council) by treaty. 
55 Simons, supra n. 49, p. 52. 
56 G. Ginsburgs, The Sctht Union, the Nuranlxig Trial and International Law (unpublished study) p. 283, cited in 
Simons, ibid p. 53. 
57 See Simons, ibid p. 52. 
58 Ibid 
59 Most importantly General Assembly Resolution 95(1), UN Doc. A/64/Add. 1. 
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mandated the Allies. 61 On the contrary, as mentioned above, the agreement did not say 
the four powers acted with these States' authority. If the four had authority from the 
others, Article 5 would be otiose. Woetzel offers a slightly different justification for the 
implication of a mandate from the world community. 62 Although he counsels caution, 
claiming strong evidence must be found before authority from the world can be 
implied, 63 he claims that the Nuremberg IMT was authorised by the world community as 
the "quasi-totality of civilised states" were represented on the UNWCC. Two points must 
be made about this. The LJNWCC had sixteen members, with many large States 
(including the USSR) not participating. Secondly, the UNWOC was not involved in the 
creation of the Nuremberg IMT. 64 
In reality, as Reid points out "the sponsors were not the world community, but a 
fragile coalition whose interests only temporarily coincided". 65 Woetzel's claim of support 
by the "quasi-totality of civilised States" is over-enthusiastic, but this does not remove the 
treaty basis between the four members and nineteen adherents, who agreed to pool 
jurisdiction in an international tribunal. Thus its basis was international in this way. 
TOKYO IMT 
Whereas the Allies spoke of punishment for the atrocities committed in the 
European sphere from fairly early on in the Second World War, those fighting in the 
Pacific sphere did not expressly mention individual liability until late in the war. 66 In 1942 
60 The relevant parts of which are cited above, supra n. 32 and accompanying text, where it is noted that acting 
"in the interests of" is not the same as "with the authority of". 
61 United Nations States does not refer to State members of the international organisation the United 
Nations, but those fighting on the Allied side in WWII. 
62 Supra n. 49, p. 52. 
63 JJj 
64 For a discussion of the UNWCC's non-involvement, see M. C Bassiouni, "From Versailles to Rwanda in 
Seventy-Five Years: the Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court" (1997) 10 Hanwd 
H. R. J. 11 p. 22; also Taylor, supra n. 23, p. 28. 
65 K. Reid, War Cranes Trials and Cultural Mythology (unpublished honours thesis, University of Melbourne, 
1992)(on file with author) p. 58. See also Prose=or v Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, 1 May 1997, IT-94-1-T, 
pars 1, noting that the Nuremberg IMT was "multinational in nature, representing only part of the world 
community". 
66 Protests relating to violations of the laws of war were issued though. R. J. Pritchard & S. M. Zaide, (eds. ), 
The Tokyo War Crvnes Trial (New York: Garland, 1981) Vol 20. Juc kt, pp. 48,648,48,669,48,683. 
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China was the only party who claimed the St James' Palace Declaration referred to above 
applied to the Pacific sphere. 67 Later that year there were some statements relating to 
prosecution of international crimes from the US, 68 but the first important multilateral 
declaration came in 1943. This was the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, in which 
the UK, US and China promised to "restrain and punish the aggression of Japan" and to 
eject Japan from the territories it had conquered. 69 Although some later US declarations 
were contradictory on whether or not individual liability would be imposed, 7° in May 
1944 the UNWCC set up a Far East division. 71 By far the most important of the 
declarations of the war, however, was the Potsdam Declaration of 25 July 1945.72 In this, 
the US, UK and China set out their terms of surrender for Japan73 The most important 
part of this declaration was Principle 10 which read "we do not intend the Japanese to be 
enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war 
criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners". This does not 
clearly mandate an international judicial process, but given the timing, and its reference to 
"stern justice", some form of trial seemed likely. 74 On 11 August, the UK, US, China and 
the USSR clarified what General MacArthur's powers, as Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (SCAP) would be, by defining them to include the power to "take such 
steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms". 75 
67 S. Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial" (November 1950) International C, o ciliation 465, p. 478. J. Keenan and B. F. 
Brown, Cri'n Against International Law (Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950) p. 25 suggest this was 
because the USSR was not at war with Japan at the time. 
68 See Roosevelt's comments, and Vice President Wallace's address "America's part in World 
Reconstruction", both quoted (without citation) in J. Piccigallo, 7lx Japanese on Trial (Austin, Texas: Texas 
U. P., 1979) p-4- 
69 E. Kopelman, "Ideology and International Law: the Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial" (1991) 23 N. YJ. LL & Politics 373 at p. 386 notes that this is not phrased in terms of individual liability. 
7o Houtz, supra n. 67, p. 477. 
71 See Bathurst, supra n. 23, p. 570. In view of the criticisms of the UNWOC (see above, supra n. 23) this could 
be seen as a case of too little, too late. 
72 13 US Dept. of State Bulletin (29 July 1945), p. 137. Annex A-1 Vol. 7 p. 1. By this time the Allies in Europe 
had already agreed (in principle) to an international tribunal for the major war criminals in Europe. 
73 The USSR adhered to the declaration later, upon its entry into the Pacific war (9 August 1945). 
74 That earlier statements were equivocal was shown by the fact of many people being surprised by this part 
of the declaration, See B. V. A. Röling & A. Cassese, 77 Tokyo Trial and Beyond- R bons of a Peaa" nger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) p. 2. 
75 13 US State Dept. Bulletin (12 August 1945) p. 206. 
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On 14 August 1945, the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam declaration, 
and the instrument of surrender was signed on 2 September 1945.76 After the surrender 
General MacArthur made various statements to the effect that those charged with 
atrocities or war crimes were to be handed over to the Allies or punished. On 21 
September there was a directive from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved by all of 
the nations taking part in the occupation of Japan The directive ordered the investigation 
and arrest of all persons suspected of war crimes. General MacArthur was mandated to 
set up international courts for their trial. At this point, although the directives were 
"known and approved" by the other nations, they constituted unilateral action by the 
US 
. 
77 
In October, the Allies set up the Far Eastern Advisory Commission to recommend 
policies for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender. 78 The USSR refused to join, 
due to the Commission's non-mandatory powers, 79 so in December, the US, UK and 
Soviet Union agreed to create the "Far Eastern Commission" (FEC) by declaration on 27 
December. 80 This set up a body of eleven States, with the four major Allies having a veto 
power. It issued directives for the occupation to the Allied Council for Japan. The 
declaration also officially delegated the power to General MacArthur to implement their 
directives and the terms of surrender. 81 The nature of this was that the Allies granted the 
power to General MacArthur to act on behalf of all of them, (and for Japan, in 
accordance with its consent), to implement the surrender terms and any further directives 
they gave him. The instrument of surrender amounted to a treaty between the Japanese 
authorities and the Allies. The Allies then delegated the powers that they had in 
international law to punish war crimes and those conceded to it by Japan, to General 
MacArthur, subject to their right to issue directives to him 
76 13 US Dept. of State Bulletin (9 September 1945) p. 364 Annex A-2, pp. 7-1 1. It was signed by Japan and 
General MacArthur, on behalf of the US, UK USSR, China and the other United Nations at war with Japan. 
n See, UNWCC supra n. 23, p. 383; S. Horwitz, supra n. 67, p. 480. 
78 As s of the Far Eastern Qnvnrssian Report by the Seretary Gazeral US Dept. of State Publication 2888, 
(1947) 24 Far Eastern Series. 
79 Horwitz, supra n. 67, p. 481. 
80 13 US Dept. of State Bulletin no 340 (1945) pp. 1027-1032. China concurred in the communique. 
81 IUL Article VII B. 5. 
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It was by virtue of the powers granted to him under the Moscow agreement (thus on 
behalf of the FEC)82 that, on 19 January, General MacArthur, as SCAP, ordered the 
creation of the Tokyo IMT "in order to implement the term of surrender which required 
the meting out of stern justice to war criminals". 83 There are three possible bases for his 
authority under the Moscow agreement. Either the Allies transferred their powers under 
the instrument of surrender to him, they transferred rights they already had to enforce 
international criminal law, or they transferred their powers under Article 43 of the Hague 
Rules to hi 
. 
84 It is interesting to note that at no point did General MacArthur or the 
Allies rely on occupation law. Reliance on occupation law for the authority to set up the 
Tokyo IMT would not necessarily mean that the tribunal was non-international as, in 
contrast to the position in Germany, the Allies did not claim to be the sovereigns of 
Japan. If occupation law was used as the basis of the Tokyo IMT, it would not bring it 
under the acts of one sovereign as the Allies (and Japan) agreed that they were entitled to 
prosecute international crimes and delegated the authority to General MacArthur. 85 
The Charter of the Tokyo IMT is not particularly helpful here. It is possible to argue 
that as Article 5 gave the Tokyo IMT to right to prosecute the "Far Eastern War 
Criminals" it was an exercise of universal jurisdiction by the Allies. Of course this 
argument is weakened by the fact that there were no other States fighting alongside Japan 
in the Far East. In contradistinction to the provision at Nuremberg, the individual States 
did not appoint the members, they submitted one candidate each, to General MacArthur, 
who formally appointed them86 What is clear though (albeit not from the Charter itself), 
82 It is clear that MacArthur was exercising powers delegated to him (and not to the USA), and he was acting 
as an agent of the Allied nations. See Hi7vta v MacArthur 335 US 876; 93 L. Ed. 1903 at p. 1904. 
83 Special proclamation,: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 
1946, T. I. A. S. No 1589 at p. 3. The proclamation cited the Potsdam declaration, the instrument of surrender, 
and the Moscow agreement. See Schwarzenberger supra n. 22, p. 467. 
84 Rules Annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
UKTS 9 (1910), Cd 5030, Article 43. 
85 For a differentiation of the situations of Germany and Japan at the end of the war and a convincing 
rebuttal of the argument that the Allies had unlimited powers in Japan see Ando, supra n. 47, pp. 65-102. 
86 Tokyo IMT Charter, Article 2. 
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is that the primary author of the Charter, Joseph Keenan, considered the basis to be the 
joint exercise of universal jurisdiction. 87 
As the Tokyo IMT's decision refers to the basis of General MacArthur's authority to 
set it up, it is worthwhile examining both the majority and individual opinions. The 
majority opinion is helpful in narrowing the options to those addressed above, but not so 
helpful in distinguishing which of the bases MacArthur was actually relying on: 
"The tribunal was established in virtue of and to implement the Cairo declaration of 
the Ist of December 1943, the Declaration of Potsdam of the 25th of July 1945, the 
instrument of surrender of the 2nd of December 1945, and the Moscow conference of the 
26th of December 1945". 88 
A little later in the judgment, certain things may be implied from the majority's 
rejection of the view that "the Allied powers or any victor nations have the right under 
international law in providing for the trial and punishment of war criminals to enact or 
promulgate laws or vest in their tribunals powers in conflict with recognised international 
law or rules or principles thereof. "89 They continued: "[i]n the exercise of their right to 
create tribunals for such a purpose and in conferring powers upon such tribunals 
belligerent powers may only act within the limits of international law". 90 
Here we can see that their focus was on the rights of belligerent powers both in terms 
of the Allies, but also in abstracto, they did not mention Japan's consent in the surrender 
terms. On the other hand, when dealing with the argument that the Japanese government 
did not consent to jurisdiction of the Tokyo IMT over crimes against peace the Tokyo 
IMT gave two reasons why this was not the case. Firstly, the majority noted that (in its 
opinion) aggression was an international crime before the Potsdam declaration. Thus, in 
consenting to it Japan could be taken to have consented to jurisdiction over these 
87 See Keenan & Brown supra n. 67, p. 18. 
88 The Tokyo IMT Judgment, supra n. 66, p. 48,415. 
89 Ail p. 48,836. 
90 jba 
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crimes. 91 The second reason the majority in the Tokyo IMT gave was that Japan, in the 
circumstances, clearly did know that prosecution for crimes against peace would be 
undertaken 92 Both of these arguments presume that the basis for jurisdiction was consent 
of Japan to the punishment of international crimes, not the power of the Allies to assert 
such jurisdiction prgprio motu. 
President Webb seemed to think that he differed to the majority on the basis of the 
Tribunal. Although he thought the basis was Potsdam and the instrument of surrender, 
he considered the majority to have relied on the exercise of the pre-existing right of 
belligerent States to prosecute war crimes. 93 For the actual authority to set up the 
Tribunal in Japan, Webb referred to occupation law 
. 
94 
In his dissenting opinion, judge Bernard disagreed with the majority about the basis 
for the Tokyo IMT. 95 He thought the basis was the right of States to enforce international 
criminal law. He wrote "he who possessed of actual power and moral authority sufficient 
to assume that duty [enforcing international law] can set up the necessary tribunals for the 
trial of persons suspected of acts supposed to be in criminal infringement of natural and 
international law. "96 He considered the Allies to have devolved this power onto General 
MacArthur who set up the Tribunal "in their name. "97 
Judge Jaranilla relied on both theories of General MacArthur's powers. He began by 
basing himself of the agreement of Japan to the prosecution of war criminals in the 
instrument of surrender, 98 but then went on to note that even without such agreement, 
belligerent nations had the power to prosecute war crimes. He later claimed that the 
Tokyo IMT was "created pursuant to an agreement among the Allied powers and to 
Japan's acceptance" but that "what one nation can, in accordance with international law, 
91 Ibid p. 48,440. 
92Ibd p. 48,440-48,441. 
93 Separate Opinion of the President, supra n. 66, Vol 21. Separate Opinions p. 1. He referred to the Charter as 
"international law" (ibid. ). 
94 Ibid pp. 1-2. 
95 Dissenting Opinion of the Member from France, ibid p. 1. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid p. 3. 
34 
do in said cases, a number of nations can, acting under a common agreement likewise 
do.... victorious states have the right to try war criminals pending the signing of a peace 
treaty. "99 He may be taken to have seen the creation of the Tokyo IMT as the joint 
exercise of belligerent rights, given additional authority by the Japanese consent. 
Judge Pal had little to say on this matter (although it is possible that he considered 
the basis of the Tokyo BAT to be belligerent rights to prosecute international crimes, 
given his views on the Tokyo IMT's Charter (see infra p. 53)), but judge Röling's judgment 
was helpful as he summarised what he thought the majority's basis for the Tokyo IMT 
was. He claimed that the basis was "that the victorious nations, in providing for the trial 
and punishment of war criminals, have the right to promulgate a Charter and to create a 
Tribunal. "100 His personal view was that the basis of the Tokyo IMT was the acceptance 
of the Potsdam declaration by the Japanese. 101 
From the above it is difficult to definitively state the basis upon which the Allies were 
granted their powers, whether the consent of Japan or their right to assert belligerent 
jurisdiction over international crimes. 102 In the end, it is ultimately unnecessary to 
determine the basis of the Allied power to try the Japanese war criminals, as it is clear that 
the basis was international law. This was either customary international law allowing 
jurisdiction over international crimes103 or the surrender terms being signed by the 
various States, and the delegation of these powers to General MacArthur. Although he 
was a US citizen, and also acting under orders of the US government, in creating the 
9s Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Jaranilla, Member From the Republic of the Philippines, i&d p. 13. 
99Ibid pp. 13-14. 
ioo Partially Dissenting opinion of the Member from the Netherlands, ibid p. 14. 
101 Ibid. pp. 6-7. 
102 Gross, supra n. 25, p. 161, and Schwarzenberger, supra n. 22, p. 468 consider it the former, Keenan and 
Brown, supra n. 67, p. 18 the latter. 
103 Or, to be more accurate, their view of which international crimes existed at the time, which did not 
necessarily correlate with other views on the matter. 
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Tokyo IMT he was not acting under powers granted to him under the constitutional law 
of any one State. 104 
The last ground that had been asserted was that "international society" (such that 
there was) had mandated the Allies to set up the Tokyo IM-f, and this was evidenced by 
the surrender terms. 105 This argument cannot stand, there is nothing in the surrender 
terms to warrant such a conclusion, and the Allies had not been mandated by any nations 
other than themselves to act on the surrender. As Woetzel states, 106 a mandate from 
"international society" cannot easily be implied, and states cannot merely presume it. A 
resolution of an international organisation such as the UN may suffice. However, there 
was no such resolution before or after the Tokyo IMT, so this cannot be used to justify 
the Tokyo IMT. Some say that due to the proportion of mankind notionally represented 
at the Tokyo DAT (over half the world's population), a mandate from international 
society can be implied. 107 This form of crude head counting is not a clear basis from 
which to work, not least as the representation at Tokyo was that of the victors in a war, 
and no other nations. This does not remove the fact that the basis of the Tribunal was 
agreement between various States to act jointly, thus rendering the basis formally 
international. 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
(ICTY) 
Despite numerous wars and atrocities occurring in the forty five years following the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IlVITs, there were no international criminal tribunals created. It 
104 See Hiivta v MacArthur supra n. 82, p. 1904. Occupation documents of the US authorities tend to show that 
the court was considered an international one, not a US court. See Keenan & Brown supra n. 67 p. 9, citing: 
motion of japan, Policy and Progress US Dept of state publication 267 Far Eastern Series, 17 Appendix 32,147 
at p 148; Prosecution exhibit 9 General Orders No 20, GHQ, SCAP, Charter of the IMTFE, Tokyo transcript 
May 6 1946,106 Document 6503. 
105 Keenan & Brown Ad, pp. 2,40. 
106 Supra n. 48, p52. 
107 See Piccigallo supra n. 68, p. 212. 
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took the atrocities of the Yugoslav wars of dissolution108 to elicit an international penal 
response. The history behind the creation of the ICTY reveals certain similarities and 
differences to that preceding the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs. One similarity to the two 
IMTs created in the aftermath of WVXTII, was that the history of the ICTY begins with 
public denunciations of the atrocities. 109 The first relevant resolution was Security Council 
Resolution 764,110 which demanded compliance with humanitarian law in former 
Yugoslavia. When this had no practical effect, the Security Council passed Resolution 
771.111 This demanded, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that the parties to the 
conflict cease their breaches of humanitarian law, and gave a list of such violations. It also 
contained a request to States to submit any "substantiated information" on these 
violations which was in their possession to the Security Council-112 
The next step mirrored the events in WWII. In the face of the continued violations 
of humanitarian law in former Yugoslavia, the Security Council promulgated Resolution 
780.113 This created a Commission of Experts to investigate and gather evidence of the 
violations of humanitarian law in former Yugoslavia. 114 Like the UNWCC, the 
Commission was hamstrung by State ambivalence and lack of finance. 115 A difference 
between the reaction to the atrocities in Yugoslavia and the analogous steps in WWII, 
108 On which see generally, L. Silber & A. Little, The Death of Yugosl a-lamondsworth: Penguin & BBC 
Books, 1996); J. Gow, The Tri: anph of the Lack of Wilk Intemational Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: 
Columbia U. P. 1997). For an early discussion of the application of international law to the conflict, see J. J. 
Paust, "Applicability of International Criminal Law to Events in Former Yugoslavia" (1994) 9 A. U. J. LL. & 
Policy 499. 
109 On the following resolutions and the events leading up to the creation of the ICTY see J. O'Brien "The 
International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia" (1993) 77 
A. J. I. L. 639, pp. 639-642; Morris & Scharf, supra n. 11, Ch. 2; M. C Bassiouni & P. Manlkas, the Law of the 
International Crnmvurl Tribunal for Yugoslavia (N. Y: Transnational 
, 
1996) Ch. 2; M. P. Scharf, Balkan Justice The 
Story Bdthid the First International Trial Since NunrAig (Durham: North Carolina U. P., 1997) Ch. 4; On the 
response of other organisations or UN bodies see P. Akhavan, "Prosecuting War Crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia: A Critical Juncture for the New World Order" (1993) 15 H. R. Q. 262. 
110 UN Doc. S/RES/764. 
111 UN Doc. S/RES/771. 
112 As Morris & Scharf note, supra n. 11, p. 23 the lack of definition of "substantiated information" led to 
conflicting State interpretations of the type of information requested. 
113 UN Doc. S/RES/780. 
114 On the Commission see Bassiouni, supra n. 64, pp. 39-42; M. C Bassiouni "The United Nations Commission 
of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780" (1994) 88 A. J. LL. 784; W. J. Fenrick "In 
the Field With UNCOE: Investigating Atrocities in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia" (1994) 34 R. Dr. Mil 
et Dr de la Guerre 33; Scharf, supra n. 109 Ch. 3. 
115 See Bassiouni, supra n. 64, p. 39 ("there is an uncanny resemblance between the problems facing the 
Commission of Experts and those of the UNWCC") and p. 41. 
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was that the pronouncements were not made by one party to the conflict, but by the 
(near universal) international organisation, the United Nations. 
Between the submission of the Commission of Experts' interim and final reports, the 
Security Council took the decision to take steps to bring into being an international 
criminal tribunal. This decision came in the form of Resolution 808,116 in which the 
Council decided that "an international criminal tribunal shall be established for the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991". To begin the 
process, the resolution asked the Secretary General to prepare a report within sixty days 
on how to establish an international criminal tribunal. When the Secretary General 
reported back, he included a draft statute for the tribunal. This was adopted unanimously 
by the Security Council in Resolution 827, which created theICTY. 117 
It remains to determine the precise legal basis for the ICTY. In the Secretary 
General's report (which serves as a form of trawux prepzratoi s for the ICTY Statute) the 
possibility of using a treaty to set up the ICTY was canvassed, as this would be "the 
approach which, in the normal course of events, would be followed in establishing an 
international tribunal". 118 In the circumstances, the Secretary General thought this would 
take too long, and, tellingly, there was "no guarantee that ratifications... [would 
be]... received from those States which should be parties to the treaty". 119 As a result and 
"in the light of the disadvantages of the treaty approach... the Secretary General 
believe[ed] that the International Tribunal should be established by a decision of the 
Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Such 
116 UN Doc. S/RES/808. 
117 UN Doc. S/RES/827. 
118 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808 UN Doc. S/25704 para 19. 
The CSCE had previously suggested a treaty for the creation of the ICTY, and had drafted one. See UN Doc. 
S/25307. 
119 Ibid. para 20. 
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a decision would constitute a measure to maintain or restore international peace and 
security" 120 
This was the approach taken by the Security Council, which established the ICTY by 
Resolution 827. The resolution determined that the continued violations of humanitarian 
law by the parties involved in former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international 
peace and security, and thus was based on an exercise of power under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. There has been criticism of this decision to categorise the atrocities as a 
threat to the peace. Alfred Rubin, for example claims that by its decision, the Security 
Council was acting against international law by trying to make revolution illegal. 121 This is 
incorrect, as the Security Council's decision that there was a threat to the peace was not 
based on the idea that the threat to peace was based on the civil war per se. As mentioned 
above, it was based on the atrocities occurring. It also presumes that the characterisation 
of something as a threat to international peace and security is a determination that a 
violation of the law has occurred. This is not the case. 122 It is generally accepted that the 
Security Council acted legally in this respect, 123 a position in which the author concurs, 
not least as there is practice that supports such an interpretation, and the Security Council 
120 Ibid para 22. A. Roberts "The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts" (1995) 6 Duke J. I. & C. L. 11 at p. 64 commends the Secretary General's realistic approach, which effectively 
circumvents the requirement for State consent. 
121 A. P. Rubin, "Dayton, Bosnia and the Limits of Law" (Winter 1996/7) 47 77e Nationallnterest 41 at p. 41. 
122 See generally N. D. White, Keeping the Peace (Manchester: MUP, 2nd ed. 1997), pp. 42-47. 
123 See Morris & Scharf, supra n. p. 43-44; O'Brien, supra n. 109, p. 640; T. Meron, "War Crimes in Yugoslavia 
and the Development of International Law" (1994) 88 A. J. I. L. 78, p. 79; C. Greenwood, "The International 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia" (1993) 69 I. Aff. 641, p. 646; F. Patel-King, "Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia 
Tribunal's Development of Limits on the Security Council's Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter" 
(1996) Emory I. L. R. 509, pp. 547-557, Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 109, pp. 237-252; C. Tomuschat, 
"International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed" in R. Clark & M. Sann, The 
Pms z of International Cr nes (New Brunswick Transaction, 1995) 17, p. 21; R. Klodokin, "An ad hoc 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former 
Yugoslavia" in Clark & Sann, ibid 165, pp. 175-9; C. Warbrick & P. Rowe "The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction 
in the Tadic Case" (1996) 45 LCL. Q 691; D. Sarooshi, "The Legal Framework Governing United Nations 
Subsidiary Organs" (1996) 67 B. YB. I. L. 413, pp. 428-431; C. Blakesley, "Atrocity and its Prosecution: The Ad 
Hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda" in McCormack & Simpson, supra n. 22,189, pp. 198- 
99; Ratner & Abrams, A arnmtabilily for Human Rights A trt thies in International Lazar. Beyond the NuranA-ig Para4 
(Oxford: OUP, 1997) p. 167, albeit noting some discomfort in developing States. The legality is challenged by 
A. P Rubin, supra n. 121 & "An International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia"(1994) 6 Pace I. L. R. 7 at pp. 7-8 
and (on similar grounds) by T. D. Mak, "The Case Against an International War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia" (1995) 2 International Peacekeeping 536. See also D. Colic, "Introduction" in Clark & Sann, 
ibis, 3, p. 13; T. Sapru, " Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council into 
Rwanda"(1997) 32 Texas I. L. J 329. 
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is granted a wide discretion in the interpretation of the phrase. 124 The legality of the 
determination has been upheld by the ICTY in the Tactic case, 125 and since the Tactic 
determination, the matter can be considered settled. 
The actual provisions within Chapter VII on which the power to set up the ICTY are 
based are not mentioned in Resolution 827. The issue of where in Chapter VII the power 
was based was settled by the Tactic decision. Here the Appeals Chamber expressly rejected 
the idea that it was a forcible measure under Article 42, or a preliminary measure under 
Article 40.126 The Appeals Chamber placed the basis squarely on Article 41 of the 
Charter. 127 The legality of the creation of the Tribunal has caused some controversy, and 
was challenged by the defendant in the Tadic case. The first ground of challenge was that 
the Security Council was not mandated by the framers of the Charter to create such a 
body. 128 It may be true that the framers did not specifically consider the issue of whether 
the Security Council could do such a thing. That is not the point. In a constitutional 
document such as the UN Charter, the intention of the original drafters is less important 
that subsequent interpretation of the powers granted. 129 As Schachter comments "the 
Charter is surely not to be construed like lease of land or an insurance policy, it is a 
constitutional instrument whose broad phrases were designed to meet changing 
circumstances for an undefined future". 130 
124 See Patel-King ibid, White supra n. 122. 
125 Pmsauti rv Tadic, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, IT-94-1-AR72, 
paras 32-36. See Patel-King, ibid G. Aldrich "The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 64; J. Alvarez, "Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 245; 
C. Greenwood "The Development of International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia" (1998) 2 Max Planck Y. B. U. N. L. 97, p. 103; Warbrick & Rowe, supra n. 123; GR 
Watson "The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction in P to v Tadic" 
(1996) 36 V. J. LL. 687. 
126 7adic, supra n. 125 para 33. 
127 Ibid para 34 "Prima facie, the International Tribunal matches perfectly the description in Article 41 of 
`measures not involving the use of force'. " Para 36. "the establishment of the International Tribunal falls 
squarely within the powers of the Security Council under Article 41. " 
128 7adic, jbO. para 32. See also the comments of Brazil at UN SCOR 47thSess. S/PV. 3175 p. 4, and China at 
S/PV. 3217 p. 20-21. 
129 See B. Urquhart, "The United Nations and International Security After the Cold War" in A. Roberts & B. 
Kingsbury, Umtal Nations Divrdel Wo& (Oxford: OUP, 2'd ed. 1993), 81 p. 91; R. Higgins, "The 
Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations" (1965) 59 Pitc 
A. S. LL. 116, p. 119. 
130 O. Schachter, "Review of Kelsen, The Law of the Unit& Nations" (1951) 61 Yale L. J. 189, p. 193. 
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Here the argument revolves around Article 41, which states "the Security Council 
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed... and 
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include... ". An important point to note in this respect is that as it is the Security Council 
which is given the primary role in determining the measures to be taken, its acts are to 
enjoy a (rebuttable) presumption of legality. 131 Even more important is that the list of 
actions "include[s]" the instances given (not including the creation of courts) thus it is not 
a closed list. 132 The real question is not, as Fox thinks, whether States have implicitly 
conferred criminal jurisdiction on the Security Counci1,133 but if they have conferred upon 
the Council the authority to determine what it may do to restore or maintain international 
peace and security. 
It is clear that the Security Council has the power to set up subsidiary bodies. 134 It is 
true that the Security Council does not have judicial powers, 135 but it has previously 
created bodies exercising certain judicial functions, for example sanctions committees and 
the UN Compensation Commission. 136 
The ICJ in the Effect of Au rds Case confirmed the authority of organs of international 
organisations to create judicial organs in the exercise of their functions despite their lack 
of judicial powers. There the ICJ stated "the Charter does not confer judicial functions on 
the General Assembly... [but by creating a judicial body]... the General Assembly was not 
delegating the performance of its own functions: It was exercising a power which it had 
under the Charter to regulate staff relations. "137 The ICTY's reliance on this judgment has 
been criticised, on the basis that this case was referring to an internal UN matter, whereas 
131 See Certain EXpmses of the Unital Nations Case (1962) ICJ Rep. 151, p. 168, Higgins, supra n. 129; N. D. White, 
The Lary of Intematiorral Otganisat'iow (Manchester: MLTP, 1996) pp. 119-125. 
132 Tadic, supra n. 125, para 35. See also I ms torvKan)a absi, Decision on the Defence Motion on jurisdiction, 
18 June 1997, ICIR-96-15-T, para 29. 
133 H. Fox, "The Objections to Transfer of Criminal Jurisdiction to the UN Tribunal" (1997) 46 I. CL. Q 434, 
p. 435. 
134 By virtue of Articles 7(2) and 29 of the UN Charter. See generally, D. Sarooshi, supra n. 123. 
135 Tadic, supra n. 125, para 38. Greenwood, supra n. 125, p. 103 
136 Resolution 687, UN Doc S/RES/687, See White supra n. 122, p. 96, see also K. Harper "Does the United 
Nations Security Council have the Competence to Act as a Court and a Legislature? " (1994) 27 N Y. UJ. I. L. 
& Politics 103. 
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creating the ICTY was an external matter. 138 This is to confuse the general part of the 
judgment, allowing the creation of judicial bodies by non-judicial bodies, with the 
particular power used in that instance (the power to regulate staff relations). In the 
creation of the ICTY, the Security Council used its Chapter VII powers, which are clearly 
not related to internal UN matters, but the (external) maintenance of international peace 
and security. In this respect, therefore it is difficult to disagree with Greenwood that 
"there seems no reason in principle why the Security Council, if it considers that the 
creation of a judicial instrument is necessary for it to effectively perform its functions in 
respect of peace and security, should not create such an instrument. "139 
The only issue that could be raised is the delegation of authority by the Security 
Council to the ICTY. The power of the Security Council to delegate is given by Articles 
7(2) and 29. The Secretary General considered the ICTY to be a subsidiary organ within 
the terms of Article 29. To delegate under Article 29, the Security Council needs to 
delegate one of its functions, here, as mentioned above, the Security Council was not 
delegating one of its own functions, but a judicial one. 140 This does not mean that there 
was an improper delegation however, as Article 7(2) allows the creation of subsidiary 
bodies by the Security Council without the limitation on functions that may be 
delegated. 141 
The legal basis for the Security Council's creation of the ICTY is generally supported 
by States142 (particularly in the General Assembly), 143 and has been entrenched by the 
repetition of the actions for the ICTR144 and the provisions of the Rome Statute allowing 
the Council to send cases to the ICC. 145 Thus the question is now of less practical import. 
137 Certain Expanses case, supra n. 131, p. 61. 
138 Greenwood, supra n. 125, p. 103; Klodokin, supra n. 123, p. 174. 
139 Greenwood, ibid p. 104. 
140 See Sarooshi, supra n. 123, p. 431. 
141 Aid pp. 426-431. 
142 See P. C. Szasz, "Centralized and Decentralized Law Enforcement: The Security Council and the General 
Assembly Acting Under Chapters VII and VIII" in J. Delbrück (ed. ) Allocation of Law Enfonurait Audxrity in 
the In&wut orral Systen (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1995) 17, p. 33. 
143 GA Resolution 48/88, UN Doc. A/RES/48/88, welcomed the creation of the ICTY. 
144 See infra n. 146f. and accompanying text. 
145 See infra, p. 90. 
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What is relevant for this study is that the ICTY was set up by an organ of an international 
organisation under the powers delegated to it by States under a treaty. Its basis is 
international. It is also worth noting that this method is more reminiscent of the method 
of creation of the Tokyo IMT than it is of the Nuremberg "precedent". 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR) 
Soon after the creation of the ICTY, another conflict arose that shocked many 
members of the UN, to which the response from the Security Council showed the impact 
of the creation of the ICTY. In Rwanda genocide was perpetrated in full view of the 
x. 146 Early In the genocide ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed. Within a fortnight this 
led to the reduction of the peacekeeping force from over 1,500 to 270 by virtue of 
Resolution 912.147 The Council began its actions on the atrocities in Rwanda quietly. As in 
Yugoslavia, it began by condemning violations of humanitarian law (not genocide, which 
was conspicuously absent from the statement) in Rwanda, but only in a Presidential 
statement. 148 Stung by criticism, after the Rwandan Patriotic Front had asked for an 
international tribunal, the Security Council mandated the Secretary General to investigate 
the Rwandan situation. 149 The Secretary General's Special Rapporteur for Rwanda broke 
the taboo surrounding describing the activities in Rwanda as genocide, and reported that 
genocide was occurring there. As a result, the Security Council passed Resolution 925,150 
which acknowledged that genocide had occurred151 From this, the Security Council (not 
without some reservations) went on to create a Commission of Experts for Rwanda. 152 
As in Yugoslavia, in between the submission of the interim and final report of the 
146 On the conflict generally see G. Prunier, The Rzumda Crisis (London: Hurst & Co. 1997) A. Destexhe, 
Rwznda and Guide in the 20tý Ga=ry (Cambridge: Pluto Press, 1995); P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform you 
71xrt Tanonm We Will be Killte With Our Fannies (London: Picador, 1998). 
147 UN Doc. S/RES/912. 
148 UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/21. See J. Karhilo, "The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda" (1995) 64 NonlicJ. I. L. 683, pp. 689-90. 
149 Resolution 918, UN Doc. S/RES/918. See Karhilo, ibid, p. 689. 
150 UN Doc. S/RES/925. 
151 See, on this V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The International Crinmal Trib tnal for Rumida (New York: 
Transnational, 1998) pp. 59-64. 
152 Resolution 935, UN Doc. S/RES/935. See Morris & Scharf, ibid, p. 65. 
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Commission, the Security Council, responding to many calls for an international tribunal, 
(including one from the new government of Rwanda)153 promulgated Resolution 955.154 
This created the ICTR, and annexed its Statute. The Statute was drafted not by the 
Secretary General, but New Zealand and the US, with input from the (new) Rwandan 
government. 155 
Although the ICTR was set up as a separate institution, the Security Council decided 
to set it up with institutional links to the ICTY. The most important of these are the 
provision for the same prosecutor to act for both tribunals and the extension of the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY Appeals Chamber to hear appeals from the ICI'R,, which has no 
Appeals Chamber of its own. 156 'gis was done to ensure a coherent legal approach 
between the two tribunals, 157 and for reasons of cost. Bassiouni claims that neither of 
these reasons is convincing, 158 and the Rwandan government was clear that this was one 
of the reasons that it voted against the creation of the ICTR. 159 
This aside, the legal authority did not come from the consent of Rwanda, but Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. 160 In Resolution 955 the Security Council noted the request of 
Rwanda, but if Rwandan consent had been the ICTR's legal basis, this would have been 
negated by its vote against the Resolution. As the Secretary General noted in his first 
report on the Rwanda Tribunal, the ICTR was set up under Chapter VII to ensure the co- 
operation of all parties (including Rwanda) for the duration of the IC R's lifetime, as well 
as (like the ICTY) for speed. 161 This was taken a step further in the Rwandan situation by 
creating the Tribunal without asking the Secretary General to draft the Statute, allowing 
153 the Formal Request was sent to the Security Council on 28 September 1994. Letter Dated 28 September 
1994 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/1115. 
154 UN Doc. S/RES/955. See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 151, pp. 65-73. 
155 R. Lee "The Rwanda Tribunal" (1996) 9 L. J. I. L. 37, p. 39. 
156 Article 15(2) and 12(2) of the ICTR Statute respectively. See P. Akhavan, "The International Tribunal for 
Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 501, p. 503. 
157 C. Aptel, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" (1997) 321 LR. R. C 675, p. 676. 
158 Bassiouni, supra n. 64, p. 47. 
159 S/PV. 3454, p. 11. 
160 L. Johnson, "The International Tribunal for Rwanda" (1996) 67 RI de Dr. Penal 211 at p215; Lee, supra. 
n. 155, p. 41. 
161 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955. UN Doc. 
S/1995/134, para 6. 
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the members of the Security Council to draft it. 162 That said, the legal basis is basically 
the same as that of the ICTY-163 In other words, it was an Article 41 response to a threat 
to the peace determined by the Security Council. Thus most of the same arguments 
which applied to the ICTY apply here. The only difference being the fact that there was 
no attempt to claim that there was an international armed conflict creating a threat to the 
peace. A defendant before the ICIR, who challenged the creation of the IC IR, 
attempted to avoid trial by relying on this argument. In Prosecutor v Km)thzshi, the 
defendant challenged the creation of the tribunal on this ground and additionally on the 
basis that the Security Council could not create a court. The ICTR dealt with his 
contentions in a rather summary fashion, effectively refusing to second-guess the Council 
in any way. 164They claimed that the determination of a threat to the peace was totally 
within the discretion of the Security Council, 165 and that as Article 41 was not exhaustive, 
the Security Council could choose to create the Tribunal. 166 
The legality of the ICTR's creation was perhaps less controversial, given that the 
precedent had already been set in 1993. In the Security Council, both Brazil and China, 
who had queried the Council's power here when the ICTY was created, repeated their 
doubts about the legality of the creation of international courts. 167 Their doubts are of 
reduced weight given that on two occasions both States had refused to vote against the 
resolutions on grounds of legality. 168 One country outside the Security Council queried 
the creation of the ICTR This was Kenya, who adopted a hostile position to the ICTR 
162 This can also be seen as a way of returning the authority to define the law to the member States of the 
Security Council, some of who were unhappy about the law in the ICTY Statute. 
163 Secretary General's Report, supra n. 161, paras 8-9. 
164 j supra n. 132, paras 17-32 See V. Morris, "International Decisions: Prosecutor v Kanayabashi" 
(1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 66. 
165 Imo, para 20, they did note that as a conflict it was clearly a threat, and that sudden migration had been 
accepted as a threat to the peace (ibid para 19). It is clear that civil wars and mass transborder migrations can 
be a threat to the peace, see White supra 11.122, pp. 42-47. In fact, the Security Council, in Resolution 955 
referred to the atrocities as the threat to the peace (see S/PV. 3453 p. 7 (Pakistan)). This is also an accepted 
threat to the peace, White ibid. pp. 44-5; R. Cryer, "The Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to 
Coherence" (1996) 1 J. A. C. L. 161, pp. 181-182. 
166 jbo, 
167 S/PV. 3453 pp. 6-7,7 respectively. See D. Schraga & R. Zacklin, "The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 501, p. 505. 
168 Bra voted for both Resolution 827 and 955, China voted for 827, but abstained on Resolution 955, on 
different grounds (that more consultation to accommodate Rwanda should have been undertaken. (S/PV. 
3453 p. 7)). 
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After discussions with the Security Council, Kenya officially accepted the legality of the 
Tribunal. 169 The power of the Security Council to create such tribunals pursuant to 
Chapter VII appears to have been confirmed by the creation of the ICTR and the 
acceptance of this by States. 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) 
The history of a permanent international criminal court is a long one, beginning at 
least as early as 1872, with the proposal for an international court to punish violations of 
the first Geneva Convention. 170 No action was taken on this. After V DTI, the idea 
regained currency, with proposals for an international tribunal coming from an League of 
Nations Advisory Committee in 1921, as a means of overcoming the problems 
encountered in prosecuting offences from that war. 171 Consideration of the idea then fell 
into the unofficial arena, with the International Law Association drafting a statute in 
1926.172 Other bodies, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Congress 
of Penal Law and Pan-American Conference also recommended the creation of a 
court. 173 These all remained little more than debated topics, rather than concrete plans. 
The assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia led to the most advanced proposal. 
The League of Nations drafted, adopted, and opened for signature a statute for an 
international criminal court. The court was to enforce the (separate) convention for the 
prevention of terrorism174 The convention remained unratified. 
169 Letter Dated 11 October 1995 From the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council. UN Doc. S/1995/861. See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 151, 
pp. 656-7. 
170 See C. K. Hall, "The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court" (1998) 322 I. R. RC 57. 
171 McCormack, supra n. 22, pp51-2. These were not taken up. Ibid p. 52. See also Lord Phillimore, "An 
International Criminal Court and the Resolutions of the Committee of Jurists" (1922-3) 3 B. YB. I. L. 79. 
172 Report of the 34L4 Confn (ILA) 1927; see McCormack, ibid p. 53, for criticism, see J. Brierly, "Do We Need 
an International Criminal Court" (1927) 8 B. YB. LL. 81. 
173 UN1CC, supra n. 23, pp. 439-440. 
174 1937 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, (1938) League of Nations Official 
Journal Special Supp. 156. Signed by thirteen States, never in force. See McCormack, supra n. 22, p. 54. The 
separation of the conventions was indicative of the controversy, many in the proposing body were dubious 
about the possibility of the court. 
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After WWII and the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, the idea of an international 
criminal court was put on the agenda of the United Nations by General Assembly 
Resolution 177.175 In 1950 two Special Rapporteurs gave conflicting reports on the 
current desirability of an international criminal court. 176 After this, the question was 
passed to a committee of seventeen State representatives in the General Assembly, who 
produced two draft statutes in 1951 and 1953.17 Due to the Cold-War, these proposals 
were stillborn, and in 1954 the question was shelved pending the definition of 
aggression. 178 Nothing of note occurred in official fora until 1989 when, in response to 
the request of a coalition of sixteen Caribbean and Latin American States (led by Trinidad 
and Tobago), the General Assembly asked the ILC to look at the possibility of an 
international criminal court to enforce the (then unwritten) draft code of offences against 
the peace and security of mankind. 179 
Some progress had been made by 1992,180 when the General Assembly asked the ILC 
to begin work on a draft statute, 181 but many States remained sceptical, and some were 
actively opposed. 182 The procedures in the [LC were "going around in circles and getting 
nowhere". 183 By 1993, and partially as a result of the creation of the ICTY, States 
175 UN Doc. A/1316. On this period see Bassiouni, supra n. 64, pp. 49-54, McCormack, ifäd pp. 59-62; L. 
Sadat-Wexler, "The Proposed International Criminal Court: An Appraisal" (1996) 29 Ca'ndl I. L. J. 665, 
pp. 676-679. 
176 Report of the International Law Commission on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction UN 
GAOR 5th Sess. UN Docs. A/CN. 4/ 15 & 20. See B. Broms, "The Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court" in Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory (eds. ), War Criw in International Lazy (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1996) 183 pp. 183-184. 
177 Report of the Qnrn t&e on Intematzond Crnnnurl Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/2136 and Reform of the 1953 Gawdmx 
on International Cranmal Jurisdiczia 4 UN Doc. A/2638. 
178 GA Resolution 898, UN Doc. A/2890. See Bassiouni, supra n p. 53; Sadat-Wexler, supra n. 175 p. 679-683. 
179 GA Resolution 44/39, UN Doc. A/RES/44/39. Before this, Professor Bassiouni had been asked, by the 
UN Mission for Human Rights to prepare a draft statute for a court to implement the Apartheid convention 
(UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1416) (1980) Nothing was done about his proposal. See M. C. Bassiouni & C. Blakesely, 
"The Time has Come for an International Criminal Court" (1992) 25 Vanderbilt J. T. L. 151, p. 157. In 1987 the 
USSR had raised the issue of a court in relation to terrorism, again, nothing was done. Bassiouni & Blakesley, 
ibid p. 156. J. Dugard, "Obstacles in the way of and International Criminal Court" (1997) 56 Cvnbri* L. J. 
329, p. 330 notes a political upturn towards the idea in the 1980s. 
180 See B. Ferencz, "An International Criminal Code and Court: Where they Stand and Where They're Going" 
(1992) 30 CJ. T. L. 375. 
181 GA Resolution 47/33, UN Doc. A/RES/47/33. 
182 Supra n. 180, pp. 387-390; M. P. Scharf, "The jury is Still Out on an International Criminal Court" (1991) 1 
Duke J. C & LL. 135; M. P. Scharf, "Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court" (1994) 6 Pace 
1. L. R. 103, p. 103-4. 
183 Ferencz, ibid. p. 390. This was partially as a result of the US deliberately raising problems, but not answers, 
in an effort to stall matters, Scharf (Serious) ibid p. 105. 
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(particularly the US) began to become more flexible. 184 In 1993 this led the ILC to come 
up with a draft statute which borrowed heavily from that of the ICTY. 185 The General 
Assembly expressed its appreciation and asked the ILC to complete its work on the 
statute by 1994.186 The ILC did this, adopting a draft statute in 1994.187 The General 
Assembly set up an ad hoc committee of States to look at the matter, 188 then in 1995 set up 
the Preparatory Commission for an International Criminal Court (PREPCOIVI). This was 
mandated to look at the ILC Draft and to try to come up with a consolidated text of 
proposals for an international conference to create a treaty for an international criminal 
court. 189 This was done in time for the Rome Conference on an International Criminal 
Court, which met in June July 1998, and which adopted the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 190 The Statute will come into force shortly after the 60th 
ratification has been received. 191 
184 Scharf, ibicL pp. 106-7. 
iss Report of the ILC on the Work of its Forty-Fzfth Session, Report of the Working Coup on a Draft Statute for an 
Intenutic al Cri'ninal Court, UN Doc. A/48/CN. 4/Ser. A/1993/Add. 1 pp. 100-132. See J. Crawford, "The 
ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal" (1994) 88 A. J. I. L. 140. For criticism see Scharf, 
ilnd pp. 109-118. Interestingly the ILC sent the Statute straight from the working group dealing with the 
matter, to the General Assembly, rather than adopt it themselves first, which is the normal procedure, but 
which would have taken time. Also they went beyond what the Resolution 47/33 had asked them to do, 
which was to merely give a progress report in 1993. 
186 GA Resolution 48/31, UN Doc. A/RES/48/31. 
187 Report of The ILC on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session UN Doc. A/49/ 10. See J. Crawford, "The ILC Adopts 
a Statute for an International Criminal Court" (1995) 89 A. J. LL. 404, Sadat-Wexler, supra n. 175, pp. 685-726. 
188 GA Resolution 49/53, UN Doc. A/RES/49/53, M. C. Bassiouni, "Observations Concerning the 1997-8 
Preparatory Committee's Work" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ) The International Criminal Gxo Uinenutioru and Issues 
Before the P&pvat xy CIrrrnitw, and Adninistratw and Financial bnplications 13 Notne(les Etudes Feiles, (Chicago: 
Eres, 1997), 5 pp. 8-9 claims that this was a stalling movement by recalcitrant States. 
189 GA Resolution 50/46, UN Doc. A/RES/50/46, the mandate was extended by GA Resolution 51/207 
UN Doc. A/RES/51/207. On the PREPCOM's work, see Report of the Preparatory Cann won the Establishnvrt 
ofan Inter ional Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/51/22 and C. K. Hall, "The First two Sessions of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" (1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 177; C. K. Hall, "The 
Third and Fourth Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal Court" (1998) 92 
A. J. I. L. 124; C. K. Hall, "The Fifth Session of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 331. C. K. Hall, "The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" (1998) 92 A. JI. L 548; A. Zimmerman, 
"The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court" (1998) 2 Max Planck Y. B. U. N. L. 169. 
190 A/CONF. 183/9, repr7ntd in (1998) 38 I. L. M. 999. On the drafting process see P. Kirsch & J. T. Holmes, 
"The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 2; 
P. Kirsch & J. T. Holmes, "The Birth of the International Criminal Court: The 1998 Rome Confernece" 
(1998) 36 C Y. B. LL. 3; M. C. Bassiouni, "Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court" (1999) 32 ComdII. L. J. 443. For a US view see D. J. Scheffer, "The United States 
and the International Criminal Court" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 12, see also, R. Wedgwood, "Fiddling at Rome: The 
United States and the International Criminal Court" (1998) 77 Foreign Policy 20, M. Zwanenburg, "The Statute 
for an International Criminal Court and the United States: Peace Without Justice" (1999) 12 L. J. I. L. 1. On the 
statute, MH Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court" (1999) 93 A. J. LL. 22; M-C. 
Roberge, "The new International Criminal Court: A Preliminary Assessment" (1998) 325 I. R. RG 671; O. 
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As should be clear from the above the ICC will be set up by a treaty. There had been 
calls for the ICC to be set up by a Security Council resolution, 192 but the general 
consensus is that the Security Council does not have the power to set up a permanent 
body in the absence of an identified threat to the peace. 193 Probably the least controversial 
part of the negotiations for an international criminal court was that it would be set up by 
treaty. This was accepted as early as the 1992 Working Group. 194 As a result, the basis is 
beyond doubt in international law, namely, the Rome Statute. 195 
APPLICABLE LAW 
NUREMBERG 
There has been some controversy relating to the law applied by the Nuremberg IMT. 
Kranzbühler, for example, asserts that "the rules that were applied in this trial were not, 
as is generally assumed, rules of international law", 196 and that the law was merely 
(national) law defined by the Allies. A look at the views of the drafters is worthwhile. 
Perhaps the best summary of the way in which the issues arose is given by Gross: "[t]he 
problem facing the Four powers can be reduced to this: either the Tribunal is directed to 
apply international law and find this law using the traditional methods of international 
tribunals, or the Tribunal is directed simply to apply the law laid down by the four 
powers". 197 In furtherance of limiting the power of the Nuremberg IMT to decide what 
international law said about criminality, the US pushed for the removal of all references 
to international law. 198 This said, the debate in the London conference was based around 
international law, with much discussion being based around the extent to which the 
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: A Cadenza for the Song of Those who Died in Vain? " 
(1998) 3 J. A. C. L. 271. 
191 Rome Statute, Article 36. 
192 Dugard, supra n. 179, pp. 341-342. 
193 K. Ambos, "The Establishment of an International Criminal Court: some Observations from an 
International Criminal Law Viewpoint" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 519, p. 522. 
194 See Crawford, supra n. 185, pp. 142-3. 
195 Rome Statute, Article 1. 
196 0. Kranzbuhler, "Nuremberg, Eighteen Years Afterwards" (1965) 14 DePazrl L. R. 333, p. 337. 
197 Gross, supra n. 25, p. 143. 
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crimes were accepted under international law. 199 In reality, although international law was 
the basis around which they worked, David Maxwell-Fyfe summed up what was 
occurring at the London conference: "I want to make clear in this document what are the 
things for which the Tribunal can punish the defendants. I don't want it left to the 
Tribunal to interpret what are the principles of international law that it should apply... it 
should not be left to the Tribunal to say what is or what is not a violation of international 
law... What we want to abolish at the trial is a discussion as to whether the acts are 
violations of international law or not. We declare what international law is... ". 200 
Effectively what was happening was that although the four powers were utilising 
international law for the Nuremberg IMT, they were also imposing their view of what 
international law said rather than allowing the Nuremberg ItvlT to discover international 
law for itself. The extent to which the Nuremberg Charter represented the pre-existing 
international law will be dealt with in chapters 5 and 6.201 
In some ways, though, the view that the Nuremberg IMT was using occupation law 
could be supported by the IMT itself. The Nuremberg IMT Judgment asserted that "the 
making of the Charter was an exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries 
to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of 
these territories has been recognised by the civilised world. "202 These could be seen as 
implications that the Nuremberg IMT was applying occupation law, but the judgment 
continued, "[t]he Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on behalf of the victorious 
nations, but in the view of the Tribunal... is the expression of international law existing at 
the time of its creation. "203 Kranzbühler counters this assertion by claiming that the IMT 
was merely declaring that Article 6 of the Charter (which gave the crimes over which the 
198 JW p. 144, See Jackson's Report, supra n. 33, pp. 197,205,352,359,373,378,390-395 
199 Y. Beigbader, Judging War Crnninds: The Politic of International Crvnind Justice (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) 
p. 41, M. Lippmann, "Nuremberg Forty Five Years Later (1991) 7 Connt J. I. L. 1 p. 23, both discussing 
proposals relating to international law. 
200 Jackson's Report, supra n. 33, pp. 328-9,399. 
201 In some ways, the Jackson Report itself seems to accept they were modifying international law, by 
referring to the Charter as "a basic charter for the international law of the future" Al, p. 437. 
202 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 44, p. 216. 
203 Iba 
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IMT had jurisdiction) was coterminous with international law, but was applicable there as 
national law. 204 
Kranzbühler's interpretation sits uneasily with the above phrase, and also with 
various other parts of the judgment. The most telling of these is the Nuremberg Uff's 
pronouncement that "the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international 
duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual 
State". 205 It is quite clear that the Nuremberg IMT considered itself to be applying 
international law, as much is also clear from the later opinion of the President of the 
tribunal. 206 
Any doubts about the form of the law can be dispelled by reference to General 
Assembly Resolution 95, which affirmed "the principles of international law recognised 
by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal". 207 This 
clearly shows that the General Assembly considered the Nuremberg IMT to be using 
international law. 
In relation to the procedures used, they were clearly not those of the national courts 
of the four powers. The Charter blended the approaches, coming up with its own hybrid. 
For example, contrary to common law practice, there were no exclusionary rules of 
evidence, 208 and in a mixture of both procedures, the indictment was to give details of the 
particulars of the offences, but was not to include all the evidence. 209 Jackson summed the 
position up admirably, "[a]s an international Tribunal, it is not bound by the procedural 
and substantive refinements of our respective judicial or constitutional systems". 210 
204 Kranzbühler, supra n. 45, p. 109. 
205 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 44, p. 220, see also ibid. p. 221 referring to "crimes under international 
law" and p. 226 where acts are said to be "in complete violation of international law". 
206 G. Lawrence, "The Nuremberg Trial" (1947) 23 I. Aff. 151, p. 151. 
207 GA Resolution 95(1), UN Doc. A/64/Add. 1. 
208 Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 19. 
209 Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 16(a). 
210 19 Nuremberg Proceedings, supra n. 43, p. 383. 
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Sentencing was at the discretion of the Nuremberg IMT, who could impose any 
punishment they thought just, without reference to any national law. 211 
TOKYO IMT 
Less is known about the drafting of the Tokyo IMT's charter, as it was prepared 
unilaterally by the US, primarily the IMT chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan. From his 
defence of the Tokyo IMT, it seems clear that he intended the Tokyo IMT to enforce 
international crimes. 212 In addition, the Tokyo IMT was created as a sibling for the 
Nuremberg proceedings, so many of the same considerations relating to that Tribunal's 
Charter pertain equally to the Tokyo Charter. 213 
The majority opinion of the Tokyo IMT adds little to the conclusions reached at the 
Nuremberg IMT in relation to the law applied, as they preferred to express their 
"unqualified adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal rather than 
by reasoning the matters anew. "214 
More substantial help can be gleaned from the separate and dissenting opinions. It is 
clear that the judges writing these opinions considered the Tokyo IMT Charter's 
provisions relating to crimes to be jurisdictional alone, allowing them to prosecute crimes 
which existed under international law, to the extent to which they were accepted at the 
time in international law. 215 The most interesting views were those expressed by judges 
Röling and Pal, both of whom would not have applied the Charter in excess of what they 
considered to be international law at that time. Judge Röling expressed himself thus; 
"[t]he Charter determines which facts may be subjected to a legal hearing. The 
211 Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 27. 
212 Keenan & Brown, supra n. 67, p. 9. 
213 In particular, that in the formulation of the Charters, the Allies imposed their (controversial) view of 
international law on the Tribunals. 
214 Tokyo IMT Judgment, supra n. 66 p. 48,439. 
215 See Webb, supra n. 93, p6. Jaranilla, supra n. 98, p. 18, "[an international tribunal] may legally try and punish 
individuals who have violated the laws and customs of wars which... are considered part of the law of 
nations" Bernard, supra n. 95, p. 18. relies on natural law, but also p. 1 refers to acts "supposed to be in criminal 
infraction of natural and international law". 
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Tribunal... will determine which of those facts are crimes under international law. "216 
Judge Pal was entirely unambiguous on this point, stating that the law applicable to the 
case was "international law as may be found by us. "217 He took this to its logical 
conclusion by refusing to convict on charges he did not consider established as 
international crimes. 218 
In all, the judges were quite clearly of the opinion that they were applying 
international law. In relation to the procedure, as at Nuremberg, they were not bound by 
national procedures, 219 nor were they bound by any national sentencing rules. 220 Thus, it 
may be said that the Tokyo IMT was applying international law. 
ICTY 
There is little doubt that the applicable law in the ICTY is international law. From the 
beginning, this was the intention, as the French government commented to the Secretary 
General "the essential starting point would seem to be the international character of the 
crimes themselves". 221 The Secretary General took this on board, saying that the tribunal 
was only to enforce crimes which were "beyond any doubt part of customary 
international law". 222 The crimes over which it has jurisdiction are discussed in detail in 
Part 3.223 It is clear that the ICTY Chambers have considered themselves to be applying 
international law. For example, the Tadic judgment clearly adopted the position that the 
provisions of the ICTY Statute setting out the crimes are jurisdictional rather than 
substantive: "Articles 2,3,4, and 5 specify the crimes under international law over which 
216 Opinion of Juge Röling, supra n. 100, p. 6, see also p. 5, "the interpretation which considers the Charter as 
giving rules of jurisdiction and procedure only is indicated by the very constitution of the tribunal". 
217 Opinion of judge Pal, supra n. 66, Vol 21: Separate Opnions, p. 26. 
218 Ibid. p. 153. 
219 Tokyo INff Charter, Article 13. 
220 Article 16 gave the Tokyo IlviT the right to impose the punishment "determined by it to be just". 
221 Letter from the French Clxtrge di ffa s, UN Doc. 25266, para 52. The only proposal that suggested the use 
of national law was the CSCE approach, (supra n. 118). 
222 Secretary-General's Report, supra n. 118 para 34. 
223 For the moment it is only necessary to mention that they are Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
(Article 2), Violations of the Laws and Customs of War (Article 3) Genocide (Article 4) and Crimes Against 
Humanity (Article 5). 
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the International Tribunal has jurisdiction". 224 In the course of their judgments, the ICTY 
has dedicated a large amount of space and reasoning to the applicable rules of 
international law, 225 and has been wary of any application of national law. 226 They have 
looked at national law, but only to derive general principles of law, a source of 
international law. 227 
In respect to procedure, it is clear that the procedure is not subject to the national law 
of any state, and represents a hybrid, with the judges being wary of national laws. 228 In 
224 Pr autorv Tadic Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, IT-94-1-T para 558. See also Pmsautrnv Delalic et al, Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (Form of the Indictment), 15 October 1996, IT-96-21-AR72.5, 
para 26, "The Tribunal's Statute does not create new offences but rather serves to give the Tribunal jurisdiction over offences which are already part of customary international law". 
5 Pros or v Erdeng * Judgment, 7 October 1997, IT-96-22-A, Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald & 
Vohrah paras 32-51; Dissenting Opinon of Judge Cassese, paras 20-39, Separate Opinion of Judge Li para 2; 
Pms eorv Fumndzija, judgement, 10 December 1998, IT-95-17/1-T, paras 134-257; PmsautorvDaWic, Muck, 
Odic & Landzo, judgement 16 November 1998, IT-96-21-T, paras 158-593; On these see D. Turns, "The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslvia: The Erdemovic Case" (1998) 47 LCL. Q 461; 0 
Swaak-Goldman, "International Decisions: Prosecutor v Erdemovic" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 282; S. Linton, 
"Reviewing the Case of Drazen Erdemovic: Uncharted Waters at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia" (1998) 12 L. J. I. L. 251; R. Cryer, "One Appeal, Two Philosophies, Four Opinions and a 
Remittal The Erdemovic Case at the ICTY Appeals Chamber" (1997) 2 J. A. CL. 195; M. P. Scharf, 
"International Decisions: Prosecutor v Tadic" (1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 718. 
226 Eniawak ibid Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para 2, "To my mind, notions, legal constructs and 
terms of art should not be automatically applied at the international level. They cannot be mechanically 
imported into international criminal law proceedings". See also, Blaskic (Pmsecutorv Blaskic, Decision on the 
Request for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997,29 October 1997, IT-95-14- 
AR108bis) para 23 "domestic judicial views or approaches should be handled with the greatest caution at the 
international level, lest one should fail to make due allowance for the unique characteristics of international 
criminal proceedings". 
U7 ICJ Statute, Atricle 38(1)(c). The ICTY's approach is clear from Erden xec, where McDonald and Vohrah 
criticised the prosecution for relying on "decisions of national military tribunals which applied national law, 
not international law" para 52. See also Cassese, ibid. where he sifted cases for those that applied national law 
from those applying international law, and being dubious of the former, im paras. 20-39. 
228 Article 15 gives the ICTY judges the power to adopt their own rules of procedure, Rules 89 of the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure (IT/32/Rev. 17) provides that national rules of evidence are not binding on the ICTY. 
See H. Levie, "The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the 
Past and a Look to the Future" (1995) 21 Syracuse J of I. L. & Carbnerr 1, pp. 16-17; W 
. 
J. Fenrick, Rgo, i 
C mii g the Practice of the International Crbn nal Tiibiozal for the Former Yugoslavia (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author) p. 1; On other procedural aspects see Erdanot , ibid Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald 
& Vohrah, paras 3-16, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese paras 1-10. It could be thought that McDonald 
and Vohrah, went dangerously dose to accepting the applicability of certain common law decisions relating to 
guilty pleas. They claimed it was necessary given that the guilty plea procedure was transposed from those 
systems, (Para 6) and the rules themselves necessarily implied reference. So to interpret the rules, they could 
refer to national law. But this must be read in light of their comment (para 9) that "we do not in any way 
consider the common law authorities as binding upon us, we merely consider them relevant material, 
throwing light on the proper construction to be given to the guilty plea as employed in the procedure of the 
International Tribunal". A particularly controversial decision was Pmxartor v Tadic Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 10 August 1995, IT-94-1-T, 
paras 22,25. See N. Affolder, "The Anonymous Witness and The Sources of International Procedural Law" (1998) 19 Mich. J. I. L. 445; M. Leigh, "Yugoslav Tribunal Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused" 
(1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 235; C. Chinkin, "Due Process and Witness Anonymity" (1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 75; M. Leigh, 
"Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent With Due Process" (1997) 91 A. J. LL. 80; The Appeals Chamber in 
Blaskic castigated the Trial Chamber for invoking a (US inspired) "ripeness" doctrine, as "domestic judicial 
views or approaches should be handled with the greatest caution at the international level, lest one should fail 
to make due allowance for the unique characteristics of international criminal proceedings". Blaskic, ibil para 
23.; H. Ascensio, "The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY" (1996) 9 LJ. LL. 467; J. R. W. D. Jones 
71, Practice of the ICTY & ICTR (New York Transnational, 1998) passim; P. Dolenc, "A Slovenian Perspective 
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sentencing the Tribunal is also not subject to national laws, 229 it is meant to have recourse 
to the sentencing practice of former Yugoslavia when determining penalties, 230 but it is 
clear that although "this practice can be used for guidance... it is not binding. "231 There is 
no doubt that the law applied here is international law. 
ICTR 
To a large extent, the legal position in the ICTR is the same as for the ICTY. In 
terms of applicable law, the ICTR, like the ICTY, has jurisdiction over genocide and 
crimes against humanity. 232 In relation to war crimes, the Secretary-General noted that 
they included violations of Additional Protocol II (which is not generally considered 
customary) and Common Article 3, which was not universally accepted as giving criminal 
liability at the time. 233 The justification for the inclusion of these was the fact that Rwanda 
was a party to APU and the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, again, what is being applied 
is international law, not any provision of Rwandan law, or the national law of any other 
State. 234 This is also clear from ICTR judgments. 235 Again, for procedural law, the ICTR is 
not bound by national procedures or rules of procedure. 236 For sentencing, the ICTR is 
on the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" in Clark & Sann, supra 
n. 123,237; D. D. Ntanda-Nsereko, "Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia" in Clark & Sann, Al. 293; V. M. Creta, " The Search for Justice in The Former 
Yugoslavia and Beyond Analyzing the Rights of the Accused under the Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1998) 20 Hcaston J. I. L. 381;. 
The inapplicability of national law raises questions about the utility of evaluating the procedures in the light of 
national laws. For examples of this type of evaluation see M. P. Scharf, "Trial and Error: An Assessment of 
the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal" (1998) 30 N Y. U. J. LL. & Politics 167; S. Yee, 
"The Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment: A Questionable Milestone for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia" (1997) 26 Gaj. L & C. L. 263. 
229 ICTY Statute, Article 24, Rule of Procedure 101. 
230 Ibid see also Secretary-General's Report, supra n 118, para 111. 
231 Pros mrv Erden ui Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 1996, IT-96-22-T, para 39. Ibid they also note 
that there are legal obstacles to application of Yugoslav law. Not least the death penalty provided for in 
former Yugoslav law. For an attempt to create guidelines with reference to national law, see D. B. Pickard, 
"Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court" (1997) 20 L. L. A. I. & C. L. J. 123. 
232 ICIR Statute, Article 2, Article 3. 
233 Secretary-General's report, supra n. 161, para 12. See Akhavan, supra n. 156, p. 504; Johnson, supra n. 160, 
PP"220-222. 
234 The case for this is bolstered by the Chinese assertion at the adoption of 955 that it was the use of 
universal jurisdiction over international crimes S/PV. 3453, p. 7. 
235 p po 7ao vAkay su, judgement, 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, section 6 See D. M. Amann, "Prosecutor 
v Akayesu" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 195. 
236 Article (14) gives the ICR the power to promulgate Rules of Procedure and evidence, based on the ICY 
rules. By Rule of Procedure (ICIR/3/Rev. 4) 89 the ICTR is not subject to national rules of evidence, see 
proso wrvKany'Jashi, supra n. 164, para 42. 
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not to rely on Rwandan law, but may have recourse to national practice. 237 This was 
highly controversial in the drafting of the ICTR Statute, as Rwanda wanted the ICTR to 
follow its lead and use the death penalty. This proposal was rejected, and this rejection 
was one of the reasons the Rwandans voted against the statute. 238 As with the ICTY, the 
conclusion is inescapable that it is international law which is applicable to the IC R. 
Icc 
In the earlier drafts in the [LC, there were references to national law being applicable 
to the ICC. 239 There was still some disagreement in the PREPCOM, when some said that 
certain States' national laws were relevant. 240 This was rejected. The Rome Statute 
contains a provision relating to the applicable law inspired by that in the Statute of the 
ICJ. 241 The ICC is to apply its own Statute, elements of crimes and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. The applicable substantive law is international criminal law, as defined in 
the Statute. 242 In addition, it may apply relevant applicable treaties and rules of 
international law, then, general principles of law drawn from national laws, including, as 
appropriate, those States with jurisdiction. 243 These are sources of international law, the 
last not being national law per se, but general principles drawn from national laws. For 
procedural law, Article 23 also shows that the procedure is not to be a national one. 2« 
For sentencing too, the Rome ICC is not bound by national laws. Again the death penalty 
237 Article 23, Rule of Procedure 101(B)(iii). See F. Harhoff, "Consonance or Rivalry: Calibrating the Efforts 
to Prosecute War Crimes in National and International Tribunals" (1997) 7 Duke J. C & I. L. 571, p. 581. 
238 Ibid. S/PV. 3453, p. 11. See MIA Wang, "The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for 
Clarification, Opportunities for Impact" (1995) 27 CH. R. L. R. 177, p. 202; D. Schraga & R. Zaddin, "The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 502, p. 511. 
239 ILC 1993 Draft supra n. 185, Article 28. 
240 I-Jall (6th Session), supra n. 189 p. 552. For proposals made at Rome see, A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 53., 
A/CONF. 183/WGAL/L. 1, A/CONF. 183/WGGP/L. 1-12. China attempted to get some reference to 
national laws in for admissibility claims in A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 15. It was rejected. 
241 Rome Statute, Article 21. M. Arsanjani, supra n. 190, p. 28. 
242 These are, broadly, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and Aggression (Article 5) Detailed 
consideration is left to Chapter 5. The nature of the court makes it clear that these are jurisdictional 
provisions, rather than creative of international crimes, the Original ILC draft, from which the Rome Statute 
grew was intended to be an "adjectival" instrument (describing, rather than creating crimes) (See Crawford, 
supra n. 187, p. 411) The general decision in Rome was that the Court should stick to customary law crimes. 
The extent to which this was achieved is discussed in Chapter 3. 
243 The Tribunal may also draw upon its own jurisprudence, (Article 23). 
244 For detail on these matters see the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, finalised at the June 2000 
PREPCOM. 
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was excluded, 245 showing the independence from the national law of States, many of 
whom still retain the death penalty. It seems very clear that the ICC can only apply 
international law. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As can be seen, of the five courts under consideration, their bases, although in 
international law, have often been controversial. The main exception to this has been the 
Rome Statute, although arguments have raged about whether or not its jurisdictional 
provisions are in excess of what international law will allow-, this debate will be returned 
to in Part 3. It is this international basis which distinguishes them from courts Ile the 
Control Council Law 10 courts in post-WWII Germany. The various courts and tribunals 
discussed do not have a consistent basis or history, therefore it would be inaccurate to 
presume that their operation, and the critiques of them will be the same. That said, there 
are similarities in the identities of the creators of the two IMTs, and an identity in the 
creators of the two UN tribunals (although not their authors). Standing out is the ICC, 
despite being drafted by a conference under UN auspices, it will not be a UN body. The 
ICC will be brought into a relationship with the UN, but will not be, strictly speaking a 
UN body. The genesis of the courts has had an effect not only on the law (which will be 
investigated in Part 3), but also on their operations and their powers. It is to the latter 
aspect which Chapter 2 will now turn. 
245 Article 77 & Article 80. 
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OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
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CHAPTER 2: THE POWERS 
AND JURISDICTION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the powers of the international criminal courts to address binding 
orders to States and individuals will be introduced, along with the powers of those courts 
to enforce those orders against recalcitrant States and individuals. The discussion here will 
relate primarily to the nature of the obligations. Details on particular issues will be left 
until the relevant sections in the later chapters of the thesis. From here, focus will move, 
in a short section, to the jurisdictional competence, ratoniae pe sonae of the international 
criminal tribunals. The reason for this discussion is that it is impossible to understand the 
effects the various international criminal tribunals have had on the ways in which the 
international regime for the prosecution of international crimes operates without it. 
NUREMBERG IMT 
The position of the Nuremberg IMT is interesting, not least because some of the 
staff (the prosecution) were, of course subject to their own States' authority, in addition 
to the close relationship between the Nuremberg IMT and Allied control of Germany. 
Looking at the London Charter, there are some provisions which would seem to give 
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the prosecutors the authority to bind the Control Council (thus the States comprising it) 
and the nineteen adherents to the London Charter. ' The first of these is Article 3, which 
states "[e]ach of the signatories shall take the necessary steps to make available for the 
investigation of the charges and trial the major war criminals detained by them who are to 
be tried by the IM T. "2 The wide obligation this would appear to impose is greatly limited 
by Article 15 which provides that "no witness or defendant detained by any signatory 
shall be taken out of the possession of that signatory without its assent. " Equally, the 
implementing decision of the Control Council decided that "each Zone commander will 
deliver such persons who are within his zone to that committee [of prosecutors] upon 
request and will make witnesses and evidence available to it". 3 On a practical level, of 
course, the prosecutors were under national orders, and decisions on who to indict were 
heavily influenced by the home States, so this obligation was weak. 
The Nuremberg IMT itself had some powers by virtue of Article 17 of the London 
Charter. The tribunal had the "power to (a) summon witnesses to the trial and require 
their attendance and testimony (b) to require the production of documents and other 
evidentiary material". This would appear to be quite a strong obligation to cooperate, in 
that the Nuremberg IMT could require individuals to attend. Still, this would again seem 
to be weakened by Article 15. 
This does not apply to a different aspect of the Nuremberg IMT's ability to bind the 
signatory States. The first of these is Article 10, which provides that the Nuremberg 
I F's determinations on the criminality of certain organisations were final "and shall not 
be questioned". 4 In the US Zone, by Article X of Military Government Ordinance 7, the 
determinations of the IMT on various facts were considered binding. 5 The other States 
1 1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
Power and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279. 
2 If not detained by them, the Signatory States are merely to use their "best endeavours" to obtain custody. 
3 Control Council Law No. 10, Article III(3). This also gave the committee of prosecutors the right to veto 
the removal of a person they required to outside Germany. 
4 E. Schwelb, "Crimes Against Humanity" (1946) 23 B. YB. LL. 178, p. 208. 
5 Military Government-Germany, United States Zone Ordinance No 7,18 October 1946. 
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did not go so far, but generally respected the findings. 6 As a matter of formal legal 
obligation though, the only part of the judgment (other than the individual verdicts, and 
to the extent the judgment reflected customary international law) which bound the 
Control Council was its determinations on criminal organisations. 
TOKYO IMT 
The position of the Tokyo IlVIT is a little more difficult to ascertain, there is little 
more to go on than the Charter itself. In many ways the Charter was a retread of the 
provisions of the Nuremberg Charter. Article 11 gave the Tokyo IMT the power to 
summon witnesses, to require their attendance and to require production of documents 
and other evidence. Article 9 gave the defence the right to ask the tribunal to order the 
production of witnesses and documents. This article also provides the obligations of the 
occupation authorities who were to "give... such aid in obtaining the production of the 
evidence as the circumstances require". 7 This gave them the right to send binding orders 
within Japan. 
The real problem with both the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs is that, in practice, 
while their basis was international, they were functionally almost integrated into the 
occupation regimes. This puts them in a sui generis category for requiring State co- 
operation. As the ICTY put it in its first Annual Report "it is well known that the Allied 
powers that set up the international tribunals at Nürnberg and Tokyo wielded full 
authority and control over the territory of Germany and Japan respectively, and, in 
addition, had already apprehended the defendants when the trials commenced. 
6 A. Basak, "The Influence of the Nuremberg judgment on the Practice of the Allied Courts in Germany" 
(1977-8) 9 P. YB. LL. 161. 
7 Special proclamation,: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946, 
T. I. A. S. No 1589 at p. 3.14 US Dept of State Bulletin p. 461. A Separate issue of the utility of the right is shown 
by Rule of Procedure 5, by which all requests had to go through the prosecutor's office, which thus gave 
them advance warning of the defence case, and the right to object to the request. This put the defence at 
severe disadvantage. 
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Consequently those Tribunals did not need co-operation of the defendant's national 
authorities or those of other countries for the prosecutor's investigations". 8 
As a result of this, the two IMTs did have some power in relation to requiring the 
support of the occupation regimes, however these were the same regimes that they were 
representing in many respects. Therefore their State co-operation regime was far more 
like a national court in relation to national authorities, and does not represent a model 
suitable for the modern international criminal law system. Therefore, when we move onto 
discussion of the ways in which international criminal courts act in an integrated regime 
of prosecution for international crimes, there will be little debate on these courts. 
ICTY AND ICTR 
The nature of the obligations imposed on States by the Security Council is 
remarkable. Not only do the UN Tribunal's judgments directly bind the defendants, 9 but 
also the tribunals have the ability to bind all States of the United Nations, giving them an 
almost universal bailiwick to issue orders. 
There are various ways in which the Tribunal can impose obligations on States. 
Nagan has said "securing an organised international criminal law prospect would seem to 
require intergovernmental organizations (the United Nations, or within that organisation, 
the Security Council) to co-opt or preempt a significant portion of that power presently 
allocated to States themselves". 10 This is precisely what the Security Council did. As the 
ICTY said in the Blaskic Case: "the relation between national courts of different States is 
8 19 Armual Report of the Intemational Tiilwial for d Pmsaition of Per, = Respwrsibde for Serious Vw4oi ru of 
International Hwnanitarihm Law on the Ter*o y of Fomxr Yugs1avia Firm 1st Ja uivy 1991, UN Doc, A/49/342 
para 84 
9 This includes the Tribunal's judgments on contempt of false witness under oath, which are issued pursuant 
to (Joint) Rules of Procedure (Rule 77 & 91). For comment, see J J. E. Schufte, "Legal and Practical 
Implications, From the Perspective of the Host Country, Relating to the Establishment of the ICTY" in R. 
Clark & M. Sann, The Pºvse iition of Intern oral Crýrea (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1995) 207, pp. 217-9. The 
Tribunal's judicial pronouncements bind the Security Council, D. Sarooshi, "The Powers of the United 
Nations International Criminal Tribunals" (1998) 2 Max Planeck YB. U. NL. 141, p. 145. 
10 W. Nagan, "International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia" (1995) 6 Duke 
J. C & LL. 127, p. 133. 
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`horizontal' in nature. In 1993 the Security Council for the first time established an 
international criminal court with jurisdiction over individuals living in sovereign 
States... and, in addition, conferred on the International Tribunal the power to address to 
States binding orders concerning a broad variety of judicial matters.... Clearly a `vertical' 
relationship was thus established, at least as far as the judicial and injunctory powers of 
the International Tribunal are concerned". " 
PRIMACY 
The first manifestation of the "vertical" relationship created is the "high water mark" 
of the priority of international courts, 12 primacy. 13 Article 9(1) ICTY Statute (8(1) ICTR 
Statute) accepts that concurrent jurisdiction exists between national and the UN tribunals, 
then Article 9(2) ICTY Statute (8(2) ICTR Statute) gives the right to the UN tribunals to 
"formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the International 
Tribunal". It is clear that the "request" is binding. 14 This places the UN tribunals in a 
hierarchically superior position to national jurisdictions, as they may demand they defer 
their competence to them As Judge Sidhwa put it: "the rule obliges States to accede to 
and accept requests for deferral on the ground of suspension of their sovereign rights to 
try the accused themselves". 15 
For the IM, this process is a one way street. It is clear that for indictees in custody 
at the ICTR who have made their initial appearance, transfer to a requesting State would 
11 Pmsaj rxjr v B&Ciskic, Decision on the Request of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chmaber II of 
18 July 1997,29 October 1997, IT-95-14-108bis, para 46. 
12B. Brown, "Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International 
Criminal Tribunals (1998) 23 YakJ. LL. 383, p. 385. 
13 On which see, Brown, ibid.; J. Alvarez, "Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 245, 
pp. 252,256; V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Crnnnral Trbtna1 for Former Yugvs&z a (New York Transnational, 1995) pp. 125-132; V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The International Crinmal Tribunal for 
Rrda (New York: Transnational, 1998) pp. 312-325. 
14 See, for example, Pros rv Tadic, Decision on the Request of the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for 
Deferral, 8 November 1994, IT-94-1; Pms«utorv Tadic, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, 
2 October 1995, IT-94-1-AR72, Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa, para 83. L. Vierucci, "The First Steps of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia" (1995) 6 E. J. I. L. 134, pp. 136-142. 
15 Tadk, ibid. 
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not be possible. In the case deciding this point, Prrmseaitor v NaVuhaga16 Belgium had 
indicated its willingness to try the defendant. ' The Prosecutor agreed that the most 
sensible course of action was that Belgium prosecute him. Thus she sought to withdraw 
the indictment she had over him in the ICTR, and to transfer him to Belgium to stand 
trial there. The ICTR, in a controversial decision, which has done little for relations 
between itself and Belgium determined that although it could (and did) withdraw the 
indictment, at that point its jurisdiction over the (ex)indictee ended, and he had to be 
released. 18 The IM rejected Belgium's arguments that the ICTR could transfer him 
directly despite the absence of an express provision in the Statute or Rules for this. The 
decision is not unassailable. The Security Council could not have contemplated that co- 
operation between States and the tribunal should only be one way, when their 
jurisdictions, although not equal, are concurrent. 19 
The ICTY has taken a slightly more progressive approach where the arresting State 
wishes to try the suspect, and the Trial Chamber considers it appropriate. By virtue of 
Rule of Procedure 1 1bis, a Trial Chamber can suspend the ICTY indictment against the 
accused, and order transfer to the State who originally arrested the suspect and 
transferred him20 This recognises the concurrence of jurisdictions, but also the primacy 
of the ICTY. The ICTY retains the right to decide if it is appropriate and the relevant 
Trial Chamber can, at any time up to conviction or acquittal of the accused, order return 
to the ICTY to stand trial. This could be extended to other States who are willing to try 
the defendant. 
In relation to which States the two UN tribunals may ask, the ICTR Statute is clear, 
they may ask any UN member State (or State who has specifically accepted the 
16 Pius torv Ntwdxcga, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, 18 March 1999, 
ICTR-98-40-T. 
17 The reason for this was that the crime with which he was charged before the ICIR was the killing of ten 
Belgian peacekeepers. 
18 N ags, supra n. 16. 
19 See Amicus Curiae Arguments, reported in "A Sign of the Times" (1999) 58 U1utal'ra 8. 
20 Icy Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 17, Rule 11bis(A). 
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obligation) to defer of them. 21 With respect to the ICTY the position was a little 
confused, Article 9 of the ICTY Statute merely mentioning that the ICTY can ask 
"national courts" to defer. Despite there being no express limitation in this language, 22 
certain members of the Security Council gave interpretative statements that limited the 
obligation, in particular, by saying that the obligation to defer was limited to the States of 
Former Yugoslavia alone. 23 That said, there is doubt whether these should be taken as 
authoritative interpretations for all purposes. 24 The statements themselves were not 
identical, nor did they agree with each other here, 25 and seem to contradict the clear 
wording of the Statute. The approach taken by the ICTY in the Rules of Procedure show 
they considered the duty to be incumbent on all States, 26 and the duty extending to all 
States was affirmed by the ICTY in the Tactic Case27 in which Germany also accepted that 
it was under a duty to defer. 28 Thus the duty extends to all States who are UN members 
or that have accepted the obligation cm particular Switzerland). It represents a large 
inroad into State freedom to deal with people in their territory. 
There are limits to the right. After all, the UN Tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction, 
and they are not intended to prevent national jurisdictions prosecuting offences from the 
Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts. Their right to demand deferral is limited to where it is 
justified. 29 The situations when deferral is justified are given in Rule 9 of the Rules of 
Procedure. They are when the act is being charged as an ordinary (not an international) 
21 Article 8, see Ntiry ihaga, supra n. 16, "the primacy recognised by the statute is clear inasmuch as the Tribunal 
may request any national jurisdiction to defer investigation or ongoing proceedings". 
u Brown, supra n. 12 p. 407. 
23 See S/PV. 3217, UK p. 11, who claimed primacy would only be exceptionally invoked over non ex Yugoslav 
States. Russia, p. 28. Russia went the furthest, denying the automatic binding nature of the orders, none of the 
others adopted this, nor have the Tribunals. 
24 J. OBrien, "The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former 
Yugoslavia" (1993) 77 A. J. I. L. 639, p. 657-8 claims that the Tribunal should consider them an integral part of 
the Statute as they must be presumed to have been agreed to by the Council. M. P. Scharf, "Comments" (1994) 88 PnxA. S. I. L. 251 p. 252 explains that no representative had been empowered to respond to them, as 
the statements were not expected at the meeting. Prosazitcrv Tadic, Judgment, 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, paras 
298-304, found that for determining if crimes against humanity required a discriminatory anirm, the 
statements made in the Security Council were not to be considered controlling. 
25 Brown, supra n. 16, pp-400-402- 
26 Ibid See (Joint) Rules of procedure 9-10. 
27 Supra n. 14. 
28 Ibid Transcript p. 30-3 1. See Vierucci, supra n. 14, pp. 140-142. 
29 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 13, pp. 315-6. 
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offence, 30 where the proceedings are not fair or impartial, or "what is in issue is closely 
related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions which may have 
implications for investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal". 31 The first two may 
be quite narrow, focusing on the national proceedings, but the last is a very broad 
provision, effectively allowing the tribunal (on the request of the prosecutor) to demand 
transfer whenever it wants to 32 
Normally, for deferral proceedings the government to whom the order is33 to be 
made is heard as an ainicus curiae, but this is not necessary, nor is the consent of the 
government to the transfer. 34 As can be seen, this is a very wide inroad into State 
sovereignty, given that the UN tribunals can take any case they wish to try away from 
almost any national (or sub-national) authority, 35 at any stage of the national proceedings. 
As Morris and Scharf exclaim, this is both "extraordinary and unprecedented". 36 
The UN Tribunals' powers extend further than this, even to the situation where a 
national court has pronounced judgment. Once a defendant has been tried by one of the 
tribunals, national courts are prevented from retrying that person for the same crimes. 37 
30 For criticism of this in the context of Article 10(2) see H. Levie, "The Statute of the International Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look to the Future" (1995) 21 Syraarse J of I. L. 
& Canine e 1, p. 15. 
31 Joint Rule 9(i-j). 
32 In Tadic deferral, supra n. 14, para 11; The ICTY said if there was an investigation by the Prosecutor, and the 
issue in the national proceedings "is closely related to, or may have implication and common significant 
factual or legal questions, for the Prosecutor". They accepted a declaration by the OTP that this was the case 
as enough, deciding that as other cases were related to Tactic's they should order deferral. So far, all orders for 
deferral have been granted on the basis of Rule 9(iii), although the Prosecutor has occasionally asked on 9(ä) 
grounds. See Vukoun-Hospital Case CC/PIU/374-E. 
33 The governments were heard, for example, in the Karadzic & Mladic and Tadir cases, see F. Patel-King & A- 
Ni la Rosa, "The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal 1994-1996" (1997) 8 E. J. I. L. 123, pp. 127-8. 
34 No comment was made by the FRY in the Enkmak deferral proceedings, and it opposed deferral in the 
Vukouv- Hospital Case. Orders were made in each case. The ICTR has heard governments in the ßocrsutor v 
Musen Decision of the Trial Chamber in the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for 
Deferral by Switzerland in the Matter of Alfred Musema, 12 March 1996, ICTR-96-5-D; RTLM Decision of 
the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral by the Kingdom 
of Belgium and in the matter of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collins Sarl, 12 March 1996, ICR-96-6-D 
ßvs«utor v Bagosora, Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal 
Request for Deferral by the Kingdom of Belgium and in the matter of Theoneste Bagosora, 17 May 1996, 
ICIR-96-7-D. See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 13, pp. 322-5. 
35 Rule 9 was amended in 1995 to give the ICTY the right to issue orders to sub-State entities to defer, this 
was introduced to deal with the post-Dayton position in Yugoslavia. 
36 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 13, p. 126. 
37 Article 10(1) ICTY Statute, Article 9(1) ICTR Statute, Joint Rule of Procedure 13; Prasautzr v Tactic, 
Decision of the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non Bis in Ilan 14 November 1995, IT-94-1-T, para 13. 
See Patel-King & Rosa, supra n. 33, p. 150; J. Pejic & L. Egan, "Prosecuting War Crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia: the Two Tiers and the Linkage" (1995) 1 E. E. H. R. R 11, p. 18. 
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The converse does not always apply. Article 10 ICTY Statute (Article 9 ICTR Statute) 
gives the tribunals the "unprecedented power to render a national judicial process 
invalid". 38 Obviously, as this is a matter of some sensitivity (which is the reason 
extradition treaties oten have the rule of non-inquiry), and as the principle of non bis in 
Iden is an important human right of the defendant, the circumstances for this are limited. 
The UN tribunals may only retry a person if the crime was characterised as an ordinary 
crime, or the proceedings were not fair or impartial, or were designed to shield the 
accused from the tribunal's jurisdiction. 39 Here a clear hierarchy is put in place between 
national jurisdictions and the UN tribunals, with the authority to make these decisions 
being placed in the international tribunals. National courts are not permitted to question 
the UN tribunal's proceedings. 
ORDERS 
The second manifestation of the superiority of the UN tribunals over national 
jurisdictions is based on Article 29 of the ICTY Statute (Article 28 ICTR Statute). This 
states that "1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal... 2 States shall 
comply without undue delay with an request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial 
Chamber.... " For both tribunals, the obligation is bolstered by the Security Council 
Resolutions which established them Resolutions 827 and 955 declare that "all States shall 
cooperate fully with 
... 
[the tribunal]... all States shall take any measures necessary under 
their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the statute 
including the obligations of States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued 
38 K. A. Hochkammer, "The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: The Compatibility of Peace, Politics and 
International Law" (1994) 28 Vanded ilt J. T. L. 119, p. 153. 
39 Article 10(2) ICTY Statute, Article 9(2) ICTR Statute, See Morris & Scharf (ICTY) supra n. 13, pp. 134-135; 
Morris & Scharf, (ICIR) supra n. 13, p. 317; Levie, supra n. 30, p. 15; A. P. Rubin, "An International Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia" (1994) 6 Pace I. L. R. 7, p. 12. 
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by a trial chamber". 40 As can be seen, the basis of this obligation is a Chapter VII 
resolution of the Security Council, gaining its force from Article 25 of the UN Charter. " 
There is some question about the precise nature of the obligation: the Secretary General 
has claimed that every order by the tribunals was an enforcement measure. 42 It is doubtful 
that the Security Council could delegate the power to decide on further enforcement 
measures, and it is better to see the power being merely the issuance of orders, which are 
binding on States as a result of the Chapter VII resolutions 43 This is the position taken 
by the ICTY, aa ICTR, as and later on, the Secretary-General. 46 
The nature of the obligation being based in Chapter VII of the UN Charter leads to 
certain important features. First, all UN member States are under an obligation to comply 
with the requests, irrespective of the whether or not they were in the Security Council and 
voted for the tribunals. In Blaskic the ICTY described the obligation as novel and unique, 
the "obligation set-out in the clearest of terms-in Article 29 is an obligation on every 
member State of the United Nations w-ä-'us all other member States. Thus it is an eiga 
anwies obligation 
... 
[and every UN member State]... has a legal interest in the fulfilment of 
the obligation". 47 
40 This creates not only an obligation to comply with the orders, but a separate duty to introduce 
implementing legislation to ensure they may comply with any orders. See Pmsautor v Blaskic, Decision of the 
President on the Defence Motion Filed Pursuant to Rule 64,2 April 1996, IT-95-14-T, para 7. "since 1993 all 
States have been under an unquestionable obligation to enact implementing legislation necessary to permit 
them to execute warrants and requests of the Tribunal... this is not a generic obligation, but a very specific 
one... an "obligation of conduct"... or obligation of means, namely, an obligation requiring States to perform 
a specifically determined action". The national action on this obligation is surveyed in chapter 3, pp. 131-134. 
41 See S/PV. 3453, pp. 3,6. Morris & Scharf, (ICTR) supra n. 13, p. 638, C. Greenwood, The Development of 
International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia" (1998) 2 Max 
Planck Y. B. U. N. L. 97, p. 106. 
42 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 808. UN Doc. 
S/25704, para 23. 
43 K. Gallant, "Securing the Presence of Defendants Before the International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia; Breaking with extradition" in Clark & Sann, supra n. 9,343, p. 351. 
44 See PmsautorvMrksic, Radic, SljiW7z min & Dokmvvz*, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused 
Slavko Dokmanovic, 22 October 1997, IT-95-13a-PT, para 35. 
45p orvI vr) ixshi, Decision on the Defence Motion on jurisdiction, 18 June 1997, ICTR-96-15-T, para 
34. 
46 Letter from the Secretary General to FRY, 24 April 1994. 
47 Blaskic, supra n. 11, para 26. In this, the ICTY overstates the obligation as eiga cii ; it is actually to all other 
members of the UN. Similarly, C. C. Joyner, "Strengthening Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law: 
Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia" (1995) 6 Duke J. C & I. L. 79 p. 91 
overstates the position claiming orders are equivalent to jus mgens as they overcome other obligations. The real 
basis for this is Article 103. 
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This compliance trumps other international egal obligations, by virtue of Article 103 
of the UN Charter. Very importantly, "there are no specified grounds on which a State 
may refuse to comply with an order or request from the International Tribunal". 48 
National law impediments are simply not applicable. Joyner accurately comments: 
"compliance by States with any requests from the Tribunal for judicial assistance is 
obligatory and not subject to interpretation". 49 
The unconditional nature of the obligation is particularly important for two matters: 
obtaining defendants despite the normal restrictions on extradition, and gaining 
possession over documents subject to national security restrictions. For surrender, Rule 
of Procedure 55 gives the tribunal the right to demand transfer, and 58 leaves no doubt 
about the obligation. "The obligation in Article 29 of the Statute shall prevail over any 
legal impediment to surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the tribunal 
which may exist under the national law or extradition treaties of the State concerned. " 
With respect to national security protected documents, Rule of Procedure 54 allows the 
tribunals to demand documents. Although customary international law protects these 
from disclosure, 50 the ICTY asserted the right to these documents in the Blaskic case, on 
the ground that they would be required for trial and there was no specific limit in Article 
29 on the obligation. 51 Although the ICTY accepted that some measures for 
confidentiality would need to be taken, the decision on whether the documents had to be 
transferred lay, at all times, with the tribunal. 52 
48 Blaskic, supra n. 11, Trial Chamber, para 77, Appeals Chamber, para 63. 
49 Supra n. 47, p. 89, See also R. Kushen & Harris, "Surrender by the United States to the International 
Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 510, p. 511. This is the position taken by the 
UN, Letter from Hans Corell to Biljana Blavsic, 21 January 1997, "it is the position of the United Nations 
that unconditional co-operation with the International Tribunal is imperative. " 
50 Biaskic supra n. 11, para 29. 
51 Ibd paras 62-68. See generally, H. Strydom, "The Legal Authority of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for ex-Yugoslavia to Order the Disclosure of Evidence" (1997) 22 S. A. YB. I. L. 76, R. Wedgwood, 
"International Criminal Tribunals and State Sources of Proof: The Case of Tihomir Blaskic" (1998) 11 
L. JLL. 635; J. Katz Cogan, "The Problem of Obtaining Evidence for International Criminal Courts" (2000) 
22 H. R. Q 404, p. p. 415-423; A useful comparison of the UN tribunals and the ICC is T. Henquet, 
"Mandatory Compliance Powers vis-ä-s& States by the ad hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court: 
A Comparative Analysis" (1999) 12 L. J. I. L. 969. 
52 Ibid. paras. 67-8. Wedgwood is mildly critical of this, for rejecting legitimate State interests, ibrd pp. 644-5. 
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The first type of order the tribunals are mandated to issue are arrest warrants and 
transfer orders. These are sent to the authorities in the State where the accused or witness 
was known to reside, who are under a duty to "act promptly and with all due diligence to 
ensure proper and effective execution thereof". 53 
The tribunals have a very broad competence to issue orders. Rule 54 states "[a]t the 
request of either party, or prcprio motu, a judge or Trial Chamber may issue such orders, 
summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the 
purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or for the conduct of the trial". This is 
an open-ended provision granting very wide discretion to the tribunals to require 
cooperation, which has been used for orders on various matters. 54 
This does not mean that there are no limits to the tribunals' authority to issue orders. 
One particularly important limit is that they are not permitted to issue subpoenas or 
binding orders to State officials in relation to their official duties. The ICTY decided that 
this was the position in Blaskic because such persons are acting for the State, who can 
choose how to implement its obligations to the tribunals. 55 This includes soldiers in their 
national forces, but not those in international forces under UN mandate, or those ordered 
in their private capacity. 56 The importance of this is in that it prevents the tribunals from 
compelling individuals to account for State actions even where they are at a high level, 
thus making the decisions. 
An interesting issue arises with respect to the orders of the tribunal relating to 
defendants and witnesses. The power to pierce the State veil and deal directly with 
53 Rule of Procedure 56. See also Rules 55 & 59bis. 
54 See for example, ProssutorvKi nanth & Djukic, Order for Provisional Detention, IT-96-20. For criticism 
see P J. I. M. de Waart, "From Kidnapped Witness to Released Accused `for Humanitarian Reasons': The Case 
of the Late Djorde Djukic" (1996) 9 L. J. I. L. 453. ßvseaaor v Tadic, Decision on Prosecution Motion for 
Protective Measures for Witnesses, 10 August 1995,1T-94-1-T, para 8, see A. Klip, "Witnesses Before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia" (1996) 67 R. I. de Dr. Petal 267, pp. 281-2, Pros rv 
Lajic Order for the Withdrawal of Charges Against the Person Named Goran Lajic and for his Release, 17 
June 1996, IT-95-8, (See Patel-King & Rosa, supra n. 33, pp. 168-70)). In addition, Article 98 gives the Trial 
Chamber the power to order the presence of witnesses, and Rules 39 and 40 give the prosecutor the right to 
ask States for certain measures to be taken. 
55 Blaskic, supra n. 11, para 38-44. 
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individuals is a very wide power, normally associated with courts considered to have 
supranational powers. 57 obviously, all criminal courts do this to the extent that they give 
out sentences, but with the UN tribunals, the matter goes further. Originally, there was 
some doubt whether the orders of the tribunals actually bound individuals. 58 Since then 
opinion has swung to the view that Article 29 orders are directly binding upon them. 59 
This was settled by the Blaskic case, where the ICTY Appeals Chamber said that, although 
requests would normally go through the State, where the authorities prevent the tribunal 
from fulfilling its mandate "the International Tribunal may enter into direct contact with 
an individual subject to the sovereign authority of a State. The individual, being within the 
ancillary (or incidental) criminal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, is duty bound 
to comply with its orders, requests and summonses. "60 It would thus seem that going 
through the State organs is a concession made by the tribunals, but not one that is 
necessary. This is a sign of a strong supranational streak in the tribunals. 
The final aspect here, is the ability of the Prosecutor to investigate, without the 
consent of the State. Article 18(2) of the ICTY Statute (17(2) ICTR Statute), gives the 
Prosecutor the power to "question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence 
and to conduct on-site investigations. In carrying out these tasks, the Prosecutor may, as 
appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned. "61 Two points need 
making. First, this gives the Prosecutor the right to undertake investigations, and perform 
official investigations on the territory of the States concerned, without the further 
consent, or knowledge of the State concerned. Second, the Prosecutor can ask the Trial 
56 Ibid pars 49, see Wedgwood, supra n. 51, p. 642,653; Greenwood, supra n. 41, pp. 108-109 Sarooshi, supnz n. 9 
p. 161. 
57 L. R. Helfer & A-M. Slaughter, "Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication" (1997) 107 Yale 
L. J. 273, p. 289. 
58 See Klip, supra n. 54, pp. 268-9,275 (implying the duties apply to States alone). 
59 See Sarooshi, supra n. 9, p. 158; Amiars Curiae Brief Submitted by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law, IT-95-14-PT, para 391. 
60 Bjask 
, 
supra n. 11, para 55. 
61 See generally, Morris & Scharf, (ICTY), supra n. 13, pp. 192-194; Morris & Scharf, (ICIR) supra n. 13, pp. 452- 
4. 
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Chamber to make other demands for help. 62 These are very wide powers, giving the 
prosecutor the right to certain police functions on the territory of a sovereign State. 63 
Icc 
The relationship between States, their courts and the ICC will be very different to 
that existing between the UN tribunals and those same State actors. Of course, one of the 
most important issues is that as a treaty-based court, the Rome Statute does not (and 
cannot) impose duties on non-parties. 64 Thus, unless the Statute becomes as widely 
ratified as the UN Charter (or the Security Council imposes a dut)), 65 the number of 
States subject to duties under the Statute will be smaller than that under the UN tribunals' 
Statutes. 
While the UN tribunals relationship to national jurisdictions is defined by the term 
primacy, the ICC's relationship to them is one of "complementarity. "66 As Arsanjani 
explains, this means that "[t]he ICC is not intended to replace national courts, but 
operates only when they don't". 67 This was settled early on in the ILC Drafts. 68 The 
reason for this is that criminal law is traditionally seen as a central aspect of sovereignty, 
62 Joint Rule of Procedure 39. 
63 See, for example, A. Bodley, "Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1999) 31 N Y. U. J. LL. & Politics 417, p. 417. 
64 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 34, for a recent discussion of 
Article 34 see A. Aust, Modem Timmy Law and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2000) Ch 14. 
65 If or when the Security Council were to pass a situation to the ICC under Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute, there is nothing stopping it including, in the resolution, a Chapter VII duty to comply with ICC 
orders on States. 
66 I. Tallgren, "Completing the International Criminal Order. The Rhetoric of International Repression and 
the Notion of Complementarity in the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court" (1998) 67 Nordic 
J. I. L. 
. 
107, pp-110,120 criticises the use of this term as not having a stable meaning during the drafting. The 
point may be well made, (the term was not of fixed meaning (see C. K. Hall, "The First two Sessions of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" (1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 177, 
p. 181; C. K. Hall, "The Third and Fourth Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for an International 
Criminal Court" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 124, p. 130)) but it is a useful term now, given that the statute is complete, 
to describe the overall relationship. On complementarity generally, see Brown, supra n. 12; A. Bos, "The Role 
of an International Criminal Court in the Light of the Principle of Complementarity", in E. Denter & N. 
Schriver (eds. ) R ons on Intematunal Law firm the Low Camtries: Essays in Honour of Paul de Waart, (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1998) 249; J. Bleich, "Complementarity" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), 777 Intematronal Crnninal 
Covet obsenutions and Issues Before the Preparatory Crivthte and Adnzbýatirx acrd Fir xizl In p&atiwas 13 
Noe Iles Etudes P6zales, 1997) 231; J. T. Holmes, "The Principle of Complementarity" in R. S. Lee (ed. ) 71 
Il Crjnjnal Court (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999) 41; SA. Williams, "Article 17" in O. Triffterer (ed. ) 
C rzntmy on 7J e Rome Stande of th e Intematiorral Crinmal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999) 383. 
67 MR Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 22, pp. 24-5. 
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over which States have an interest in retaining control. 69 Militating against this is an 
international interest in seeing international crimes properly enforced. 70 The result is a 
complex mixture of deference, and challenge to national jurisdictions. The theme of 
complementarity runs through the Statute, coming in at many places, but it is clear from 
the very start that it is a major aspect of the court. In both the preamble and Article 1 of 
the Rome Statute, the court is described as complementary. 
Unlike the UN tribunals which effectively (other than where the principle of noz bis in 
iden applies)71 can take a case whenever they want, the ICC can effectively only take the 
case if certain States are "unwilling or unable" to investigate or prosecute the offence. 72 
Article 17 is express about this, providing "the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where (a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the 
investigation or prosecution; (b) the case has been investigated by a State which has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute... ". 73 To this must be added 
the requirement in Article 18(2) that unless the Security Council has referred the matter, 
the Prosecutor must inform all State parties and "those States which, taking into account 
the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes 
concerned" that she is investigating. Pursuant to Article 18(2) such States can request the 
prosecutor to defer to them74 A Trial Chamber can overturn the request (on grounds not 
68 J. Crawford, "The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court" (1995) 89 A. J. LL. 404, p. 410. 
69 Brown, supra n. 12, p. 424; J. Dugard, "Obstales in the way of an International Criminal Court" (1997) 56 
CvnL is L. J. 329, p. 336. 
70 Arsanjani, supra n. 67, p. 25. 
71 See above, pp67-68. 
72 Rome Statute, Article 17(1). Article 17(2) gives guidelines in order to determine if a State is "unwilling or 
unable". These are (17(2)(a)) if the investigation or prosecution is for the purposes of "shielding" the 
defendant from the court, (17(2(b)), if "there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice", or (17(2)(c)) "the 
proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being 
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice". On the negotiation of these, see Holmes, supra n. 66, pp. 48-55. 
73 Article 17 (1)(c)(d) provide for inadmissibility for non bis in idon or insufficient gravity of offence. 
74 Article 18 was a controversial addition to the Statute, supported primarily by the US, see C. K. Hall, "The 
Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" 
(1998) 92 A. J. I. L 548, p. 552, Arsanjani, supra n. 67, p. 27. The original proposal was A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 25. 
On Article 18 see D. D. Ntanda Nsereko, "Article 18" in Triffterer, supra n. 66,395. 
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set out in the Statute, but probably those in Article 17) either then or later. What these 
provisions make clear is that certain States can, by investigating or prosecuting the matter 
themselves, remove the matter from the ICC, even if it wants the case. 
A separate question is precisely which States may behave in this manner. The Statute 
merely mentions a State which "has jurisdiction" over the offence (in Article 17(1)(a)(b)) 
and (if not a State Party to the Statute) States which "would normally exercise jurisdiction 
over the crimes" (Article 18(1)). Given that under customary law universal jurisdiction 
exists over these offences, 75 this could, in theory, be any State with the domestic basis to 
prosecute. It is possible that the States who "would normally" exercise jurisdiction are 
those doing so on territoriality or nationality purposes. It is possible to imply, from 
Article 12's concentration on States with those grounds of jurisdiction, that these are the 
States referred to in Article 17. There is much to commend this view, in that it would 
simplify the regime, minimise the obstacles to the ICC's jurisdiction and would be 
consistent with the Statute's reluctance to rely on universal jurisdiction. On the other 
hand, in Article 19(2)(b)(c) States referred to in Article 12 are dealt with separately to 
States "which ha[ve]" jurisdiction over a case, and the idea of the ICC is to promote the 
exercise of national jurisdiction. Perhaps a compromise may be reached by reference to 
the notion of "interested States" used by Korea in the Rome negotiations. 76 These were 
the two States referred to in Article 12 (States with territoriality or nationality 
jurisdiction), the custodial State and a State which would have passive personality 
jurisdiction. If these were involved, or seeking extradition, perhaps a useful compromise 
would be to accept these, but no others. 
Whichever way the ICC decides to interpret the relevant phrases, it is obvious that 
States may prevent the ICC from taking a case by diligently proceeding with it 
themselves. There is one matter in which the ICC does have power over States, despite 
75 See pp. 94-98. 
76 A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 7. For other documents from Rome on these matters see A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 15, 
L. 23, L. 25, L. 53 (Articles 15-17), L. 59 (A ticles 15-16), & L. 60. Rev. 1. 
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the criteria in Article 17 which allows the Court to take a case from a State being fairly 
limited. The decision on whether or not these criteria are fulfilled is with the Court itself, 
thus in certain circumstances, it may take a case over the assertion of jurisdiction by a 
State who is "unwilling or unable" to actively pursue the matter. It may take a case after a 
national court has pronounced on it, but only where the proceedings were for "shielding" 
purposes, or were not conducted impartially, or in a manner inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the person to justice. 77 There is no provision for retrial if the crimes was 
characterised as an ordinary crime, although it is possible that a conviction for a 
manifestly disproportionate offence could initiate the application of the second criterion. 
Like the UN Tribunals, trial in the ICC bars future national proceedings. 78 
An interesting issue is that of concurrent requests. The UN tribunals requests take 
precedence over all other obligations. This is not the case with the ICC's orders for 
transfer which depend on various factors. Transfer orders are issued under Article 89, but 
it may be the case that another State has requested extradition of that person for the same 
conduct. Then it is relevant if the requesting State is a party to the Statute. If it is, and the 
court has decided admissibility and that determination included consideration of the 
requesting State, then the Court has priority. 79 If the requesting State is not party to the 
Statute, then the result depends on whether the State is under an international legal 
obligation to extradite that person to another State. If not, then the court gets priority. If 
the Court has already determined that the case is admissible. 80 If it has not, then the 
requested State may extradite to the requesting State. 81 If the court has determined 
admissibility, but the requested State is under an international obligation to extradite, then 
that State has to choose. 82 If any State requests the suspect's extradition for a different 
n Article 20. See I. Tallgren, "Article 20" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 66,419. 
78 Article 20(1). 
79 Article 90(1) (2). If admissibility has not been determined when the request is made, the court is to hear the 
matter on an expedited basis, and the requested State is not to extradite that person until the case is declared 
inadmissible. Article 90(3). For the proposals at Rome see, A/CONF. 183/WGIC/L. 2, L. 3, L. 5, L. 6, L. 7, L. 9, 
L. 19. On Article 90 generally see K. Prost, "Article 90" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 66,1081. 
80 Article 90(4). 
si Article 90(5). 
82 Article 90(6). 
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crime, then if the requested State is under no international obligation to extradite, the 
Court's request is paramount. 83 If it is under such an obligation, the State must decide. 84 
As can be seen, the Court is given some priority, but by no means is this as extensive as 
that given to the UN tribunals, whose orders "trump" any other requests. 
ORDERS 
Turning to co-operation with and assistance to the court on matters other than 
surrender, 85 there is a general duty to comply contained in Article 86.86 Article 86 gives 
the court the right to make requests to States parties for cooperation. 87 Article 93 gives a 
non-exhaustive list of the requests with which the States parties are required to comply, 
which includes finding people or articles, taking and producing evidence, questioning 
suspects, serving documents, facilitating the voluntary appearance of witnesses and 
experts, examinations on site, executing searches and seizures, tracing and freezing assets, 
and "any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested 
State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court". 88 With respect to this last provision, the exception of illegality 
in that State's national law could be very wide, giving a de facto veto for States over any 
request not expressly mentioned in the Statute. Fortunately this exception appears limited 
by Article 93(3). This provides that "where execution of a particular measure detailed in a 
83 Article 90(7)(a). 
84 Article 90(7)(b). 
85 On this generally, see C. Kress, K. Prost, A. Schlunck & P. Wilkitzi, "Part 9" in Trifherer (ed. ), supra n. 66, 
1045, P. Mochochoko, "International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance" in Lee (ed. ), supra n. 66, p. 305. 
86 See C. Kress, "Article 86" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 66,1051. In addition, there is a duty under Article 59(1) 
to take steps to arrest any person subject to a request for arrest from the ICC On Article 59 see A. Schlunck 
"Article 59" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra 11.66,765. There is also a duty on States parties, under Article 88 to 
ensure this is possible under their national law. In theory, this should mitigate the requirement that all 
requests must be executed in accordance with national law (Article 88). If a State cannot execute a request due 
to its national law (other than under Article 93(3)) it is violating the obligation to cooperate (Article 87,89(1) 
93(1)) and the obligation to have the correct national laws and procedures in place (Article 88). For discussion 
of the cooperation regime in the ILC drafts, see J. Crawford, "The ILC's Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Tribunal" (1994) 88 A. J. I. L. 140, pp. 150-1. For the PRECOM discussions see A. Zimmermann, 
"The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court" (1998) 2 Max Planck Y. B. U. N. L. 169, pp. 221- 
225. 
87 By virtue of Article 87(5) the ICC can make ad bx agreements to cooperate with non State parties, to which 
the following regime applies. Article 87(6) gives the court the power to ask intergovernemntal organisations 
to provide assistance. Article 89(1) appears to allow the Court to ask a non State party to surrender, but this 
will not bind that party without specific agreement. 
88 Article 93(1)(a-h)(1). See K. Prost, & A. Schlunck, "Article 93" in Trifterer (ed. ), supra n. 66,1101. 
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request under paragraph 1, is prohibited in the requested State on the basis of an existing 
fundamental legal principle of general application, the requested State shall promptly 
consult with the Court to try to resolve the matter. " If the matter cannot be resolved by 
these consultations, the request must be modified. The cumulative effect of these two 
provisions is that the request can only be denied if the national prohibition is based on 
"an existing fundamental legal principle of general application. " A problem is that the 
phrase in Article 93(3) is hardly free from ambiguity. 
One of the major disappointments relating to the Rome Statute is the qualified 
obligation to comply with all requests, qualifications absent in the UN tribunal regimes. 
The first of these relates to the handing over of evidence which would prejudice a State's 
national security. In sharp contrast to the UN tribunals, who have asserted the right to 
demand such evidence, the Rome Statute only imposes an obligation to consult with the 
court and to attempt in good faith to find a solution. 89 In the final analysis, a State is 
entitled to refuse the submission of this evidence, and the court cannot demand its 
production 90 Its only possible response it to declare that the State is not acting in 
accordance with the Statute (i. e. that the State is not acting in good faith). 91 Wedgwood 
sums up the position and its possible effect correctly: "[i]f the State's refusal to turn over 
national security information is made in good faith, that is the end of the matter, and, 
potentially, the end of a case". 92 
Although there is a duty to consult the ICC and attempt to get around any 
impediment, 93 there are other ways in which a State may avoid complying with an order 
of the ICC. If the requested State is investigating a different crime, and immediately 
89 Article 72, Article 93(4). See Wedgwood, supra n. 51, p. 646-8; D. J. Scheffer, "The United States and the 
International Criminal Court" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 12, p. 15. For discussion of the matter in PREPCOM, see 
Hall, supra n. 74, p. 553. Katz Cogan, supra n. 51, p. 425 claims, with some justification, that this Article is too 
deferential to States. 
9 Article 72(6). Mochochoko, supra n. 85, p. 314 asserts that this is the only ground for refusal of surrender of 
documents. This may not be the case, as there is also, for example, information contained in a bag which has 
diplomatic protection, on the immunities of diplomats see, see infra pp. 109-111. 
91 Article 72(7)(ii). 
92 Wedgwood, supra n. 51, p. 647. As will be seen, infra, p. 267, this may have a particularly negative impact on 
the prosecution of certain offences. 
93 Article 97. 
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executing the request could interfere with that investigation, then that State may delay 
compliance. 94 It may also delay a request if there has been an admissibility challenge, 
unless the Court determines otherwise. 95 These provisions do not provide a reason to 
refuse the request outright. This is not the position for the exceptions to the duty to 
comply in Article 98.96 Under Article 98(1), if the requested State would have to act 
inconsistently with the diplomatic or State immunity of a third State, it may refuse the 
request, unless the third State waives that immunity. This puts the obligations of 
cooperation with the court in a subordinate role to those on immunity, the converse of 
the position in the UN tribunals. Perhaps the reason for this is the long standing and 
important rules of diplomatic immunity. 
This justification does not apply to the exclusion of the duty to comply in Article 
98(2). This reads "the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a 
person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the 
sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender". This provision was added 
primarily to make provision for the situation of troops abroad under Status of Forces 
Agreements. 97 However, Status of Forces agreements frequently provide for offences on 
the territory of the receiving State to be the subject of that State's jurisdiction, the 
exceptions being disciplinary offences and offences against the security of the sending 
State. 98 Therefore it is uncertain why the receiving State should not be able to transfer the 
accused to the court (at least if the offence was committed on its territory), which, after 
all, exists partially as the result of the cession of jurisdiction from the receiving State. 
94 Article 94. 
95 Article 95. 
96 See generally, K. Prost, & A. Schlunck, "Article 98" in Trifterer (ed. ), supra n. 66,1131. 
97 Arsanajani, supra n. 67, p. 411. On Status of Forces Agreements, see R. Y. Jennings & A. Watts, OppmIxim§ 
Intemationa/ Law (London: Longmans, 9th ed. 1992) pp. 1154-1164; G. I. A. D. Draper, Cizilians and z/ NATO 
Status of Foit Agiwnezt (Leyden: Sitjhoff, 1966). 
98 See Jennings & Watts, ibid p. 1159. NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 1951, UKTS 3 (1955) Cmnd 9363 
Article VII. Any possible claim of State immunity must be rejected as it is in the essence of international 
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Also, Article 98(2) is broadly drafted and could apply far beyond pure Status of Forces 
Agreements, and acts as a virtual invitation to States to agree inter se a way out of the 
obligation to surrender to the Court. 
The controversy surrounding this provision is shown by Wedgwood's suggestion that 
these agreements should be reached by the US, but "quietly". 99 The only possible 
limitation on the power of States to make these agreements is that between State parties, 
it could be possible that the Court could order (under Article 93(1)(1)) that the sending 
State transfer the person, or give its consent. If this is the case, then Article 98(2) will be 
limited to agreements between receiving States who are State parties, and sending States 
who are not. Even so, for a State using the Court on the basis of its territorial jurisdiction, 
this is a major derogation of its power to use its own jurisdiction (albeit exercised through 
the Court). 
From the tenor of the Statute, it is clear that aside from the judgments themselves, 
the orders of the court do not directly bind individuals in States. The only time 
cooperation with the ICC is mentioned without reference to national procedures is 
Article 99(4), where measures "which can be executed without any compulsory measures" 
are directly executable, but only after "all possible consultations" with the State party 
concerned, 100 or when a Pre-Trial Chamber has determined the State party is unable to 
fulfil the request because there is no competent authority or judicial body able to do so. lol 
crimes that State immunity does not apply. The non-applicability of the State immunity rules is dealt with in 
Chapter 3, pp. 103-109. 
99 R. Wedgwood, "Fiddling in Rome" (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 20, p. 22. 
100 Article 99(4). On this controversial provision see K. Prost &A Schlunck, "Amide 99" in Triffterer (ed. ), 
supra n. 66,1135, pp. 1138-1144; Mochochoko, supra n. 85, pp. 315-317. 
101 Article 57(3)(d). 
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POWERS TO ENFORCE ORDERS AND DECISIONS 
NUREMBERG AND TOKYO IMTS 
The Nuremberg Mr did not have any power to enforce its decisions propio mown. It 
did not have its own police force or enforcement mechanisms. It did have the Control 
Council. From a practical standpoint, the Nuremberg IMT was integrated into the 
occupation of Germany, and its orders were carried out by the occupation authorities. 102 
Sentences, too were not enforced by the tribunal, but by the Control Counci1,103 who 
continued to do so after the Nuremberg IMT was disbanded. 
The Tokyo IMT was in a very similar position, it had no police of its own, but was 
integrated into an occupation regime. The occupation authorities for Japan carried out the 
orders, and sentences were carried out under the orders of General MacArthur. 104 
ICTY AND ICTR 
The situation with relation to the UN Tribunals was discussed in the Blaskic Case. In 
this case the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted that the ICTY (which would include, by 
analogy, the ICTR) "does not possess any power to take enforcement measures against 
States... [because]... had the drafters of the Statute intended to vest the International 
Tribunal with such a power, they would have expressly provided for it. In the case of an 
international judicial body, this is not a power that can be regarded as inherent in its 
functions. "105 Wedgwood criticises this approach, saying that the speed with which the 
ICTY Statute was drafted means that its absence may not have been determinative. 106 
102 Nuremberg IMT Rules of Procedure 4(c)(d). 
103 Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 29. 
104 Tokyo IM T Charter, Article 17. 
105 Blaskic, supra n. 11 para 25. 
106 Wedgwood, supra n. 51, p. 649. 
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There are certain problems with Wedgwood's view, in principle, and in practice. The 
UN Charter creates a system where enforcement authority is centralised primarily in the 
Security Council. 107 As a result, it cannot easily be presumed, in the absence of any 
indication of Council intent, that there has been delegation of one of its fundamental 
functions. In the past, for sanctions committees, there has been no such presumption of 
delegation, the position being that express wording was required. 108 Even presuming 
these obstacles could be overcome, practical problems remain to militate against 
Wedgwood's view. The ICTR Statute was drafted after the ICTY Statute, and no changes 
were made. If the Security Council had wished to make the delegation clear, it could have 
done so. Also, the Blaskic decision was hardly aberrational; the ICTY had taken its 
position from the beginning, when it its Rules of Procedure provided that the Security 
Council is the only enforcer of its orders. 109 It has constantly maintained this position, '10 
which is supported by the general opinion of scholars. '11 It would seem that the Security 
Council actions have supported this view. In a 1996 Presidential Statement, the Council 
said they were "ready to consider the application of economic enforcement measures" for 
107 K. Dicke, "Comment" in J. Delbrück (ed. ), Allocation of Law Enfcmrment Aut/x»ity in t/ International Systan 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1995) 57, p. 60. 
108 P. Conlon, "Lessons From Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a Source of Sanctions 
Implementation Authority and Practice" (1995) 35 V. J. LL. 633, p. 645. See also C. C. Joyner, "Sanctions, 
Compliance and International Law: Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq" (1991) 32 
V. J. I. L. 1, pp. 16-17. 
109 Joint Rules 11,13,59,61, In 1997 rule Ibis with a general power to report violations was added to the 
specific cases in the earlier rules. 
110 See 5th Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosemdm of Those Responsible for Serious Vioatiavu of 
Intematiarral Hwnmzitarivi Law Cammaral in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 UN Doc. A/53/219; 
S/1998/737, para 226: "Lacking an autonomous enforcement agency, the Tribunal is unable to give effect to 
the plethora of orders, arrest warrants and decisions that it issues. Enforcement is dependent, therefore, on 
those entities that possess the legal and logistical capacity to act no the international stage. In joining the 
United Nations, they agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, such as the one that 
established the Tribunal. Without their support and co-operation, the Tribunal cannot effectively discharge its 
mandate. In many respects, therefore, the umbilical cord is still attached. State support is the Tribunal's 
oxygen supply". 
111 See Morris & Scharf, (ICTY), supra n. 13, p. 313, Morris & Scharf (ICTR), supra n. 13, pp. 659-660; G. 
Hafner, "Limits to the Procedural Powers of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia" In K. 
Wellens (ed. ), International Law Theory and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) 651, p. 656; Bassiouni & 
Manikas, 7, he Law of the Intema zb al Crinirral Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (New York Transnational, 1996) 
pp. 775-779, M. Schrag, "The Yugoslav Tribunal: An Interim Assessment" (1997) 7 Tnvisnatianal L. & 
ernten 
-amy ): nWwu 15, p. 17; P. Malanczuk, "The International Criminal Tribunal's Power to Issue Subpoo7a 
Duces Tawn" in E. Denters & N. Schrijver (eds. ), Reflation on International Lazo fxm the Low Qunm (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1998) 260, p. 271, Greenwood, supra n. 41, p. 108; Joyner, supra n. 47, p. 93. The Netherlands, 
in its amicus ctrriae Brief in the Blaskic Case, para 17, implied that the ICTY may have an enforcement power. 
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failure to co-operate with the I(=. 112 This implies that the Council thought that it was 
the Council's right to impose any enforcement measures. Also, in Resolution 1207, the 
Security Council asked the President of the ICTY to "keep the Council informed about 
the implementation of... [the obligations to comply with the ICTY]... for the Council's 
further consideration". 113 Again, the Council appears to be of the view that the UN 
tribunal's job is to report non-compliance to them, not that the Council has passed onto 
them any enforcement powers. 
This concurs with the IM's view, expressed in Blaskic, that: "[t]he International 
Tribunal is not vested with any enforcement power. It is primarily for its parent body, the 
Security Council, to impose sanctions, if any, against a recalcitrant State". 114 As a 
secondary source of coercion, the ICTY has said that States can take certain action, 
including "political or moral condemnation, or a collective request to cease the breach or 
economic or political sanctions... In addition, collective action [presumably of a non- 
forcible nature] would be warranted in the case of repeated and blatant breaches of 
Article 29 by the same State; and provided the Security Council had not decided that it 
enjoyed exclusive powers on the matter, the situation being part of a general condition of 
a threat to the peace". 115 These could not be forcible, given that there is no right of 
unilateral forcible enforcement of Security Council Resolutions. 116 
In only one instance has the ICTY alluded to direct enforcement powers, this was in 
the exceptional situation mentioned by the Appeals Chamber in Blaskic, where the 
tribunal has directly contacted a person, and issued a subpcia. The Tribunal claimed that 
if the person failed to obey the subpoena then they could hold that person in contempt of 
112 S/PRST/34.8 August 1996. See D. Petrovic, "The Post-Dayton Role of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia", in M. O'Flahtery & G. Gisvold (eds. ) Post WarPrmtazicn of Hwncm Rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegoza (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) 195, pp. 206-206. 
113 UN Doc. S/RES/1207, para 5. The Resolution reiterates the obligation in Resolution 827, calls upon 
Yugoslavia to comply with orders under Article 29 of the ICTY Statute, and demands it surrenders three 
suspects. 
114 Blaskic, supra n. 11, para 33. 
115 Ibo_ para 34. 
116 C. Gray, "After the Cease-Fire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force" (1994) 65 B. YB. I. L. 135 
at p. 177, R. Higgins, I'roblens and Pit ss. International Law and How We Use It. (Oxford: OUP, 1994) p. 259; 
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the tribunal, in absentia, provided that full due process was followed. 117 Even here, though, 
the ICTY limited this to individuals acting in their private capacity, and of course, ignored 
the more difficult question of who would enforce the contempt judgment. 
It might be thought that in the territory of Bosnia, the answer to the absence of 
enforcement jurisdiction could be the Implementation Force IFOR (now the Stabilisation 
Force SFOR). It operates on the territory of Bosnia, and has the power to enforce, most 
importantly, the transfer orders. The debate about whether or not IFOR is under a duty 
to enforce orders addressed to it (and thus, in Bosnia, act almost as the ICTY's police 
force) has continued for some time. 118 NATO (as the primary component of IFOR) 
considers itself under no such obligation, but either way, it is questionable if this debate 
gets to the core of the matter. This is because the obligation would fall on the States 
comprising IFOR themselves. IFOR is an entity external to the ICTY, and is thus not 
part of its enforcement structure. There is nothing the tribunal can do itself to compel 
IFOR to act. In the end, the Court has to rely on reference to the Security Council, being 
devoid of its own enforcement mechanisms. Thus Cassese was correct in referring to it as 
a "giant without arms and legs", 119 as was Wedgwood in noting the absence of power 
could "even call into question the efficacy of the ad hoc tribunal as a judicial fact finding 
6o(V'. 120 
N. D. White & R. Cryer, "Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threat too Far? " (1999) 29 CaL 
WLL. J. 243, pp. 266-279. 
117 BiaSkic, supra n. 11, paras 59-60, they based themselves on Rule 77 and an inherent power to find someone 
in contempt. 
119 See N. Figa-Talamaanca, "The Role of NATO in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina" 
(1997) 7 E. J. LL. 164; J. R. W. D. Jones, "The Implications of the Peace Agreement for The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 226, pp. 238-240; copra P. Gaeta, "Is NATO 
Authorised or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia" (1998) 8 E. J. I. L. 174 (no duty). 
119 A. Cassese, "On the Current Trend Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law" (1998) 9 E. J. I. L. 2, p. 13. 
i2o Wedgwood, supra n. 51, p. 648. 
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In relation to sentencing, although they are entitled to hold persons on remand (Rule 
of Procedure 64), 121 the tribunals have no power to enforce their own sentences. Article 
27 of the ICTY Statute (Article 26 ICTR Statute) provides that terms of imprisonment 
are to be served in the prisons of States who have indicated their willingness to take such 
convicts as they arise. 122 The tribunal's primacy is ensured though, by virtue of Article 27 
of the ICTY Statute (Article 26 ICTR Statute), which provides that although the 
imprisonment shall be in accordance with the local law, this is subject to the 
"supervision" of the tribunal. As Tolbert explains, "what appears... to be envisaged is a 
co-operative relationship, with the State assuming the responsibility of the day to day 
supervision of the terms of imprisonment, provided that the tribunal is entitled to veto 
any fundamental change in the sentence, such as a pardon, in which case the tribunal has 
the ultimate authority, which authority must be respected by the state". 123 This is borne 
out by ICTY Statute Article 28 (ICTR Statute Article 27), which demands that if, by the 
law of the enforcing State, the prisoner would be eligible for parole or commutation of 
sentence, then the State must inform the tribunal, who will decide if this is to occur. 124 
Icc 
The position in the Rome Statute is quite clear. For all intents and purposes the 
Court has no enforcement powers for its orders. In the event of State failure to comply 
121 This is clearly subject to Tribunal control, for example, the powers in Rules 64-5 in relation to the 
conditions of detention and provisional release are given to the President and the Trial Chambers. The Rules 
of Detention were adopted by the Tribunal (IT/38/Rev. 7). Although the detention facility is in a Dutch jail, it 
is subject to UN powers, not Dutch rules, (see Schufte, supra n. 9, p. 211). 
122 So far, Italy, Norway, Finland and Sweden have made agreements with the ICIY to enforce sentences, 
other States have agreed to accept convicts, but have made no agreements to that effect, See 5th Rep n Of The 
Intematr al Tri&mal For The Pmsaruticn Of Persons Resp se For Serious Violatkvzs Of Intanatianal Hwnanitarian 
Law C, arrpn l In The Territory Of The Former Yug, slaüa Sinx 1991, UN. Doc A/53/219, paras 251-254. For 
ICIR sentences, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden have agreed to accept prisoners, 5th Rgarnt Of 
Thee International Tribunal For The P vmudzon Of Persons Responsible for Cimcide and Series Volativns of International 
Hwnzritarimt Law on the Territory of Rzai nda and R widan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
7ioLwions of International Hwncm tanL= Law in the Tenizory of Neigh States Betnut 1 Jana vy and 31 Dkmzber 
1994, UN. Doc. A/54/315, para 121. In August 2000 Lesotho and Mali agreed to enforce ICIR sentences. 
123 D Tolbert, "The ICTY and the Enforcement of Sentences" (1998) 11 L. J. LL. 655, p. 661. See also Rules of 
Procedure 103-104. 
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with an order of the Court, the Court can make a finding of non-compliance, then it may 
refer the matter to either the Assembly of State Parties, or to the Security Council. 125 The 
Court may only refer the matter to the Security Council if it was the Security Council who 
initially referred the matter to the Court under Article 13(b). 126 The Security Council's 
powers to compel compliance come under Chapter VII of the ÜN Charter, and he 
beyond the scope of this study. The Assembly of State Parties under the Rome Statute is 
granted no sanctioning or enforcement powers under the Statute, and its ability to 
enforce the ICC's orders, or deal with recalcitrant State Parties must be considered very 
limited 
In relation to sentences, the position is similar to that of the UN tribunals, the ICC 
will not have its own prison, but sentences "shall be served in a State designated by the 
Court from a list of States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept 
sentenced persons". 127 As with the ÜN tribunals, the enforcement of the sentence is 
governed by the local State's laws (and must be in accordance with "accepted 
international treaty standards"), 128 but is subject to the supervision of the Court. 129 The 
Court is the only body entitled to reduce the sentence of any convict, and the enforcing 
State is not entitled to release them before the expiration of the period set by the 
Co. 130 
124 See Rules of Procedure 123-125 (ICIY) & Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Determination of 
Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release of Persons Convicted by the 
International Tribunal 7 April 1999. Rules of Procedure 124-126 (ICIR). 
125 Article 87(7). 
126 JbId 
127 Article 103(1)(a). See G. AM. Strijards, "Article 103" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 66,1159; T. P. Chimimba, 
"Establishing an Enforcement Regime" in Lee (ed. ), supra n. 66,345. 
128 p cle 106(2). 
129 Article 106(1). 
130 Article 110(1)(2). 
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JURISDICTION 
NUREMBERG IMT 
The Jurisdiction of the Nuremberg IMT was, according to the London Charter, over 
those war criminals whose offences had no particular geographical location. 131 This could 
be very broad, but it was drastically limited by the reference to the Moscow declaration, 
which limited it to offences by the Axis powers in the European sphere of WWII. It is 
this aspect which provided the second thread of the charge of victor's justice against the 
Nuremberg IlVIT. Not only were the judges drawn entirely from the victorious nations, 
but the laws in the Charter "were applied exclusively to the acts of the vanquished". 132 
Indeed, any mention of alleged war crimes or aggressive acts by the Allied powers was 
banned by the Tribunal, which was required to "confine the Trial strictly to an 
expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges... [and]... take strict measures to 
prevent any action which will cause unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and 
statements of any kind whatsoever". 133 Given the jurisdictional limitation to offences 
committed by one set of belligerents, in one conflict, the legitimacy of the Nuremberg 
IMT must be considered compromised here. 
TOKYO IMT 
To a large extent, similar comments are relevant to the Tokyo IMT. It was mandated 
to try the "Far Eastern War Criminals". These were limited to the Japanese. As with the 
Nuremberg Charter, mention of offences by the Allies was precluded by the Tokyo 
IMT's constituent document. 134 Again, given that there were questions about various 
Allied actions in the war, the limits on the Tokyo IMT's jurisdiction led to the claims of 
131 Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 1. 
132 M. Lippman, "Nuremberg 45 Years Later" (1991) 7 Conn6aiaa J. L. L. 1, p. 37. 
133 Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 18(a)(b). 
134 Tokyo IlvTT Charter, Article 12(a)(b). 
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victor's justice and an inability to engage in self-scrutiny by the Allies. Both Nuremberg 
and Tokyo were marred by their concentration, not only on the offences in one conflict, 
but also by the one sided prosecution of the defeated side alone. 
ICTY AND ICTR 
Articles 1 and 8 of the ICTY Statute circumscribe its jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction 
over offences committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.135 
Obviously, by its terms, the geographical limit is very clear. There is no possibility that the 
ICTY's jurisdiction over the offences in its Statute apply to those beyond the old borders 
of Yugoslavia or before 1 January 1991 (importantly, given the recent violations of the 
ICTY Statute in Kosovo, there is no cut off date in the ICI'Y Statute). 136 The position 
with the Rwanda Statute is slightly different. Article 7 grants the ICTR jurisdiction over 
offences in Rwanda and offences in "neighbouring States", the latter if committed by 
Rwandan citizens. The temporal limit is greater here, being confined to one year (1 
January 1994-31 December 1994.137 As can be seen, the UN Tribunals are limited in 
geographical and temporal scope, the ICTR being particularly limited temporally. Some 
say the Security Council is now suffering from "Tribunal fatigue"138 and thus is unlikely 
to create any more Tribunals. This could be thought to reduce the legitimacy of the UN 
Tribunals, as they are shown to be limited measures responding to particular situations, 
selective in that other conflicts, such as those in Liberia or the Congo remain without 
similar UN responses. "Tribunal fatigue" may have been a fact in the late 1990s, or it may 
not, but the recent action of the Security Council relating to Sierra Leone (see ira p. 17'9) 
militates in favour of the view that it is not now. Still. Harris is correct in stating that 
135 See Levie, supra n. 30, p-14- 
136 See Morris & Scharf (ICTY), supra n. 13, Ch. VII The Security Council has expressly accepted that the 
ICTY has jurisdiction over the Kosovan conflict, SC Resolution 1160, UN Doc. S/RES/ 1160, SC Resolution 
1203, UN Doc. S/RES/ 1203. 
137 See Morris & Scharf, (ICTR), supra n. 13, Ch. VII. 
138 M. P. Scharf, "The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court" (1995) 6 DukeJ. C & I. L. 167, 
p. 169. 
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"despite the end of the cold war, there is absolutely no guarantee that the international 
community will not turn a blind eye to the next Rwanda or Yugoslavia". 139 The Security 
Council has not considered itself under any legal duty to respond to any other conflicts in 
a similar way, and, where actions, friends or allies of one of the Permanent five members 
of the Council are concerned, they will be protected by the veto. 140 
One significant improvement over the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs must be noted, 
and it is this that saves a great deal of their legitimacy. They may be reactive responses, 
limited to the conflicts which they were created for, but unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
predecessors, they apply equally to all parties to the conflict. 141 In relation to the ICTY, 
Rubin has asserted that "[the Security Council] made sure that only atrocities by 
participants in the actual struggle in the former Yugoslavia would be within the Tribunal's 
purview; their own activities, even as armed `peacekeepers' there, are not". 142 There is no 
legal basis for this belief, the limitations on the jurisdiction of both Tribunals are 
geographical and temporal alone. 143 This represents a large factor in ensuring a greater 
legitimacy, particularly as part of its mandate is to individualise guilt. It would be 
impossible for the Tribunals to do this if they were limited to certain parties to both 
conflicts. That said, it would take a politically brave prosecutor to indict a national of one 
of the P5, (particularly the US), given that they created the Tribunals, and are amongst its 
strongest supporters. 144 The refusal of the ICTY Prosecutor, in 2000 to indict or 
undertake serious investigation into allegations of violations of the laws of war by NATO 
139 D 
. 
J. Harris, "Progress and Problems in Establishing an International Criminal Court" (1998) 3 J. A. C. L. 1, 
p. 3. 
140 Scharf, supra n. 138, p. 170. Similarly, the notorious indictee "Arkan" has claimed that he rejects the 
authority of the ICTY as the US has never been brought to trial for its actions in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Panama. R. Dixon, "New developments in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia: Prominent Leaders Indicted and Jurisdiction Established" (1995) 8 L. J. I. L. 449, pp. 
460-461. 
141 M. C. Bassiouni, "From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent 
International Criminal Court" (1997) 10 Hanwid H. R. J. 11, p. 43. 
142A. P. Rubin, "Dayton, Bosnia and the Limits of Law" (Winter 1996/1997) 47 The NationaiIntei t 41, p. 42. 
143 This was confirmed by the prosecutor on 20thMay 1999, who said NATO countries, by their actions 
"have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of a pre-existing International Tribunal, whose 
mandate applies to the theatre of their chosen military operations, whose reach is unqualified by nationality, 
whose investigations are triggered at the sole discretion of the Prosecutor and who has primacy over national 
courts". (1999) 125 Tribunal Update. 
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when bombing Kosovo bears this out. Despite the exceptional action by the Prosecutor, 
in making the internal report on the allegations public, 145 the suspicion remains that her 
refusal to investigate further was partially motivated by the severe displeasure with which 
the US (in particular) received the news that she was investigating at all. 
Icc 
Some of the States negotiating at the Rome conference wanted the ICC to be 
empowered to assert universal jurisdiction at all times, and there is no reason, in law, why 
this could not have been the case. 146 Politically, this was not possible (it was on this issue 
that the Rome conference finally broke consensus). 147 As a result, the Court is given 
jurisdiction first of all over offences committed on the territory of, or by a national of, 
one of the States party. 148 For these the Prosecutor has proprio motu powers, thus she may 
begin investigations without a reference from States or the Security Council. Under this 
head of jurisdiction, the Court will have as broad a jurisdiction as it has States party. It is 
therefore the only court which, with high levels of State ratifications, could have 
jurisdiction over a large part of the globe. It could thus be the most legitimate, particularly 
144NATO spokesman Jamie Shea, with reference to what the Prosecutor said (il d) said that "NATO is a 
friend of the Tribunal... [and]... would allow Justice Arbour to go to Kosovo and investigate. NATO are the 
people who have been detaining indicted war criminals for the Tribunal". 
145 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (undated), and press release, 13 June 2000 PR/ P. I. S. / 5 10-e. 
146 Zimmermann, supra n. 86 pp. 205-206. For the debates on this issue, from the ILC (1993) on, see, Crawford 
(1994) supra n. 86, p. 412; Hall (3z1 & 4th Sessions), supra n. 66, p. 131; Hall, (6th Session) supra n. 74, p. 549; M. 
Politi, "The Establishment of an International Court at a Crossroads: Issues and Aspects After the First 
Session of the Preparatory Committee", in Bassiouni (ed. ) supra n. 66,115, pp. 148-152. For Rome documents 
see A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 6, L. 53 (Article 7), L. 59 (Article 7), L. 70. 
147 See E. Wilrnshurst "Jurisdiction of the Court" in Lee (ed. ), supra n. 66,127; E. La Haye, "The Jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court: Controversies Over the Preconditions for Exercise of its jurisdiction" (1999) 46 N. LL. R. 1; R. Dicker, "Issues Facing the International Criminal Court's Preparatory Commission" 
(1999) 32 Cornell I. L. J. 471, p. 473 canvasses US approaches to re-opening the jurisdictional clauses of the 
Rome Statute. 
148 tae 12. See S. A. Williams, "Article 12" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 66,329. In addition, States can agree, 
under Article 12(3) to the Court exercising jurisdiction over one or more of the categories of crimes. For war 
crimes, for the first seven years of the existence of the Court, it will also be contingent on the nationality or 
territorial State not both having opted out of the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 124 on which see A. 
Zimmerman, "Article 124" in Triffterer (ed. ) ibid, 1281. 
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as it is set up prior to the commission of any of the offences for which it may assert 
jurisdiction. 149 
In addition to this (practical politics means that it is unlikely that every State, or even 
an overwhelming majority of States, will ratify the Statute), the ICC has another form of 
jurisdiction, one based on universality. For this, the Security Council has to pass the 
matter to the Court under Article 13(b). Given that in Tack the ICTY expressly rejected 
the view that the Security Council had criminal competence, it must be the Court which 
has this universal jurisdiction. 150 For the exercise of this jurisdiction, the Security Council 
must have passed the matter to the prosecutor, who has no paprio mau powers to 
investigate here. Thus although the Court has, in one way, universal jurisdiction, this is 
only exercisable on a contingency outside the power of the Court. This form of 
jurisdiction is just as selective as the decisions of the Security Council to create the ICTY 
and ICIR. Nonetheless, the Court has the possibility of having a very wide jurisdictional 
basis for future offences, and will be by far the most global in scope, not being created 
for one particular conflict, or set of parties to that conflict. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Extensive debate relating to the possibilities of the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs 
being models for the integrated system of international criminal law enforcement is not 
worthwhile. They were both integrated into regimes exercising authority over the territory 
and persons over which they were acting, therefore, in many ways, for enforcement 
purposes, were more akin to national courts than international courts, although their legal 
basis remains international law. Their jurisdictional scope was limited to the losing side in 
a particular war, giving rise to criticisms of "victor's justice" The UN Tribunals, with 
149 Article 241imits its jurisdiction, to offences committed after the Statute comes onto force. 
iso 7dicAR72, supra n. 14, para 38. 
90 
powerful obligations to accept their orders represent in some ways a best case scenario 
for the powers of international criminal courts. The absence of any enforcement authority 
goes some way to undermining the efficacy of those obligations. Their jurisdiction, 
although limited to one set of circumstances, is more equitable, applying, in theory 
anyway, to all parties involved in the conflict. In practice though, this has not been the 
case. The Rome Statute structurally being more a creature of political compromise than 
the two UN Tribunals, has less intense duties of compliance, subject to enforcement only 
via the Assembly of States Parties, or (if it chooses to send a situation to the court) the 
Security Council. 151 This weakening must be balanced against the increased jurisdictional 
reach of the ICC when it comes into existence. The remainder of this part of the thesis 
will attempt to sketch some of the implications the creation of these three bodies has had, 
will have, and could have, on the regime for the prosecution of international crimes. 
151 See supra p. 85. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF THE INDIRECT 
ENFORCEMENT REGIME: ARE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS THE ANSWER? 
INTRODUCTION 
It is all too easy, given the prominence of international tribunals, to overlook the 
primary enforcers of international criminal law, national courts. While international courts 
are of higher profile, the bread-and-butter enforcement should be carried on at the 
national level, and this is no coincidence. International criminal law itself does not 
primarily place enforcement on the international level. Of all the substantive international 
criminal law conventions in force, only two, the Genocide Convention, ' and the 
Apartheid Convention even mention enforcement by an international tribunal. The 
Geneva Conventions Grave Breaches regime, considered to contain paradigmatic 
international crimes, does not mention international enforcement 
.3 Indeed, what 
characterises a Grave Breach is an obligation on States to make it a crime in the municipal 
sphere and either prosecute malefactors themselves or extradite them to another 
contracting State. 4 Until recently, State obligations under international law relate almost 
entirely to national prosecutions. The fact that national courts are the preferred fora for 
the enforcement of international criminal law is reiterated by the Rome Statute for the 
1 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNIS 277, Article VI. 
2 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Prevention of the Crime of Apartheid, 1015 UNIS 
245, Article V. 
3 1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31, Article 49; 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration for the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85 Article 50; 
1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135, Article 129; 1949 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287, Article 
146. See H. Fischer, "Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions" in G. K. Mcdonald & 0. Swaak- 
Goldman (eds. ), Prot 'al and Substawhe Aspects of lntemational Crinirral Law he Hague: Kluwer, 2000) 67. 
4IM 
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International Criminal Court. 5 The court is based on the principle of complementarity, i. e. 
it acts at most in tandem with national jurisdictions: it does not exercise primacy over 
then-L6 It is meant only to act as a jurisdictional back stop, when a national court is either 
"unwilling or unable" to take the case.? 
It is the purpose of this chapter to evaluate the legal regime relating to the national 
implementation of international criminal law. Certain problems are identified, not least in 
the law and practice of extradition, which is central to the transfer of suspects to 
jurisdictions willing to prosecute. The problems relating to extradition in many ways are 
indicative of the tension identified in the introduction, 8 between the universal nature of 
the international crimes undermining sovereignty-based assumptions, and the bilateralist, 
Statist system which is still identifiable in the international system. The chapter proceeds 
by evaluating the effectiveness of the legal regime surrounding the prosecution of 
international crimes nationally, through the "indirect" enforcement system. Problems that 
have arisen in practice with jurisdiction, extradition, the non-existence of a general duty to 
extradite or prosecute, and the differing approaches of national laws to international 
crimes will be noted In each instance an investigation into the extent to which the 
existence of, and legal regime surrounding, international criminal tribunals has served to 
improve matters. 
When the focus turns to the ways in which international criminal tribunals have (or 
have not) overcome the problems identified, reference will be made primarily to the 
recent UN tribunals and ICC. This is because the two earlier IMTs were very much sui 
generis institutions, sitting for a single trial each (although there were numerous defendants 
in each trial). They were not integrated into a system of enforcement of international 
crimes. This was partially as the idea that international crimes required an international 
5 A/CONF. 183/9; (1998) 371 L. M. 999. 
6 This is clear from the Preamble, which, in paragraph 10 "Emphasi[ses] that the international criminal 
Court... shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions" and Article 1 of the Statute "its 
jurisdiction... shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions". 
7 Ibid Article 17. 
8 pp. 7-10. 
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response it primarily traceable to those two institutions. The other reason is that due to 
the military defeat of the Axis powers, and the position of the Allies as occupiers (albeit 
of a special kind in the case of Germany) of the States where the defendants were located, 
third parties were not required for obtaining defendants. The UN Tribunals and the ICC 
are different, as they are intended to operate in tandem with national jurisdictions. To 
differentiate these tribunals is not to say that there is, as yet, a truly functioning integrated 
system of prosecution for international crimes. But it is emerging. With the advent of the 
Rome Statute, a clear trend towards an integrated system is discernible. 
JURISDICTION 
JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS 
As the offences involved in international criminal law are often anticipated to be 
prosecuted outside of their laic delicti, discussion of the principles of jurisdiction relevant 
to extra-territorial jurisdiction applicable to war crimes, aggression, crimes against 
humanity and genocide is relevant. Perhaps the reason for the traditional absence of 
enforcement outside the territory of commission is referable to a real or imagined lack of 
jurisdiction. The reason for the choice of these crimes, as opposed to offences such as 
terrorism, is that these crimes are generally considered to be the "core" offences against 
international law, and are the types of crimes over which the three international criminal 
tribunals this decade have jurisdictional competence. 9 
There are various strands of jurisdiction other than territoriality, for example 
nationality, protective and passive personality. They all have their limits, be they upon 
who is subject to them (nationality, passive personality) or to which kind of offences they 
9 The Rome Statute gives the permanent court jurisdiction over aggression, however, the court is prohibited 
from exercising this jurisdiction unless and until the States party to the statute agree a definition, at the 
earliest, seven years from the entry into force of the statute. (Article 5(2) Rome Statute). 
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apply (protective). 10 There is a common theme to all these heads of jurisdiction, they are 
granted by international law to a State so it may protect its national interests-" However 
there is an exception to this trend for one form of jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction. 
Here an interest of all States in the maintenance of a norm is considered so strong it may 
be analogised to a national interest for all States. 12 This can be seen as evidence of the rise 
of new values in the international system, establishing a community based interest, that is 
passed on to individual States. This underlines the idea that such crimes are an attack on 
the international legal order itself, 13 an order in which States all have an interest in 
upholding. 14 The result of this is that if an offence subject to universal jurisdiction is 
committed, any State may prosecute the offence, irrespective of where, or by whom, the 
offence was committed. This exceptional form of jurisdiction covers the three main 
offences discussed here. 
For genocide, there were some initial questions about whether or not jurisdiction was 
universal, as the Genocide Convention itself only provides for jurisdiction of the 
territorial State, or an international tribunal. 15 A proposal to include universal jurisdiction 
in the convention was dropped. 16 It has since been settled that customary international 
law permits States to invoke universal jurisdiction over this offence, and crimes against 
10 See P. Malanczuk, Akehunt's Modem Inmx&K ion to International Law (London: Routledge, 7th ed. 1997) pp. 
110-13; C. Blakesley, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), International Cri bial Law VoL Ik" 
P xdural and En, rett Malxmisms (New York: Transnational, 2nd ed. 1999) 33 The classic treatment of 
jurisdiction remains M. Akehurst, "Jurisdiction in International Law" (1972-1973) 46 B. YB. I. L. 145. 
11 B. Stem, "Better Interpretation and Enforcement of Universality Jurisdiction" in C. Joyner (ed. ), Reign* in 
In ovi yforIntemational Crbn and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights (St. Agne: Ere s, 1998) p. 175 at 
p. 177. 
12 Ibid 
13 On which, see R. Higgins, Problens and I'ývcpss, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) pp. 58-59. 
14 On the idea that all States have an interest in the upholding of an international order bounded by law see A. 
Watts, "The Importance of International Law" in M. Byers (ed. ), 7lß Role of Law in International Politics 
(Oxford: OUP, 2000) 5, p. 7. 
is Supra n. 1. 
16 Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Sixth 
Committee. 3d Sess. UN Doc. A/760 (1948) p. 8,3 UNGAOR 6th Committee, 3d Sess. 100th, 130th-133rd 
meetings. See S. Ratner & J. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atv res in International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1997) p. 142. 
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humanity. 17 War crimes, at least in the sense of the Grave Breaches regime are subject to 
universal jurisdiction both by the regime set up in the conventions themselves, 18 and 
customary international law. 19 This is because the obligation in the regime is to enact 
legislation enabling the prosecution of all offenders irrespective of nationality or laus 
delicti. 
It would thus seem that universal jurisdiction could almost be seen as a panacea, 
solving many of the enforcement problems of international criminal law. However, until 
recently, State practice on its usage was rather weak. An example would be the Eichmarm 
case, which also relied on the protective and passive personality heads of jurisdiction. 20 
This has led some to go as far as to say that practice on universal jurisdiction is "so 
sketchy that at present.. 
. 
it appears to hold little promise for effective national 
prosecution. "21 This does not alter the legal position if jurisdiction is seen as a right, not a 
duty. 22 As Stem points out, under-use of universal jurisdiction " is not because it is not 
available as a matter of international law; rather it is because States most often are not 
eager to deal with crimes-however odious, committed by foreigners, against foreigners, 
17 See, for example A-G of Israel v Eichnann (Trial Court) (1968) 36 I. L. R. 18,26-57, Matter of the Extradition of 
Dazlanjuk 776 F. 2d. 571, pp. 582-3. Ratner & Abrams, Ad, p. 143. Also see K. Randall, "Universal Jurisdiction 
Under International Law" (1988) 66 Tex. L. R. 785, pp. 788-90; W. Cowles, "Universality of Jurisdiction Over 
War Crimes" (1945) 33 CaLL. R. 177; Higgins, supra n. 13; I. Brownlie, Prim* of International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 5th ed., 1998), pp. 308-309; C. C. Joyner, "Arresting Impunity, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction 
in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability" (1996) 59 L. & Contcnxnw y Pmblens 153; C. L. Blakesley & O. 
Lagodny, "Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction, the Role of Human 
Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law" (1991) 24 Vande, hildt J. TL. 1, 
p. 35. 
1s Supra n. 3. 
19 The Grave Breaches regime was held to be customary in Pros or v Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 
1997, IT-94- 1 
-T, para 577. They may, however have been refering to the acts prohibited, rather than the duty 
imposed. As the Geneva Conventions are to all intents, universally ratified, this is not a matter of great 
importance. 
20 Supra n. 12. 
21 L. S. Sunga, The Emerging Systan of Intemational Cran»7al Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) p. 250. 
22 If it is conceived of as such (as it is here, see infra) then the matter becomes not whether there are large 
numbers of such prosecutions, but whether or not they are protested. As far as the author is aware, none of 
the prosecutions mentioned in this section on the establishment of universal jurisdiction have been protested. 
The conception of universal jurisdiction as a right rather than a duty refutes the argument of, for example, 
Lord Slynn in Rv Bozo Street Stiperdiary Magistrate ex pane Pinodaet Uga v [No. 1][1998] 4 All E. R. 897 p. 913, "It 
does not seem to me that it has been shown that there is any state practice or general consensus let alone a 
widely supported convention that all crimes against international law should be justiciable in national courts 
on the basis of universality of jurisdiction. " To say there is no practice at all is easily empirically falsified, as 
the Eicbnmm case was cited before them. It seems more likely that he was confusing the ideas of a right and 
duty of prosecution, and noting that there are not many cases. 
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outside their territory". 23 This is changing to a certain extent. Whilst in France the Dazian 
de Tribunal de Grande Instance 6thMay 199724 a retrogressive denial of universal jurisdiction 
under French legislation occurred, other counties are beginning to use either treaty based 
or customary universal jurisdiction in prosecutions of non nationals. Uses or assertions of 
universal jurisdiction have recently been reported in Switzerland, 25 Austria, 26 Denmark, 27 
Germany, 28 Canada29 and Belgic 
. 
30 These are welcome instances of State practice 
actually using universal jurisdiction, and a refutation of the idea that it is merely a 
theoretical construct 31 In particular, the Austrian case of Dusko C was particularly 
interesting, implying universal jurisdiction into the Genocide Convention if there is no 
functioning territorial judiciary. 32 This shows that if judicial and political will is present, 
universal jurisdiction can be an important part of national prosecution efforts. At the 
international level, Germany has recently noted that there is universal jurisdiction over 
23 Supra n. 11, p. 178. 
24 Ibid pp 187-8. For discussion of the earlier decision overturned by the Trilwial see R Maison, "les premiers 
cas d'l'applicaation des dispositions penales des Conventions de Geneve par les jurisdictions internes" (1995) 
6 E. J. I. L. 260. See also B. Stem, "International Decisions: In re Javor, In re Munyeshaka" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 
525, p. 529 commenting that "these cases illustrate the reluctance of French Courts to assert universal 
jurisdiction". 
25 In re G Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne, 18th April 1997, noted A. Ziegler, "International Decisions: 
In re G" (1998) 82 A. J. I. L. 78. The case applied Code Penale Mdiaire Art 2(9) & Arts 108-14, which assert 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes. 
26 Dusko C. Beschluss des Oberstem Gerichtshofs Os99/94-6,13th July 1994. See A Marschik, "European 
National Approaches to War Crimes" in T. L. H. McCormack & G. Simpson (eds. ), 771 Law of War Crim. 
National and Intemational Approach (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 65, pp. 79-82. 
27 Refac Saris, Ostre Landsret Decision of 25 November 1994. 
28 Public Prosautor v Djajic No20/96. Supreme Court of Bavaria, 3d Strafsenat, 23rd May 1997. Noted C J. M. 
Safferling, (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 528. Applying German Penal Code s6(9) German Penal Code, which gives 
Germany jurisdiction over offences over for which Germany has an international duty to punish (which the 
court took to include genocide). The German courts have asserted universal jurisdiction over other offenders 
in the ex-Yugoslav context, for example Nikola Jorgic (sentenced to life for genocide on 27 September 1997, 
see The Guardian 27 September 1997), and Dusko Tadic, who was transferred to the Hague. 
29 Canadian legislation was used to investigate Leon Mugesera for genocide in Rwanda, which necessarily 
would involve a claim of universal jurisdiction. See 77. Guanlian 17 August 1994. For an overview of 
legislation (from the UK, Canada and Australia) that are based on universal jurisdiction see T. Meron, 
"International Criminalisation of Internal Atrocities" (1995) 89 A. J. I. L. 554, at pp. 572-4. 
30 Belgian Authorities have been attempting to use their Loi 16 June 1993 Monizew Belge 5 August 1993, which 
asserts universal jurisdiction over breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in relation to Rwanda. See L. 
Reydams, "Universal Jurisdiction Over Atrocities in Rwanda: Theory and Practice" (1996) 1 
Eur. J. Cran. Crin. L. & Cron. Just- 18, pp. 35-38. 
31 For a helpful discussion of the cases relating to non international armed conflict, see S. Boeleart-Suominen, 
"Grave Breaches, Universal Jurisdiction and Internal Armed Conflicts: Is Customary Law Moving Towards a 
Uniform Enforcement Mechanism for All Armed Conflicts" (2000) 5 J. CS. L. 63. 
32 Supra n. 20. 
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war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 33 The matter should no longer really 
be in doubt. 34 
Thus jurisdiction over international crimes is simple, as universal jurisdiction provides 
all States with the right to prosecute international crimes, wherever, and by whoever, they 
are committed. This is in addition to any other heads of jurisdiction which may apply 
(such as territorial or nationality). The difficulty is determining between the overlapping 
jurisdictional claims universal jurisdiction creates, as there is no hierarchy established 
between the forms of jurisdiction. This has been a problem for Tanzania, which has been 
faced with both Rwanda (the State with territorial jurisdiction) and Belgium (who seek to 
prosecute on the grounds of universal jurisdiction) seeking the extradition of 
Ntuyuhaga. 35 It is also, in some ways, what was at issue in the Pinochet litigation, as Chile 
claimed it should be able to try him, 36 while the "implicit assumption in the Spanish- 
English effort was that Chile had no protected right" to do so in preference to their 
courts. 37 Bassiouni is a supporter of the creation of a hierarchy of jurisdictional claims. 38 
It would be a sensible, but difficult development, 39 and the problem of overlapping 
jurisdiction remains. 
Although the jurisdictional claim underlying them may have been universal, neither 
the Nuremberg or Tokyo I ITs were mandated to exercise the jurisdiction in a universal 
33 This was a the sixth meeting of the UN PREPCOM. See C. K. Hall, "The Sixth Session of the UN 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 548 at p. 
550. 
34 A secondary argument could be made that to the extent that international crimes are also subject to jus 
aoga s prohibitions this could lead to the existence of universal jurisdiction, Praetor v Fuiwidzija, judgment, 
10 December 1998, IT-95-17/1-T, para 156. Jus aogau norms coincide with eV aw obligations, (M. Ragazzi, 
The Corxxpt of International C igations Erga Omnes (Oxford: OUP, 1997) p. 50) This supports the idea of the 
community interest in the suppression of international crimes being converted into a national interest of 
States for the purposes of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, although the prohibitions on genocide and crimes against 
humanity are jus mgau that is not the case for all war crimes, which are also subject to universal jurisdiction. 
35 See supra pp. 63-64. 
36 See written submissions of Chile, as reported by Lord Hutton in Rv Bow Stmt Stipaad&v y Magistrate, ex prate 
pined. Ugarte [No. 3] [1999] 2 W. L. R. 827, p. 900. "The Republic [of Chile] intervenes to assert its own 
interest and right to have these matters dealt with in Chile... Nor is the purpose to prevent him from 
being 
investigated and tried for any crime he is alleged to have committed whilst in office, provided that any 
investigation and trial takes place in the only appropriate courts, namely those of Chile". 
37 R, Wedgwood, "International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet" (2000) 40 V. J. LL. 829, pp. 832-833. 
38 M. C. Bassiouni, "Policy Considerations on Inter-State Cooperation in Criminal Matters" in M. C. Bassiouni 
(ed. ), supra n. 10,3, p. 9, ranking them territoriality, nationality passive personality, protective and universal. 
39 Blakesley, supra n. 10, p. 82. 
98 
manner. Limited to the prosecution of Axis nationals, they were operating on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction, albeit violating its spirit. The Nuremberg agreement, in conjunction 
with Control Council Law 10 seemed to overcome the problem of hierarchy for the 
signatories who were duty bound to make defendants available to the IMT. 40 This "duty" 
was rendered unworthy of the name by the granting to each occupying power the right to 
veto the removal of a defendant from their control. 41 The Tokyo Charter did not have 
this requirement, probably as the US was in effective control of the entire territory of 
Japan, unlike in Germany where the four occupants all had their respective "zones". 
The ICTY and ICTR both partially exercise what amounts to jurisdiction mandated 
by the universal principle (m both instances for genocide and crimes against humanity 
and some war crimes). For some war crimes, those not considered customary but 
nonetheless applicable to the conflict by virtue of agreements entered into by the parties 
to the conflict, or adherence to the relevant treaties, jurisdiction is on the basis of 
nationality or territorial jurisdiction 42 Like the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs they do not 
have the power to exercise jurisdiction over offences outside the limited areas to which 
they have been assigned. 43 
Within their jurisdictional limits, the two UN tribunals have gone a long way towards 
solving the problems of overlapping jurisdiction. This comes from the principle of 
primacy of the UN tribunals. 44When either Tribunal wishes to take jurisdiction over an 
indictee, its jurisdiction trumps that of national jurisdictions, 45 which are obliged to 
40 1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
Power and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279, Article 3. 
41 As discussed in Chapter 2, n. 3 Control Council Law 10 gave the signatories a veto over the removal of a 
defendant from their custody. 
42 For the ICTR this can be seen by the limitation of jurisdiction, for offences committed outside the territory 
of Rwanda to those of Rwandan nationality (ICTR Statute, Article 1) This does not mean that the ICTR is 
applying national law, merely international law which, although non-customary, has been expressly consented 
to by the parties. See V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The International Cri nihtal Trihtnal for Ruw7da (New York 
Transnational. 1998) pp. 118-120. 
a3 That the ICTY has jurisdiction over the Kosovo conflict must be regarded as a fortuity. 
as See supra, pp. 63-67. 
45 Strictly speaking, not quite any, just all UN members and Switzerland. The ICTR in Pmsa utor v Nttry da Aga, 
Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, 18 March 1999, ICTR-98-40-T, said "the 
primacy recognised by the statute is clear inasmuch as the Tribunal may request any national jurisdiction to 
defer investigation or ongoing proceedings". This is in accordance with its Statute (Article 8). 
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transfer that person to the relevant tribunal. In cases including the transfer of Dusko 
Tadic from Germany this has worked well. On other occasions, for example in the case 
of the "Vukovar three" States have resisted surrender, particularly where the accused are 
of the holding States' nationality. 
In the "Vukovar three" case, We Mrksic, Miroslav Radic and Veselin Sljivancanin 
were indicted in November 1995 for their alleged roles in the Vukovar Hospital 
massacre. 46 Following the non-compliance with the arrest warrant by the FRY, a Rule 61 
hearing was convened, and an international arrest warrant was issued. 47 The continuing 
failure of the FRY to transfer the indictees to the ICTY led to an adverse statement from 
the President of the Security Council directed at the FRY "deplor[ing the] failure... to 
execute the arrest warrants". 48 In 1998, pressure increased on the FRY to comply with the 
various warrants for arrest. This included a full Security Council resolution which 
"[c]ondenm[ed] the failure to date of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute the 
arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal against the three individuals... and demands the 
immediate and unconditional execution of those arrest warrants, including the transfer to 
the custody of the Tribunal of those individuals". 49 In response the FRY initiated 
investigations into the Vukovar Hospital massacre, and scheduled hearings involving the 
three suspects. The prosecutor did not consider this to be adequate, as the FRY was duty- 
bound to pass them to the ICTY for trial. The ICTY Trial Chamber dealing with the case 
issued a formal request to the FRY to defer its proceedings to them, and transfer the 
accused to the Hague. 50 This request has gone unheeded. The primacy of the UN 
Tribunals should, in theory, end the difficulties associated with overlapping jurisdiction, 
but without having power to enforce its judgments when faced with State contumacy, it is 
powerless to bring about a practical solution. 
46 See Prosautarv Mrksic, Radicand Slji wra i, Indictment, 7 November 1995, IT-95-13. 
47 Prosautorv Mrksic et al, Rule 61 Hearing, 3 April 1996, IT-95-13-R61. 
48 S/PRST/1996/23,8 May 1996. 
49 S/RES/ 1207,17 November 1998. 
so prosauwr v Mrksic et aL Request to The Federal Republic Of Yugoslavia To Defer The Proceedings 
Instituted Against Mile Mrksic, Veselin Sljivancanin and Miroslav Radic, 10 December 1998, IT-95-13-T. 
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The ICTR has had more practical success. Uganda has complained about the fact that 
the ICIR has primacy over it for crimes under ICTR jurisdiction committed by 
Rwandans in Uganda, 51 but as a UN member it has no choice but to accept the ICTR's 
power. 52 Co-operation between the ICTR and States in Africa has been quite good, 53 
although at times the ICTR and Rwanda have clashed over defendants they both wish to 
try. 54 Although their primacy determines priority in the legal sense, practical political 
considerations have led to compromise solutions. ICTR proceedings have shown the 
limits on the usefulness of having such prime jurisdiction. There is no possibility that all, 
or even a large proportion of, international crimes committed in Rwanda or former 
Yugoslavia could be tried by the relevant international tribunal. This means that smaller 
violations of the laws of war are not worth pursuing in international tribunals. 55 
This limit could be avoided if the UN tribunals operated as a clearing mechanism. 
This could take the form of transferring cases which it had investigated, or persons 
against it had issued indictments, to willing national jurisdictions, who could prosecute 
such offences applying international law. Appeals relating to international law could be 
made to the joint Appeals Chamber of the tribunal. There is an analogue to this in the 
two UN Tribunals themselves. Appeals from the ICTR are made to the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber. It must also not be forgotten that the ICTY has, for several years, under the 
"Rules of the Road" Agreement, 56 acted as a reviewing mechanism over cases involving 
international crimes in Bosnia. All cases involving such offences are meant to be 
submitted to the ICTY prosecutor, who reviews the evidence to see if there is a prbna facie 
51 "The Ugandan Government considers that its judicial system has primary and supreme jurisdiction and 
competence over any crimes committed on Ugandan territory". Letter Dated 31 October 1994 From the 
Cage d'Affairns A. I. of the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations Addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/1230. 
52 V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The International Crvnnwl Triht l for Ruwida (New York Transnational, 1998) 
p. 296. 
53 See C. Cisse, "The End of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda" (1998) 1 YB. I. H.. L. 161, pp. 169-170. 
54 See M. Morris, "The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda" (1997) 7 Duke J. C & I. L. 
349, pp. 362-363. 
ss Indeed, they are excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunals by their limitation to "serious" violations of 
Common Article 3 and APII (ICTR Statute Article 4) or the laws and customs of war (Article 3 ICTY 
Statute). 
s6 Rome Statement Reflecting the Work of the Joint Civilian Commission, Sarajevo Compliance Conference, 
18 February 1996. 
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case. 57 Unless and until this is certified by the Prosecutor, the authorities are not meant to 
arrest such persons. Post-Ntwyuhaga, it is clear that for indictees in custody at the ICTR, 
and who have made their initial appearance this would not be possible, although, as 
discussed in chapter 2, there is no necessary reason for this, and the ICTY has not had 
complaints about its assertion of an analogous power in Rule of Procedure 11 bis. 
Although this suggestion would seem to be a wide power to grant to the UN 
tribunals, it must not be forgotten that they have been entrusted with primacy over the 
offences coming under their jurisdiction. The Tribunals have the power to demand 
submission to its jurisdiction of any person in effectively every State, and to nullify 
national proceedings if they deem it falls under the criteria it set out in Rule 9. It would 
not appear to be an unacceptable additional grant of power to the tribunals, particularly if 
the proceedings remained under their supervision. This could be achieved by the 
provision of Appellate jurisdiction to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, and close co-operation 
between the national jurisdictions and the tribunal, such that the national jurisdiction 
could be seen as acting as a franchised Trial Chamber for the tribunal, but still within in 
its system. 
The ICC mainly exercises nationality and territorial jurisdiction, based on a cession of 
jurisdiction from the States parties. This is a severe limitation on the ICC. Some States 
were highly unwilling to allow the court to exercise universal jurisdiction (particularly over 
them, if they were to remain non signatories to the Statute). There is a very limited form 
of universal jurisdiction permitted to the ICC by the Statute. The Security Council can 
pass any situation to the ICC, irrespective of where it is. Even with this the Court is more 
limited than States, who are entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over the core 
international crimes by no body's leave. The ICC will probably not make any difference 
to the existence of overlapping jurisdiction, because it is meant to operate only if national 
jurisdictions are not doing so. The ICC can only take a case if certain jurisdictions are 
57 Admittedly, cases are not always submitted there, see R., Wedgwood, "National Courts and the Prosecution 
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"unwilling or unable" to do so themselves. Precisely which States these are is a matter of 
uncertainty, and if any of these are involved, then the Court cannot act. 58 If none of these 
are actively pursuing the matter, under certain conditions the Court's transfer request is 
given priority (discussed above, pp. 76-77). Here a hierarchy is set up by which the Court's 
Statute solves the problem of overlapping jurisdictions. This is the exception, not the 
rule, and unlike the UN Tribunals, it cannot request a suspect, then decide what to do 
with him. 
IMMUNITIES FROM JURISDICTION 
There are two types of immunity from jurisdiction of national courts: State immunity 
(also known as immunity ratia7ae maxeriae) and personal immunities such as diplomatic or 
head of State immunity (also known as irnrnunity rat Tae personae). The former has 
recently returned to the centre of debate because of the Pinochet cases. Although strictly 
speaking, immunity raticnae rnateriae and rat Tae personae both emanate from the concept of 
the State, this thesis follows the usual convention of using the term "State immunity" to 
refer to immunity rat iae materiae. 
RvB4UNrrY RATIONAE MATERIAE 
It is here that the conflicting imperatives of the ideas of sovereignty and the 
challenges of international crimes clash. The idea that State activities are immune from 
the jurisdiction of foreign States stems from the bilateralist mantra par in paron narr baht 
imp riu n. This conflicts with the newer values in ascendancy in the international system, 
that posit the need for prosecutions of such offences. The better view is that sovereignty 
gives way, creating an exception to State immunity where international crimes are at stake. 
Prosecutions of war crimes have been undertaken by States for centuries, both of their 
of War Crimes" in Kirk-McDonald & Swaak-Goldman (eds. ), supra n. 3,389, p. 406. 
59 See supra pp. 75-76. 
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own nationals (where State immunity would not apply) and of foreign nationals (where it 
would). The initiation and execution of an armed conflict has always been considered a 
sovereign act, but prosecutions of members of foreign armed forces have always 
proceeded upon the assumption that State immunity does not apply. 59 The same would 
apply to genocide and crimes against humanity, as, for the most part, these are crimes 
carried out by, or at the instigation of, States. 60 The major dissenter from this view was 
Hans Kelsen, who asserted that to avoid the application of the doctrine of State immunity 
preventing trial, a treaty had to be in force allowing such prosecutions. 61 This view Cannot 
account for the prosecutions of international crimes to date. 
The legal position is summed up in the Supreme Court of Israel's judgment in the 
Eicbmanm case: "international law postulates that it is impossible for a State to sanction an 
act that violates the core of the concept of `international crime'... If it were otherwise the 
penal provisions of international law would be a mockery' 
. 
62 This conclusion was 
adopted by Lord Nicholls in the first Piý appeal to the House of Lords, when he 
averred "international law has made plain that certain types of conduct, including 
torture... are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads 
of state, or even more so, as it does to everyone else: the contrary conclusion would make 
a mockery of international law. "63 Lord Steyn, despite some doubts expressed, which 
59 If it were not so, Article 85 of Geneva Convention III, which provides that prosecutions for pre-capture 
violations of the law of war are possible, would be made a nonsense. 
60 It is also supported by the Nuremberg Principles adopted by the ILC, that "Principle 1: Any person who 
commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to 
punishment... Principle IV the fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of his government... does not 
relieve him from responsibility under international law" (1950) 2 YB. LL. G p. 374. 
61 H. Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the 
Punishment of War Criminals" (1943) 31 GzLL. R. 530, pp. 552-553. It could also be the Quincy Wright 
adhered to this view, see Q. Wright, "The Scope of International Criminal Law: A Conceptual Framework" (1975) 15 V. J. I. L. 561, pp. 571-572, but he is vague on this point, accepting that in the US courts martial can 
prosecute very high level officers, but then claims (ibid) that the limits on national courts require international 
tribunals. Given his earlier writings, he probably accepted that State immunity did not apply, but was referring 
to the Anglo-American Act of State doctrine, which urges judicial caution in this area. For his earlier writings 
see Q. Wright, "War Criminals" (1945) 39 A. J. I. L. 257, p. 266, "an act of government is not an `act of state' 
when it attempts to authorize an individual to do something beyond the competence of the state in 
international law", Q. Wright, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial" (1947) 41 A. J. I. L. 38, p. 71. 
62 A-G of Israd v Eidanann, supra n. 17, Supreme Court, p. 310. 
63 pi fjet In appeal, supra n. 22, pp. 939-940. On this appeal see H. Fox "The First Pvaaxt Case: Immunity of 
a Former Head of State" (1999) 49 LC. L. Q 207; N. Boister & R. Burchill, "The Pireodet Precedent: Don't 
Leave Home Without It" (1999) 10 Cron. L. F. 405, pp. 409-413. 
104 
appear to relate to conspiracy, 64 said "the development of international law since the 
second world war justifies the conclusion that... international law condemned 
genocide... [and crimes against humanity]... as international crimes deserving of 
punishment. Given this state of international law, it seems to me difficult to maintain that 
the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts performed in the exercise of the 
functions of head of state... [thus entitling Pinochet to State immunity]. "65 
The result that international crimes are not subject to the normal rules of State 
immunity is correct, although their Lordships means of deciding this, by declaring the 
acts not "official" has been criticised by some, as flying in the face of reality. 66 But we are 
not dealing with (civil) State responsibility here, but individual criminal responsibility and 
immunity. The two are different, thus the attribution of the offences to the State for the 
purposes of State responsibility, and the existence of individual criminal responsibility not 
subject to State inununity is not inconsistent. 67 It is true that the Lords, in both the In and 
3rd appeals did not look into the implications of their judgment for State responsibility. 68 
There is a simple reason for that, they drew a distinction between civil (State) 
responsibility and (individual) criminal liability. 69 
That the imposition of responsibility on both the State and individual need not be 
inconsistent (i. e. that international crimes may be official acts for the purposes of State 
responsibility, but that their official nature does not give immunity from individual 
64 Fox, ibid, p. 214 expresses the opinion that his opinion was limited by the fact that the DINA was 
personally responsible to Pinochet, not to him qua head of State. Boister & Burchill, iF, pp. 438-439 prefer 
the view that this is likely to refer more to conspiracy, and would not exclude, for example, command 
responsibility. What Steyn was concerned about was allegations based purely on position, as opposed to 
based on the usual principles of international criminal liability. Fox's view seems inconsistent with the passage 
in the judgment cited above. 
65 Pi 
*x 1n appeal, supra n. 22, p. 939. 
66 J. C. Barker, "The Future of Former Head of State Immunity After Ex Parte Pmt" (1999) 48 I. CL. Q 
937. 
67 This may explain B. J. George Jr. 's, comment that "Obviously, problems of sovereign immunity are of only 
perhipheral concern in criminal justice administration" B. J. George Jr., "Immunities and Exceptions" in M. C. 
Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 10,107, p. 109. 
68 See E. Denza, "Ex PartePinaAt: Lacuna or Leap? " (1999) 48 LCL. Q 949, p. 954. 
69 See, for example in the 3rd appeal, Lord Phillips, supra n. 36, p. 916, "we are not, of course concerned with a 
civil suit but with proceedings that are criminal in nature. Principles of the law of immunity that apply in 
relation to civil litigation will not necessarily apply to a criminal prosecution, Lord Hutton, iäd, p. 892. This 
distinction is also drawn by Dinstein, Y. Dinstein, "Defences" in McDonald & Swaak-Goldman (eds. ), supnz 
n. 3,369, p. 386. 
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criminal responsibility) can be implied from the oft-cited statement (by the House in both 
appeals) of Sir Arthur Watts. Watts noted that "for international conduct which is so 
serious as to be tainted by criminality to to r gan as attributable as only to the ip? sonal state 
and not to tk imdit duals zed orcder or perpetrated than is both umralistic and ctntrary to ctmmm 
notices of justice" [emphasis added]. 7° It is clear that Watts considers the two to be 
cumulative, and consistent. Lord Hutton adopted a similar approach. 71 
The majority in the 3' appeal though did not use the simple (and, it is submitted, 
largely correct) analysis of Lord Nicholls, that international crimes are not subject to State 
immunity rules when individual criminal responsibility is at issue, and got themselves into 
all sorts of trouble 72 Most of the Lords relied on a curious mixture of customary 
international law (relating to international crimes in the narrow sense in which this thesis 
uses the term) and the Torture Convention, 73 although the Torture Convention seemed 
the more important to them. 74 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in particular, was incapable of 
distinguishing an individual act of torture, as a creature of the Torture Convention from 
torture as a modality for the commission of a crime against humanity. 75 Only 2 of the 7 
Lords in the 3rd appeal, Lord Hutton and Lord Millett were prepared to assert that State 
70 A. Watts, "The Legal Position in International Law of heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign 
Governments" (1994) 111 247 R. d C 9, p. 82. 
71 supra n. 36, p. 901, relying on Article 4 of the ILC Draft Code of Crimes, UN. Doc. A/51/10 (1996). Millett 
could have added that the commentary to article 7 of the Draft Code supports his position, "it would be 
paradoxical to allow the individuals who are, in some respects, the most responsible for the crimes covered by 
the code to invoke the sovereignty of the State and hide behind the immunity that is conferred on them by 
virtue of their positions" (1988) 2 YB. LL. C p. 71. 
72 See C. A. Bradley & J. L. Goldsmith, "Pinodaet and International Human Rights Litigation" (1999) 97 Mich. 
L. R. 2129, p. 2140, their reasons are "unclear and often contradictory"; A. Bianchi, "Immunity Versus Human 
Rights: The Pinochet Case" (1999) 10 E. J. I. L. 237, p. 243, the decision was "lengthy and rather convoluted"; 
Boister & Burchill, supra n. 63, p. 405 it was "fraught with... legal confusion". For a strongly worded critique 
see H. Fox, "The Pinochet Case No. 3" (1999) 48 LCL. Q 687. 
73 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA 
Resolution 39/46. UN Doc. A/39/51, (1986) 24 I. L. M. 1027. 
74 See Fox, supra n. 72, p. 692. 
75 See, for example, supra n. 36, p. 832, "Since the Nazi atrocities and the Nuremberg trials, international law 
has recognised a number of offences as being international crimes... The most important of such 
international crimes for present purposes is torture which is regulated [by the Torture Convention]". This also 
seemed to be a mistake made by Lord Hutton, who appeared to think that the Torture convention made 
single acts of torture international crimes like crimes against humanity (ibid) pp. 900-901, Boister & Burchill, 
supra n. 63, p. 422. Lord Hope also did this, although his position was opposite to that of Browne-Wilkinson, 
who believed that there was immunity until the convention, even though torture was an international crime 
prior to the convention (ihid, p. 847) (see Boister & Burchill, ibid, pp. 415-418). Lord Hope believed that there 
would be immunity under the convention, except when it was a crime against humanity (i/id, p. 885), see 
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra n. 72, p. 2145. Lord Saville relied solely on the Torture Convention ice, p. 903. 
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immunity did not apply in criminal proceedings relating to international crimes. 76 
Nonetheless, it is their view which is to be preferred. 
The dissenters in both appeals (Lords Slynn and Lloyd in the 1St, Bord Goff in the 
3'') drew a distinction between international and national tribunals on this point. They all 
maintained that State immunity was not applicable before international tribunals, but that 
it was before national tribunals. » This argument cannot stand for three reasons. The first 
is that it does not explain the prosecutions before national tribunals that have occurred (a 
point not lost on Lord Millett). 78 Second, as Millett noted, the Allies claimed merely to be 
exercising jointly the powers that they could have asserted singularly (thus in national 
courts). 79 A final, and determinative reason relates to the later international tribunals, the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC. None of the courts are intended to have exclusive jurisdiction. 
Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes anticipate that national courts will prosecute such 
offences. The ICC, in particular, supports this assertion, since it is based on the notion of 
complementarity, which means it is meant to promote the national prosecutions of such 
offences. The concurrence of jurisdictions as envisaged by the current international 
tribunals therefore undercuts the assertion of the dissenters. 
As with jurisdiction, there is a secondary argument based on jus mgrs. The argument 
here, although none of the Lords in the Pinadaet appeals was prepared to rely on it alone, 80 
is simple. Jus aogau rules, being hierarchically superior to other rules "trump" them when 
they conflict. As the rules of State immunity could conflict with a prosecution of a 
violation of a jus cogars rule, the former is inapplicable. 81 The argument is limited to those 
international crimes which are Jus cc is, so it cannot be a full explanation why all 
international crimes are unaffected by the usual rules of State immunity. 
76 Hutton, ibicL, p. 901; Millett, ihid, pp. 907-910. This is also the view of Dinstein, supra n. 69, pp. 384-386. 
77 Slynn, supra n. 22, p. 913; Lloyd, supra n. 22, p. 930; Goff, Ad, p. 853. 
78 en, jbid, p. 908. 
79 wett, ihid-, p. 908, see also chapter 2, pp. 26-28. 
80 On the use of jus ctgou in PinodJet see M. Byers, "The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case" (2000) 11 
DukeJ. C & LL. 415, p. 436. 
81 See Bianchi, supra n. 72, pp. 262-265. 
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International courts, beginning with the Nuremberg IMT, have all rejected any State 
immunity arguments. The most famous of these was the ultra virus argument of the 
Nuremberg RvIT. In response to claims that the defendants before it were entitled to 
State immunity for their crimes and thus Article 7 of the Nuremberg IMT Charter was 
illegal, 82 the IMT responded: "he who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity 
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorising such 
action moves outside its competence in international law. "83 This was agreed with by the 
Tokyo IMT, 84 and is correct insofar as it refers to actions criminalised by international 
law. The Nuremberg IMT comment on this point was taken up, inter alia, by the Supreme 
Court of Israel in the Eichnann case. 85 Thus its pronouncement was of assistance in 
clarifying the point, or, according to some, establishing it. S6 By the time of the ICTY and 
ICTRs' creation, when their statutes reaffirmed "the official position of any accused 
person, whether as head of States or government or as a responsible Government official, 
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment", 87 the 
matter was beyond doubt. This made Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute fairly 
uncontroversial. This provision reads "this Statute shall apply equally to all persons 
without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head 
of State or government, a member of a Government or Parliament, an elected 
representative or a Government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for 
reduction of sentence". 88 The extensive reliance on these provisions by the House of 
82 Article 7 of the Nuremberg IMT Charter states: "the official position of defendants, whether as heads of 
State or responsible officials of government departments shall not be considered as freeing them from 
responsibility". 
83 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, (1947) 41 A. J. I. L. 172, p. 221. For support of the position of the Nuremberg 
IMT here, see R. K. Woetzel, The Nuren1 'g Trials in International Law (London: Stevens, 1962) pp. 68-76; H. 
McCoubrey, "The Concept and Treatment of War Crimes" (1996) 1 J. A. C L. 121, pp. 125-126. 
84 R J. Pritchard & S. M. Zaide (eds. ), The Tokyo War Cranes Trial Vol 20: Judgn" (New York Garland, 1981) 
p. 48,439. 
85 Supra n. 17 p. 311. 
86 W. V. O'Brien, "The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War" (1991) 31 V J. LL. 391, pp. 393-394. 
87 ICTY Statute, Article 7(2), ICTR Statute, Article 6(2). 
88 See P. Saland, "International Criminal Law Principles" in R. S. Lee (ed. ), 77 International Crininal Gant (The 
I-iague: Kluwer, 1999) 189, p. 202; and generally O. Triffterer, "Article 27" in O. Triffterer (ed. ), Can vitary on 
the Rahe Statztte of tlae Intematianal Crbnriral Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999) 501. 
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Lords in the 3rd Pint appeal is a testament to their importance in entrenching the 
absence of State immunity for international crimes. 89 
MAUNITY RATIONAE PERSONAE 
There is another set of immunities which are relevant. These are personal immunities 
from jurisdiction of States. There are three major types of personal immunities. 
Diplomatic immunity, Head of State immunity and those granted pursuant to agreements 
such as Status of Forces Agreements. Such immunities have had a greater impression on 
national jurisdictions than State immunities, although there is no reason in principle why 
this should be. 
Diplomatic agents (and their families)90 enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction 
of the "receiving State" (the State to which they are sent as diplomats), and, with limited 
exceptions, to its civil and administrative jurisdiction too. 91 There are limits to immunities 
though, they relate only to the jurisdiction of receiving States and, whilst they are en rau& 
to or from that State, those States through which they travel. 92 Diplomatic immunities 
also come to an end when the person's posting comes to an end and they leave the 
receiving State, or a reasonable time after they cease to perform their diplomatic 
functions if they do not leave the receiving State. 93 Heads of State have similar personal 
immunities to diplomats, 94 they are absolutely immune from legal process in all foreign 
States. 95 Although there are fewer Heads of State than diplomatic agents, Heads of State 
are entitled to immunity in all States. This immunity comes to an end when the Head of 
89 See supra n. 36, pp. 840 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), pp. 852-853 (Lord Goff), pp. 895-897 (Lord Hutton), 
pp. 908-909 (Lord Millett), p. 924 (Lord Phillips). 
90 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 500 UNIS 95, Article 37. 
91 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1). On immunities generally, see George, supra n. 67. On the Convention see 
E. Denza, Dipbncaic Law (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed. 1998). 
92 Vienna Convention, Article 40. 
93 Vienna Convention, Article 39(2). This is also the case if they do not leave in a reasonable time after being 
declared peiwna non grata, Vienna Convention, Article 9(2). 
94 See Pincxhet 3" appeal, supra n. 36, p. 844 "immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power and an ambassador 
is a complete immunity attaching to the person of the head of state or ambassador. " 
95 Jbij, p. 845 (Lord Browne Wilkinson), p. 905 (Lord Millett). 
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State stands down 96 The third type of immunities arise under Status of Forces 
Agreements, where on occasion, States agree to exempt members of foreign armed forces 
stationed in their territory from aspects of their criminal jurisdiction for the period of 
their duties. 97 The most well known agreement of this nature, the NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement, 98 allows concurrent jurisdiction over offences criminalised by both the 
sending and receiving State, but gives priority to the sending State where the act is done 
as part of official duties. 99 It is uncertain whether the Pinxhet type of reasoning (that 
international crimes are not part of an offender's official duties) could apply here. If it 
did, priority in jurisdiction would reside in the territorial State. 
Diplomatic and Head of State immunities, it is traditionally thought, prevent national 
courts exercising jurisdiction over any offence, be it criminalised by national or 
international law. There are three authorities for this position. The first (chronologically) 
is the French case of Abetz, 100 in which it was accepted that a properly accredited 
diplomat could not be prosecuted for a war crime. It was a little ambiguous, as the 
defendant was not so accredited, and the Court held that the national law under which 
the defendant was prosecuted excluded any ground preventing prosecution. More 
recently, in 1997, the German Constitutional Court, in in w Former Syrrm A, nkissador to dd 
Geirnan Doncxratic Republülol said "diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution 
basically knows no exception for particularly serious violations of law. "102 It continued, 
referring particularly to international crimes: "exemptions from immunity for cases of war 
criminals, violations of international law have been discussed as developments of this 
n&.. However, as the wording of article 7 of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg makes clear, these exceptions are relevant only to the applicable 
96 See ibid, p. 845 (Lord Browne Wilkinson), p. 905, Lord Millett, "this [personal immunity] is not in issue in 
the present case... If he were, he could not be extradited. It would be an intolerable affront to the Republic of 
Chile to arrest him or detain him. " 
97 On these see George, supra n. 67, pp. 134-142. 
98 1951 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces 
199 LINTS 67. (Hereinafter NATO SOFA). 
99 NATO SOFA, Article VII. 
100 French Courd' Gassation 28 July 1950, noted in "International Decisions: Abetz" (1952) 46 A. J. I. L. 161. 
101 Case No. 2 BvR 15/16/96, unreported, quotations are as given in the 3rd Piixhet appeal, supra n. 36. 
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law of state immunity... and not to diplomatic immunity. "103 Their interpretation of 
Article 7 is not necessarily correct. Article 7 and its progeny have been taken to refer to 
diplomatic or head of State immunity, and it is not clear why Article 7 (given below) is 
"clear" that it does not apply to diplomatic or Head of State immunities. Still, the 
approach that diplomatic or Head of State immunities act to prevent a State subject to 
such immunities from acting upon allegations of international crimes was adopted 
unanimously by the House of Lords in both Pinadaet appeals. '°4 
These cases go to show that although sovereignty has given way to the values 
protected by international crimes in the context of State immunity, it has not done so for 
the rules of Head of State and diplomatic immunity. This may extend to immunities 
where they are granted by SOFAs. 105 It is uncertain why this is the case, as the rules 
involved are, like the rules of State immunity, normal rules of international law. They are 
not jus cogau. Indeed, the jus cans arguments canvassed above under the heading of 
immunity ratianae materiae are equally applicable to the immunities here, and it is at least 
arguable that for international crimes where the prohibition has the status of jus aces, this 
would indeed trump the immunities discussed. 106 For SOFAs, the same problems may 
not arise as discussed above, the exclusion of official acts may not apply here, leaving 
priority in jurisdiction to the territorial State. 
Personal immunities have not caused problems for international tribunals. The 
precedent was set by the London Charter, Article 7 of which provides, "the official 
position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials of government 
departments shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility". This could 
have been invoked in the Nuremberg IMF's prosecution of Admiral Dönitz, as he was 
the notional successor to Hitler as the Head of the German State. It practice it was 
102 I, cited ibid, p. 894. 
103 Imo, p. 895. 
104 See for example, Lord Millett, supra n. 96. 
105 This is the implication of Article 98 of the Rome Statute. 
106 Denza, supra n. 68, p. 954 notes that the arguments they use on immunity rationae matenae can equally apply 
to ratiarmpeg onae immunities. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra n. 72, p. 2144; Bianchi, supra n. 72, p. 261. 
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unnecessary to rely on Article 7, as the government had collapsed and no one considered 
the Dönitz regime to be a government, or Dönitz a Head of State. 107 Article 6 of the 
Tokyo Charter was similar (although not identical to) Article 7 of the London Charter. 108 
The issue arose in the Tokyo IMT, when the Ambassador Oshima asserted his status as a 
diplomat to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 109 The Tokyo IMT 
rejected this claim, on the basis that as it was an international tribunal, there was no 
imrnunity. 110 This is interesting, as unlike in the case of State immunity, here it would 
appear that the Tokyo IMT argued that there is a difference between international and 
municipal courts. It is possible, that for diplomats, this makes sense. As the prosecution 
argued in the Tokyo proceedings, the Tokyo IMT was not the municipal jurisdiction of a 
State to which Oshima was sent as a diplomatic agent, thus he was not immune from 
proceedings"' It would not operate to negate Head of State immunity however, and both 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMT Charters refused this form of liability. This adds to the 
case for recognising the non-immunity ratiarrae personae for international crimes, but given 
the total absence of rejections of immunity on this ground it in domestic courts, it cannot 
be said to be the accepted position in national courts. 
Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute, Article 6(2) of the ICTR Statute and Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute all exclude reliance on personal or State mununities. 112 It can safely be 
107 H. McCoubrey, "War Crimes Jurisdiction and a Permanent International Criminal Court: Advantages and 
Difficulties" (1998) 3 J. A. CL. 9, p. 14. 
108 Tokyo M' Charter, Article 6 "Neither the Official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that 
an accused acted pursuant to an order of a superior shall... be sufficient to free such accused from 
responsibility... but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment". The differences are 
that it may be taken as mitigation, a provision which may have been put in to assist the Emperor should he 
have been brought to trial, although the omission of the express reference to "Head of State" which was 
contained in the Nuremberg formulation would also appear to be a concession to the emperor, see Watts, 
supra n. 70, p. 83; O. Triffterer, "Article 27", in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 88,501, p. 503. 
109 For discussion, see Tokyo IlvTT proceedings, supra n. 69, pp. 40,541 (prosecution theory that immunity is 
merely from municipal criminal jurisdiction, not crimes against international law), 43,594 (ild. ), 47,607-47,126 (defence claim that he enjoyed complete immunity in accordance with international law), 48,394-396 
(prosecution rebuttal that here the issue was international crimes, and not municipal jurisdiction of the 
diplomat's accredited State). 
110 Tokyo IMTT Judgment, reprinted in Pritchard & Zaide, ibid p. 49,824. 
1I1 supra n. 109. 
112 Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute, (with which Article 6(2) of the ICTR is Statute identical) reads, "The 
official position of an accused person, whether as head of State or government or as a responsible 
government official, shall not relieve a person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment". Article 27 
of the Rome Statute is more detailed: "1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a 
112 
said that there are no procedural immunities for defendants before international 
tribunals. 113 Both the UN Tribunals and the Rome Statute rely on State proceedings to 
obtain custody over putative defendants, and before these proceedings immunities may 
be raised. It may be necessary to establish jurisdiction to arrest and transfer the person, 
and, of course, personal immunities may prevent such jurisdiction attaching. 114 
For the UN Tribunals, joint rule of procedure 58 considers national law to be 
inapplicable, but what is being dealt with here is more fundamental: an absence of 
jurisdiction, based on an immunity deriving from international law. It is possible that the 
UN Tribunals can validly require States to transfer diplomats and others with immunity 
even in the face of an apparent international legal obligation to exempt them from 
jurisdiction. This obligation comes from Article 103 of the UN Charter, which demands 
that obligations incurred under the Charter (including those created by Security Council 
resolutions) take precedence over other treaty obligations. 115 Therefore, unless the rules 
concerned were jus cngozs, immunities would be trumped by the obligations in Resolutions 
827 and 955 to co-operate with the UN Tribunals. In practice, persuading States to do 
this could be difficult. 
The Rome Statute takes a very different track. Article 98 prevents the ICC from 
asking States to act inconsistently other rules of international law. 116 The ICC cannot 
proceed with a request that could require the requested State to act inconsistently with 
immunities stemming from international law, be they diplomatic immunities, or those 
person from criminal responsibility under this Statute nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for 
reduction of sentence. 2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction 
over such a person. " 
113 A practical confirmation of this can be seen in the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, a serving head of 
State, in 1999. Prosa aorv Milosei is et al, Indictment, 24 May 1999, IT-99-3 7. 
114 This, as will be seen, is the position taken by the Rome Statute, (Article 98). 
115 This would probably also apply, by analogy, to customary norms. 
116 "1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or 
diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
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based, for example on Status of Forces Agreements. 117 The only difference between 
surrender to the ICC and other proceedings is that national law immunities, which have 
no basis in international law, will not be applicable. 118 Although State immunities are not 
relevant to international crimes, 119 personal immunities may undercut the co-operation 
regime. 120 For example, Heads of State could not be transferred to the ICC under the 
normal regime of surrender, unless by their home State, a highly unlikely scenario. 
Removal of such immunities before national tribunals, even for the purposes of 
surrender, is still taboo for States. 121 With the wide mandate given in Article 98(2) to 
States to negotiate agreements allowing immunity, this is a loophole created to be 
exploited. The only possible way around this problem for States party to the Rome 
Statute, would be if the Court interpreted its powers to issue orders under Chapter 9 of 
the Statute to include the power to demand waiver of immunity by the sending State of 
the immune person. This may be possible under Article 93(1)(l), but as of yet, it is too 
early to tell whether or not the ICC will risk goodwill from States party to the Statute by 
requiring them to waive their representatives' immunity. 
A DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE? 
The question of whether or not there is an actual duty to extradite or prosecute those 
suspected of international crimes, is a fundamental one. The answer to this needs to be 
dealt with both for treaty and customary obligations. First, by treaty, it is clear that for 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending 
State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender. " See K. Prost &A Schlunck, 
"Article 98" in Triffterer, supra n. 88,1131. 
117 See supra pp. 76-79, where this is criticised. 
Its See Prost & Schlunck, supra n. 116, p. 1132, D. Sarooshi, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court" 
(1999) 48 I. C. L. Q 387, pp. 390-393. 
119 See above, pp. 103-109. 
120 As Sarooshi, puts it supra n. 118, p. 392, "some official capacities may allow a State to exempt itself from an 
obligation to co-operate with the Court". 
121 J. C. Barker, supra n. 66, pp. 944-945. 
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Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, there is a duty to either prosecute an 
offence or extradite the offender to another jurisdiction willing to prosecute. This is clear 
from the obligatory language of the Grave Breach provisions, which states "[e]ach High 
Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts [or hand them over to 
another High Contracting Party]". 122 As the Genocide Convention does not mention 
trials before national courts other than those with territorial jurisdiction, strictly it has no 
application outside this sphere, but for those courts it is clear that there is a duty to 
prosecute. 123 As there is no treaty directly dealing with crimes against humanitythere is no 
treaty based duty to prosecute. However, for both genocide and crimes against humanity 
involving torture, there is a duty to prosecute acts of torture under the heads of territorial, 
nationality and passive personality jurisdiction placed on signatories to the Torture 
Convention. 124 Parties to the Rome Statute may have accepted an obligation to prosecute 
international crimes occurring on their territories or by their nationals. 125 
The question must arise, for all crimes, of whether there is a generally applicable 
customary obligation to prosecute such offences. Problems arise, in particular for 
genocide and crimes against humanity. Neither has a treaty provision involving 
mandatory assertion of universal jurisdiction like those in the Geneva Conventions, so 
any obligation must be free standing. The General Assembly has promulgated resolutions 
122 Supra n. 3. 
123 Artides IV and VI are both phrased in the mandatory "shall be" tried and punished. 
124 Torture Convention, Article 5, although individual acts of torture are not, of course international crimes, 
but national crimes mandated by the Torture Convention. 
125 The preamble to the Rome Statute "Recall[s] that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes" (preambular paragraph 6). M. Bergsmo & 0. 
Triffterer, "Preamble" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 88,1, p. 13 note that the phrase relating to whether it was 
universal or territorial/national jurisdiction was deliberately left ambiguous. This probably reflects an absence 
of consensus on the existence of a 
duty, rather than on the absence of universal jurisdiction. See also T. N. 
Slade & R. S. Clark, in Lee (ed. ), supra n. 88,421, pp. 427, who refer to it as "delightfully ambiguous", but note 
that it reflects the ambiguity of earlier debates that relate to the jurisdictional consents the ICC has to have to 
operate. Given that, as will 
be seen, the Rome Statute creates a type of prosecution obligation on the 
territorial or nationality States, it is more consistent to read the preamble as reflecting the obligation to 
prosecute offences by those States, rather than an all encompassing 
duty. In any event, it can only bind 
signatories to the Rome Statute. 
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with relevance to the possibility of a duty. 126 The most important of these, Resolutions 
2840 and 3074, could be thought to give rise to a duty. Resolution 2840 states that refusal 
to co-operate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of persons accused of 
international crimes is contrary to the purposes of the UN Charter and international law. 
Resolution 3074 builds on this, and is worth quoting at length. 
"1. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, wherever they are committed, 
shall be subject to investigation and... [perpetrators]... shall be subject to tracing, arrest, 
trial and, if they are found guilty, to punishment. 
2. Every State has the right to try its own nationals for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
5. Persons.. 
. 
[suspected of such crimes]... shall be subject to trial.. 
. 
as a general rule 
in the countries in which they have committed these crimes" (emphasis added). 
It is, of course, axiomatic that General Assembly Resolutions are not, in themselves, 
an independent formal source of law. They may, however, act as evidence, for example of 
practice or opmio jUni 
, 
127 or alter the way in which States view their rights and obligations 
thus catalysing change. 128 A succinct elaboration of the status of General Assembly 
Resolutions was recently given by the ICJ in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons Cpnnion: 
"General Assembly Resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes 
have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important 
for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opmio juni 
. 
To establish 
whether this is true of a given General Assembly Resolution, it is necessary to look at 
126 GA Resolution 2840, UN Doc. A/8429 p. 88; GA Res 3074, UN Doc. A/9030 p. 78. 
127 See generally, B. Sloane "General Assembly Resolutions Revisited" (1987) 58 B. YB. I. L. 39; D. J. Harris, 
Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Stevens, 5th ed. 1998) pp58-64 and literature cited therein; A 
useful recent treatment is V. Degan, Soui rs of Interrratianal Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) pp. 194-200. 
128 See M. Bos, "The Recognised Manifestations of International Law" (1977) 20 G. YB. I. L. 9, pp. 65-70. 
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its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an 
opmio juris exists as to its normative character". 129 
Opinion differs on the effect of these Resolutions. Some commentators, such as 
Jordan Paust consider the Resolutions to be constitutive of a duty to extradite or 
prosecute, 130 others consider them as merely evidence of an emerging customary rule. 131 
Therefore it is worthwhile examining the issue. The resolution is phrased in the 
imperative, at least at some points, ("perpetrators "shall" be subject to trial, however, 
national States have the "right" to try them"). Thus the wording could be taken to imply a 
duty, albeit not unambiguous, not least as principle 5 implies that any duty may be limited 
to the State where the crimes were committed. It is also noteworthy that whilst it recalls 
Resolution 2840, it does not expressly say it is declaratory of international law, it merely 
"proclaims" the principles. 
The voting patterns are instructive. There were 94 positive votes and no votes 
against. There were also 29 abstentions, thus the Resolution cannot be said to be 
unambiguously supported by the entire international community. This level of abstention 
may be dismissable if the rule relying on it is permissive, however, if the rule consists of a 
mandatory positive demand, this voting pattern must raise an impediment to an hasty 
assertion of its customary nature. 
Perhaps the best evidence of its customary nature, or if it has altered State 
perceptions of pre-existing international law, is if States have acted as if they are under a 
duty to prosecute, by initiating proceedings. With one possible exception, (Ethiopia), 132 
there is no evidence of any State practice confirming prosecution as a customary duty 
rather than a right. Even the most ardent supporters of such a duty are forced to concede 
129 Advi"y pfrion on d Legality of the 7hmat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) LC. J. Rep 4, pp. 254-5, para 70. 
130 J. Paust, International Law as Law of the Units States (Durham: N. C., Carolina A. P., 1996) p. 405. 
131 M. P. Scharf, "National Prosecutions: Report of the Rapporteur" in Joyner (ed. ) supra n. 11,125, p 128. 
132 See J. Y. Mayfield, "The Prosecution of War Crimes and Respect for Human Rights: Ethiopia's Balancing 
Act" (1995) 9 Emory I. L. J. 553 at p. 570. 
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this point, 133 and this would also seem to show that after the Resolutions there has not 
been any alteration in the way States have perceived their international legal obligations. 
The view that they do not represent positive international law is correct, which is also 
supported by a large body of secondary literature. 134 If there is a duty to extradite or 
prosecute, then it must be found elsewhere in international law. 
It may be that there are other places from which a duty may arise. The first is human 
rights law. Since States have a duty to "respect and ensure"135 the rights granted in the 
various human rights conventions, it could be that the latter clause implies a duty to 
prosecute certain serious violations of human rights. All acts constituting genocide and 
crimes against humanity would be serious violations of human rights obligations, as 
would most war crimes. There is some support for this position in the practice of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, the European Court and Commission of Human Rights and 
from the famous Velzsquez-Rcxlrigues Case before the Inter-American Court of Human 
rightS. 136 
In the Velzquez case they held that a violation of the right to life had occurred, and 
as part of the violation of the right was the failure to "ensure" the right to life by 
investigating and punishing those responsible. 137 On the other hand, Scharf warns against 
over interpreting these cases for three reasons: the Human Rights Committee is not a 
binding interpreter, none of the cases are entirely unambiguous about the presence of a 
duty and in Velasquez the court did not offer injunctive relief to the plaintiffs demanding 
133 M. C. Bassiouni & E. M. Wise, Aut Dlderv Aut Judine 77 Duty to Extradite or Pmso e in Intern atianal Law 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) p. 45. They note, ibid, that even the treaty duty under the Geneva 
Conventions remains effectively a dead letter. 
134 E. g. G. Gilbert, Aspars of Extraditim Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990), p. 26; G. Gilbert, 
Transnational Fugitire C nders in International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) p. 47; Stern, supra n. 11, 
p. 181; M. P. Scharf, "Swapping Amnesty for Peace, Was there a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in 
Haiti? " (1996) 31 Tex. I. L. J. 1. 
135 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171, Article 6. 
136 On these, see D. Orientlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Former Regime" (1991) 100 Yale L. J. 2537, pp. 2568-2582. 
137 Ve[asquez-Rodrigues v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of July 29,1988. (1989) 
28 I. L. M. 29, paras. 166,175-7. See Orientlicher, ibid pp. 2576-2579; K. Ambos, "Impunity and International 
Criminal Law" (1997) 18 H. R. L. J. 1, pp. 6-7. Gantt, Scharf, supra n. 134, pp. 26-28. 
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prosecution as requested. 138 In response to his points, as he admits, many States often 
consider the HRC's jurisprudence as highly persuasive. 139 With respect to the cases he 
claims are ambiguous, at times he is perhaps reading in ambiguity where perhaps none 
exists. He is right about some of the cases, not others. Mutelan v Zaire, for example, 
decided Zaire was "under a duty to... conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of [the 
victim's] torture, to punish those found guilty of torture... ". 140 Scharf claims this meant 
"only that it had a duty to punish those found guilty by an enquiry, " thus leaving the door 
open to measures such as dismissal from service, removal of pension etc. 141 Possibly, but 
the primary form of punishment remains sanctions imposed after criminal trial. 142 In 
relation to the Velasquez case, whilst the court did not offer an injunction to force the trial 
of the persons responsible, this does not alter what it said in the case about the 
obligations of the State party. 
The body that has gone furthest towards recognising a duty to prosecute has been the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which declared Chile's amnesty to be 
incompatible with the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and that for 
compliance with the Convention to be achieved, perpetrators had to be punished. 143 
Leaving aside the non-binding nature of the Commission's opinions, some other points 
may be made. The Chilean amnesty was imposed by the Pinochet regime itself, and 
138 Ibid 
139 Ibid On State response to state response to decisions of the HRC see D. J. Harris "The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom: An Introduction" in D 
. 
J. Harris & S. Joseph 
(eds. ), The International Cow a on Civil and Political Rights and Unit& Kmgdam Law (Oxford: OUP, 1995) 1, 
pp. 38-9. 
140 Comm. No 124/1982,39 UNGAOR Supp. 40 Annex XIII, UN Doc. A/39/40. Annotation as in Scharf, 
supra n. 134, p. 27. 
141 Scharf, ibid p. 27. 
142 Joel Feinberg goes as far as to say the criminal sanction is effectively the only proper way to punish, other 
forms of action are punishment improperly so called. See J. Feinberg, Doing and L)eseniig (1970) 95-118 
reprinted in A. Duff & D. Garland A Reader on Punislanent (Oxford: OUP, 1994) 71, especially pp. 80-83. 
When the HRC was using the phrase, however, it was probably not speaking of punishment in such a 
technical sense as Feinberg does. 
143 Gray Hemn-ifia et al, Case No. 10.843,1996 Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, 156, pp. 182-183, Irma Reyes et al, cases 11,228, ibid., 196, pp. 219-220. A detailed analysis of the Inter- 
American Organs' treatment of amnesties can be found in D. Cassel, "Lessons From the Americas: 
Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities" 1996) 59, L. & Contanporwy ßvbilens 197, 
see in particular pp. 215-216. Also, see Generally, D. Shelton, Rmxdzes in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), pp. 322-327. In 1998 the Inter-American Commission repeated this position, and 
condemned the Chilean amnesty, 1998 Report of the Inter-American commission on Human Rights p. 512, 
see Shelton, ibid pp. 326-327. 
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Chile's investigation commission was hobbled by its lack of power. The reaction of 
human rights bodies to more nuanced decisions not to prosecute, such as South Africa's, 
may not be the same. 144 The strongest argument against the use of these decisions to 
establish a duty to extradite or prosecute suspects is the continuing absence of State 
practice supporting a duty. Despite the persuasive authority of the human rights bodies' 
decisions, States have not denied that they have amnestied such offences, but have 
considered amnesties compatible with their international duties, a position that, in some 
instances appears to have been supported by the UN. 145 As Scharf puts it, "a `rule' that is 
so divorced from the realities of State practice is unlikely to achieve substantial 
compliance in the real world, and, therefore, cannot be said to be a binding rule at all, but 
rather an aspiration". 146 
A further point that also must be made is that even if the duty was accepted, it would 
be applicable only to the State whose officials committed the offence. It would not be a 
universal duty to prosecute all offences. Any argument to the contrary would be subject 
to the same arguments identified in relation to jus cc Wu below. 
A different way of establishing a duty to extradite or prosecute is suggested by Cherif 
Bassiouni. He suggests that international society has developed to the extent that there is 
a common interest in all international society in the repression of such offences, which, 
when combined with the right they all have to prosecute them, gives rise to a duty to 
either prosecute them or extradite them147 This is questionable: it implies a duty to 
extradite or prosecute from a permissive right to do so. More importantly, as Bassiouni 
recognises, it rests on the presumption of the international society being a cirri maxima, 
144 See J. Dugard, Dealing With the Crimes of a Past Regime: Is Amnesty Still an Option? " (1999) 12 L. J. LL. 
1001, p. 1009-1010. 
145 See Dugard, ibid, p. 1003; M. P. Scharf, "The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal 
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes" (1996) 59 L. & Cantenp rwy ßvý 41, p. 57-59. This was 
also the position of Lord Lloyd in the In Pinochet Appeal, supra n. 22, p. 929. On this, Lloyd is correct, unlike 
his dismissal of universal jurisdiction, this part of his decision correctly focuses on duties rather than rights. 
146 Scharf, supra n. 134, p. 41. 
147Bassiouni & Wise, supra n. 133, p. 49-50. A similar argument, which is subject to the same criticisms is G. S. 
Gill, "Crime in International Law: Obligations Eia Grimes and the Duty to Prosecute" in G. S. Goodwin-Gill 
& S. Talmon (eds. ), 7 he Reality of Int ional Law Essays in Honour of Ian Brrjimlie (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 199, 
pp. 213-220. 
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which is hotly contested. 148 This thesis takes the view that we are not currently at the 
point where we can confidently derive normative conclusions from the move towards 
new values in the international community, so the approach taken by Bassiouni is not 
persuasive. 149 
Perhaps a more convincing argument for a duty would be from the nature of the 
crimes under consideration. The prohibitive norms they encapsulate are in many 
instances jus aogcs. 150 From this Bassiouni implies that there is a duty to suppress such 
crimes and assist in bringing perpetrators to justice by extraditing or prosecuting them. 
The problem here is, does this duty follow from the fact that they are Jus cogazs? This 
cannot be guaranteed. It is true that the effects of jus cis go beyond the invalidity of a 
treaty incompatible with such a norm, the essence of a jus cogens rule is such that it renders 
illegal any act conflicting with it. 151 The problem here is whether a State, by not 
prosecuting those suspects of international crimes whose activities are alleged to have 
violated jus ccgens norms, is itself also violating the jus ct ns. To imply a duty from this 
there are two levels of enquiry. First, does the content of the norm itself impose a duty to 
prosecute? Here Bassiouni's argument is left begging the question of whether there is 
such a duty. Secondly, and more importantly, to what extent does non-prosecution 
amount to an adoption of the acts? If the State has authored the action, then it may have 
the duty to prosecute the malefactors (as the action may be attributed to that State), but it 
has already shown itself willing to violate the obligation. In respect of other countries 
failing to prosecute the position is more difficult. An isolated instance of non prosecution 
is almost certainly not adoption of the acts, on the other hand, a systematic policy of 
refusal to extradite or prosecute perhaps could be. This may be supported by the 
Restatement (7hinv) of Foreign Re km Law of the Unit& States, paragraph 702 where it states 
1481bii p. 26-37. 
149 This accords, for example with the view of Bassiouni's collaborator on his major work in the area, Edward 
Wise:, see E. M. Wise, "Aut Dpi v Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), 
supra n. 15, pp. 27-28. 
150 M. C. Bassiouni, "International Crimes, Jus Q gm and QUigatio Erga On m" in Joyner (ed. ) supra n. 11,133, 
p. 133. See also L. Hannikainen Pa mxoy Nonns (Jus Qgens) in Inxematiofd Law (Helsinki Finnish Lawyers' 
Publishing Company, 1988), p. 286. 
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that a State violates customary law if "as a matter of State policy, it... encourages or 
condones [various criminal acts]". 152 If this is the case, then perhaps it could be 
considered that there is a duty on States to take actions to distance themselves from jus 
a ns violatiors, or at least not encourage or condone them One way of doing this would 
be to prosecute at least some malefactors. Even so, this may be stretching the notion of 
complicity rather far. 153 
In sum there are various arguments used by some scholars by which they attempt 
to overcome the absence of a general duty to extradite or prosecute. On their own, they 
are incapable of overcoming the simple fact that States cannot be considered to have 
acted in a way that is indicative of sufficient practice or opinio juris necessary to establish a 
duty. There are possible movements in this direction, as there is increased prosecution of 
the core international crimes. However, to impose a positive duty on States to prosecute 
all core offences, would require much greater practice. The remaining arguments may 
show a way towards creating a paper based duty, but it is questionable if these, even were 
they to be accepted more widely in theory would easily transform themselves into State 
practice, given that until recently, there has been a widespread failure to respond even to 
clear treaty based duties such as those in the Geneva Conventions. This is a serious failing 
in the decentralised system of enforcement of international criminal law. It will be argued 
infra, pp. 155-156, that the ICC is capable of making great progress in this area, by acting 
as an incentive for national prosecution. 
The absence of a general duty to extradite or prosecute international crimes 
undermines their effective penal repression. In addition, the absence of a hierarchy of 
obligations where duties to extradite or prosecute exist can cause similar dilemmas to 
those involved in overlapping claims of jurisdiction, as the Lockerbie case has shown. In 
151 Hannlcainen, ibrcL p. 7. 
152 Third Restatement of US Foreign Relations Law. Vol 2 (1987) p 165. 
153 Even those who argue in favour of complicity in State responsibility do so only for limited circumstances, 
where there is a more direct link than mere presence. See J. Quigley, "Complicity in International Law: A 
New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility" (1987) 58 B. YB. LL. 77. 
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the field of these duties the various tribunals may represent a significant step forward. 
The founding documents of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC do not explicitly enshrine the 
extradite or prosecute obligation, but may have formulated a functional equivalent. 
For the UN Tribunals, the creation of a duty to take action is a result of Article 9 of 
the IM Statute (Article 8 of the ICIR Statute) which gives the tribunals the right to 
require the transferral of any person in any State's jurisdiction to it, for the purpose of 
prosecution. So where the UN Tribunal has jurisdiction, and has taken an interest in that 
individual, a duty is created for the custodial State. The duty is to transfer the 
suspect/indictee to the UN tribunal concerned, irrespective of its own preferred course 
of action. Therefore, not only is a duty similar to auf dedere auf judicare imposed, but it is 
clarified by the precedence given to surrender to the UN Tribunal concerned. 
There is one caveat. In practice there is no duty on the Prosecutor to indict all 
persons against whom a prima facie case exists. The Statutes seem to impose that duty. 
Article 18(4) of the ICTY Statute (Article 17(4) ICTR Statute) states that "upon 
determination that a prima facie case exists, the Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment". 154 
However, this determination is left to the discretion of the Prosecutor who has not 
interpreted her duty to require indictment of all persons against whom such a case can be 
made, and who expressly follows a policy (which has never been protested) of primarily 
pursuing indictments against those in positions of command. 155 In Ntuyuhaga, the ICTR 
accepted the right of the Prosecutor not to proceed against a person indicted, and said 
matters of prosecution policy are for the Prosecutor alone. 156 Even after preparing an 
154 Article 18(1) ICTY Statute (Article 17(1) ICTR Statute). A duty to investigate, itself an important point. 
For the procedure for the submission of indictments, see Rule of Procedure 47. 
155 RJ Goldstone, "The International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: A Case Study in Security Council 
Action" (1995) 6 DukeJ. I. & C. L. 5, p. 7. 
156 Supra n. 45. It must be accepted though, that once an indictment has been confirmed, it cannot be 
withdrawn without leave of the confirming judge, or once evidence has been presented, leave of the Trial 
Chamber, Rule of Procedure 51(A). 
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indictment, the Prosecutor can withdraw it at her discretion prior to confirmation by a 
judge, manifesting the absence of a duty. 157 
This is understandable, because of the limited resources of the Tribunals. It also does 
not detract from the obligation on the Prosecutor to investigate international crimes. 
Particularly as the ICTY and its Prosecutor exist to ensure the prosecution of such 
crimes, this limit is not too worrying. In any event, the powers and activities of the two 
UN tribunals have operated in a way which for many cases has led to a duty on States to 
take action (to transfer the suspect to the Tribunal for the purpose of trial) which is 
analogous to a duty to extradite or prosecute. 158 
For the Rome Statute, the situation is different, although the end result of ensuring a 
proper investigation of charges may also be achieved for States party to the Rome Statute 
or, when the Security Council passes a situation to the Prosecutor, all UN members. 
When information is passed to the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor has a duty to investigate 
the situation unless "he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed". 159 
It is worthwhile remembering that the Prosecutor is not limited to references from States 
or the Security Council, neither of which are duty bound to submit such references. 160 
The Prosecutor is given the power, ex proprio motu, to initiate investigations "on the basis 
of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the court". 161 Subject to a Pre-Trial 
Chamber's determination that there is "reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, 
and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court", the Prosecutor may 
157 Rule of Procedure 51(A). 
158 For most of the treaty based duties to extradite or prosecute, in practice the duty only crystallises when 
another party to the treaty takes an interest in the particular case and expresses a desire to see the duty 
fulfilled one way or another. 
159 Article 53. The factors to be considered for this are if the information provided to him provides a 
reasonable basis to proceed, if the case would be admissible under Article 17, and if there are "nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice (Article 53(1)(a-c)), 
see M. Bergsmo & P. Kruger, "Article 53" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 88,701. 
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investigate the offences. 162 Unless the Security Council has passed the situation to the 
Prosecutor, she must inform all States party to the Statute and those "which, taking into 
account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes 
concerned. "163 Any one of these States, if they wish to prevent the Prosecutor acting, 
must investigate "its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts 
which may constitute crimes referred to in Article 5 and which relate to the information 
provided" by the Prosecutor, and notify her of this investigation within a month. 164 If this 
occurs, then the Prosecutor is entitled to require the State concerned to keep her 
informed about the investigation. 165 If the Prosecutor can persuade a Trial Chamber that 
the State is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate the offences, then the Prosecutor 
may continue her investigations. 166 
The outcome of this rather tangled procedure is that should a State, the Security 
Council, or the Prosecutor become interested in a situation, then although they cannot 
directly impose a duty to extradite or prosecute on the relevant parties, steps can be taken 
to prompt them into taking action. This is because States, particularly in relation to 
offences by their nationals, are more likely to prefer to investigate at the national level, 
rather than have an investigation proceeded with in public by an independent 
international investigator. The powers of the Prosecutor to investigate offences and 
160 Article 14, relating to State referrals is phrased in the permissive "may". See A. Marchesio, "Article 14" in 
Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 88 353. Unfortunately, if the practice of the various human rights bodies is used as a 
guide here, the probability of State referrals may not be high, see R. Cryer, "Commentary on the Rome 
Statute: A Cadenza for the Song of Those Who Died in Vain? " (1998) 3 J. A. C. L. 271, p. 285. There was no 
suggestion in the Rome Conference that the Security Council would be under a duty to refer situations, and 
the basis for inclusion of such a power was that there was a permissive right of the Security Council to act. 
See generally L. Yee, "The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16" in 
Lee (ed. ), supra n. 88,143, pp. 146-149. 
161 Article 15. 
162 That is, unless the Security Council has issued a deferral under Article 16 of the Statute. A serious 
possibility, and a large loophole deliberately inserted into the Statute. On Article 16 see Yee, supra n. 160, 
pp. 149-151; M. Bergsmo & J. Pejic, "Article 16" in Triffterer (ed. ), supran. 88,373. 
163 Article 18, see D. T. Ntanda Nsereko, "Article 18" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 88,395, Nsereko questions if 
this obligation applies if the States referred to are not parties to the Statute (p. 399). It is likely that it does. His 
doubt is based on the requirement in Article 18(5) that States party requested to keep the prosecutor up to 
date on their efforts to investigate must respond. The fact that that duty is limited to States party is an 
application of the principle that treaties only put obligations on their parties. 
164 Article 18(2). 
165 Article 18(5). 
166 Article 18(2)(3). Either party can appeal a decision of the Trial Chamber on this (Article 18(4)). It may be 
noted that this also prioritises the obligation, the first obligation is on the State, to investigate, rather than 
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oversee national investigations could be used by a diligent Prosecutor to ensure offences 
are investigated in an impartial manner. If this was done, a duty to investigate offences 
could be seen to take shape. In addition to this, and unlike the duty to extradite or 
prosecute in many treaties, there is a supervisory organ, the Prosecutor's office, which has 
a mandate to ensure the operation of the Statute system. Of course, this all rests on how 
assiduous the Prosecutor is, and there is no guarantee that States will vote in a vigorous 
Prosecutor. 
Although the Prosecutors for the ICY/R have distinguished themselves by their 
independence and commitment to their task, 167 the alleged veto of Professor Bassiouni as 
Prosecutor due to the possibility that he would attend to his duties more vigorously than 
the creators of the ICTY wished168 counsels some scepticism about State intentions. The 
situation for the ICC may not be the same. The ICTY was created even though several 
members of the Security Council were decidedly lukewarm about it. 169 The Rome Statute 
will come into force just after 60 States have ratified it. 170 The first 60 States to ratify the 
Statute are likely to be those most interested in setting up an effective court system, and it 
is those who will make up the Assembly of States Parties during the initial stages of the 
Court's existence. It is this Assembly which votes in the Prosecutor, 171 so it must be 
hoped that these States, being amongst the strongest supporters of the Court, will appoint 
a committed Prosecutor. If so, the Prosecutor could do a great deal to overcome the 
absence of a general duty to extradite or prosecute for States party to the Rome Statute. 
initially to send the accused to the Court. This secondary obligation only becomes relevant if the investigation 
is unsatisfactory. 
167 That is, all those who have actually taken up the position. The first appointed Prosecutor, Ramon 
Escobar-Salom, in the words of Geoffrey Robertson, "proved a disaster: he delayed taking up the job for five 
months, then decided to accept a better offer. " G. Robertson, Crimes Against Hwncmity. " The StnCo for Global 
Justice (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999) p. 278. 
168 See M. C. Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Crnnind Tribunal for fcnmer Yugoslavia (New 
York: Transnational, 1996) pp. 270-271. 
169 See D. Forsythe, "Politics and the ICTY" in Clark & Sann, supra n. 10,185, pp. 186-189. 
170 Rome Statute, Article 126. 
171 Jbid Article 42(4). 
126 
The caveat that this is for States party alone is a large one. If the Security Council 
does not pass a matter to the Prosecutor (and there is no guarantee it will), 172 then the 
extent of the Prosecutor's bailiwick for this action is limited to States party, so unless the 
Statute reaches a near universal level of acceptance, this will remain a partial solution. 
Nonetheless, for States party to the Rome Statute, this is almost revolutionary. 
EXTRADITION 
Closely tied with the issue of jurisdiction is that of extradition. Experience shows that 
those guilty of international crimes are liable to leave the laus delicti for a country 
unwilling to prosecute them Thus, to obtain the presence of the accused, a country 
wishing to prosecute must seek the extradition of the accused. This can be a problem for 
two reasons, one relates to the conditions for extradition, the other with the institution 
itself. 173 
CONDITIONS OF EXTRADITION 
The duty to extradite in most of the bilateral extradition treaties is not absolute. One 
large problem is the refusal of many civil law countries to extradite their own nationals. 174 
Another is the requirement that many common law countries have of the need to show a 
1n Particularly with the hostility to the Court of at least one permanent member of the Council (the US and 
probably China), who can single-handedly prevent the Council acting to pass a matter to the Prosecutor. 
173 These problems also apply to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (M1LA Treaties). Space constraints prevent 
lengthy discussion of them, but the problems noted in extradition frequently apply, mievis mutandis, to MLA 
treaties. For example, many contain double criminality and political offence exceptions. See for example, A. 
Ellis & R. L. Pisani, "The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters" in M. C. Bassiouni 
(ed. ), supra n. 10,403, p419 (noting the prevalence of political offence exceptions); D. D. Spinellis, "Securing 
Evidence Abroad: A European Perspective" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), iliä 359, p. 366, giving examples of the 
requirement of double criminality in some treaties. The problems relating to the bilateralist nature of 
extradition relations apply a fortiori to MLA treaties, as they are very much the exception rather than the rule, 
D. B. Heyman, "Two Models of National Models Towards International Cooperation in Law Enforcement" 
(1990) 31 Hanmd LL. J. 99, p. 100. 
174 Gilbert, supra n. 134, pp. 95-99. As he notes, this refusal is being relaxed now. 
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prvna facie case. 175 Both of these are self-explanatory. In addition, certain conditions must 
be fulfilled. 176 These include the rule of double criminality and speciality, which are that 
the crime for which extradition is sought must be a crime in both countries and if 
extradited for a particular crime, a person may only be tried for that crime. 
The speciality rule is merely to ensure extradition requests are not used duplicitously, 
attempting to extradite for one type of crime, only to try the person for a crime which 
extradition would likely be refused. 177 With careful, good faith investigation, the speciality 
rule should not be a problem The two rules of extradition that have caused particular 
problems are the double criminality requirement, and the "political offence exception". 178 
The requirement of double criminality boils down to the necessity of the conduct for 
which extradition is sought being criminalised in both the requesting and requested State. 
The purpose of the double criminality rule is to prevent extraditions being made for 
aberrant crimes, which are the product of the idiosyncrasies of some legal systems. 179 This 
rationale should not apply to international crimes. The international crimes under 
discussion are the antithesis of aberrant, being accepted by the overwhelming majority (if 
not all) States as constituting crimes applicable to all. The crimes are overwhelmingly 
customary, and directly applicable to all persons. Therefore, there is no question of the 
person not being subject to the criminal prohibition, wherever it was committed. An 
absence of legislation implementing them nationally should not frustrate the transfer of 
suspects. This, though, has not been the case, as the Pinaclxt 3rd appeal showed. Only 
175 Again, this requirement is showing some signs of being relaxed, for example it has no place in the 
European Convention on Extradition, E. T. S. No. 24. See D. Poncet & P. Gully-Hart, "The European 
Approach" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 10,277. 
176 See generally Gilbert (1990), supra n. 134, Ch. 3; Gilbert (1998), supra n. 134, Ch. 6. 
In For an instance of it's application here, see In re Issel (1950) 18 I. L. R. 331 (Denmark). 
178 See ibia, Ch. 6; L. C. Green, "Political Offences, War Crimes and Extradition" (1962) 11 I. CL. Q 329; C. 
van den Wyngaert, "The Political Offence Exception to Extradition: How to Plug the Terrorists' loophole' 
Without Departing form Fundamental Human Rights" (1990) 19 Is. YB. H. R. 297; J. Dugard & C. van den 
Wyngaert, "Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 187. 
179 See Poncet & Gully-Hart, supra n. 175, p. 292 who phrase the rationale as lawfulness of deprivation of 
liberty, on the basis that it should be prosecutable in either State. The problem goes a little deeper than that in 
this author's opinion, as their approach does not entirely explain why the offence must be prosecutable in 
both States when an international crime is in issue. They also refer (ibid) to maintaining reciprocity in 
extradition. It is submitted that reciprocity also does not apply in relation to international crimes, as there is a 
community interest in repression of such crimes. If the reason it should be prosecutable in both States is an 
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Lord Millett was prepared to accept that extradition should proceed on the basis of 
customary international law, and then only on the basis that the ÜK is an incorporationist 
State as regards customary international law-180 As incorporation of international crimes 
into domestic jurisdictions has not been especially impressive this could be a large 
problem, particularly as many States also incorporate a locational aspect to double 
criminality, 181 which requires that the requested State would also have to have 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offence. 
The political offence exception rule is a mix of humanitarian concern for the 
defendant and unwillingness to enter into the internal affairs of other States. States worry 
that trials for political offences are politically motivated and unfair, and they do not wish 
to be seen to be taking sides. 182 To this end, most States exempt from extradition those 
offences which are of a political nature. This is uncontroversial for offences of a purely 
political nature, such as treason. Problems arise when the offence is of a mixed political 
and normal character, or a normal offence, carried out with a political motive. 
In theory, this should not be a problem for international crimes. It is difficult to see 
how such crimes could be subsumed under the political offence exception, as Gilbert 
notes "that it [the exception] should be applied to war criminals may seem to be 
stretching the point to absurdity". 183 In practice, the political offence has been used. 
aspect of a form of mdkon cavnaen sine /. age argument, it must also fall, the suspect is directly bound by 
international criminal law irrespective of the lex lows ddiczi. 
180 See Millett, supra n. 36, p. 912; for criticism of the Pino t 3" appeal on double criminality (on the basis of 
its reading of the temporal aspect of double criminality) see C. Warbrick, "Extradition Aspects of Piro6a 3" (1999) 48 LCL. Q 958; M. Birmbaum, "Pinochet and Double Criminality" [2000] Cmz L. R. 127. 
181 Gilbert (1998), supra n. 134, pp. 112-113 criticises such uses of locational double criminality, on the ground 
that as long as the conduct is criminal in both States and the assertion of jurisdiction is accepted, no problems 
should arise. This is eminently sensible, particularly for international crimes. On the locational aspect of 
Pincdx 
, 
see Warbrick, ibrd p. 959-960. This is the requirement that not only does the offence have to be 
criminal in the requested State, but also, if the requesting State is relying upon extraterritorial jurisdiction, that 
the requested State also has such extraterritorial jurisdiction over that offence. Again this requirement need 
not have to apply to international crimes, as all States have a right to prosecute such offences under universal 
jurisdiction. Their failure to do so should not stand in their way of co-operating with States that do. Universal 
jurisdiction is limited to a small number of accepted offences, and there is a community interest in their 
suppression, so it would not cause the problems, for example, that large extensions of passive personality 
jurisdiction do. 
182 Gilbert, supra n. 134, p. 113. Not least, many states require proportionality between the political aspect and 
the offence committed. This would be very difficult to show in most war crimes and effectively impossible 
for crimes against humanity, to even raise the question of if genocide could be proportional is ludicrous. 
183 Imo, p. 135 
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Although Article VII of the Genocide Convention excludes the operation of the political 
offence exception to those accused of genocide, the Geneva Conventions Grave Breach 
provisions leave the question open. As a result of this, there have been some instances, 
particularly of Nazi war criminals, where extradition has been refused on this ground. 184 
The most notorious instance of this was the refusal, by the US, to extradite Andrija 
Artukovic to Yugoslavia in 1956. The court in that case decided that crimes involving 
responsibility for 700,000 murders in Croatia were of a political character. 185 The 9th 
Circuit in that case said war crimes could be subject to the political offence exception, 
and all of the courts applied a test beyond any formulation of the political offence 
exception, accepting that crimes committed in obedience to governmental orders were 
political offences. 186 Fortunately, there is evidence of opposing practice, with many 
jurisdictions now accepting that such crimes cannot be political in this sense. 187 The US 
now accepts that the Artukozk decision was wrong, and they specifically rejected the 
application of the exception to Artukovic in 1986.188 The increasing acceptance of this 
position, in tandem with the fact that very few war crimes and crimes against humanity 
could possibly meet the definitions of the political offence exception must bear out 
Green's conclusion that "the concept of political offences as it has developed in the 
practice of States and courts cannot be extended to protect a person accused of war 
184 For example in reKalm (1948) 15 LL. R. 972 
185 Artukovic v Boyle 140 Supp. 245 (S. D. California (1956); Karadzole v Artukvrnc, 247 F. 2d 198 (9th (71rcuit). 
(1957); 355 US 393 (1958); ex rd KaradzolevArtukavc 170 F. Supp. 383 (S. D. California)(1959). 
186 See Gilbert, supra n. 134, p. 214. The essence of the political offence exception is that the offence is against 
the state, not at the behest of the state. Green, supra n. 178, p330. Re Castiom [1891] 1 QB 149 at 159; Re 
Giozmiii Gatti (1947), (1951) 15A. D. 145. 
187 For example, State vS 'uhrrmm (1966), (1970) 39 I. L. R. 433 (Ghana), Km v Prosa r (Switzerland) 
(1966), (1987) 72 I. L. R. 606; see Gilbert (1990), supra n. 134, p. 215; Wacgner Case Tribunale Supremo Militare 
12.3.1950. (Italy); Rv Wilson, ex p. Witness (Australia), (1992) 88 LL. R. 169 (Australia). In QuimvRo%nson 783 
F. 2d 776 (1986) p. 779, the US 9th Circuit claimed that crimes against humanity were not susceptible to the 
political offence test. In re Extraditzan of Atta Abroad v W&m 426 F. Supp. 389 (1989) A US court said to 
prove the offence was political, the extraditee had to prove it did not violate the Geneva Conventions, 
Gilbert, supra n. 134, p. 249. The UK position may be inferred from rv Gass, ex p Tunny Solithor [1968] 3 All 
ER 804. Gilbert notes that the inference is that war crimes and crimes against humanity are not susceptible to 
the test. Gilbert (1998), ibid, p. 393. 
188 Den kv PebVt ky 776 F. 2d 571(USCA 6th Cir. 1985); at doz 475 U. S. 1016 (1986), 628 F. Supp. 1370; 
784 F. 2d 1254 (1986). See J. Moeller, "United States Treatment of Alleged Nazi War Criminals: International 
Law, Immigration law and the Need for International Co-operation" (1985) 25 V. J. LL. 793, R. H. Reiss, 
The Extradition of John Demjanjuk War Crimes, Universality Jurisdiction and the Political Offense 
Doctrine" (1987) 20 Comeü I. L. J. 281. 
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crimes or crimes against humanity. "189 At the least the exclusion of international criminals 
from the political offence exception is, as Gilbert claims, a developing rule of customary 
international law. 190 The fact that it has been used at all raises more questions of the wish 
of the executive to extradite the accused than the interpretation of the concept. As 
Gilbert points out: "the judges decisions... [on the exception]... often seem to owe more 
to foreign policy than to legal reasoning. "191 
The UN Tribunals deal with the possibility of failure to extradite due to the 
conditions of extradition by a simple method: they simply declare the conditions to be 
inapplicable. The view was taken that extradition is a feature of the horizontal 
relationship between States. This differs from relations between States and the UN 
Tribunals, who are in a vertical, hierarchically superior position to States. Thus, joint rule 
of procedure 58 excludes the application of national law or treaty based bars to 
extradition or surrender. 192 This approach should avoid all the problems of the technical 
nature of extradition, but implementation of this provision has been uneven. Only 20 
States have adopted legislation relating to obligations under the ICTY Statute, 193 and only 
four States have affirmed that they can perform all of their duties under international law 
without alteration of their existing laws. The situation in relation to the ICTR is worse, 
with only eleven States having co-operation legislation. 194 Even amongst those States 
having introduced implementing legislation, there are variations in the extent to which the 
provisions of that legislation conform to the obligations under the UN tribunal Statue 
and rules. Some, such as the UK, Spanish, and possibly the Croatian legislation do seem 
to confine any court based review to formal matters, such as that the person is not the 
189 Supra n. 178, p. 354. 
190 Gilbert supra n. 134, (1998), p395. 
191 Supra n. 134 (1990), p. 113. Carbonneau, in relation to the French decision not to extradite the terrorist Abu 
Daoud, states the court's reasoning "strongly suggests that the court was searching for some sort of legal 
justification of a foregone political conclusion". T Carbonneau "The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent 
Release of Abu Daoud by French Authorities" (1977) 17 V. J. I. L. 495, at p. 510. Referring to the extradition of 
Abdullah Ocalan, Gilbert reaffirms "the process... has not dignified rendition within Europe and has 
highlighted how far realpolizik can interfere with the proper law of extradition", G. Gilbert, "The Arrest of 
Abdullah Öcalan" (1999) 12 L. J. I. L. 565, p. 573. 
192 IC1Y Rules of PrOCfiure and Evidence (IT/32/Revl7), Rule 58; ICTR Rules of l-- &e and Evidence, Rule 58. 
193Amnesty International, Status of Signal and Ratoiations of the Statute of dx Intemational Criminal Court 
(London: Amnesty International, 1999). 
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one named in the arrest warrant. 195 Others though, such as the Italian legislation are more 
problematic. 196 
With the exception of the Italian law, none of the implementing legislation refers to 
double criminality. 197 This exception aside, double criminality appears not to be relevant 
not only in the ideal scheme created by the ICTY Statute and Resolution 827, but also in 
practice. Some writers have been lukewarm about this abandonment-198 It should be 
applauded, as discussed above, whatever merits the double criminality requirement has, 
its raisons d'ebr do not apply to international crimes. Consonant with the current status of 
international law, none of the legislation contains an equivalent to the "political offence" 
exception, which can be considered otiose when the crime alleged is criminalised directly 
by international law. 
Turing to other of the national limits to extradition, there have been problems with 
both the anomalies of the civil law system (the non extradition of nationals) and those of 
the common law countries (the requirement of demonstration of a prima facie case). 
Although the legislation of some civil law countries (such as Austria) expressly prevent 
the operation of their constitutional bars on extradition of nationals to surrender to the 
194 I'M 
195 For the UK, see the United Nations, (International Tribunal) (Former Yugoslavia) Order 1996, Article 6(5), 
C. Warbrick "Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia" (1996) 45 I. C. L. Q 947, 
p. 951. There is one possible problem with the UK legislation, as it creates the possibility of non-surrender 
due to the operation of laws relating to past conviction. It is unlikely that this will cause problems in practice 
though. UK Order Article 6(d), Warbrick, ibid p. 951 For Spain, see Act 15/1994 on Cooperation With the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, (2 June 1994), Article 4(3) In relation 
to Croatia, see Constitutional Act on the Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal, Narodna 
novine No. 32/1996, Articles 13-24. See I. Josipovic, "Implementing Legislation for the Application of the 
Law on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Criteria for its Evaluation" (1998) 
1 YB. LH. L. 35, piussrin, especially, p. 55 & 66. Josipovic claims the Croatian Act is fully in accordance with the 
obligations under the Statue. Croatia, however, for a long time attempted to hide from its obligations, 
pointing to its constitution's prohibition of the surrender of nationals, a prohibition dearly trumped by Rule 
58 and Article 29 of the ICTY Statute. For a rather self-serving rebuttal of the facts underlying the ICTY 
reports to the Security Council of non-compliance see Croatian Ministry of Justice, White Paper on the 
Coaperatron with the Intentional Tribunal far the Pmsazrtion of Persons Responsible for Serious zialath2s of Intemational 
Honaiitý Law (. antral in the Tenitmy of Fanner Yugoslavia sic 1991 (Zagreb: Ministry of justice, 1999). 
196 Provisions on Cooperation With the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, 
Decree law No 544 of 28 December 1993 & no 120 14 February 1994. 
197 See Ibid Article 1(c-bis), Josipovic, supra n. 195, p. 66. 
198 Lady Fox, for example, criticises the UK government for providing for transfer in relation to crimes she 
claims are unknown to UK law. H. Fox, "The Objections to Transfer of Criminal jurisdiction to the UN 
Tribunal" (1997) 46 I. C L. Q 434, p. 441-442. 
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UN tribunals, 199 this is not the case in all countries. The Croatian legislation, for example 
does not so provide, 200 and this provided the pretext for long periods of non compliance 
with surrender warrants. That Croatia persuaded ten suspects to "voluntarily surrender" 
themselves to the ICTY in 1997,201 did not alter the fact that they were, at that time still 
using the excuse of their constitutional prohibition of the extradition of nationals to 
explain their non-compliance with transfer orders. 202 One of the primary reasons the FRY 
refuses to surrender its nationals to the ICTY is said to be based upon its constitutional 
prohibition of the extradition of its nationals. 203 The veracity of this argument has been 
rejected above, and its enunciation owes far more to politics than constitutional fidelity. 
Even States ostensibly willing to assist the UN tribunals have run into problems. The 
primary example of this amongst common law States is the Ntakinctinana litigation in the 
US. 204 In this case a Texan court gave precedence to a controversial reading of US 
constitutional requirements to mandate itself to apply the prang facie requirement in US 
extradition law and to require there to be an extradition treaty in place for surrender to 
occur. 205 This situation, which highly embarrassed the US government, shows the 
199 Austrian Federal Law on Cooperation With the International Tribunals, 1 June 1996, pars 5, see Josipovic, 
supra n. 195, p. 62. 
200 See supra n. 195. 
201 See D. Robinson, "Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs: Major Developments in 1997 at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia" (1997) 35 Gmadim YB. I. L. 179, p. 181. 
202 Cooperation has improved, and this excuse is no longer used see T. Judah, "Croatia Reborn" 12 August 
2000 N Y. R. 20, p. 23. 
203 G. Sluiter, "To Cooperate or not to Cooperate?: The Case of the Failed Transfer of Ntakirutimana to the 
Rwanda Tribunal" (1998) 11 L. J. I. L. 383, p. 384. 
204 In the Matter of the Sunvnder of Elizapº = Ntakinrtönana 1997 LEXIS 20714 (S. D. Tex., Laredo Div. Dec. 17 
1997), See generally, Josipovic, supra n. 195, pp. 59-60; G. Sluiter, did; J J. Paust, "The Freeing of 
Ntakirutimana in the United States and `Extradition' to the ICIR" (1998) 1 YB. I. H. L. 205. The surrender has 
now been approved at appellate level, (184 F. 3d 419 US Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit), a further appeal to the 
Supreme Court was denied, see M. J. Coombes, "International Decisions: In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana" 
(2000) 94 A. J. I. L. 171. The US law is contained in Section 3181 of Title 18 USC. For attempts by US lawyers 
to justify the US governmental approach to implementing their obligations from the point of US 
constitutional law see K. J. Harris & R. Kushen, "Surrender of Fugitives to the War Crimes Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Squaring International Legal Obligations with the US constitution" (1996) 7 Cnm 
L. F. 561; K. J. Harris & R. Kushen, "Surrender of Fugitives to the War Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 510. These of course are of more interest to US constitutional lawyers than 
international lawyers. 
205 Harris & Kushen, ibid pp. 599-600 attempt to prove that a warrant from one of the UN Tribunals would 
cover this requirement. This slightly misses the point, under the Statute, it is not that the ICIY has to fulfil 
these requirements, but that they are irrelevant. On the other hand, the ICTY has entered into agreements 
with the US which oblige it to supply such information. The legal basis for the ICTY entering into these 
agreements is uncertain. 
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difficulty of overcoming entrenched laws on extradition, which are applied by the US to 
surrender to the UN tribunals. 206 
In conclusion, for the conditions of extradition, the UN tribunal's statutes take a bold 
approach, which has led to a significant reduction in the problems which have plagued 
extradition in practice. In relation to the conditions of extradition, there has been a fair 
degree of success in removing the general conditions, such as double criminality, and the 
political offence exception. Unfortunately, in practice the legislative enactments that there 
are207 have not all lived up to the promise of the theoretical regime, and ironically, it has 
been the conditions peculiar to the common and civil law systems that have proven most 
problematic here. To the extent to which conditions of extradition operate to protect 
human rights, 208 their removal may be of concern. It can only be hoped that the 
protections for human rights contained in the Statutes of the UN tribunals will suffice to 
ease concern. 209 It is almost certain that the level of human rights protection is at least as 
high as in many States which enjoy extradition relations with countries conunitted to 
human rights. 210 
The Rome Statute's provisions on the conditions of extradition are a little less 
absolute than the corresponding articles in the UN Tribunals' Statutes. Article 89 of the 
Rome Statute sets out the obligations of the parties on surrender, subject to the 
206 To the extent to which the US cannot surrender the accused to the UN tribunals, they violate the Statutes 
and resolutions setting up those tribunals. 
207 The low number of which is itself a problem. 
208 For debate on this issue, see Dugard & van Den Wyngaert, supra n. 175. 
209 This has not been enough for some, see Fox, supra n. 198, pp. 437-438. 
210 The level of protection of human rights in the Tribunals has been the subject of much debate, especially 
surrounding the use of an anonymous witness in the Tadic trial. See, Y. M. O Featherstone, "The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: Recent Developments in Witness Protection" (1997) 10 L. J. I. L. 
179; A-M La Rosa, "A Tremendous Challenge for the International Criminal Tribunals: Reconciling the 
Requirements of International Humanitarian Law with Those of Fair Trial" (1997) 312 I. R. R. C 635; A. 
Sherman, "Sympathy for the Devil: Examining the Defendant's Right to Confront Before the International 
War crimes Tribunal" (1996) 10 Emrny LL. R. 833; J. Sloan, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia and Human Rights: A Closer Look" (1996) 9 L. J. I. L. 479; N. A. Affolder, "Tadic, the Anonymous 
Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law" (1998) 19 Michigan J. I. L. 445; C. Chinkin, "Due 
Process and Witness Anonymity" (1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 75; M Leigh, "Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with 
Due Process" (1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 80; A. Cassese, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
and Human Rights" (1997) 1 Eumpam H. R. L. R. 329; V. M. Creta, "The Search for Justice in Former 
Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1998) 20 Hasston J. I. L. 381; C. 
Warbrick, "International Criminal Courts and Fair Trial" (1998) 3 J. A. C. L. 45. 
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requirements set out in Article 91. Article 91 does not mention any limits such as the 
political offence limitation, or dual criminality, or nationality. It must be considered 
therefore, that these limits are inapplicable in relation to the surrender process. 211 This 
cannot but be welcomed. 
There does, though, appear to be one limit left. This is probably due to the problems 
associated with the Ntakirutimia litigation in the US and is contained in Article 91(2) (c). 
Article 91(2) (c) requires the court to accompany the request with "such documents, 
statements or information as may be necessary to meet the requirements for the 
surrender process in the requested State, except that those requirements should not be 
more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or 
arrangements between the requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less 
burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature of the court". As a result, some 
common law States' requirement of the showing of a prima facie case has been retained, 
albeit in attenuated form. Although the requirement may not, in theory, be too 
burdensome, the Ntakirutvnima litigation shows this need not necessarily be the case. 212 
Civil law States may also feel aggrieved that they have given up their system-specific 
prohibition on the surrender of nationals, while common law States have managed to 
211 This can be supported by the conspicuous absence of the term "extradition" in this part of the Statute. Its 
use was specifically avoided, as it was wished to create a separate regime to extradition for surrender to the 
court. Article 91(1)(c) which deals with surrender also draws attention to the "distinct nature of the court". As 
Strijards notes, G. Strijards, "The Institution of the International Criminal Court" (1999) 12 L. J. I. L. 671, 
p. 675 the ILC, when introducing the concept into the Draft Statute saw it as a form of informal transfer, 
specifically put in to avoid national law limitations. He is concerned that the reference to "procedures under 
their national law" in Article 89 may bring it back in. This appears to overlook the obligation in Article 88 to 
have national legislation that allows full co-operation with the Court in accordance with the Statute; the 
wording served to emphasise "procedures are to be used to meet, not to defeat the obligation to comply with 
requests", K Prost, "Article 88" in Triffterer, supra n. 88,1069, p. 170. In the Canadian draft "Act Respecting 
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes and to Implement the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts" Bill No. C-19 s. 52 
expressly disapply grounds for refusal (of extradition) under Canadian law when the requesting body is the 
ICC. This is in accordance with Article 102, which specifically differentiates "surrender" to the ICC, and 
"extradition" which is delivery of a suspect between States. See C. Kress, "Article 102" in Triffterer (ed. ), ibil, 
1157, p. 1157 who notes it was specifically introduced to deal with the problem of surrender of nationals. 
212 It is true, of course that the refusal, at first instance, was overturned on appeal. The fact that the first 
instance decision necessitated this shows the possible problems involved in using the exception, which could 
be interpreted nub fides by States in an attempt to evade their obligations under the Statute. 
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retain their requirement of showing a prnna facie case. 213 In all though, the regime set up by 
the Rome Statute overcomes a large number of problems related to the conditions of 
extradition, an advance which could have significant implications for the surrender of 
persons for trial accused of international crimes. 214 
THE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE EXTRADITION SYSTEM 
Many of the problems related to national use of extradition are aspects of a more 
general problem with extradition; it "is often tied to a political axis. Absent treaty or 
convention, extradition practice depends on comity and reciprocity". 215 As discussed 
above, it may be possible to contend that there is a duty to extradite or prosecute, 
however, in practice States have refused to accept such a duty. Some States are prepared 
to extradite on the basis of international comity, whilst others, such as the US and Canada 
refuse to extradite to countries with which they do not have an extradition treaty. 216 The 
treaty regimes entered into by States are primarily done so on a bilateral basis, and only 
213 Gilbert, for example suggests that in extradition, both should be abolished (see supra n. 134 (1998), pp. 178- 
179). This would be a way forward, but abolishing one alone creates an imbalance. In addition, the trend even 
in common law States is towards a reduction in the use of the prim facie requirement, which is inapplicable to 
extraditions under the removed in the European Convention on Extradition, E. T. S. No. 24. An oddity created 
by the Rome Statute is that if the UK was requested to extradite a suspect for an ordinary crime to the 
Netherlands, as both are parties to the European Convention, the Netherlands would not have to show a 
prnna facie case. If however, the ICC, situated in the Netherlands, wished to obtain the surrender of an accused 
person, for an international crime, the UK could presumably rely on its normal requirement of the 
demonstration of a präna facie case in its extradition treaties, to require such proof (an unwarranted 
assumption of Article 91(1)(c) is that a State's conditions of extradition are uniform ). The regime thus 
created for the ICC may well, therefore, run directly against the trend of making the extradition or surrender 
of suspected international criminals simpler. 
214 The same concerns, and considerations in rebuttal, on human rights as have been raised about the UN 
Tribunals may also apply here. 
215 R. Friedlander, "Problems of Enforcing International Criminal Law" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), Inemational 
Crininal Law Vol Ilk En)&rw7xn4 (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational, 1987) 13, p. 17. 
216 For the US see Factor v Laulbnlaeiw 290 US 276,287 (1933); See generally, J. Wagner, "US Prosecution of 
Past and Future War Criminals and Criminals Against Humanity: Proposals for Reform Based on the 
Canadian and Australian Experiences" (1989) 29 V. J. I. L. 887, p. 892; S. Williams "Laudable Principles 
Lacking Implementation: The Prosecution of War Criminals in Canada" in McCormack & Simpson (eds. )
supra n. 26,151, p. 155. 
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with friendly States. 217 This comes from the very traditional, bilateral view of the self- 
interest of States which is in some ways at odds with the ideas of universal crimes. 
Even when there is a treaty basis for extradition, many countries treat the obligation 
as merely giving rise to an executive discretion, the executive retaining the final decision 
on the extradition. 218 Courts in these countries merely determine if legal grounds 
permitting extradition exist, not if extradition should occur. This has led to decisions 
based on criteria far removed from legal obligations. 219 Regimes are not above supporting 
those who have helped them internally, for example Klaus Barbie was shielded by the 
Bolivian authorities until a government hostile to the one he assisted gained power. In 
that instance the offer of an aid package by the French government was also not 
irrelevant. 220 Until very recently, Western States have been particularly reluctant to 
extradite to the (former) Eastern bloc countries. Countries such as the UK and Australia 
were explicit about this, 221 other countries just did not enter into extradition treaties with 
them222 This reluctance to extradite to unfriendly regimes is not limited to the Eastern 
bloc, the entire Lockerbie situation has arisen due to Libya being unwilling to extradite to 
an unfriendly country, with the US and UK not wishing Libya to prosecute the accused 
bombers itself. 223 
In relation to overcoming the essentially bilateral form of extradition relations, the 
(near) universal secondary jurisdiction of the UN tribunals (i. e. their power to address 
217 There are some multilateral approaches, such as the European Convention on Extradition and the 
Commonwealth rendition scheme of mutual legislation, but these are the exception, rather than the rule. 
218 Gilbert, supra n. 134 (1990), p. 162. These countries include the US (M. C. Bassiouni, "Law and Practice of 
the United States" in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 10,191; Moeller supra n. 188, p. 804, this position has not been 
altered by Lo Bue vC hthý 893 F. Supp. (65 D. D. C. 1995) 82 F. 3d 1081 (D. C. Cir. 1996) as its finding of 
unconstitutionality related only to a review of the court's legal findings, not the right to decide on extradition., 
on this, Gilbert suggests that it is "aberrant" and should be ignored (supra n. 134 (1998), p. 83)), Canada (Canadian Extradition Act RSC 1985 c. E-23 SC 1992 c. 13, s. 25) the UK, Extradition Act 1989 s12. 
219 Gilbert, ibid, p. 114. Or indeed, as the experience of Columbia and the "extraditables" in the 1980s shows, 
those capable of wielding power in that country. For an account of their actions and their influence on the 
political nature of the refusal of their extradition see G. G. Marquez, Neus o fa Kidnapping (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1997). 
220 G. Binder, "Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity in the Trial of Klaus Barbie" (1989) Yale L. J. 
1321, p. 1327. 
221 See Green, supra n. 178, pp. 346,352. 
222 See e. g. Williams supra n. 216. 
223 This is an oft-overlooked aspect of the dispute. See C. C. Joyner & W. P. Rothbaum, "Libya, the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie: What Lessons for International Extradition Law" (1993) 14 Mich. J. 1. L. 222. 
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binding surrender orders to States) obviates the problem. The UN tribunals entirely alter 
the system of transfer of persons for those under their jurisdiction. Irrespective of the 
existence of a traditional extradition treaty, they are entitled to demand the surrender of 
the people concerned, wherever they are found. This represents a complete break with 
the normal, bilateral system, which relies on the happenstance of suspects being found in 
a country enjoying extradition relations with the country wishing to try them or is 
prepared to extradite on grounds of international comity. 
Turning to the Rome Statute, as a treaty, its obligations will only apply between the 
parties, unless the Security Council has referred the matter to the Court (in which case it 
would appear that there could be an obligation on all States to obey the Court's orders). 224 
The ICC's power to address, ex proprio mote, binding surrender orders to States, though, is 
limited to States party. In this, it differs from the UN tribunals, who have the power to 
address surrender orders to practically all States. Although this means the answer the 
Rome Statute offers to the problem of the bilateral nature of extradition is not total, as is 
the approach taken for the UN tribunals, this should not blind us to the major advance 
made by the ICC's structure. After all, even within its limits, it amounts to a central 
institution, which may address orders to all the States party, who will be at least 60 States. 
For the parties, at least, it is an important addition to their extradition/surrender regimes. 
For the ICC, it is analogous to having extradition/surrender treaties with at least 60 
States, when many States party will not have extradition relations inter se, be it because of 
224 That appears to be the implication of Articles 86, and 87(1)(5)(7). Article 86 Gives the general obligation 
to co-operate, for States party. Article 87(1) gives the court the power to address orders to States party. There 
is no express mention of non parties in this part, but Article 87(5) may well provide the answer. That Article 
provides that "The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance under this part 
on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis". "Any 
other appropriate basis" will almost definitely include a Security Council Resolution, since that was the 
method used in the ICTY & ICTR to impose a duty to co-operate, and such an obligation is likely to be 
appended to any resolution sending a situation to the prosecutor. This interpretation is strengthened when 
the provisions of the second sentence of 87(5) is examined. This reads "[w]here a State not party to this 
Statute fails to co-operate with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement the Court may 
inform 
... 
[where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court]... the Security Council". The 
reporting of non compliance to the Security Council is highly analogous to the procedure outlined 
for the 
ICTy in the Blaskic case ((discussed above). The Blaskic case was almost certainly on the minds of the 
drafters, and Article 87 seems to reflect the underlying understanding that when the Security Council sends a 
situation to the prosecutor, it will include an obligation. The drafters though were quite careful to avoid the 
implication that any obligation on non parties could be imposed by the treaty without their consent. The 
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the necessity not having arisen, or the States not being particularly friendly. This puts the 
Court in a strong position, but also may bring benefits to its parties. If they receive a 
request for extradition for a person subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, which they are 
unable or unwilling to fulfil (for example, as they have no extradition treaty, or there is a 
serious question of the ability or willingness of the requesting State to grant the accused a 
fair trial), they would not be left with the options of prosecuting the person themselves, 
with the logistical and political difficulties this possibly entails, or allowing someone to 
escape trial for very serious acts. In this instance, they would be able to waive their 
complementarity rights under the Statute, and send that person to the ICC, with whom it 
has surrender relations, and where human rights are fairly well protected225 The ICC 
therefore represents a substantial improvement over the traditional system, and manifests 
an acceptance of the new values in international law, overcoming at a minimum, some of 
the problems associated with the bilateral nature of extradition. 
IRREGULAR RENDITION 
Due to the failings in the practice of international extradition, certain other methods 
have been used to obtain custody over defendants. Even where extradition would be 
possible, it has been perceived as too slow or uncertain by some States who are interested 
in obtaining a particular defendant. 226 As a result, some countries have taken advantage of 
their courts' acceptance of jurisdiction irrespective of the methods by which the person 
was brought before them227 
Security Council's power to do so, is a matter extraneous to the Rome Statute. On the last point, see C. Kress 
& K. Schlunck, "Article 87" in Triffierer (ed. ), supra n. 88,1055, p. 1061. 
225 For a discussion of the approach that the ICC should take towards human rights protection, see S. 
Stapleton, "Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation and the 
Impermissibility of Derogation" (1999) 31 NYU. J. I. L. & Politic 535. 
226 Gilbert, supra n. 134, p. 184; Lagodny, supra n. 17, p. 9. 
227 For example, see Eichmann, supra n. 17, p. 59 (Trial level). The same refusal to concern themselves with 
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DENATURALISATION AND DEPORTATION 
The less serious form of irregular rendition occurs by denaturalisation and 
deportation. Transfer by this method involves the revocation of an obtained citizenship, 
then deportation. It usually occurs when someone is discovered who is likely to have 
committed an international crime prior to coming to a country, and concealed the 
commission of the offence to gain citizenship. In the nature of deportation inheres one 
of the major drawbacks, it may only be done for those who have obtained citizenship, it 
cannot be done for nationals. 228 Another problem is that whilst, in distinction to 
extradition, it may be done unilaterally, not requiring another State to request such action 
it does require a country to be willing to accept the person. This may not be a problem 
where a country wishes to try the accused, but this may not always be the case. Even 
where a country has indicated willingness to try the deportee, it is often the case that he is 
given the option of choosing where to go, though this is usually limited to one choice. 229 
If there is one country offering a safe haven, then he is likely to choose that, thus 
frustrating attempts to bring that person to justice. On the other hand, it is also used 
hypocritically by States, as it does not require extradition relations between the deporting 
and receiving States. It has been used to circumvent the safeguards contained in 
extradition law, and to collusively send accused persons to countries to which extradition 
has been refused. Denaturalisation in the end fails to solve the problem, it either allows 
the manner in which custody was effected is present in the US under the Ka=Frisbie doctrine (Ko-vlllinois, 119 
U. S. 436,7 S. Ct. 225,30 L. Ed 421 (1886), Frisbie v Collins, 342 US 519,72 S. Ct. 509,96 L. Ed. 541 (1952)). 
Other countries courts have given themselves a limited discretion to review the manner of the person's 
attendance, the UK is one of these (R v Horseferry Road Magistrates, ex. p. Bennett [ 1993] 2 All E. R. 318). Other 
countries following this route include New Zealand (R v Hartley [1978] 2 NZLR 199), South Africa, State v 
Ebrahin (1 S. Af. Crim. LR 307) Zimbabwe, (StatevBeahcm 1992,103 LL. R. 203) and Switzerland (Decision of 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court 25.7.82, Eur. Grund. Zeitschrift (1983). See generally, Gilbert (1998), supra 
n. 134, pp. 185-193. As a result, Mann's comment (F. Mann, Further Studies in Intemational Law (Oxford: OUP, 
1990) p. 346); having canvassed Israeli, US, UK, French and German authority, that "with rare unanimity 
and undeniable justification the courts of the world have held that the manner in which an accused has 
been brought before the court does not, and, indeed cannot, deprive it of jurisdiction" must, whilst 
accepted as generally acceptable, (in law if not morality), be qualified insomuch as some courts retain a 
discretion to refuse to hear a case. 
228 See Moeller supra, n. 188, pp. 813-4. 
229 If the country of choice refuses to accept him, then the deporting country finds one itself. See Ratner & 
Abrams, supra n. 16, p. 213. 
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the accused to escape any adjudication of his crimes, or allows a country to send that 
person to a country they are not prepared to formally extradite to, by a procedure that 
does not fully respect the rights of the accused. 230 
ABDUCTION AND LURING 
The wrongs involved in denaturalisation pale into insignificance when compared to 
those involved in another form of irregular rendition, abduction. Unlike the (generally) 
collusive process of deportation, abduction involves the non-consensual entry of State 
agents onto another's territory to forcibly remove an alleged international criminal to a 
jurisdiction willing to try him. The most famous abduction is that of Adolf Eichmann 
from Argentina by Israe1.231 It is clear from the Security Council debates and the 
Resolution which it issued (Resolution 138232) that such action is a violation of the 
sovereignty of the State from which the accused is abducted. It is also a flagrant violation 
of the human rights of the accused, who has the right, if he is to be extradited, to at least 
present arguments against the extradition, and to not be subject to arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment or to deprived of liberty "except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedures as are established by law". 233 
230 For a discussion of examples of collusive deportation and how the US procedures fail to respect 
defendant's rights see G. Getschman, "The Uncertain Role of Innocence in United States Efforts to Deport 
Nazi War Criminals" (1988) 21 CorivlI. L. J. 287. 
231 Israel, rather unconvincingly, claimed that the actions were of private citizens, not its agents. Recently, one 
of Eichmanns's abductors wrote a book explaining his role, as a Mossad agent, in the events, see Z. Aharoni, 
Operation Eic nrn (London: Cassell, 1996) Even if Israel's assertion was correct, it is clear that Israel adopted 
their acts by retaining custody of, and trying Eichmann. See Mann, supra n227, p. 339-40. See generally J. E. S. 
Fawcett, "The Eichnama Case" (1962) 39 B. YB. LL. 181, especially pp. 197-201; D. Lasok, "The Eichmann 
Trial" (1962) 11 LCL. Q 355; P. Papadataos, The Ekbnmm Trial (London: Stevens:, 1961); H. Silving, "In re 
Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality" (1961) 55 A. J. I. L. 307, especially p312-318; J. Weinig, 
"Enforcing the Lessons of History: Israel Judges the Holocaust" in McCormack & Simpson, supra n. 26,103, 
pp. 112-3. 
232 UN Doc. S/RES/138. It is true, as Henkin notes that "the debates revealed some understanding, if not 
sympathy, for Israel's position" L. Henkin, How Nations Mate (New York: Columbia U. P., 2nd ed., 1979) 
pp. 275-276, but that cannot take all the sting from the resolution. 
233 ICCPR Art 9(1). On this see M. Nowak, ICCPR Cärn "itary (Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 1993) pp. 168-172. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has decided, under Optional Protocol I, that a US abduction of A 
Colombian in Ecuador, and his removal to the US for trial, amounted to a violation of Article 9. Cz'm Garcia 
vEcuudor (5.11.91, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988). 
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Abduction is also highly detrimental to relations between States. In the Eichmaim case, 
Argentina was satisfied with an apology alone, and effectively waived any further claim, 
including that for the return of Eichmann. 234 This was a highly unusual case, perhaps due 
to the gravity of his crime, (a factor which may apply to all "core" crimes, although an 
increase in abductions is unlikely to be welcome). More recently, international abduction 
has caused serious tensions in relations between States. The most famous of these is the 
Akwez-Machgin case. Here US agents abducted a Mexican and spirited him away to the 
US for trial for the alleged murder of a US DEA official. Despite the fact that there was 
an extradition treaty in force between the two countries and Mexico had not in the past 
been capricious in refusal of extradition, the US Supreme Court upheld the right of US 
courts to hear the case. 235 The US failure to even request extradition, then its abduction 
and removal of a Mexican citizen to the US prompted a protest from Mexico, and other 
States repeated Mexico's claim that the actions of the US were a violation of international 
law. 236 A Kreczko (US Dept. of State deputy legal advisor) reported to a House of 
Representatives sub-committee that "many governments expressed outrage that the 
United States believes it has the right to decide unilaterally to enter their territory and 
abduct one of their nationals. Governments have informed us that they would regard 
such action as a breach of international law [and would seek prosecution of the agents 
concerned and review their extradition treaties with the US)". 237 
234 See Fawcett supra n. 231, p. 193-4; Silving, supra n. 231. 
235 60 U. S. L. W. 4523 (June 15th 1992). The case effectively admitted that the abduction was a violation of 
international law, ibicL p. 4527. The case turned on whether the abduction was a violation of the extradition 
treaty, on the grounds that abduction was not specifically prohibited by the treaty, the court, highly 
controversially, decided it did not. See R. Rafuse "International Abduction and the US Supreme Court: The 
Law of the Jungle Reigns" (1993) 42 LCL. Q 882; M. Glennon "State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on 
United States v Alzwz-Madxain" (1992) 86 A. J. I. L. 746; contra, M. Halberstam "In Defence of the Supreme 
Court Decision in Aluz-Macho i (1992) 86 A. J. I. L. 736. The Aluzrez case was followed in US v Noritga 117 
F. 3d 1206 at 1212-3. This when the method of abduction was a full scale invasion, and harassment of a 
diplomatic mission. 
236 Canada gave an vnicus curiae brief for Alvarez-Machair stating that the US had violated international law 
and if it had involved a Canadian citizen they would have considered it a violation of the extradition treaty (as 
an extradition treaty is the exclusive method of obtaining defendants from that country). Canada also said it 
would have protested, demanded extradition or prosecution of the agents involved and commented that the 
whole situation gave cause for concern over the application of US treaties. (1991) 31 I. L. M. 919. 
237 Reprinted in J. Paust, M. C. Bassiouni, S. Williams, M. P. Scharf, J. Gurule & B. Zagaris, International 
Cr j Lawn Czes and Materials (Durham. N. C.: Carolina A. P., 1996) pp. 480-81. 
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As the above shows, abduction is simply unacceptable as a means of obtaining 
custody over those accused of even serious crimes. It violates international law on a 
number of counts, and is seriously detrimental to inter-State relations. Shearer, writing in 
1971 summed up the position admirably. "[a]bduction is such a manifestly extra-legal act, 
and in practice so hazardous and uncertain, that it is unworthy of consideration as an 
alternative method to extradition". 238 Whilst criticism becomes more muted when 
offences of the gravity of Eichmann's are involved, 239 this does not alter the fundamental 
illegality of abduction. 
Luring is a slightly different process. In luring, the person is persuaded to leave the 
jurisdiction of the State where they are staying, under false pretences, and when they are 
outside the jurisdiction of that State they are arrested. It does not represent such a huge 
invasion of sovereignty as abduction, but as it still requires some unconsented to official 
law enforcement activities in a foreign State, it represents a violation of international law. 
The UN Tribunals have had cause to consider irregular rendition, not because of any 
absence of duty on States (and non State entities) to fulfil requests for surrender, but 
because of the reluctance of certain States to actually do so. As with extradition, where it 
fails, other methods have sprung up. Instances of irregular rendition centre mostly on the 
ICTY suspects, particularly those in Republika Srpska and the FRY, who have been the 
least co-operative with the ICIYs surrender orders. It is clear that when NATO forces 
arrest persons on Bosnian territory, they are acting there with a Chapter VII mandate, and 
with the consent of the Bosnian government. 240 As a result, such arrests, occurring as a 
consented to exercise of police authority, do not amount to kidnapping. For Eastern 
Slavonia, similar conditions applied, as Security Council 1037 gave UNTAES (the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia) complete authority (which was 
238 I. A. Shearer, Extradition in Intemalia d Law (Manchester: MUP, 1971) p. 75. 
239 Supra n. 232. 
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consented to by Croatia, the territorial sovereign). 241 Currently, there have been no 
substantiated cases where an accused has been arrested outside these areas by bodies 
other than the regular police authorities of that State. Luring of suspects into capture has 
been an active issue. This was raised by Slavko Dokmanovic, who claimed he was lured 
from the FRY (who had not been requested to surrender him) to Eastern Slavonia, 
allegedly to discuss compensation for lost property. Upon arrival in Eastern Slavonia, he 
was arrested, and transferred to the ICTY. The Trial Chamber dealing with his 
application claimed (controversially) that luring was not contrary to international law. 242 
As discussed above this is, to say the least, questionable. 243 The Chamber's general 
approach seemed more firmly grounded in existing law. The Trial Chamber claimed that 
if any of the accused's human rights had been violated, they could refuse to try the 
accused. 244Therefore the ICTY has rejected the mala captus benedetentus doctrine. The joint 
Appeals Chamber in Fmsecutorv Barayqý45 has confirmed this approach (in a different 
situation). The Chamber examined cases such as Bennett, 246 and determined that they had a 
residual power to refuse to hear a case where there had been serious violations of human 
rights prior to trial. 247 This, as in national jurisdictions, is probably as far as courts can be 
expected to go, enabling themselves to refuse to adopt such actions by trial on a case by 
case basis. It may be hoped that, when kidnapping occurs, the ICTY will be unlikely to 
accept the suspect for trial. 248 
240 Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1031 and Article 9 General Framework Agreement, Article IV(4) 
Annex 4, & Article 10, Annex 1-A of the Dayton Peace Agreement. See N Figa-Talamanca, "The Role of 
NATO in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina" (1997) 7 E. J. I. L. 164, pp. 171-172; P. Gaeta, "Is 
NATO Authorised or Obligated to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia? " (1998) 8 E. J. I. L. 174, pp. 175-178. 
241 See Prosautorv Mrksic, Radic, Sljirw anon & Doknanovk, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused 
Slavko Dokmanovic, IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, paras 44-46. 
242 JbId para 57. 
243 Supra p. 144; See also M. P. Scharf, "7 Prosauhr v Slavko Dobnanozi Irregular Rendition and the ICTY" 
(1998) 11 L. J. I. L. 369, pp. 373-376. 
244 D0, ( xvEic, supra n. 241, para 60. 
245 Flms orv&xrayzgueza, Decision, 19 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-A. 
246 Rv Harsefeny Road Magistrates, ex. p. Barnett [ 1993] 2 All E. R. 318. 
247 Barayigwza, supra n. 245, paras 70-77. 
248 It must be said though, that so far, the ICTY has been uncomfortable entertaining applications from 
detainees who claim their arrest was illegal. For example, a Trial Chamber originally refused Stevan Todorovic 
an evidentiary hearing in relation to the circumstances of his arrest, Pra utvrv Si* Tadic, Z, aric &Todonruc, 
Decision Stating Reasons For Trial Chamber's Order Of 4 March 1999 On Defence Motion For Evidentiary 
Hearing On The Arrest Of The Accused Todorovic, 4 March 1999, IT-95-9, a decision upheld by the 
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Obviously, as the Rome Statute is not yet in force, there is no practice or 
jurisprudence upon which to comment. The Rome Statute does contain some provisions 
that may have a bearing on irregular rendition. By virtue of Article 55(1)(d) a suspect 
"shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention; and shall not be deprived of his or 
her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are 
established in the Statute". 249 This appears to make the irregular rendition of those under 
investigation contrary, not only to the human rights of the accused (as is the case for 
kidnapping), but also the Statute itself. Article 59(2) creates a duty upon the custodial 
State, prior to transfer, to ensure that the person has been "arrested in accordance with 
the proper procedure and... the person's rights have been respected". 250 These provisions 
may not be enough to prevent surrender of someone who a State seeks to render to the 
ICC without respecting the necessary procedures or human rights of the suspect. This 
conclusion follows from the custodial State's duty to determine these matters "in 
accordance with the law of that State". 251 A State accepting the mda captus beiredetentus rule 
could possibly continue with the surrender, as although Article 59(2) specifically requires 
the court to ensure the correct process has been followed, the "process" referred to is the 
national one. 252 Nonetheless, it can be hoped that the existence of the Court, where 
actions will probably be publicly scrutinised at the international level, may deter 
abductions. 253 Its jurisprudence on the matter could also serve to clarify international law 
here. 
Appeals Chamber (Prosa =r v Sink, Tadic, Zaric &Todonth Decision On Appeal By Stevan Todorovic 
Against The Oral Decision Of 4 March 1999 And The Written Decision Of 25 March 1999 Of Trial 
Chamber III, 19 October 1999, IT-95-9-A). The decision was overturned, and the evidentiary hearing granted 
Pms arv Simic, Tadic, Zaric & Todamt c Decision, 23 November 1999, IT-95-9-T. At the time of writing there 
had been no decision on the arrest, although it has caused tension with SFOR, who have refused to divulge 
the circumstances of his arrest, see (2000) 184 Tri&mal Update- The ICTY has released people where arrests 
have been based on mistaken identity such as Goran Lajic, P ms or v Lajic Order for the Withdrawal of 
Charges Against the Person Named Goran Lajic and for his Release, IT-95-8 17 June 1996. 
249 On Article 55 (1) (d) see C. K. Hall, "Article 55" in Trifferter, supra n 727, pp. 730-731. 
250 Rome Statute, Article 59(2)(b-c) See A. Schlunck, "Article 59" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 88,765. 
251 Ibid Article 59(2). 
252 See Schlunck, supra n. 250, p. 768, who is of the opinion that this solely meant the warrant has been duly 
served. Also, in her opinion (ibid) the rights referred to in 59(2)(c) are just that they are informed about the 
charges and the grounds for detention. 
253 For an argument that an ICC would limit the temptation for abduction see W. N. Giniaris, "The New 
World Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court" (1992-3) 16 Fonhha nLL. J. 88, pp. 109-110. 
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The Rome Statute provides for Pre-Trial Proceedings, in which the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is to ensure that the accused has been informed of his/her rights, 254 but this 
does not contemplate the raising of possible pre-existing violations of the accused's 
rights. The only reference to possible pre-trial violations of human rights is extended pre- 
trial detention due to "inexcusable delay by the prosecutor", and the remedy for this is 
the consideration of pre-trial release (as if on bail, not a withdrawal of charges). 255 The 
closest the Statute comes to dealing with the issue of irregular rendition is Article 85. This 
grants "anyone who has been the victim of an unlawful arrest or detention... an 
enforceable right to compensation". This would appear to cover a case of irregular 
rendition if "unlawful" also means under international law (including the Rome Statute). 
If so, it could be argued that as the Statute thus provides a remedy, this excludes the 
possibility of the ICC declaring arrest illegal and refusing to try that person. It is unlikely 
that the Court would take such an approach. What must be recalled is that in all cases 
where a court has refused to proceed to trial on the grounds of such procedural 
irregularity, it has done so on the grounds of the inherent power it has, as a court, to 
prevent abuses of process. This power is not based on statutory provision, but the 
inherent power of a court256 This option would probably be open to the ICC, and it may 
well follow the approach of the joint Appeals Chamber in asserting such a power. Even if 
they did not, this objection may not, in practice, prove too serious, as it is unlikely that a 
State would seek to surrender such a person to the court. The Court only comes into play 
when national courts are unwilling or unable to try such offences, and a State is unlikely 
to go to the lengths required for irregular rendition if it is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute that person domestically. As with extradition, we can see that the international 
courts may well improve the system of prosecution by limiting the necessity for, and 
excluding the operation of, irregular rendition, although, particularly for the ICTY, this is 
by no means certain. 
254 JML Article 60(1). 
255 j meide 60(4). 
256 See, for example, Barayzgzti a, supra n. 245. 
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DIFFERENT STATES, DIFFERENT LAWS 
International crimes are universal crimes, so it is axiomatic that they should be 
defined the same way in all jurisdictions. Unfortunately this has not been the case. Courts 
of various states have pronounced incorrectly on international law, in good faith or 
otherwise. On international law generally, US courts have shown a distinctly partisan 
bent. As Koh notes, there is a "line of recent Supreme Court precedent misconstruing 
international treaties". 257 Their misconstructions have consistently not merely weakened 
the treaties, but interpreted them "to sanction precisely what the treaty was drafted to 
prevent". 258 At this point, focus must fall on the structural reason why courts (in 
particular) have had immense problems identifying the international definitions of 
international crimes. As, in the bilateral system, one State (or a group of States) cannot 
impose their definition unilaterally, 259 differences in definitions have arisen. In the 
absence of broadly accepted definitions of them, courts have had to rely on custom, 
which can be vague. At times, it has been considered so vague, questions have arisen 
about whether it is possible, or consistent with the nuffwn Granen sine 4 principle, to rely 
on custom for prosecutions. 260 This is understandable, but sometimes the critiques are 
overstated. Many of the arguments over customary law relating to international crimes 
relate to the customary or otherwise nature of treaty provisions (this is particularly so for 
war crimes), rather than on a tabula rasa. The content of the rules at issue, therefore are no 
more or less certain than the treaty rules, which are frequently incorporated, unaltered, 
257 H. H. Koh, "The Haiti Paradigm in United States Human Rights Policy" (1994) 103 YaleL. J. 2391 at 
p. 2416. referring to Sale v Hairixi Cente, Cow cil (113 SCt. 2549 (1993)), Volksrwge neerk AktingaAdxgt v 
Schlank 486 US 694 (1988), Societe NationaleIndustridkAemspatielev US District Court 482 US 522 (1987) and US 
vAk rez-Mach'th2 supra n. 231. 
258 JbId 
259 This is not necessarily a bad thing. 
260 See, e. g. Warbrick, supra n. 180, p. 965. 
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into domestic law261 Where the debate does not involve treaty rules, or the treaty rules 
themselves are very vague, these arguments have some currency. 
Courts have had particular difficulty with crimes against humanity, which is 
unsurprising. Until recently, there was no broadly accepted detailed codification of their 
definition. 262 Two jurisdictions have recently attempted prosecutions for crimes against 
humanity and run into problems, namely Canada and France. 
In Canada definitional problems abounded in Rv Finta, 263 and in spite of 
overwhelming evidence, the courts did not record a conviction. Despite the statute being 
fairly clear that the provision was jurisdictional alone, the Canadian Supreme Court read it 
as creative of a national offence. 264 This led them down various legal blind alleys, most 
notably into a confusion of national and international requirements of me rw, which 
they incorrectly decided in favour of national law. They then compounded this by using a 
standard in excess of that required in Canadian law. 265 In addition they misconstrued the 
requirements of the actus reiss; requiring that the acts "shock the conscience of right 
thinking persons". 266 Both elements of the crime were thus construed in a narrower way 
than in international law. The results of this were very serious, it has led to an 
abandonment of the attempt to prosecute Nazi offences in Canada. The government 
position paper released to explain its resort to extradition and denaturalisation was 
express; "[in Rv Finta] the court established a higher standard of proof for the 
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity than is recognised at international 
261 For an example of this, see the UK Geneva Conventions Act 1957, which merely appends the 
Conventions as a schedule, and criminalises Grave Breaches. 
262 Although attention here focuses on crimes against humanity in national jurisdictions, issues also arise from 
the notoriously underdeveloped "general part" of international criminal law, which deals with the principles 
of liability. 
263 Rv Finta 112 DLR (4th) 513. On this case see I Cotler "R v Finta" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 460; I. Cotler 
"Bringing Nazi War Criminals in Canada to justice: A Case Study" (1997) 91 P rcA. S. I. L. 262; I. Cotter, "War 
Crimes Law and the Finta Case (1995) 6(2d) S. Ct-Reu 577; D. Matas, "The Case of Imre Finta" (1994) 34 
UN. B. L. J. 281, Williams supra n. 212; C. Amerasinge, "The Canadian Experience" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), 
I ational Crnninal Law Vol III. - Enfo winezt (New York: Transnational, 2nd ed. 1999) 243; M. Lippman, "The 
Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other Anglo-American Legal Systems" (1998) 29 
GzI WI L. J 1, pp. 29-32. 
264 Jam, p. 592 (Cory J. ), con ra pp. 540-541 (la Forest), see Cotter "War Crimes Law", ilid, p. 607-11. 
265 See Cotter, ibid, pp. 623-7. 
266 Supra n. 263, p. 593. See Coder, ibicl, p. 618. 
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law. For the World War II cases, this decision has made the prosecution of these crimes 
much more difficult and less likely". 267 
If the majority in Finta were misguided, at times the French cases seem little less 
than defmitionally perverse. Prior to 1992, when a statute was brought in to try to clear 
up some of the confusion caused by the courts, the courts were notionally applying the 
definition in Article 6(c) of the London Charter. However "the definition of crimes 
against humanity arrived at by the French courts through the twenty year litigation that 
the Touvier and Barbie cases went through was really quite different from anything found 
in 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter". 268 The reason for this is that the courts added a 
particular requirement to the definition of crimes against humanity, which had no place in 
the international definition, and had no coherent rationale. 269 The requirement was that 
the crime against humanity must have been committed in furtherance of a common plan 
instigated by a state practising a hegemonic ideology. 270 This was introduced in the Barbie 
case, 271 but reached it's zenith in the Tonvier litigation. 272 In addition to it being entirely 
extraneous to any international definition of crimes against humanity, it is hopelessly 
vague, and the courts did not attempt to elaborate the meaning of their innovation. 273 
This addition is highly destructive of the definition, and, as Sadat-Wexler comments, 
makes the French definition of crimes against humanity so "distant from its international 
meaning as to arguably remove it from the province of international law. "274 It must also 
be remembered that both of these jurisdictions have a stable political system and a well 
developed and professional judiciary, thus labour under none of the limitations that many 
267 Cited in I. Coder, "R v Finta" supra n. 263, p. 461. 
268 L. Sadat-Wexler, "Prosecutions for Crimes Against Humanity in French Municipal Law: International 
Implications" (1997) 91 PmGA. S. LL. 270, p. 271. See also L. Sadat-Wexler, "The Interpretation of the 
Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Barbie to Touvier and Back Again" (1995) 32 
C. J. T. L. 289; L. Sadat-Wexler, "The French Experience" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 263,273, pp. 288-292 
also includes an analysis of the Papcn trial, which seemingly, did not alter much in the legal interpretations 
discussed here. 
269 See C. Finkelstein, "Changing Notions of State Agency in International Law: The Case of Paul Touvier" 
(1995) 30 Tex. LL. J. 261, p. 268; Sadat-Wexler (1995), supra n. 268, pp. 337-355. 
270 See Sadat-Wexler (1997), supra n. 268, pp. 271-3. 
271 Judgment of 20th December 1985 Cass. Crim. 1986 J. C. P. II G No 20,655. 
272 particularly Decision of 13th April 1992, cited in Sadat-Wexler (1995), supra n. 268, p. 293. 
273 Sadat-Wexler, ibid, p. 359. 
274 jbid, p. 273. 
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other societies operate with. Even they seemed to be incapable of coming up with 
definitions that comported with international aw, or that were even similar. 
A benefit of the proliferation of international criminal tribunals may be the effect 
their creation and operation has on the acceptance of the prohibitions in international 
criminal law in domestic jurisdictions. The mere fact of the existence of these tribunals 
alone will not alter State's pre-existing monistic or dualistic inclinations. Their influence 
may be less jurisprudentially profound, but nonetheless of considerable pragmatic 
significance. The founding documents and judgments of the tribunals contribute to, 
declare, and develop customary international law, for incorporationist States, this may 
amount to a directly enforceable corpus of law which may be used. For those States 
which refer to "war crimes" or "international crimes" or "crimes against humanit' 
without presenting a definition, or leaving the definition expressly to international law, 
then these developments will have an effect on those concepts, hopefully clarifying them, 
and increasing similarity in definitions between States. 
Some of the international criminal tribunals have had a profound effect on customary 
international law. The Nuremberg Principles, which were developed by the ILC from the 
Nuremberg Charter and judgment are widely considered to represent customary 
international law. 275 The declaration, in the judgment of the Tribunal that the Hague 
Convention IV, the rules attached to it and the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War are customary has been frequently cited as authoritative. 276 
In contrast, the Tokyo MT's discussion of law, insofar as it was not merely a 
recapitulation of that pronounced at Nuremberg, has not left such an imprimatur on 
275 See infra pp. 221-222. 
276 Ibid see also, I. Blischenko, "Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Humanitarian Law" in A. 
Cassese (ed. ) The New Hwrumitariaz Law of Amnel Con lit (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 1979) 41, L. C Green, 
ContenJvra y Law of Amnl Caoict (Manchester: MUP, 2nd ed., 2000) pp34,113,196,291; G. Abi-Saab, 
The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some General Reflexions" in A J. M Delissen 
& G. J. Tanja, Hummiitarian Law Of Amz6d Conf kt. Claall s Ahead (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 115, 
p. 116 asserts that the judgment on that aspect is "famous". 
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custom27 The main problem with the Nuremberg definitions was their vague nature 
however, which led to the problems discussed above. 
The ICTY's Statute and judgments has contributed to the development and 
clarification of customary international law. 278 Its case law, especially the Tadic 
jurisdictional appeal, 279 has been iconoclastic, with much of its jurisprudence being 
adopted by States as declaratory of custom. 280 Decisions by the ICTY have been used by 
States not only in international negotiations, 281 but also in the preparation of their 
national military manuals. 282 A State's military manuals are intimations of what the State 
considers to be the customary position. 283 There have even been comments made to the 
effect that the ICI' focuses a little too much on elaborating the law and not enough on 
277There has not been such a take-up of the Tokyo IMT judgment. Before the building of the UN Tribunals 
the only references to the law of the Tokyo IlviT in the International Law Reports are references to the 
Tokyo Charter, cumulatively to the Nuremberg Charter, in n' Albnxbt (1947) 14 A. D. 196, p. 198 and DPP v 
Polyukhovric (1991) 91 I. L. R. 1 pp. 46-7. Of the 7 speeches in Piný, only one mentioned the Tokyo Charter, 
again cumulatively to the London Charter. (Lord Phillips, supra n. 89), in contrast four refer to the Nuremberg 
Charter (supra n. 89). The UN Tribunals have used the Tokyo IMT's judgment as authority for the proposition 
that civilians may be convicted of war crimes, Prosautor v Delalic, Muck, Delic & Landzo, judgment, 16 
November 1998, IT-96-21-T, paras 357-358 (Hereinafter Celebüz), in Celebici they supported their position 
with reference to the Flick & Roerblb2g cases too, did paras 359-62. This was followed in Pros vrvAkayesu, 
Judgment, 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4 although they did not consider the matter entirely settled (s 6.2). 
Cele'ki (ilnd paras 368-370) and Prosavor v Aleksovski, judgment, 25 June 1999, IT-95-14/ 1-T (paras 77-78) 
case reject the Tokyo IMT's majority approach to command responsibility, which only required influence as 
opposed to requiring a superior/subordinate relationship. 
278 T. Meron, "War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law" (1994) 88 A. J. I. L. 78. 
279J%s«utorv Tactic, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, IT-94-1-AR72. 
280 T. Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formulation of Humanitarian Law" in T. Meron, War 
Crbn Law Canes of Age (Oxford: OUP, 1998) 262; passen, especially p. 269; T Meron, "The Normative Impact 
on International Law of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" in ibid 210; T. Meron, "War 
Crimes Law Comes of Age" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 462, p. 464; T. Meron, "The Hague Tribunal: Working to 
Clarify International Humanitarian Law" (1998) 13 A. U. J. I. L. & Policy 1511; C. Greenwood, "The 
Development of International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia" (1998) 2 Max Planck Y. B. U. NL. 97, pp. 122-133; P. Akhavan, "The Dilemmas of Jurisprudence" 
(1998) 13 A. U. J. I. L. & Policy 1518; See also P. D Alesky, "The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal and 
International Humanitarian Law" (1998) 35 International Politics 1, p. 13; S. D Murphy, "Progress and 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 57, p. 63. 
281 Meron confirms that the US position on certain crimes was influenced by the ICTY's jurisprudence ibid (A. U. J. I. L. & Policy), p. 1538, the same can probably be said of Germany, see A. Zimmerman, "The Creation 
of a Permanent International Criminal Court" (1998) 2 Max Planck YB. UNL. 169, Zimmerman, a member 
of the German delegation makes frequent reference to ICTY & ICTR practice in his comments. See also D. 
Robinson, Defining Crimes Against Humanity at the Rome Conference" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 45, p. 45; D. 
McGoldrick, "The Permanent International Criminal Court: An End to the Culture of Impunity? " [1999] 
Cruz L. R. 627, p. 636 notes the impact of the Tadic Appeal in reversing the view that war crimes were limited 
to international conflicts. Bantekas claims that the Celebici judgment influenced Article 28 of the Rome 
Statute, I. Bantekas, "The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 573, p. 576. H. 
Von Hebel & D. Robinson, "Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court" in Lee, supra n. 88,79, p. 93 note 
the extensive use of the Tadic judgment in relation to the definition of crimes against humanity. 
282 W. Hays Parks, "Comments" (1998) 13 A. U. J. LL. & Policy 1531, especially p. 1532, "In my official capacity 
as, one of my jobs is to draft substantial portions of the new United States Joint Services Law of War Manual. 
It is going to be very comprehensive. I can tell you that the cases to date have been absolute gold mines of 
information to me. They have assisted me very substantially in my drafting". 
283 See A. Roberts & R. Guellf, Docun s on the Lazes of War (Oxford: OUP, 3rd ed. 2000) pp. 12-13. 
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ensuring justice for the individual defendants. 284 Whatever the merits of that claim, the 
ICTY has made an unequivocal contribution to the development and elaboration of 
customary law. The ICTR's statute, where it differs from the ICTY's (principally on the 
express inclusion of war crimes in non international armed conflict) militated against the 
position still quite prevalent at the time, that war crimes were limited to international 
armed conflicts. 285 There are signs that the ICTR's case law has affected State's thinking 
on international crimes. 286 Evidence is sparser than that applicable to the ICTY, which 
may be attributable to the more recent nature of a majority of the ICTR's output. Current 
indications point to the Rome Statute appealing to States as providing a statement of 
customary law. 287 These developments are particularly important, as the Rome Statute, in 
particular contains very detailed, and broadly accepted, definitions of international crimes 
and general principles of liability. The French constitutional court is of the opinion that 
the definitions are detailed enough to overcome any ncdlumcrvnm sine leggy issues. 288 
There is a second way in which the Rome Statute may promote equivalent definitions 
between States. There is anecdotal evidence that the creation of the two ad hoc tribunals 
has, through the increase in interest in international humanitarian law, led to States at 
least considering updating their legislation. 289 The creation of the ICC may assist in the 
284 L. C. Green, "Drazen Erdemovic: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 
Action" (1997) 10 L. J. LL. 363 p. 376. 
285 See infra, pp. 256-257. 
286 Zimmerman, supra n. 282. 
287 Despite Article 10, as Charney states, it is "unavoidable" that something as rare as the Rome Statute will 
not influence the law, J. Charney, "Progress in International Criminal Law? " (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 452, p. 454; See 
also O. Triffterer, "Article 10" in Triffterer, supra n. 88,315, p. 320, "from the practical point of view it can be 
expected that on subject matters the Statute deals with in a compromising way, such... development outside 
the possibilities provided for by review or an amendment to the Statute appears improbable". The Canadian 
draft Act, supra n. 207, s6(4) provides "for greater certainty, crimes described in Articles 6,7 and paragraph 2 
of Article 8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17,1998, crimes according to customary international law, and 
may be crimes according to customary international law before that date. There is no jurisprudence from the 
ICC, but it can be implied from Article 21(2) of the Statute that the Court is intended to create a consistent 
body of law, which should have knock on effects on the consistency of national prosecutions and law. On 
Article 21 see M. MaAuliffe de Guzman "Article 21" in Triffterer, supra n. 88,435, especially p. 445. The Rome 
Statute has been cited as authority by the Trial Chamber in ßvsautor v Funtndzia, judgment, 10 December 
1998, IT-95-17/1-T, para 216 and the Appeals Chamber, in Prose utnr v Tactic, judgment, 15 July 1999, IT-94- 
1-A, para 291. This did not go unchallenged, judge Shahabuddeen reserved his position on the matter 
(Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para 3) and the Trial Chamber in Caici seemed uncomfortable 
with the Statute in relation to command responsibility, supra n. 277, para 393. 
288 See B. Rudolf, "International Decisions: Statute of the International Criminal Court" (2000) 94 A. J. LL. 
391, pp. 392-393. 
289 See T. Meron "Remarks" (1996) 90 Frvc A. S. I. L 484, p. 484, and D. Wembou, "The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda" (1997) 321 I. RR. C685, p. 692. 
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incorporation of international crimes into domestic legal systems. This is for a simple 
reason. If a State wishes to prevent its nationals (or offences occurring on its territory) 
being prosecuted in a very high profile international forum, then it must prosecute them 
itself. To do this, it must have the legal means at its disposal to prosecute such offences. 
As States are likely to prefer to investigate and prosecute these offences then this presents 
an incentive for States to incorporate the crimes enunciated in the Rome Statute. 290 
The benefit of increased incorporation will accrue from the coming into being of the 
ICC. It may extend beyond the States Party. Non-party nationals can become subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Court, if they commit a crime within its jurisdiction on the territory 
of a State party to the Statute. 291 So, non-party States may consider it expedient to 
introduce such legislation, to ensure that they could prosecute their nationals for 
international crimes as defined in the Rome Statute, to prevent them being tried at the 
international level. 292 This is a significant move towards ensuring States take the 
prohibitions contained therein seriously. Another positive aspect of this could be that a 
fairly uniform corpus of law is in place over a large number of States, thus alleviating the 
problems identified above about the non-standard nature of national implementation of 
international criminal law. 
Unfortunately, the definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute only partially reflect pre- 
Rome customary international law. Also, the ambit of prohibited conduct within the 
Rome Statute is at times more limited than customary law. 293 As a result, States are likely 
to enshrine versions of international crimes into their national law which are more limited 
than general international law. There may also be a further problem The view is often 
290 This incentive has also been noticed (independently) by David Turns, See D. Turns, "Prosecuting 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position in the United Kingdom" (1999) 4 J. A. CL. 
1, p. 3. 
291 In the absence of a duty to prosecute, this does not violate international law. 
292 That way, if they could get their extradition request in early, they could take precedence over the ICC. The 
US approach, is unlike this, being to hobble, or bring down the court if there is any possibility of any of its 
national being called to account before the ICC for crimes committed overseas. 
293 See chapters 4 and 5, passive. 
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taken that what is not expressly prohibited is legitimate. 294 Because of the incomplete list 
of war crimes, war crimes not contained in the Statute will not only become sidelined at 
the international level, but also in national jurisdictions, rendering war crimes not 
contained in the Rome Statute prone to being overlooked. 
In cases where the Rome Statute's definitions are narrower than customary law, and 
where defences are more widely drawn than international law requires, it is feasible that a 
person would be entitled to an acquittal under the Rome Statute, or national laws 
following it, when general international law would not require such a result. One 
characteristic of sham trials, which the ICC is being set up to combat, is the "creation" of 
exonerations to justify otherwise illegal conduct. Ironically, in some cases this is precisely 
what the Rome Statute does. The trade off between the level of incorporation and the 
fidelity to international law of that which is incorporated has, in some cases been 
unambiguous. In others, this bringing of an additional pressure to bear on States to 
incorporate international legal norms may prove felicitous. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There is a clash of values in the current international system The schism is between 
the traditional "billiard ball" bilateral-sovereignty based approach, and the more modem 
ideas of the system. In the former, States are considered to be in an Hobbesian state of 
nature, and international law is merely to regulate their external relations, which exists 
solely to facilitate relations between States. In the latter, the international system is 
considered to protect different values, which tend to inhere in the human person, as well 
as State interests. The primarily bilateralist nature of the structure of the international 
294 This is not just to say that the Lotus presumption of State freedom (SS. Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) 
PCIJ Series A, No. 10, the status of which is still contested, may be applicable, but that which is not 
prohibited is considered 1Egitinate. See P. Allort, "State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International 
Law" (1988) 29 Haru I. L. J. 1, p. 16, also C. of Jochnik & R. Normand, "The Legtimation of Violence: A 
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system is not entirely compatible with the concept of (universal) international crimes, as 
their effective repression requires a larger degree of cooperation than traditionally has 
been the norm. It is no surprise that the modem trend towards prosecution arose from 
activities of the (effectively) universal organisation, the UN, which has the power to 
impose duties to cooperate, even on the ambivalent or unwilling. 
It has been the aim of this chapter to show how this tension between the old and 
new conceptions of international order have been played out by reference to some of the 
practical problems States have faced enforcing universal crimes in the bilateral world, and 
the extent to which the new institutionalisation has, or has not improved matters. The 
record is mixed. At times, it would appear that the new values have come out on top. For 
example, State immunity for international crimes has been rejected, with the necessity of 
repressing international crimes winning out over the idea of equal sovereign States not 
interfering with each other's affairs. On the other hand, for national courts, the rules on 
personal immunities still appear inviolate. 
Many of the problems stem directly from the absence of coordinating or supervisory 
mechanisms, that can encourage prosecution, clarify laws and resolve disputes that arise 
over jurisdiction. There have been some successes here, with the UN tribunals, in 
particular acting under their primacy powers, resolving difficult jurisdictional questions on 
the legal plane. The absence of enforcement mandate has created problems in the world 
of practicality. The same can be said for extradition, which in its traditional form is a 
microcosm of the problems of a bilateral world. The two UN tribunals, have overcome 
the patchwork coverage of extradition relations, and the conditions of extradition, which 
are ill suited to international crimes. The ICC, despite having a smaller bailiwick in which 
to order cooperation, has also overcome many of the problems of bilateralism, despite its 
retention, in attenuated form, of one of the extradition conditions. The ICTY and ICC 
have made particularly strong contributions to clarifying the law, making many of the 
Critical History of the Laws of War" (1994) 35 Hare I. L. J. 49, pp. 89-91. 
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fears of imprecise customary definitions less real. The Rome Statute's creation of a 
powerful reason to incorporate the crimes over which it has jurisdiction should improve 
national incorporation of international crimes. Despite the caveats relating to the content 
of those crimes, increased levels of incorporation will have knock on effects of dual 
criminality, when it is invoked in bilateral extraditions. Perhaps the largest contribution 
made by the three modern tribunals is their functional analogues to the duty to extradite 
or prosecute. The absence of a broad, customary duty to extradite or prosecute suspected 
international criminals is an ugly manifestation of the traditional system of international 
order. The creation, for offences over which they have jurisdiction, of international 
criminal courts is a sea change in the approach to international crimes. The ICC's 
position on this could, for States party to its Statute, become a cornerstone of effective 
prosecution and repression of international crimes. 
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CHAPTER 4: SELECTIVITY 
AND NON-PROSECUTION: 
JURISDICTION RA TIONAE 
PERSONAE 
INTRODUCTION 
It would be fatuous to pretend that enforcement of international criminal has been 
consistent, uniform, or, in many instances, even attempted. Whilst the cases discussed at 
the end of chapter 3 have serious failings in their interpretation of international law, ' they 
still stand out as examples of attempts to enforce international criminal law. The general 
trend has not been towards enforcement, but conversely, towards non-prosecution of 
even the most egregious offences. For example, the atrocities in Stalin's Gulags, the 
Chinese "Cultural Revolution" and, until recently, the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and 
the vast majority of offences from the various military coups in the 1970s in Latin 
America have been met with an ominous silence from the judiciary, both national and 
international. The problem of enforcement is the most pressing, by far, of the problems 
facing international criminal law. The lacunas in substantive international criminal law 
cannot be ignored, 2 but the challenges they present pale into insignificance when 
compared to the under-enforcement of those rules. War crimes law may have, in Meron's 
phrase "come of age", 3 but its enforcement has not, as yet, reached adolescence. 
Even when enforcement of international criminal law has occurred, in many 
instances, it has been done in a selective manner, with only certain offences by certain 
types of defendants being prosecuted. Normally those which are prosecuted are those 
1 Supra pp. 148-150. 
2 On which see S. R. Ratner, "The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law" (1998) 33 Tex 
.. 
L. J. 237. 
3 T. Meron, War Crvnes Law Games ofAge (Oxford: OUP, 1998). 
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which are committed by, or on behalf of, other entities than the prosecuting State. 4There 
are two methods of selective enforcement. One method is selectivity r iae personae, i. e. 
limiting the jurisdiction of courts enforcing international crimes to certain conflicts, or 
sides in those conflicts, so to prevent other similar offences being prosecuted. The other 
method is selectivity rationae matiriae. This appears in two forms. First, by limiting the 
jurisdiction of courts to certain types of offences, when other, equally serious offences are 
not included, or by defining crimes more narrowly than international law. Doing this 
excludes liability for acts which are actually criminal under international law. Second, by 
defining crimes in excess of international law's criminal prohibitions, to ensure conviction 
when that is the desired outcome. This chapter will concentrate on selectivity raiorrae 
personae. A discussion will also be entered upon of some of the reasons why States choose 
to only prosecute certain categories of offenders, or none at all. This will include the 
extent to which these reasons have played themselves out at the international level, and 
whether or not international prosecutions have served to turn the tide in favour of 
prosecution, or provided responses to the problems facing States in prosecuting 
international crimes. Chapters 5&6 will relate to selectivity raticnae materiae. A lengthy 
discussion of this matter is required as the selectivity is more subtle. For international 
courts, the discussion will also require a distinction between the courts based on the 
likelihood of the courts exercising jurisdiction over their creators. 
40n this "distancing" function, by which prosecutions of international crimes are used, in a didactic fashion, 
to emphasise the difference between the prosecuting State and international criminals, see G Simpson, "War 
Crimes: A Critical Introduction" in T. L. H. McCormack & G. J. Simpson, War Crz'nes Law. " National acrd 
Intematwna1 Appraches (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 1, pp. 24; Criticisms of similar (mr snnttandis) motives for 
the creation of the two UN Tribunals have been made, with some justification, by Jose Alvarez, J. Alvarez, 
"Crimes of Hate/Crimes of State: Lessons from Rwanda" (1999) 24 Yale J. I. L. 365, p. 411, "current 
international prosecutions are intended to exculpate the international community that permitted atrocities to 
occur but is now trying their perpetrators". 
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SELECTIVITY RATIONAE PERSONAE 
It is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law that the law should be applicable to 
all persons within a State's jurisdiction, 5 not merely to a certain group. Just as laws should 
be generally applicable, enforcement must be evenhanded. It is a fundamental 
requirement of equality before the law that laws (and, by extension, their enforcement) 
must be general. The notion of equality before the law is not only a human right, 6 but also 
the principle that like cases must be decided in a like fashion is a fundamental axiom of 
law. Selectivity undercuts this axiom, giving rise to the impression that when a decision is 
made to prosecute or not, conditions other than the acts themselves are being taken into 
account. The idea of universal crimes conflicts with the selective enforcement. As such 
offences are universally applicable when enforcement is selective, the law, or those 
invoking it, appear hypocritical. 
An examination of State practice reveals highly selective enforcement of international 
crimes, at least until very recently. This has occurred in various ways. The first of these is 
by legislation. Many States do have adequate, if under-used, legislation in place for war 
crimes and genocide. 8 Others, though do not fare so well. The Acts brought in by the UK 
and Australia for prosecution of World War II offences all effectively prevent Allied 
actions being prosecuted. 9 The UK War Crimes Act 1991 was brought into deal with the 
possibility of Axis offenders being found in the UK, and jurisdiction is limited to offences 
committed "in a place which at the time was part of Germany or under German 
5 See Simpson, supra n. 3, p. 11. 
6 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Article 14(1) "An persons shall 
be equal before the courts and tribunals". 
7 See M. Loughlin, Szwid and Scales (Oxford: Hart, 2000) p. 20. 
8 The UK Geneva Conventions Act 1957 and Genocide Act 1969 both define the crimes, with correct 
jurisdictional provision in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention, but 
remain dormant, see D. Turns, "Prosecuting Violations of Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position in the 
United Kingdom", (1999) 4 J. A. C. L. 3; P. Rowe & M. Meyer, "The Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 
1995: A Generally Minimalist Approach" (1996) 45 LCL. Q 476. The Finnish legislation appears satisfactory, 
including war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, see Chapter 13 Finnish Penal Code, Articles 1-5, 
Chapter 1 Article 3 (9887/1974,1975 Code). See L. Hannikainen, R. Jhanski &A Rosas, In zg 
Hwnw, *ý Law Applicable in Anal Cor uts: The Case of Finland (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) p. 116. 
9 The analogous Canadian Legislation, includes provisions granting jurisdiction over Canadians (Canadian 
Criminal Code R. S. C. 1985 c-C46,3.71. 
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occupation". lo Although this could notionally cover alleged Allied offences such as the 
bombing of Dresden the possibility of charges against Allied soldiers for such offences is 
remote. It could also exclude any responsibility of leaders outside of Germany or the 
occupied territories. The Australian legislation is expressly selective, limiting jurisdiction 
to the European sphere of World War 11,11 where few Australians fought. 
Some case law has also effectively prevented prosecution outside of a very small ring 
of people. The French incorporation of Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg IMT Charter was 
held, in the Boudarel case, to be limited only to offences by the Axis powers in World War 
II. 12 This excluded any claims relating to French war crimes in Indochina. This was in 
accordance with the view of the French government, which confirmed the judgment. 13 
This has prevented any prosecution for anything other than Axis officials (which, since 
Pap on admittedly now includes those acting under orders of the Vichy regime). Prior to 
the Pagan judgments, 14 the French Court's criterion of the acts being undertaken under 
the direction of a State following a hegemonic ideology was held, against the historical 
record, to exclude the crimes committed under the Vichy regime, on the ground that it 
was not hegemonic. 15 It is interesting to note that even this decision was after the first 
apologies by the French State for the activities of the Vichy regime, and acceptance that 
many French people had worked for it. 
10 War Crimes Act 1991 sl(a). See D. Turns, "Prosecution Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The 
Legal Position in the United Kingdom" (1999) 4 J. A. CL. 1, pp. 21-23; J. Garwood-Cutler, "The British 
Experience" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ) Intematianal Crin ial Law Vol. III. " Enfo7wn r (New York: Transnational, 
2nd ed. 1999) 325; G. Ganz, "The War Crimes Act 1991-Why no Constitutional Crisis? " (1992) 55 M. L. R. 87; 
A. T. Richardson, "War Crimes Act 1991" (1992) 55 M. L. R. 73; C. Greenwood, "The War Crimes Act 1991" 
in H. Fox & M. A. Meyer (eds. ), Ar»nl Corflit and the New Later Effecting Carnplimm' (London: British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law, 1993) 215; E. Steiner, "Prosecuting War Criminals in England and 
France" [1991] Cruz L. R. 180. 
11 War Crimes Amendment Act 1988, s. 5, See generally G. Triggs, "Australia's War Crimes Trials: A Moral 
Necessity or Legal Minefield? " (1987) 16 Melbourne U. L. J. 382; G. Triggs, "Australia's War Crimes Trials: All 
Pity Choked" in McCormack & Simpson, supra n. 3,123. On the Australian prosecutions under this act see G. 
Blewitt, "The Australian Experience" in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 301; D. Bevan, A Case to Ansreer (Kent Town, 
Australia: Wakefield Press, 1994). 
12 Judgment of the Cour d' Cassation 1 April 1993, see A. Marschik, The Politics of Prosecution: European 
National Approaches to War Crimes" in McCormack & Simpson, supra n. 3,65 pp. 85-86; L. Sadat Wexler, 
"The French Experience" in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 10,273, pp. 273-274. 
13 See Sadat-Wexler, ibid. 
14 Judgment of Clwnbre d'Acaisatkn de la Cour d'Appel de Bordeaux, 18 September 1996, judgment Cass. Cann 23 
Jan 1997. On the decisions, see Sadat-Wexler, ibid 
15 See Sadat-Wexler, ibid., p292. 
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It is very interesting that, when it comes to prosecution, what little there has been has 
been limited mostly to "others", either those of discredited past regimes, (such as in 
Argentina, 16 Ethiopia and France), or foreigners, (mainly Nazis, but now including ex- 
Yugoslavs and Rwandans). Only very rarely (but increasingly, as the recent Belgianl7 
prosecutions of their own peacekeepers show) has a country tried international crimes 
committed by citizens of that country, for offences committed under the current regime. 
Even when they have done so, for example as in the Colley case, there has been great 
ambiguity of purpose and result. In the Gilley case President Nixon intervened to 
personally review the record and effectively ended his sentence. 18 
Selectivity is a phenomenon which has plagued international criminal tribunals from 
their inception to date. None of them have been endowed with universal jurisdiction 
which can be exercised free from external constraint. 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were quite clearly the embodiment of 
selectivity. It in no way minimises the crimes of the Nazi or Imperial Japanese regimes to 
note that the criticisms of both those tribunals under the general heading that they were 
"victor's justice", i. e. that they chose to apply the supposedly universal law (which they 
defined, in excess of what international law had previously criminalised) only to the 
actions of the defeated enemies are largely accurate and legitimate. 19 Not only was the law 
applied only to the defeated powers, and selectively in relation to them too, 20 but the law 
itself was structured to avoid scrutiny of the Allies' past actions. 21 
16 See the judgment, (1987) 8 H. R. L. J. 368; A. Garro, "Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: 
Partial Failure or Qualified Success? " (1993) 31 CJ. T. L. 1. 
17 D. A. v C§7 m Conseil de Guerre de Bruxelles, arret du 21 Decembre 1994, Cour Militaire, ch. perm. neerl; 
arret du 24 Mai 1995. On the other hand, Charlesworth & Chinkin question the acquittals in some of the 
Belgian cases, H. Charlesworh & C. Chinkin, 7be B=doii s of Intematioml Law (Manchester: MUP, 2000) 
p. 297. 
18 See A. P. Rubin, Ethics and Autix» ty in Intenunional Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1997) p. 175; M. Bilton & K. Sim 
Four Hours in My Lai (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993) Chll. Levie describes this intervention as 
"unquestionably a miscarriage of justice and one which will return to haunt the United States. " H. Levie, 
Tenvrým in Wm- The Law of War Crbna (New York: Oceana, 1992) p. 207. 
19 See D. Luban, "The Legacies of Nuremberg" (1987) 54 Social Reseanhh 779, pp. 809-811. 
20 B. V. A. Röling "The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect" in M. C. Bassiouni & V. Nanda, A Traitise 
on InWnzavona1 Crnninal Law (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1973) 590, p. 591 gives the very pertinent example 
of the absence of population centre bombings from the Nuremberg indictment. The absence is likely to be 
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For the UN tribunals, selectivity has arisen, albeit in a different fashion. For both of 
these tribunals the claim that they are set up to judge the "losers" is inapposite, as neither 
was set up by a belligerent, but by the LJN. 22 Selectivity is relevant to the jurisdiction of 
both Tribunals. The ICTY has had to come to terms with allegations of selective 
application of its law because of the political impossibility of indicting any nationals of 
NATO countries for their actions subject to the jurisdiction of the ICI'Y. 23 This operates, 
post-Kosovo, to give rise to uncertainties about whether the ICTY will become an 
instrument of victor's justice, in that the standards it seeks to apply can only be enforced 
against the actions of a weak State, possibly at the behest of a stronger one. 24 A different 
permutation of the selectivity argument could be made about the temporal jurisdiction of 
the IC T& Alvarez has criticised the decision not to extend the ICTR's jurisdiction back 
before 1994 in the following terms: "[b]roader jurisdiction for the ICTR could well have 
led to inquiries that would have embarrassed either the UN as a whole or a particular 
referable to the fact that it was a tactic also employed by the Allies. It is now not doubted that the refusal to 
indict the Emperor in the IMTFE was politically motivated (see M. C. Bassiouni, "From Versailles to Rwanda 
in 75 Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court" (1997) 10 Hanwd H. R. L. J. 11, 
p. 35; A. C. Brackman, 7 he Odxr Nuivnkrg: The Untold Story of the Tok)a War CrD Trial (New York: William 
Morrow, 1987) pp. 77-78, R. Minear, Vurorc Justice The Tok)o War Cri, Trial (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971) pp. 111-113; J. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979) 
p. 16. ). In addition, the refusal to indict the notorious Unit 731 would appear to be related to the wish of at 
least one of the US or USSR to obtain their results (see B. V. A Röling & A. Cassese, 77 Tokw Trial and Beytpad (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) p. 18; Levie, supra n. 18. pp. 154-155, who shares the blame between them 
Yuki Tanaka reports that the USSR did give the US their information, and asked the US to join them in a 
joint investigation into Unit 731, which the US refused, putting the inaction down to US agreement with the 
accused not to prosecute them in return for information, Y. Tanaka Hidden Honors: Japanese War Crone in 
World War II (Boulder: Westview, 1998) pp. 159-160. The refusal to indict organisations in the IMTFE (or 
include a provision in the IMTFE Charter allowing such an indictment to be laid) appears, to one 
commentator to be related to MacArthur's policy decision that US interests would be best served by fostering 
good relations with intelligence, industrial and political groups, see R 
. 
J. Pritchard, "The International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East and the Allied National War Crimes In Asia" in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 10,109 
p. 124. 
21 For example, Robert Jackson, when drafting the provision on crimes against humanity, was aware that if 
the jurisdictional limit to war was not introduced, not only could colonialism (embarrassing for France and 
the UK), or the Gulags (still a secret in the USSR) be evaluated with reference to the law, but so could the 
segregationist policies in the US, see Luban, supra n. 19, pp. 787-788. This reluctance to use law which could 
rebound upon its authors is not unnatural, as Bassiouni puts it, "governments are not particularly inclined to 
criminalize the conduct of their high officials" M. C. Bassiouni, "The Normative Framework of Humanitarian 
Law, Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities" (1998) 8 Trannational L. & Contanganary Niles 199, p. 202. 
22 Although this is not to say that the UN was uninvolved in either conflict. 
23 See supra chapter 2, pp. 88-89. 
24 It must not be forgotten that the Security Council could, at a moments notice, decree the ICTY out of 
existence (See L. Sadat-Wexler, "The Proposed International Criminal Court" (1996) 29 Cc ndl I. L. J. 665, 
p. 712). As three of the 5 permanent members were involved in the NATO action against the FRY, this must 
operate as a limit on the extent to which the Prosecutor could subject the actions of NATO force to 
appraisal, as the furore over her decision to have a report prepared on NATO actions showed, (1999) 158 
Tribunal Upda. 
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permanent member of the Security Council [France]". 25 This criticism is possibly well 
founded, although even the limited jurisdiction of the ICTR has led to embarrassing 
questions, and answers. 26 
The jurisdictions of both tribunals are not immune to assertions of differential 
application of the law. Both are specific reactions to limited areas and conflicts. Where 
there is agreement on the acceptability of a tribunal amongst the permanent five members 
of the Security Council, the possibility of an international tribunal is there. Where it is 
not, either as there is insufficient interest to make proposals for a tribunal27 or if the 
interests of any one of those powers is implicated, 28 then quite simply there will not be a 
tribunal. In terms of the gravity of offences, like incidents are not being treated alike, and 
as such, the ad hoc nature of the tribunals leaves them open to charges of exceptionalism29 
The Rome Statute could be on firmer ground on this respect, 30 but due to its 
jurisdictional regime, the ICC is far from perfect. When it comes into existence, the ICC 
will have jurisdiction over a larger personal, temporal and geographical range than the 
UN Tribunals, but States can choose to remain outside of this regime to a large extent by 
simply not signing the Statute or agreeing to its jurisdiction under Article 12(3). 31 On the 
other hand, States not Party to the Statute cannot exempt themselves completely, as if 
their nationals commit offences criminalised under the Rome Statute on the territory of 
States party to the Statute, they may be prosecuted. In this respect non-parties may be 
25 Alvarez, supra n. 4, p. 397. 
26 The UN has accepted a degree of responsibility for the events in Rwanda, following the Reprnt of the 
Indepma'o t Inquiry into d Actions of the Uniei Nations Duräsg the 1994 Genaride inR=24 15th December 1999. 
27 An example of this type of situation is the conflict in the Congo. 
28 The conflict in Chechnya is a case in point, see A. P. Rubin, "Dayton, Bosnia and the Limits of Law" (Winter 1996/7) 47 The National Interest 41, pp. 42-43. 
29 See, Alvarez, supra n. 4, pp. 452-456. 
30 Bothe argues that this undermines claims that the ICC will be a natural outcropping of the UN Tribunals, 
as they were what he terms "safe" mechanisms (i. e. ones which do not threaten to prosecute the actions of 
their creators), M. Bothe, "International Humanitarian Law and War Crimes Tribunals: Recent Developments 
and Perspectives" in K. Wellens (ed. ) International Lau Thorny and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) 581, 
p. 593. 
31 Which they have a right to do: "there is no obligation for a State to become party to a treaty it does not 
like, even if many or most other states do", P. Malanczuk, "The International Criminal Court and Landmines, 
What are the Consequences of Leaving the US Behind? " (2000) 11 E. J. I. L. 77, p. 78. The effect on non-Party 
States is probably the most controversial aspect of the Rome Statute, see, for example, D. Scheffer, "The 
International Criminal Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction" (1999) 63 Proc A. S. I. L. 68, p. 69, " The single 
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worse off than parties, who are entitled, under the very controversial Article 124, to "opt- 
out" of the jurisdiction of the Court for war crimes, for seven years. 32 The United States, 
in particular, has been fiercely critical of the ICC's jurisdiction over non-parties who have 
not specifically agreed to the Court exercising jurisdiction, 33 even though as a matter of 
international law, it is unobjectionable. 34 As the ICC does not have an independent ability 
to utilise universal jurisdiction the spectre of selective prosecution will hover over it. For 
the Court to be able to move beyond its bailiwick of the territory and nationals of States 
party (or those who have, on an ad bac basis, agreed to its jurisdiction) a situation must be 
referred to it by a positive resolution of the Security Counci1.35 As the Security Council is 
a body that functions for political reasons, and sees itself as being under no duty to act 
whenever and wherever international crimes are committed, any references it makes will 
raise the memory of those it has not referred. All exercises of jurisdiction by the ICC, 
whether over the territory or nationals of States parties or not, are subject to a certain 
level of control by the Council. The Council has been granted the right to demand 
postponement of action by the Court for as long as it can maintain the necessary positive 
most problematic part of the Rome treaty is Article 12"; S. A. Williams, "Article 12" in O. Triffterer (ed. ), 
C want vy on the Rom Statute for the Imemational Crönriial Court (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999) 
, 
329, p. 329. 
32 See A. Zimmermann, "Article 124" in Trifferer (ed. ). ibd, 1281. 
33 This is the underlying position of the US, who currently are unlikely to sign or ratify the Statute, that the 
nationality State should, essentially, have a veto over the Court's jurisdiction when that State is a non-party, 
D. J Scheffer, "The International Criminal Court: The Challenge of jurisdiction" supra n. 31, p. 71; R. 
Wedgwood, "The International Criminal Court: An American View" (1999) 10 E. J. LL. 93, p. 99. On the US 
position see, for example M. Zwanenberg, "The Statute for an International Criminal Court and The United 
States: Peace Without Justice" (1999) 12 L. J. I. L. 1; M. David, "Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections 
to the International Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law" (1999) 20 Midi J. I. L. 337; 
1-LT. King & T. C. Theofrastous, "From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Back for US Foreign Policy" (1999) 31 
Case W. RJ. LL. 47; B. S. Brown, "U. S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief 
Response" (1999) 31 N. Y. U. J. LL. & Politics 855; C. C. Joyner & C. Posteraro, "The United States and the 
International Criminal Court, Rethinking the Struggle Between National Interests and International Justice" 
(1999) 10 Cron. L. F. 359 p. 366 refer to the "paranoia about US soldiers being prosecuted for war crimes in 
the course of international peacekeeping duties"; M. C. Bassiouni "Untitled" (1998) 13 American Uniwsity 
LL. R. 1400, p. 1401, "those from the department of defense are more interested in guarantees that no 
American personnel will ever be prosecuted by the ICC"; J. Bolton, "Courting Danger: What's Wrong With 
the International Criminal Court" (Winter 1998/99) 55 7 he Interest 60, p. 63 goes further, saying that 
one of the real worries is that the National Security Council could become subject to its jurisdiction. See also 
Malanczuk, supra n. 31, p. 80 & p. 82: "I am much more disturbed by the basic assumption that seems to 
underlie the argument, beyond the particular issue of the application of Article 12, namely that if US soldiers 
commit war crimes abroad during their `global presence', as a matter of principle, they should remain 
exempted from the jurisdiction of international tribunals and prosecuted only by US courts. Whether this is 
really an effective and objective remedy may sometimes be doubted", & p. 83. 
34 Supra pp. 94-98. 
35 Supra p. 90. 
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votes for a resolution requesting the Court to do so. 36 This allows a large element of 
politically inspired selectivity to remain surrounding prosecutions of international crimes, 
something the Rome Statute was meant to combat. 37 
Taking into account the critiques of the international criminal courts discussed above, 
McCormack's (pre-Rome) comment remains relevant, if a little overstated: "[t]his self 
righteous tendency to apply a different set of principles of international justice to one's 
own nationals, and the corresponding willingness to promote collective international 
responses when some `other' entity is involved, is as evident in current national positions 
in relation to the proposed permanent international criminal court as it was in the 
attitudes of the Allied powers establishing Nuremberg and Tokyo". 38 In lumping all States 
together, McCormack goes a little too far, in particular bearing in mind the efforts of the 
"Like Minded States" to ensure the creation of a strong and effective court. We must also 
remember the massive leap that has occurred from even a few years ago as, 
"nobody... even after the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, dared to hope that 
before the end of the millennium a pmnanent International Criminal Court could be 
established". 39 Nonetheless, the internationalism of many States remains limited, and 
36 On Article 16 generally, see M. Bergsmo & J. Pejic, "Article 16" in Triffterer, supra n. 31,373; L. Yee, "The 
International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16" in R. S. Lee (ed) 77v Intema&nal 
Criminal Cwt (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999) 143, pp. 149-152; F. Berman, "The Relationship Between the 
International Criminal Court and the Security Council" in H. von Hebel, J. G, Lammers & J. Schukking (eds. ), 
R öns on the Intemational Cri final Court (The Hague: Kluwer/T. M. C. Asser Press, 1999) 173, pp. 176-178. 
Berman, head of the UK delegation accepts that it is a "departure from pure principle". See also A. O'Shea, 
"The Statute of the International Criminal Court" (1999) 116 S. A. L. J. 243, p. 249, who criticises the Article, as 
the idea that a political body may interfere in such a manner is unknown in democratic States; G. H. 
Oosthuizen, "Some Preliminary Remarks on the Relationship Between the Envisaged international Criminal 
Court and the UN Security Council" (1999) XLVI N. LL. R. 313, p. 330; V. Gowlland-Debbas, "The Functions 
of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System" in M. Byers, (ed. ) The Role of Law in 
International Politics (Oxford: OUP, 2000) 277, p. 297. 
37 See Rome Statute preamble, US proposals to entirely subordinate the ICC to the Security Council are 
thought by many (and probably with good cause) to stem from a fear of possible prosecutions of US 
nationals for war crimes. See Joyner & Posteraro, supra n. 33. 
38 T. L. H. McCormack, "Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International 
Criminal Law" (1997) 60 Albany L. R. 681, pp. 719-720. 
39 O. Triffterer, "Preliminary Remarks: The Permanent ICC-Ideal and Reality" in Triffterer, supra n31,17, 
p. 47. See also D. J. Harris, "Progress and Problems in Establishing an International Criminal Court" (1998) 3 
J. A. C. L. 1, p. 2: "even a decade ago, the idea of an International Criminal Court was not a serious item of the 
political agenda"; C. Warbrick, "International Criminal Law" (1995) 44 LCL. Q 466, p. 466 notes the 
difference between the 3rd and 4th editions of Harris' Cases and Materials on International Law, in the latter, the 
excerpts from Nuremberg were removed, Warbrick opines that few would question the excision. See also I 
Brownlie, Principles of PuWic Intematic ial Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 4th ed. 1990) p. 563-564, "in spite of 
extensive consideration of the problem in committees of the General Assembly the likelihood of setting up 
an international criminal court is very remote", aa'ira I. Brownlie, Iräuiples of Public International Law (Oxford: 
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many are far more willing to set up courts for others than a court that could force them 
to engage in self-reflection. 
WHY STATES Do NOT PROSECUTE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
INTRODUCTION 
Having discussed the phenomenon of selective enforcement of international criminal 
law, where such enforcement exists, it is necessary to examine the causes of these 
problems to see if international enforcement can provide a solution, or if the causes of 
selectivity in national enforcement are operative at the international level. 
The difficulties of prosecution fall into two categories, financial/practical and 
political. Within those categories there are separate problems. On the financial/practical 
level, in addition to cost, and the problems arising out of patronage which surround 
discretionary funding, there is the simple practical problem of finding enough lawyers 
competent in international criminal law. Political controversies surround international 
criminal prosecutions. They can be separated into three issues. First, the continued belief 
by States that prosecution of international crimes alleged against another State's nationals 
is a form of interference in that State's affairs (the "interference argument"). Second, the 
fear that prosecution of international crimes of others could draw attention to offences 
committed by the nationals or officials of the prosecuting State in the past (the "clean 
hands" argument). The third set of problems are particular to States trying offences by 
their own nationals. 
Clarendon, 5th ed. 1998) p. 568, "Unease in the face of creation of ad hoc tribunals has given an impetus to 
plans for a creation of an international criminal court, and on 18 July 1998 the Rome Conference concluded 
with the adoption of a convention establishing such a court". J. Crawford, "Remarks" (1995) 89 Pmc A. S. LL. 
301, p. 302 "the question has changed; it is no longer # we are going to have an international criminal tribunal, 
but what kind of criminal tribunal we will have". 
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DIFFICULTY AND COST 
It is obvious that trying cases of violations of international criminal law is not easy, 
particularly when the events are temporally or geographically distant. First, the number of 
practising lawyers with knowledge of international criminal law is very small, and this 
extends to the judiciary, who are not trained in such areas. As a result, trying these cases 
involves finding and engaging the services of trained personnel. This is not simple. 
Another difficulty in this area is the obtaining of evidence. For countries with no 
particular link to a conflict, or trying offences from a past conflict, problems of evidence 
gathering may be nearly insurmountable. Indeed evidential inadequacy has been the 
downfall of two recent trials, D. P. P v Polyukbo i4° and Dusko C41 To find witnesses, 
arrange transport for them, to obtain forensic evidence from the scenes of crimes, take 
depositions from those unwilling to travel to the jurisdiction and to ensure that all 
collected evidence meets national admissibility standards takes much time and effort, and 
resources. The extent to which the tribunals overcome the problems in extradition and 
mutual legal assistance is dealt with in chapter 3. 
Cost is another feature of States' reluctance to prosecute. Mounting such a 
prosecution requires considerable outlay, with no guarantee of result. In the case of 
Australia, the failure of the Pc1yukbmk prosecution led to the closure of the Australian 
War Crimes Bureau, it having attempted three prosecutions, failed in all three and cost 
A$20m The press picked up on this spending which turned opinion against more trials. 42 
It is also notable that when the UK was passing the War Crimes Act 1991,43 for the 
prosecution of World War II offences, concern was expressed in Parliament at costs 
40 (1991) 101 ALR 545. See Triggs, supra n. 11, p. 132. On the extent of the cooperation between various 
States that was required for the Australian attempts at prosecution see Blewitt, supra n. 11, p. 322. 
41 Beschluss des Oberstem Gerichsthofs Os 99/94-6,13 July 1994. 
42 Triggs, supra n. 11, p. 123. See also D. Bevan, A Case to Ansrizr (Kent Town, Australia: Wakefield Press, 
1994) pp. 22-23. 
43 1991 ch. 13. 
168 
mentioned to be between £7 
-L l Om per prosecution. 44 States without direct interest in 
prosecution may see themselves as having higher priorities, or at least having a 
convenient pretext for inaction. 
These examples, of course come from industrialised countries, where costs are not 
necessarily crippling, although they may be a political issue. In countries such as Rwanda 
and Ethiopia, trials are being undertaken in societies that are immensely poor, and are 
both involved in armed conflicts in an unstable part of the world. Ethiopia has also 
recently been the victim of a famine, and claims that the approach should be "food first, 
justice later" are difficult to refute. Therefore the cost of large or small scale prosecutions 
that comport with internationally recognised human rights may be beyond the purse of 
many small or underdeveloped countries. This is particularly the case for those that have 
recently been at war or the subject of mass atrocities. Wars and atrocities of this nature 
can destroy the economic life of a country, as Rwanda showed. 45 
The problems of obtaining the services of staff conversant in international criminal 
law that States have encountered are also applicable at the international level. Although 
there was not, and is not, a lack of people willing to work at the ICIY, at least in the 
beginning, many of those who went knew little about humanitarian law. This extended to 
the Prosecutor's office46 and the bench of both the ICTY and ICIR. 47 Of course, the 
more people who work at the UN Tribunals, as officials or interns, the larger body of 
persons there will be to work in the ICC or in national prosecutions. With the 
rehabilitation of international criminal law as an academic discipline, more universities, 
governments and NGOs are running courses on international criminal law, which 
4* Hansard 18. March 1991, HC Deb. 188 col. 116. 
as See, e. g. G. Pruner, The Rzwna i Crisis: Histo yofa Genc de (London: Hurst & Co, 1997) pp. 327-328. 
46 M. Schrag, "The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: A Prosecutor's View" (1995) 6 Duke J1 & CL. 187, 
p. 187 reports that she, and many of her colleagues at the OTP, upon arrival knew little humanitarian law. The 
Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt, came from the Australian war crimes unit, and was one of the few ICTY 
prosecutors with experience of prosecution of war crimes. This is not in any way intended to question the 
dedication or professionalism of any of the staff, merely to note that the supply of those with direct 
experience of prosecution of international crimes was low. Those with the most direct experience, those who 
prosecuted after WWII were, of course, too old by 1993 to work actively as prosecutors, although some, such 
as Ben Ferencz have maintained an active interest in advocacy of an international criminal court. 
47 Alvarez, supra n. 4, p. 420. 
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expands the body of people informed on the law. 48 The only way out of shortages of 
trained staff is learning, training and experience. We may be seeing the beginnings of a 
body of professional international criminal investigators, prosecutors and judges, which, 
in the long run could provide the answer to the dearth of trained international criminal 
lawyers. 
Until the Rome Statute, each tribunal (with the partial exception of the ICIR) has 
had to be created as a structure from nothing, so international criminal tribunals have 
been expensive. Between 1993 and 2000 the official budget of the ICTY totalled over 
US$380million. Since its creation, the ICTR has cost in the region of US$310m, a sum 
that some have suggested would have been better spent reconstructing the Rwandan 
judicial system49 As a counterweight to these considerations, the relative burden on each 
State is less than if it were unilaterally to attempt prosecutions. Also, as funding comes 
from the UN coffers, the proportion of the cost borne by each State is based on their 
ability to pay. 50 A problematic concomitant to this set of arrangements is that larger 
States, as larger contributors to funds, may be able to put pressure on these courts. 51 Both 
of the UN Tribunals have also been heavily dependent on donations given by States, 
either in the form of monetary grants or seconded personnel. 52 Such gifts could raise 
issues of partiality, as the exchanges concerning the possible investigation of NATO 
48 One such initiative is the UK government's torture handbook C. Gifford, 77r Torture Reportviig Hxx wk (Colchester: University of Essex Human Rights Centre, 2000). Richard Goldstone, "Assessing the Work of 
the United Nations War Crimes Tribunals" (1997) 33 Stanfoiv1 J. I. L. 1, p. 6 "you would not be sitting at 
Stanford Law School listening to a talk about war crimes if the international community had not set up the 
tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda". In response to requests from participants, the Ccwce on 
International Law for Military Lauen run through the University of Nottingham has recently increased its 
component on international criminal law, the ICC and the experiences of the international courts. 
a9 Alvarez, supra n. 4, pp. 414. 
50 The percentage of the UN's budget which is paid by each State is assessed on a scale reflecting ability to 
pay, see B. Simms (ed. ), The Charter of the Unital Nations: A Co vv vy (Oxford: OUP, 1994) pp. 309-311. 
51 This is by no means new, or limited to the UN Tribunals, one of the reasons that the US was willing to pay 
for the Tokyo IMT pending an agreement among the Allies and Japan on where the cost should finally he, 
was that by holding the purse strings, the US was able to influence the track the IMT took. See Pritchard, 
supra n. 20, p. 125-126. 
52 See In Arnaal Report of the Internatioml Tribunal for the Pmsoz trop of Persons Responsile für Serious Violations of 
International Hienmitarimt Law on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia Frain 1St January 1991, UN Doc, A/49/342, 
para 183-188; 2" Annual Report, UN Doc. A/50/365 paras. 140-15 1; 3rd Annual Report, UN Doc. A/51/292, 
paras 181-198. UN Doc. A/RES/51/292 demanded that reliance on seconded personnel be ended by the 
end of 1998. 
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actions in Kosovo have shown. 53 Underfunding has also proven problematic for not only 
the tribunals, but the investigatory bodies which preceded them54 These quandries may 
not be easily soluble, as even where an obligation to pay is clear, as in the UN, actually 
collecting that money is difficult. 
The cost of the ad hac tribunals may have been part of the impetus for the creation of 
the Rome Statute, 55 but the ICC will not come cheap. As Clark has mentioned, "the 
Prosecutorial office... if it is meant to be a serious professional operation, is likely to be 
very expensive". 56 Thus financing is of fundamental importance for the ICC, and was one 
of the difficult issues at the Rome Conference. 57 The situation is complicated as the Court 
will not necessarily have control over the number of cases, which makes forward planning 
difficult. 58 The Court's budget will be set by the Assembly of States Parties, 59 who may, 
should the whim take them set the budget low or high. The dangers of the former are 
that the Court could be prevented from taking an active role in prosecution by lack of 
finance, as happened to the two UN Tribunals. This is not too far-fetched, particularly if 
the Court is brought into being by the ratifications of 60 small or impecunious States and 
the UN refuses, or limits, any funding. 60 Setting the budget at a level that cannot be 
realistically afforded will do nothing more than raise hopes, and the possibility of 
s3 When Prosecutor Arbour asserted that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the NATO actions in Kosovo, 
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea responded that he did not think indictments were likely, and "NATO 
countries are those that have provided the finances to set up the Tribunal" (1999) 125 Trihmal Update. 
Alvarez, supra n. 4, p. 398 queries the extent to which the UN Tribunals can be independent of their "defacto 
master and treasurer" the Security Council, to which could be added the General Assembly, which controls 
their budgets. 
54 See, supra p. 37. 
55 Scheffer claims that one of the reasons that a permanent court is required is that it is too expensive to 
reinvent the wheel (an ad hoc court), every time offences are to be prosecuted, D. J. Scheffer, "International 
Judicial Intervention" (1996) 102 Foreign Policy 34, p. 49. Michael Scharf is of the opinion that one of the 
underlying causes of "tribunal fatigue" is the cost, M. P. Scharf, "The Politics of Establishing an International 
Criminal Court" (1995) 6 Duke J. G &. LL. 167, p. 170. 
56 R. S. Clark, "The Proposed ICC: Its Establishment and Its Relationship with the UN" (1997) 8 Crvn L. F. 
411 p. 413. See also Amnesty International, The Intematianal Criminal Court Making the Right C, hnk : Part IV- 
Establishing and Financing the Court and Final Clauses March 1988, AI Index No. 40/04/98; J. Laurenti, 
Considerations on the Fznmarg of an International Criminal Court, (Rome: UN Association of the US, 1998). For a 
review of the negotiations on financing see S. Rama Rao, "Financing of the Court, Assembly of States Parties 
and the Preparatory Commission" in Lee, supra n. 36,399, pp. 399-406. 
57S. Rama Rao, "Article 113" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 31,1215, pp. 1215-1216. 
58M. Halff & D. Tolbert, "Article 115" in Triffterer (ed. ), ibicl, 1221, pp. 1224-5. 
59 Article 115, see ibid p. 1225. 
60 Under Article 115 the UN is permitted to pay into Court funds "in particular" for Security Council 
referrals. The UN is under no legal duty to do so, and if the Court remains far from universal, it may consider 
itself to be under no moral duty to do so either, see Halff & Tolbert, i&d pp. 1223,1227-8. 
171 
bankruptcy as States will not be able to pay. 61 There is another method of funding for the 
Court, that of voluntary contributions, but these cannot be relied on heavily as they are 
discretionary, thus unforeseeable, and they cause suspicions of influence being bought. 62 
Despite these difficulties, the cup should be seen as half-full, rather than half-empty. 
The cost of investigation is going to be spread at least 60 ways, rather than States having 
to shoulder the entire cost of prosecutions themselves. If the court achieves its goal of 
promoting efficient prosecution in national jurisdictions, the cost will again fall on States. 
However the expense which has characterised previous attempts will be mitigated by 
economies of scale and timely prosecution of offences. 63 If the national prosecution of 
such crimes becomes inculcated into national criminal tradition, then costs will be more 
easily integrated into the normal law enforcement budget of a State, rather than being 
seen as additional expenditure. It is also possible (but as yet speculative) that a State 
finding itself unable to bear the cost of prosecution could either ask the court to declare it 
"unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution" in the sense of Article 17, 
or waive its rights under that Article. This would pass the authority to investigate and 
prosecute (and the related costs) to the Court, (or other States who wished to prosecute 
the accused), leaving the impecunious State only to contribute its share under Article 117 
if the Court handles the proceedings. 64 How much the Court will be willing for this to 
happen may be determined by how well financed the Court is itself. If its budget is 
stretched, then it will be vigilant about States seeking to externalise their prosecution 
costs without a clear necessity. 
61 Amnesty International also point out that it could deter lesser developed countries from joining the Statute, 
and point to the failed attempts to fund the Committee Against Torture by State parties' contributions to 
argue (pre-Rome) against this form of funding. Amnesty International, supra n. 56, Ch. II. D. 1. 
62 On Article 116, which allows the Court to accept voluntary contributions see M. Halff & D. Tolbert, 
"Article 116" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 31,1229, especially p. 1231 on influence. 
63 Part of the reason for the expense has been that offences prosecuted recently have primarily been based on 
WWII, thus requiring difficult investigation, which need not be the case in prosecution of offences in a timely 
fashion, in the frnanmu n. 
64 Under Artide 117, contributions are to be worked out on a scale along the lines (maxis rnutandis) of that 
used by the UN, i. e. based on ability to pay. See M. Halff & D. Tolbert "Article 117" in Triffterer, supra n. 31, 
p. 1233. 
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POLITICAL HURDLES 
INTERFERENCE 
A priority States have is the maintenance of friendly international relations. The 
realities of the situation are simple, prosecuting individuals from a foreign state is likely to 
be seen as an unfriendly act even if it is for an international crime. This is particularly so 
for such crimes as genocide or crimes against humanity, which generally have state 
consent or acquiescence. 65 As a result, it is highly unlikely that nationals of a friendly State 
suspected of international crimes will be tried in another State, unless they are insurgents 
against that State. Paradoxically, those of unfriendly States with at least one powerful ally 
are unlikely to be prosecuted for fear of upsetting that ally. Whilst this is troublesome 
enough in international conflicts, when the conflict is internal then the State concerned is 
highly likely to be taken to be interfering in internal affairs, or taking sides, which States 
are usually loath to do. As Bothe comments: "a neutral state will most often try to stay 
away from the politically difficult undertaking to punish another state's officials". 66 The 
political furore around the Pinochet litigation (1998-2000) showed this remains the case. 67 
It is no coincidence that for prosecutions under the UK Geneva Conventions Act 1957 
or the Genocide Act 1969 the consent of the Attorney-General is required before a 
prosecution can be undertaken, or the prosecution must be taken by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. 68 Also, in the 1994 Ca-de für Curren Proseaitors when a determination is 
required of whether a prosecution is in the public interest, one of the factors Crown 
Prosecutors are to consider is if any disclosures in the trial could harm international 
65 It is ironic that although in legal terms, State immunity does not attach to international crimes, States are 
still, de facto highly sensitive to any allegations of international crimes directed at them or their nationals. 
66 Bothe, supra n. 30, p. 584. 
67 This was clearly a factor in Lord Lloyd's dissent in the first House of Lords judgment on Pinochet: "[f]or 
an English court to investigate and pronounce on the validity of the amnesty in Chile would be to assert 
jurisdiction over the internal affairs of that State", Rv Bow Stmt Metrqpditmc Stipaidrary Magistrate ex pane 
Pintat Ugarte [1998] 4 All ER 897, pp. 934-935. Chile intervened in the 3d Pinochet appeal. There were 
concerns that the extradition proceedings would damage relations with Chile, with whom the UK has 
important trading links, see M. Byers, "The Law and Politics of the Pinadet Case" (2000) 10 Duke J. C & LL. 
415, p. 421 The UK also came under pressure from the US to allow general Pinochet back to Chile i&d p. 431. 
The Vatican also exerted pressure to this effect, G. Robertson, Cranes Against Hwnanity. " The Stnile for Glohd 
Justice (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999) p. 349. 
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relations. 69 It would not be excessive to extrapolate from this that if the prosecution itself 
might jeopardise international relations, prosecutors could consider a prosecution not to 
be in the "public interest". This is particularly the case when the alleged offender comes 
from a friendly State. General Pinochet was quick to criticise the UK for its part in his 
arrest, partially on the grounds that Chile was a friendly State, and had helped the UK 
during the Falklands conflict. 7° 
There is, however, an interesting phenomenon surrounding conflicts which have 
received the attention of an international criminal tribunal. Before the 1990s, almost all 
the prosecutions of international crimes committed by non-nationals of the prosecuting 
State were of those associated with the European sphere of WWII. 71 There are various 
reasons for this, including that there was no State openly willing to protect the Nazis. The 
State of nationality of many (although not all) defendants was Germany, which was itself 
prosecuting Nazi offences and was therefore unlikely to protest other States' efforts at 
prosecution. Another reason that this culture of prosecution arose around Nazi offences 
was the Nuremberg IMT delegitimising that regime, and creating a precedent for 
prosecution of its officials. 72 The influence of the Nuremberg Charter and judgment can 
be traced in certain of the national laws on prosecution of WWII offences, 73 evidencing 
that those prosecutions are inspired, and legitimised, by the Charter and judgment. 
68 Geneva Conventions Act 1957, sl (3), Genocide Act 1969 (1969) ch. 12, sl (3). The same is true of 
prosecutions under the War Crimes Act 1991, s 1(3). 
69 Cade for Cman Pmsa-j on (1994) s. 6.5. 
70 BBC News "General Pinochet's Statement in Full" 8 November 1998 available at <http. //news6. 
thdo. bbc. co. uk/hi/english/uk/newsid%F209000/209742. stm>. "The friendship between our countries is, of 
course an historic one... that friendship has stood the test of time. When Argentine forces occupied the 
Falklands in 1982 I instructed my government to provide, within the context of our neutrality, whatever 
assistance we could to our friend and ally... I am saddened that the experience of my arrest has shaken my 
belief in Britain". Byers suggests though that although pro-Pinochetist support in Chile meant that the 
government felt compelled to uphold a public face of upset at the Pinochet arrest, in private they were 
pleased that he was removed from the scene in the election period, Byers, supra n. 67,439. 
71 See infra, pp. 316-317. 
72 This is alluded to, without discussion, in J. Charney, "Progress in International Criminal Law? " (1999) 93 
A. J. I. L. 452, p. 456. 
73 For example Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Poland, China, Israel all have legislation based on the IMT 
Charter and judgment. See I Brownlie, Intemational Law and the Use of Fong by States (oxford: Clarendon, 1963) 
pp. 176-181. 
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In contrast, with respect to the Far Eastern sphere of WWII, there were no trials 
after the initial post war prosecutions by the belligerents. 74 Possible explanations of this is 
the general perception of illegitimacy that surrounded the Tokyo IMT, and its relatively 
low profile. Another reason could be that there was less of an exodus of alleged war 
criminals from Japan than there was of the alleged Nazi criminals from Germany. There 
was also no clean break of regime between the pre and post-war Japanese governments, 75 
such that there could be seen to be a government who may have protested the 
prosecution of alleged Japanese crimes in WWll. 76 
Proof that the prosecution of offenders from a conflict by an international criminal 
tribunal serves to help States overcome the "interference" argument can be gleaned from 
the experience of the two UN Tribunals. Since their creation there has been a marked 
increase in the number of prosecutions of international crimes alleged against non- 
nationals in national courts. » The important thing to be noticed is that almost all of these 
prosecutions not only post-date the creation of the UN Tribunals, but also relate almost 
entirely to either Former Yugoslav or Rwandan defendants. 78 
These prosecutions are particularly significant. Unlike those relating to the Nazi 
defendants, prosecutions here have been initiated by States that have no direct link to the 
74 J. Crawford, "An International Criminal Court? " (1997) 12 Conn J. LL. 255, p. 256. On the prosecutions 
in the direct aftermath of the war see, for example, G. Erickson, "US Navy War Crimes Trials (1945-1949)" (1965-66) 5 Washburn L. J. 89; J. Ginn, Sugmno Prison, Tokyo: An Ac mt of the Trial and Sentarcmg of lapmnese War 
Crbninals in 1948, by a US Particzpmct (efferson: North Carolina, 1992); Piccigallo, supra n. 20, Pritchard, supra 
n. 20, pp. 134-140. 
75 The most potent reminder of this, of course was the continuity in the position of Emperor Hirohito. 
76 The attitudes of post-war Japan to those convicted at the Tokyo IMT was, at the least, sympathetic, for 
example, Tojo, the major defendant at the Tokyo IMT was reburied in 1977 in a Tokyo Shinto shrine in 1977. 
See A. Brackman, supra n p. 27. The famous apology given in 1995 by Prime Minister Murayama, had to be 
given in an individual, as opposed to official capacity, due to political pressure in Japan, see Tanaka, supra 
n. 20, p. 8. 
n The recent upturn is noted by e. g. A. Bianchi, "Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case" 
(1999) 10 E. J. I. L. 237, p. 253, although he does not attribute it to the UN Tribunals' influence. 
78 This has not escaped the attentions of some scholars, see for example, Charney, supra n. 72, p. 456; T. 
Meron, "War Crimes Law Comes of Age" (1998) 92 A. J. LL. 462, p. 464; A. Cassese, "On the Current Trend 
Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Criminal Law" (1998) 9 E. J. I. L. 
2, p. 6 "following the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, and 
plausibly as a result of the incentive created by that initiative" national prosecutions have occurred. The 
"synergy" advocated by Meron has been questioned by Alvarez, supra n. 4, p. 369, yet even he is prepared to 
admit (p. 421-22) "it is doubtful whether a number of recent civil and criminal cases before national courts 
would have been brought but for the establishment of these two ad hoc tribunals". The cases to which this 
section refers are discussed in chapter 3, p. 97. 
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conflict themselves. 79 The existence of an international criminal tribunal serves to prove 
the international interest in the prosecution of such offences, and demonstrate that they 
are not purely within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Nevertheless, the creation of 
such tribunals may not be determinative. In both the Yugoslav and Rwandan cases, there 
is no powerful State willing to protest on behalf of the defendants. 80 It could be argued 
that this, instead of the existence of international criminal tribunals, dictates who is 
prosecuted and who is not. This contention does not withstand scrutiny, because there 
are a huge number of other defeated regimes with no powerful supporters where there 
have been no prosecutions in neutral States (the Mengistu regime being a prime example). 
Still, this must be taken into account, so the existence of an international criminal tribunal 
is a relevant and persuasive factor encouraging prosecution, but not a sufficient cause of 
national prosecutions per se. 
Further support for the idea that prosecution breeds prosecution, although this time 
at the international level can be obtained from the previous experience of international 
criminal tribunals. Ad hoc tribunals have come about in pairs. One of the reasons for the 
inclusion of war crimes in the jurisdiction of the Tokyo IMT was the existence of the 
Nuremberg IMT. 81 Initially, the US only wanted to prosecute the attack on Pearl 
Harbour. Because of the more wide ranging trials set up in Nuremberg, if that was done, 
the implication would have been that there were no war crimes or crimes against 
humanity committed in the Pacific sphere, and aggression had only been committed 
79 Previous prosecutions of Nazi defendants in the post-war era have all been by States either actually 
involved in the war, or (in the case of Israel, which was not in existence during WWII) whose nationals were 
the victims of the offences. 
80 In the Rwandan case, this is unsurprising, as the Rwandan government itself is prosecuting the offences 
too. In the former Yugoslav case, all the States have held trials of alleged war criminals and are hardly in a 
position to be critical, not least as Serbia is currently a pariah State, and Bosnia is still dependent on 
international involvement. As, because of the creation of the ICTY, the international community has shown 
itself to be in favour of prosecution, it makes it less likely that there would be protests. As far as research has 
shown, there has been no public protest by Serbia of the national prosecution of Serbs (from Serbia or 
Bosnia). 
81 See Röling, supra n. 20, pp. 593-598. Especially p. 596 "the Tokyo trial was a natural and unavoidable 
consequence of the Nuremberg trial". 
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against the US. 82 This was unacceptable to the Allies, and to rectify the situation the 
Tokyo IMT was granted a wider jurisdiction than its primary advocate originally intended. 
The existence of the two IMTs did not lead to a wide-ranging trend towards 
tribunals. The pull towards action was not strong enough to withstand powerful contrary 
political forces. 83 The UN Tribunals do show some additional support for the dynamic of 
punishing international crimes. After the Rwandan genocide, the most natural response 
seemed to be the construction of another ad bcc tribunal. When calling for the creation of 
a tribunal, the Rwandan government explicitly invoked the precedent of the previous 
international criminal tribunals, and asked "is it because we are Africans that a court has 
not been set up? ". 84 This underscores an important point in international criminal law, the 
idea of a universal crime gives rise to expectations of universal enforcement. Even when 
the initial turn to the law is made for political reasons, 85 that turning to the law gives rise 
to an expectation that when similar events occur, the response will be the same. 86 This 
time, the existence of the two tribunals did have a further effect, that of spurring on the 
82 Ibid, pp. 596-8. 
83 See J. Dugard, "Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court" (1997) 56 Ccanbridge L. J. 329, 
p. 329 states that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials did lead to an "enthusiasm" for a court, this did not 
survive the cold war. Still, when the Yugoslav conflict broke out, Nuremberg provided a clarion call, for 
example, M. Maria, "Nuremberg Now! " (19th May 1991) Borba, translation from the Serbo-Croat in A 
Cassese (ed. ) The Path to the Hague (The Hague: ICTY, 1996) 13; J. O'Brien, "Comments" (1995) 12 
N. YL. S. J. HR. 657, p. 657. 
84 Quoted in V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The International Crvninal Tri 2unai forRzewada (N. Y: Transnational, 1998) 
p. 62 See also P. Akhavan, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 501, p. 501 "On the basis of international responses to other situations, it has 
been suggested that the plight of African victims would not generate the same outcry as the suffering of 
Europeans. In other words, the Rwanda tribunal was set up because of the precedential effect of the 
Yugoslav tribunal" (also referenced in Morris & Scharf, ibid); P. Akhavan, "Justice and Reconciliation in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" (1997) 7 
Duke J. C &LL. 325, p. 328, "Had the Rwandan genocide occurred first, would we have resigned ourselves to 
the view of Africa as a continent where horror is commonplace, and where an International Tribunal would 
make no appreciable difference? ". 
85 As was the case for the creation of the ICTY, the Security Council certainly saw itself to be under no legal 
duty to act as it did. 
86 See E. P. Thompson, Whzgs and Huffis: 71e Ongvu of the Black Act (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1990 (1975)) 
pp. 262-263. See also B. Ferencz, "International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg" (1998) 10 Pax 
I L. R 203, p. 225, "temporary tribunals, created after the event, and with only limited jurisdiction to deal with 
a few particular crimes, only within a limited time frame, are better than doing nothing. But it is certainly not 
good enough. Law, to be worthy of the name, must apply equally to everyone, everywhere. What is needed 
now is a permanent international criminal court to condemn major crimes that threaten the peace and security 
of all human beings". 
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negotiations for the ICC. 87 Part of the reason for that was the criticism of the UN 
tribunals on the ground of selectivity. 
The last point leads onto another fundamental question. Have the tribunals managed 
to successfully show that international crimes, no matter where they are committed, are 
matters of international concern, and not a matter purely for the domestic jurisdiction of 
the lc delicti? In other words, have they vindicated the use of the law per se or just the 
prosecution of offences from certain conflicts? The Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs did not 
lead to general prosecutions of international crimes, 88 although many unofficial bodies 
and writers appraised the conduct of States by reference to the "Nuremberg Principles". 89 
When it came to Yugoslavia, the existence of the Nuremberg IMT was seen as a reason 
to create a tribunal. There were few, if any analogous attempts to use the "Tokyo 
principles", if any separate substantive body of law could be said to have arisen from 
them9o 
A good case can be made that the UN Tribunals (especially the ICTY) have made a 
contribution to the vindication of attempts to prosecute international crimes. The 
87 See Crawford, supra n. 74, p. 257; Bolton, supra n. 33, p. 62; Brownlie (1998), supra n. 39. 
88 McCormack, supra n. 38, pp. 682-3, "the reality [is] that innumerable alleged violations of international law 
have gone unpunished, despite the expectations raised by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals". His use of 
the Tokyo Tribunal here is interesting, very few others refer to the Tokyo IMT, and even here the reference is 
cumulative to that of Nuremberg. 
89 Probably the most famous of the academic attempts is Telford Taylor, Nunmhag and Vietnan An Amerrcmt 
Tragedy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970). See also W. Bosch, Judgene7t on NwwA- 
. 
Ame iam Attilzules 
Tortwth tL Malor Gennom War Crim Ti7aic (Durham: North Carolina U. P., 1970) p. 187. W. Baird (ed. ), From 
Numn1 g to My Lai (London: Heath & Co., 1972); W. V. O' Brien, "The Nuremberg Principles" in Finn (ed. ) 
A Conflict of Lo5akres, reprinted in R. Falk (ed. ), 7/ Vietmmn War and Intmuda al Law (Princeton: Princeton 
U. P., 1972) 193; W. V. O'Brien "The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War" (1991) 31 V. J. LL. 391; L. 
Ocampo, "The Nuremberg Parallel in Argentina" (1990) 11 NYL. S. J. I. & C. L. 357; B. Ferencz, "The 
Nuremberg Precedent and State Sponsored Mass Murder" (1990) 11 N. YL. S. J. I. & CL. 325; L-R. Beres, 
"Toward Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes Under International Law: Jurisprudential Foundations and 
Jurisprudential Choices" (1991/2) 22 CaLW. I. L. J. 127. Of the institutional attempts to use the "Nuremberg 
principles" the most Famous is the Russell Tribunal on Vietnam, see R. A. Falk, "Keeping Nuremberg Alive" 
in R. A. Falk, F. V. Kratchowil & S. H. Mendlovitz (eds. ), Rem Intematic al Law (Boulder. Westview, 
1985) 494. In many ways, these works and bodies, although differing in their intent and conclusions, all try to 
live up to justice Jackson's declaration, "whilst this law is applied first against German aggressors, the law 
includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, including 
those which sit here now in judgment" Trial of the Major War Craninals (Nuremberg, 1947) Vol. 2, p. 154. 
90 Perhaps the only full attempt to use the Tokyo IMT (not its law) for the purposes of evaluating activity is 
Minear, supra n. 20; Other works referring to parts of the Tokyo judgment include J. J Paust, "My Lai and 
Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility" (1972) 57 Military L. R. 99 and W. H. Parks "Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes" (1973) 62 Military L. R. 1, but both of these refer to the Tokyo judgment in 
addition to a number of other sources of international law, and neither see themselves as applying the "spirit" 
of the Tokyo IMT, unlike those relating to Nuremberg. On the intellectual ferment that is part of the 
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increase in national interest in international criminal law since their inception, 91 which has 
led to a number of States incorporating international criminal norms into their domestic 
law, can be attributed in part to their presence. Since the creation of the ICTY there has 
been an increase in attempts to prosecute international crimes either directly, or indirectly, 
related to the UN Tribunals. Judge Garzon, the Spanish judge responsible for the 
extradition request for General Pinochet expressed a debt towards the ICTY. 92 More 
recently, the Senegalese attempts to prosecute the ex-Chadian Head of State appear to 
have adopted the Pinochet litigation as an inspiration, 93 thus is at least indirectly traceable 
to the IC Y. 94 The existence and prosecutions of the UN Tribunals have not completed 
this process of justifying action. In Webber's words, no recent case "has aroused as much 
passion and partisanship" as Pinochet's. 95 The application of international criminal law 
outside the conflicts where there has been an international criminal tribunal remains 
politically controversial. 96 Nonetheless, the reviving of proposals, leading to agreement in 
2000, for trial of the Khmer Rouge97 against many expectations, 98 show a strong case for 
the argument that the impact of international criminal tribunals on the reincarnation of 
international criminal law has been important. As do the calls from Sierra Leone for an 
"Nuremberg Legacy", see M. C. Bassiouni, "The Nuremberg Legacy" in Bassiouni, supra n. 10,195, pp. 211- 
212. 
91 In the words of Alvarez, supra n. 4, p. 421 "the establishment and operation of the ad hoc tribunals has 
significantly expanded the attention paid to international humanitarian law, not merely among international 
lawyers but among national and international polic}rnakers". 
92 Alvarez, ibid, p. 421. 
93 See "An African Pinochet" NY Ths, 11.2.2000, p. A30. Although one court has dismissed the case (July 
2000), this decision is now on appeal, and the point is still made that cases are now being brought that were 
unthinkable a decade ago. 
94 It may also not be coincidental that the ex-President of the ICTR, Laity Kama, is Senegalese, making the 
action traceable to that institution too, although this is speculative. On the indictment generally see F. L. 
Kirgis, "The Indictment in Senegal of the Former Chad Head of State" (February 2000) 41 A. S. LL Insights 
pp. 1-2 (<fttp: //www. asiLorg/insigh41. htm>). 
95 F. Webber, "The Pinochet Case: The Struggle for the Realization of Human Rights" (1999) 26 J. L. & 
Society 523, p. 523. See Also Charney, supra n. 72, p457, who notes the political bodies in the UK and Spain 
were uncomfortable about the litigation. What he omits to mention, though, is the sea change which allowed 
it to go ahead at all. 
96 Still, one of the large contributions of the ICIY, and, (perhaps to a greater extent) the ICTR is the 
legitimisation of international interest in offences committed in non-international conflicts, by their 
characterisation as threats to the peace, thus not purely domestic matters. 
97 UN Press release SG/SM/7481, although the deal is not fully settled yet, see BBC News "Khmer Rouge 
Genocide Deal" 6 July 2000, <http: //news. bbc. co. uk/hi/english/world/a-pac/newsid_822000/822627 >. 
98 For comments prior to the deal see. D. Chandler, "Will There be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge? " (2000) 14 
Ethics and LA}f. 67; B. Rajagopal, "The Pragmatics of Punishing the Khmer Rouge" (1998) 1 YB. I. H. L. 189; 
S. Marks, "Forgetting the `Policies and Practices of the Past': Impunity in Cambodia" (1994) 18 FL F. WIdAff. 
17. On the Cambodia Settlement Agreements, which seemed to provide an amnesty in Article 15, see S. R. 
Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements" (1993) 87 A. J. I. L. 1, especially p. 4. 
179 
international tribunal for the prosecution of the rebels in Sierra Leone, which have not 
fallen on deaf ears in the Security Counci1.99 
There is reason to believe that the Rome Statute and Court have, and could, have the 
effect of further entrenching the acceptability of domestic prosecutions of international 
crimes. This has been alluded to by several scholars, both before and after the Rome 
conference. 100 If the Rome Statute has this effect, it will not have been unintentional. 
Aspects of the preamble manifest the intention of the drafters to entrench the position of 
international criminal law. 101 The first of the preambular paragraphs with this theme is 
paragraph 3, which builds upon the Security Council practice determining violations of 
international criminal law to be threats to peace, by "recognizing that such grave crimes 
threaten the peace, security and well being of the world". This, in itself vindicates action, 
as it brings such activities under the purview of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus 
outside the domestic jurisdiction of any State-101 
This is not undermined by preambular paragraph 8, which provides "[e]mphasizing in 
this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State party to 
intervene in an armed conflict or the internal affairs of any State". The paragraph prior to 
8 provides the context in which it operates (hence "emphasizing in this connection"). 
Paragraph 7 reaffirms "the Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent 
99 See C. Lynch "Sierra Leone Seeks Aid on Tribunal" 16 June 2000, Washingtn Post p. A24; BBC News, 
"Sierra Leone Backs Tribunal Plans" 28 July 2000 <http: //news. bbc. co. uk/hi. english/world/africa/newsid_ 
855000/855478. stm>. 
100 L. F. Damrosch, "Enforcing International Law Through Non Forcible Means" (1997) VII 269 R. dC 9, 
pp. 239-241. Especially p. 241, arguing that the ICC may only be symbolic, but "even `mere symbolism' can 
have powerful real world effects, at least in the long run". For a view post-Rome see Charney, supra n. 72, 
p. 452, stating that, with respect to the creation of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, "each of these events appears to 
reflect growing support by the international community for the effective enforcement of international law", 
and p. 464, arguing that the existence of the ICC will improve the legitimacy of international criminal law. 
Also in a telling editorial, the editors of the American Journal of Intemational Law have said "we may well be 
witnessing the emergence of consensus in the international community that it accepts the responsibility to 
prosecute and punish, be it through international or domestic tribunals, persons who commit such crimes"; 
The Editors, "Developments in International Criminal Law" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 1, p. 1. 
101 On the preamble generally, see O. Triffterer, "Preamble" in Triffterer, supra n. 31,1, especially at p. 5, 
where he reminds us, "the moral and Apolitical importance of the adopted preamble should not be overlooked". 
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with the Purposes of the United Nations". Paragraph 8 is referring to forcible, or 
threatened forcible, intervention, not prosecution. 103 
Decisively, paragraph 9 states: "[d]etermined to these ends and for the sake of 
present and future generations, to establish an independent International Criminal 
Court... with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole". What this means is that, those crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the court must be regarded as being not purely an "internal affair of any State". As 
international concern is justified by the Rome Statute (and by the Security Council's 
action in setting up the two UN Tribunals), then at least between parties to the Rome 
Statute, there is a defence against the "interference" argument. This is only enhanced by 
the fact that the ICC is complementary to national jurisdictions, i. e. national enforcement 
is the preferred level of action. 104This is particularly momentous in relation to crimes 
occurring in internal armed conflicts, or crimes against humanity or genocide occurring in 
peacetime. 105 The Rome Statute promotes the vindication of international interest in 
crimes occurring outside international armed conflicts that began, at the latest, with the 
creation of the ICTY and ICTR. There is some evidence that at least some of the States 
who have signed or ratified the Rome Statute are taking international criminal law very 
seriously indeed now. The first ratifying country, Senegal, has recently arrested Habre, the 
ex-head of State of Chad, on charges of murder, torture and disappearances, after 
allowing him to live in Senegal unmolested for a decade. 106 Whether or not the ICC will 
102 See article 2(7) UN Charter. 
103 The impact upon this for the law relating to humanitarian intervention is, alas, beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
104 See preambular paragraphs 4& 10. A subsidiary argument can be based on paragraph 6, which recalls that 
States have a duty to prosecute international crimes. The question which remained unanswered at Rome was 
whether or not this meant on the basis of universal or territorial/nationality jurisdiction (see Triffterer, supra 
n. 101, pp. 12-13). Equally, the bone of contention there was whether or not there was a duty to prosecute, not 
a right. 
105 See Triffterer, supra n. 101, pp. 14-15. 
106 See "Africa's Many Pinochets-in-waiting" 12.2.2000 ? lx' Econwu t (US Edition). As its title suggests, in 
addition to mentioning the Senegalese ratification of the Rome Statute, the article draws parallels with the 
Pinochet litigation. It must also be noted that it is not the argument of this section that international criminal 
tribunals are the sole cause of prosecutions and a groundswell of support for international criminal law. For 
another view affirming that it is possible that Senegalese ratification of the Rome Statute could have 
influenced the decision to proceed see R. Wedgwood, "International Law and Augusto Pinochet" (2000) 40 
V. J. I. L. 829, p. 846. International criminal tribunals remain, it is submitted, both symptom and cause of such 
support. After all, the creation of the Nuremberg IMT and (to a far lesser extent) the ICTY cannot be put 
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lead to an abandonment of the "interference" argument is currently unquantifiable, 107 but 
both recent history and the text of the Rome Statute itself give reason for hope. 108 
TU QUOQUE (OR "CLEAN HANDS") 
The last part of international iralpolitik relates to the cleanliness of the hands of those 
prosecuting. Many States have, at some point or another, been involved in acts that may 
fall foul of international law. Examples of such activities include the Vichy regime in 
France, as well as France's record in Algeria, the US in Vietnam, and Europe's record of 
colonialism It is safe to say that most States view reminders of these events as 
embarrassing. It has thus come to pass that for a large proportion of States, a position of 
benign antipathy has been a way of avoiding charges of hypocrisy and having their own 
misdemeanours brought to international attention. An example of a very public assertion 
of this type of argument was the controversial defence of Klus Barbie by Jaque Verges, 
whose strategy involved trying to undermine the prosecution of his client by raising 
questions about France's role in Indochina. 109 When General Pinochet issued his first 
statement after being arrested at the behest of Spain, he took little time to remind the 
Spanish of their own activities, and response to them, under the Franco regime. 110 A form 
of reciprocal myopia towards offences has become endemic and has seriously damaged 
the enforcement of international criminal law in third party States. It is ironic that in this 
down, in any real way to any previous tribunals. The argument of this section is merely that international 
criminal tribunals are a contributory factor. For an argument that the UN tribunals were at least partially a 
response to a pre-existing increase in interest in humanitarian law see A. Roberts, "The Role of Humanitarian 
Issues in International Politics in the 1990s" (1999) 333 LR. RC 19. 
107 The arrest of Habre, it would appear from the reports, has led to protestation from Chad, See the 
Economist, ibid 
108 It must be remembered that while litigation such as Pinodxt and on the Habre case is now controversial, a 
decade ago, it was all but unthinkable, much like the creation of a permanent international criminal court. 
109 Verges' strategy is the subject of G. Binder, "Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity in the Trial of 
Klaus Barbie" (1989) 99 Yale L. J. 1321. His strategy drew strong condemnation from, for example Alain 
Finkielkraut, A. Finkielkraut (R. Lapidus trans. ), Ranenlx Zg in Vain: The Klasis Barbie Trial and Criw Against 
Hwnanity (New York: Columbia U. P., 1992). 
110 See supra n. 70, "in challenging Chile's reconciliation, Spain ignores its own past. It denies to us the path 
which it followed. Spain left the Franco years with no recriminations". He also referred to when "our own 
country obtained its freedom from Spanish colonial domination". 
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area of law, where reciprocity is expressly denied as a basis for obligation, "' it should 
reappear in practice, to avoid enforcement of that law. 
The "clean hands" contention has been raised with respect to all the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals, and some have argued, to prevent the creation of others. 
Both before and during the Nuremberg IMT's proceedings the actions of their own 
States was on the minds of the prosecutors. At the London Conference, Justice Jackson 
made it clear that the prosecutors did not wish to be in a "position where the US is 
obliged to enter into a discussion at this trial of the acts or policies of our allies". 112 The 
UK was concerned that the defendants would use the trial to grandstand their views, 
which would have included the Allies' alleged misdeeds. 113 This had knock-on effects in 
the indictment process, as the bombing of population centres was deliberately omitted 
from the indictment, on the ground that any defence would involve raising the legality of 
similar allied bombings. 114 The legalised version of this allegation, tu quo ue, has never 
been accepted. 115 It arose in a slightly different way in the Nuremberg Mr. Evidence of 
alleged Allied misconduct was generally forbidden by the Charter, 116 but Otto 
Kranzbühler, counsel for Admiral Döniz, argued that allied practice in submarine warfare 
in the war was identical to that which was charged against his chent. 117 He argued that the 
practice arose from the acceptance by both sides that customary international law 
accepted unrestricted submarine warfare. This position was partially adopted by the 
111 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 U. N. T. S. 331, Article 60. A. Cassese, "On the 
Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Criminal Law" 
(1998) 9 E. J. I. L. 2, p. 5 also notes that the possibility of a State's own misdeeds coming to light has retarded 
prosecution of offences committed by non nationals. 
112 R. Jackson, Report of Roben H Jackson US Repnwratiw to the Intema&mal Conference on Military Dills 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1945) p. 380. 
113 See Bassiouni, supra n. 20, p. 24. It is important to note that the UK raised this in the context of their 
arguments against any sort of trial whatsoever. There were serious questions, particularly about the activities 
of the Russians, both before, during, and after the war, that could embarrass the Allies. After all, Stalin had 
been involved in pogroms and the creation of the Gulags, activities analogous to those committed by the 
Nazis. 
114 See Röling, supra n. 20, p. 591, who also notes that the UNWCC omitted mention of such actions. 
115 For a recent reaffirmation of this see Pmsauto -v Kupn5ic, Kupmic, Kupresic, Josif J Papis & Santic, 
Judgment, 14 January 2000, IT-95-16-T, paras 515-520.; M. C Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the 
Intemational Crininal T nbwial fi r floe Foren Yugoslavia (NY: Transnational, 1996) pp. 420-423. 
116 London Charter, Article 18(b). 
117 In support of this he submitted a signed statement by UN Admiral Chester Nirnitz, which confirmed this 
allegation, see Luban, supra n. 19, p. 811; J. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge: Harvard U. P. 1986) p. 162; A. P. Rubin, 
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judgment. 118 Externally, the fact that the law was not applied to Allied actions has led 
many to criticise the Nuremberg IMT on that ground, and consider its integrity 
diminished as a resuh. 119 
In the Nuremberg IMT although the Allied record was not unsullied, no-one could 
claim moral equivalence between the sides. In Tokyo, the use of atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki meant that some thought the two sides were equally guilty. 120 
Allied activities arose in the judgments of the Tokyo IMT, particularly that of Mr. Justice 
Pal. Pal excoriated the Allied powers for what he saw as their hypocrisy, 121 on two 
grounds, their own record of colonialism, and the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. 
Pal criticised the US and its allies for trying to impose a prohibition of aggression that 
prioritised peace over the interests of those States under colonial domination. 122 He made 
a point of contrasting European and Japanese actions in the far-East, concluding that 
Japan was coerced into coming out of isolation "under terms of treaties obtained by the 
Western powers from her by methods which, when later on imitated by Japan in relation 
"The International Criminal Court: A Skeptical Analysis", p. 12 (forthcoming, pre-publication manuscript 
provided by A. P. Rubin). 
118 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, pp. 303-305, for criticism, (on the ground that Dönitz was thus entitled to an 
acquittal) see T. Taylor, 7he Anatomy of the Nuranleig Trials New York Little Brown & Co., 1992) p. 594. In 
another instance though, the UK Foreign Office deliberately withheld evidence relating to British plans to 
invade Norway, as it could have been embarrassing to them, See O. Kranzbühler, "Nuremberg as a Legal 
Problem" in W. Benton & G. Grimm (eds. ), Nuranlxr : Gern cm Vxw of the War Trials (Dallas: Southern U. P., 
1955) 107, pp. 115-116; A. Tusa & J. Tusa, 7h e Nuivnleig Trial (Macmillan: London, 1983) pp. 261-263. 
119 J. Alvarez, "Nuremberg Revisited, the Tadic Case" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 245, p. 260; M. Lippman, "Nuremberg 
Forty Five Years After" (1991) 7 Cc vioiicut J. I. L. 1, pp. 37-38; G. Simpson, supra n. 3, p. 5. In addition see, 
A. P. Rubin "International Crime and Punishment" (Fall 1993) 34 The National Interest 73, p. 73; M. Gordon, 
"Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" (1995) 1 I. L. S. A. J. 1 & 
CL. 217, pp. 226-227; A Roberts, "The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary 
Conflicts" (1995) 6 Duke J. C & I. L. 11, p. 26; K. R. Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons 
of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials" (1995) 14 Dickinson J. I. L. 57, p. 73; K. Acheson, 
"Nuremberg Sensibility" (1997) 7 Hanwd H. R. J. cited in P. Akhavan, "Justice in the Hague, Peace in the 
Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary in the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal" (1998) 20 H. R. Q. 736, 
p. 745. For an in depth discussion of the moral issues involved see M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Coda t Mo oy and 
the Law (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997) pp. 122-135. This criticism is not limited to international lawyers, 
similar critiques have been made by international relations theorists and historians, see H. Bull, The Ananhkal 
Society. 
" 
A Study of Oraler in World Politic (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1995) pp. 85-86; Tusa & Tusa, ibrd, p. 415. 
120 Röling, supra n. 20, p. 591, "from World War II above all two things are remembered: the German gas 
chambers and the American Atomic bombings". 
121 On this aspect of Pal's dissent see generally, E. Kopelman, "Ideology and International Law: The Dissent 
of the Indian justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial" (1991) 23 N YU. J. LL. & Politics 373. 
122 Dissenting Opinion from the Member From India, Judge Pal, in R. J. Pritchard & S. M. Zaide (eds. ), 77r 
Tokyo War Crzm Trial VoL21: Separate Opiruöns (New York: Garland, 1981) pp. 238-241. In this respect, he 
also raised the USSR's declaration of war on Japan, claiming it would fall under the definition of aggression 
proposed by the prosecution, ibid, pp. 241-246. 
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to her neighbours, were characterised by those very treaty powers as aggressive", 123 and, 
"after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan seemed to follow closely the precedents set by 
Europe in its dealings with China". 124 Pal reserved his most critical comments for the 
atomic bombings, which the prosecution had tried to ignore completely. He considered 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings far more iniquitous than anything the defendants 
were charged with: "[f]uture generations will judge this dire decisionl25... [to initiate the 
bombings]... if an indiscriminate destruction of civilian life and property is still illegitimate 
in warfare, then, in the Pacific war, this decision to use the atom bomb is the only near 
approach to the directives of the German emperor during the first world war and of the 
Nazi leaders during the second world war. Nothing like this could be traced to the credit 
of the accused". 126 The actions of the prosecutors were publicly damned in Pal's 
judgment, and those actions dominate discussion about the Pacific sphere of the war, to 
the exclusion of many of the acts prosecuted in Tokyo. 127 As with the Nuremberg IMT 
(albeit to a much greater degree) the activities of the prosecuting States served to partially 
undercut the legitimacy of the trial. 128 
Moving forward to the last decade, the same arguments have been made, perhaps 
successfully, by those seeking to prevent the creation of international tribunals, or to 
undercut their legitimacy. A conceivable explanation of the retreat of the coalition in the 
Gulf conflict of 1991 from their calls for an international tribunal for the Hussein 
government129 was the allegations of coalition offences. These would either have to be 
brought before the tribunal or excluded from it, which would lead to allegations of 
123 Ibid, p. 785. 
124 Ibid, p. 795(20) For his survey of pre-war activities see pp. 795 (1-20), especially (rather at odds with this 
rejection of an objective definition of aggression) p. 785(15) "European aggression on China". 
125 It is very interesting that he described this decision as "coming from the allies" (i/ d p. 1,091) rather than 
the US, when the position of the other allies on this is, at best controversial 
126 Ibid. p. 1,091, see Kopelman, supra n. 121, pp. 406-409. Kopelman, ibid p. 407 asserts that Pal described the 
bombings as a crime against humanity in this part of the judgment, he does not expressly say this, and 
appeared to be thinking of war crimes, but the point is still made. Judge Jaranilla also mentioned the 
bombings, coming to the conclusion that their use was entirely justified, relying on comments of US secretary 
of war Stimson, Concurring Opinion of The Member for the Philippines, supra n. 122, pp. 24-27. 
127 See Osiel, supra n. 119, p. 130. 
128 Judge Pal is the most notable example, but enunciation of this criticism was not limited to him by any 
means, see, for example, Röling, supra n. 120. 
129 Some of these calls are reproduced in Cassese, supra n. 83. 
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hypocrisy. 130 This is not to take a position on the acceptability or otherwise of the Allied 
actions, it is more to suggest hat even the invocation of the possibility of their own 
actions being subject to external scrutiny was enough to raise concern amongst those with 
the power to set up such a tribunal. 
The UN tribunals have been subjected to a variant of the claim. As the tribunals were 
not set up by one belligerent to judge the conduct of the other, but by the UN, arguments 
identical to those above could not be made. Critics have instead focused on the actions, 
or lack thereof, of the UN in the conflicts concerned. In addition contentions of this 
nature have been made about activities of permanent members of the Security Council. 
Most of these critiques of the two UN Tribunals are cognate. They stem from 
popular impression that the "decision to set up an international tribunal was influenced 
by the political and moral pressure, both domestic and international, to do 
something.... because the international community was unable to agree on any major 
intervention or other decisive action, creation of a tribunal was one of the few options 
left". 131 In other words the UN (or more specifically, the Security Council) could have 
prevented the international crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but there was not the 
political will to act forcibly to this end. Instead tribunals were set up as an alternative to 
the morally preferable option of those crimes' prevention. 132 This implies that, in some 
way the UN, or its component member States, were at fault in failing to prevent the 
atrocities. 133 There have also been questions over the role of individual States. The ICTY, 
130 D. Martin, "Reluctance to Prosecute War Crimes: Of Causes and Cures" (1994) 34 V. J. I. L. 255, p. 259. 
131 Roberts, supra n. 119, p. 57. 
132 For arguments of this nature relating to the ICTY see C. Greenwood, "The International Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia" (1993) 69 Intemational Affairs 641, p. 643, J. Podgers, "The World Cries Out for Justice" (April 
1996) A. B. A. J. 51, p. 53; D. Forsythe, "International Criminal Courts: A Political View " (1997) 15 NQH. R. 
5, p. 8; D. Forsythe, "Politics and the ICIY" in R. S. Clark & M. Sann, The 1vseaaian of International Cannes (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996) 185, p. 187; V. Epps, "The International Trial of the Century? A Cross 
Fire Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal" (1996) 29 Canal I. L. J. 636 
p. 637. For the ICTR, see, M. Morris, "The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda" (1997) 7 
Duke J. C & LL. 349, p. 357; C. Cisse, "The End of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda? " (1998) 1 YB. LH. L. 
161, pp. 162-3; M. M Wang, "The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, 
Opportunities for Impact" (1995) 27 Calwnbia H. R. L. R. 177, pp. 188-189; Alvarez, supra n. 4, pp. 384,390 & 
411. 
133 The UN accepted this in relation to Rwanda see supra n. 26. 
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in some eyes, is inextricably linked with the US, 134 who is one of its main sponsors and 
some have raised the issue of alleged US violations of law to undercut the legitimacy of 
the IC Y. 135 The refusal of the prosecutor to fully investigate NATO actions in Kosovo 
lends some support to these calls, 136 although they are frequently polemical and have 
often come from those who were already hostile to theICTY. 137 
Proposed international prosecutions of the Khmer Rouge have led to the 
resurrection of accusations of complicity between the prosecuting authorities and the 
defendants. Ta Mok (who is to be tried for his activities as a Khmer Rouge leader) has hit 
back at the US, other countries and the UN, all of whom are pushing for international 
trials. Seeking to evade trial, he has claimed he will subpoena US and UK officials to 
answer questions about their actions, and past Secretaries-General of the UN to explain 
why the Khmer Rouge continued to be recognised at the UN in preference to the 
Vietnamese imposed government that ousted the Khmer Rouge. 138 
When the Rome Statute comes into force, the opportunities for this type of allegation 
to be made may diminish. The ICC is to be an independent body, with its own 
international personality. 139 Therefore it may be insulated from such claims, as it will pre- 
exist any actions over which it exercises jurisdiction. However, there is still the possibility 
for allegations of this nature. The Court is to be brought into a relationship with the UN 
134 See, inter alia, A. Fatic, Rax»aciliation va the War Cnin Tribrmal (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2000) p. 69; "The 
ICY has demonstrated little or no divergence from the foreign policies of the great powers, especially the 
USA". 
135 See R. Dixon, New Developments in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" 
(1995) 8 L. J. I. L. 449, pp. 460-462. Of course those raising these issues are frequently doing so in a self-serving 
manner, but that does not detract from the point that such arguments are being made to deter prosecutions. 
136 The Russian Foreign Ministry, for example issued a statement accusing the Tribunal of "political 
prejudice" in indictment after the prosecutor's refusal to fully investigate NATO, see (2000) 178 Triharal 
Update 
137 Predictably the FRY has been heavily critical of the ICTY for its refusal to investigate, viewing it as a 
demonstration of ICTY collusion with NATO. See for example its (highly propagandistic and personal) 
attack on ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, "Carla del Ponte's Legal Amateurishness and Dirty Political 
Game" 23 June 2000 <http: //www. serbia-info. com/news/2000-06/23/19609. html>. This is nothing new. 
Commenting on the Tadic case, Alvarez maintained: "the official Serbian reaction has been that the Tadic 
proceedings and verdict constitute further evidence that the Tribunal is a fraud perpetrated by hostile foreign 
interests pursuing political show trials to undermine the Serbian nationalist cause" J. Alvarez, "Rush to 
Closure, Lessons of the Tadk Judgment" (1998) 96 Mich. L. R. 2031, p2053. 
138 BBC News, "Khmer Rouge Lawyer Targets World Leaders" 27.12.1999, <http//news. bbc. co. uk/world/ 
a-pacific/newsid_579000/579534. stni> . 
139 Rome Statute, Article 4(1). 
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(Rome Statute Article 2). Depending on how close this relationship is, if the ICC 
becomes identified with the UN, then it could be open to some of the claims made 
against the two ÜN Tribunals. This will almost certainly be the case if the Security 
Council passes a situation to the ICC. Financing is also relevant, as the ICC could become 
considered dependent on, and thus an arm of, its major funders (as has the ICTY to 
some extent). If this comes to pass, there could be discussion surrounding the actions of 
those parties' actions. The final way the "clean hands" question could arise is if a State 
party refers a situation. A State may hold back from making such a referral for fear of 
being embarrassed itself either by retaliatory rhetoric, or even a referral of its own 
conduct to the ICC. Similarly to national trials, this argument, although it should not be 
thought to undercut the moral foundation of international (or national) criminal 
prosecution, 140 has quite consistently been made, and may have had a pernicious impact 
by causing some States to shy away from supporting such prosecutions. The ICC may be 
more insulated from these claims than the ad hoc Tribunals that have preceded it, but it 
may not be immune from thern. 
PROBLEMS OF ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW BY A STATE IN 
RELATION TO ITS OWN NATIONALS 
Perhaps, to avoid the above mentioned problems, particularly those of obtaining 
witnesses and evidence in what still, for State prosecutions, is a bilateral regime of co- 
operation, it should be the State in which the offence occurred, or the State of nationality 
of the alleged offender who prosecutes the suspect. In international conflicts, unless the 
person is captured, offences are likely to be prosecuted, if at all, by the accused's home 
State. 
Unfortunately, prosecution at home is also fraught with difficulty. One of the 
paramount problems facing prosecution is that most of the crimes are committed most 
140 See Osiel, supra n. 119. 
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frequently with State consent or acquiescence, the exception being usually when they are 
ordered or tolerated by an organised sub-State entity such as those in the Former 
Yugoslavia. As a result of this, the controls of the prosecution mechanisms in that State 
are often those of the perpetrators of the crimes themselves. This leads, almost without 
exception, to de facto, or de juw impunity. 141 In the Nazi state, even though there was 
understanding that the acts perpetrated amounted to crimes the idea of prosecution was, 
of course, completely alien. When criminality is State policy, the law of the State is a tool 
of that policy, not a check upon it. 
Even when this Dystopia does not reflect reality, prosecution of nationals for serious 
offences is a difficult endeavour, as frequently there is not a majority of voters wishing to 
engage in an honest appraisal of their country's activities. 142 Jordan Paust puts the point 
eloquently: "those of us who are quick to judge sometimes ignore the fact that men are 
both good and bad whether they are of our nationality or that of the enemy". 143 Indeed, 
after 1971, US government legal experts decided not to prosecute any further US 
violations of humanitarian law as the issue was, politically speaking "too hot". 144 The 
introduction by the Rome Statute of a powerful national interest for prosecution "at 
home" for its States party could conceivably help counter this trend. 
AMNESTIES las 
Often, from a mixture of the above concerns, there are very powerful interest groups 
(be they in the government or the military) who are unwilling to countenance 
141 Koffi Annan, in a speech to the Rome Conference (UN Doc. L/Rom/6. rl) expressed the point as follows 
"[g]radually the world has come to realise that relying on each State or army to punish its own transgressors is 
not enough. When crimes are committed on such a scale, we know that the State 
lacks either the power or the 
will to stop them. Too often, indeed, they are part of a systematic State policy, and the worst criminals may 
be 
found at the pinnacle of State power". 
142 M. Osiel, "Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre" (1995) 144 U. Pa. L. R. 463, 
pp. 590-599. C van den Wyngaert, "War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity-Are States Taking 
Their Obligations Seriously? " in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 10,227, p. 228 notes the lack of political will in 
prosecuting nationals. 
143 J, J. Paust, "My Lai and Vietnam Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility" (1972) 57 Military L. R. 99, 
p. 101. 
144 Ibicd p. 125. 
145 For further comments on amnesties, see, the Introduction, pp. 6-7, and N. Roht-Arriaza, Ind In Human 
Rights Law and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 1995). 
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prosecutions. Frequently, their claims are made in the context of attempts to obtain 
amnesties from prosecution, for themselves, or their political (or military) allies. 
Amnesties have been a particular feature of democratic transfers in Latin America, as old 
regimes have either granted themselves amnesties by passing legislation absolving 
themselves of responsibility or by forcing the hand of new regimes into passing legislation 
to this effect, or simply not prosecuting and displaying a quickly developed amnesia. 
Countries that have amnesties include Brazil, Guatemala, and Uruguay, 146 and 
Argentina. 147 
Argentina is an exemplary case as it ran the gamut of problems also seen elsewhere. 
Prior to their removal from power, the military realised their position was weak, so they 
issued a law absolving themselves and the "terrorists" from liability for offences. 148 This 
did not, however, prevent the incoming President, Alfonsin, from campaigning on the 
platform of accountability. When he came to power he did not forget his promises, and 
initiated prosecutions against high ranking members of the jwita. To do this he needed to 
overturn the amnesty law. This was done by the Supreme Court declaring the amnesty 
unconstitutional. 149 Nine military officials, including two ex-presidents, were tried for the 
national equivalents of what would internationally be classified as crimes against 
humanity. After this, a more wide ranging scheme of prosecutions was instituted. The 
military, fearful of further accountability began to stall the prosecutions, this was done by 
the military courts (who had initial jurisdiction over the offences) not taking up cases, 150 
146 K. Ambos, "Impunity and International Criminal Law: A Case Study on Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile 
and Argentina" (1997) 18 H. R. L. J. 1. See also Robertson, supra n. 67, pp. 248-258 who gives a summary of 
various Latin American approaches to past crimes. 
147 See A. Garro & H. Dahl "Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step 
Forward and Two Steps Backward" (1987) 8 H. R. L. J. 283; E. F. Mignon, C. L. Estlund & S. Issacharoff, 
"Dictatorship on Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights Violations in Argentina" (1984) 10 Yale J. I. L. 118. The 
series of events in Argentina is told, from the perspective of a government adviser, in C. S. Nino, Radial Evil 
on Trial (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1996). 
148 Garro & Dahl ibid 
, 
p. 301. 
149 Ibid, p. 305. At p. 306 they admit that it took an "innovative" reading of the constitution to achieve this 
result. Judgment of October 4,1984 C. Fed. Crim Corr. Ist Chamber, LL Feb 19 1985. 
150 They had done this with respect to the first nine also. 
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the military protecting officers who refused to co-operate and then threatening a caip. 151 
This led to the prosecutions being brought to an end. 
These features of the Argentinean move to democracy show some of the problems 
involved in prosecutions of nationals. Very powerful interest groups may be opposed to 
prosecution, and can exert political pressure. When that group includes the army (and, of 
course armies and State apparatuses are in almost unique positions in having the power to 
commit wide-scale international crimes) problems become very serious, as the threat of 
prevention of prosecutions by force, if necessary is a serious one which cannot be 
ignored. When negotiations occur for transfers of power a frequent demand is immunity 
from prosecution. Negotiators often feel that this must be the price to be paid for 
obtaining the removal of a regime that may be responsible for, and may be continuing to, 
commit offences which amount to crimes against humanity. 
There are multifarious policy based arguments both for and against the use of 
amnesties. 152 There are also serious questions over their compatibility with international 
human rights law. 153 The primary argument in their favour is that they may be a necessary 
evil, being an integral part of a transfer of power from an abusive regime to one which (it 
must be hoped) will not commit international crimes. 154 Another is that they allow the 
country to move forward, rather than wallowing in past miseries, picking at the scabs. 155 
151 S. R. Ratner & J. Abrams, Ac rta&lity für Hwnan Rights Atnxiiies in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 1997) 
p. 149. 
152 For surveys, see, for example, S. Cohen, "State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability 
and the Policing of the Past" (1995) 20 L. & Soc. Inquiry 7; M. Minow, Betz Vengemxe and Fo? giit is (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). 
153 See generally, supra pp. 118-120, see also, for example Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, 
UN. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/rev. 1/Add3, para 15, "[a]mnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States 
to investigate such acts, to guarantee prosecution of such offences... States may not deprive individuals of the 
right to an effective remedy including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be possible". Where 
there is a duty to prosecute offences, amnesties must be contrary to those treaty provisions, where there is 
not, an amnesty (with immunity from criminal, not civil law) may be legal. This fact is probably the 
inspiration for the intimation of a duty to prosecute. The HRC was discussing torture, which has a treaty 
based duty to prosecute. 
154 The transfer to a regime that has not committed international crimes since coming to power was the 
situation in South Africa, where democratic elections in 1994 returned the ANC, and were a sophisticated 
form of amnesty provision was brought in. For secondary literature on this see L. Berat & Y. Shain, 
"Retribution or Truth Telling in South Africa: Legacies of the Transitional Period" (1995) 20 L. & Soc. Inquiry 
163. For an account of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission see A. Krog, Ca oitry of my Skull 
(London: Vintage, 1999). For a comparison of prosecutions and truth commissions, with particular reference 
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There are also arguments undermining the over zealous advocacy of amnesties. 156 It 
is all too easy for amnesties to be demanded by perpetrators of atrocities, who are eager 
to invoke the flexible rhetoric of reconciliation (while simultaneously threatening further 
abuses if they do not get their way). '57 The line between amnesty and impunity is thin, at 
best. As Osiel points out the consent to such amnesties is often coerced. 158 Perhaps what 
is required to circumvent this objection is some form of international scrutiny of such 
amnesties. In the long run amnesties are not always determinative, as the Cambodian and 
Chilean situations have shown. 159 It would appear that truth commissions and amnesties 
don't allow people to move on, and victims do not give up their desire for criminal 
prosecution of those responsible for international crimes. 160 Lastly, as international crimes 
are the concern of all, a domestic amnesty does not divest other courts of their universal 
jurisdiction over international crimes, and any attempt of a domestic amnesty provision to 
do so would be an illegal assertion of extraterritorial effect. 161 Only one of the 12 judges 
who sat on the In and 3rd Pincxhet appeals considered the Chilean amnesty as relevant to 
the extradition request by Spain. 162 The utility of amnesties is thus questionable, and there 
to South Africa see R J. Goldstone, "Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and 
International Tribunals" (1996) 28 N. Y. U. J. I. L. & Politics 485. 
155 boa, makes much of the healing power of truth commissions, supra n. 152, pp. 61-85. Reconciliation, 
healing and moving forward are frequent themes in discussion of amnesties, when used with truth 
commissions. Others, such as Y. Tamir, question the psychological assumptions that these rest upon, 
comments extracted in H. Steiner & P. Alston, Hannan Rights in C ite t Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford: OUP, 2nd 
ed. 2000) pp. 1127-1128. Others argue, that amnesties violate a moral duty to the victims, who are left 
struggling, trying to put the past behind them, while their oppressors enjoy a comfortable retirement. 
M. P. Scharf, "Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was there a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes In Haiti? " (1996) 31 Tex. I. L. J. 1, p. 14-15. 
156 For other reflections, see the Introduction, notes 19-20. 
157 For an analysis of concerns on this point, see S. Dwyer, "Reconciliation for Realists" (1999) 13 Ethics &L 
Aff. 81, pp. 82,98. As Aryeh Neier remarks, "Those decreeing amnesties... often manage to be the main 
beneficiaries" A. Neier, War Crones: Brutality, Genaride and the StnCk for Justice (New York: Random House, 
1998), p. 96. 
158 M. Osiel, "Why Prosecute?: Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity" (2000) 22 H. R. Q 118, p. 138 
159 On Cambodia, see, supra, p. 179 In Chile, the Supreme Court has now removed General Pinochet's 
immunity from prosecution. His immunity was part of the deal allowing a democratic transfer. 
160 As Minow, supra n. 152, p. 123 points out, in Argentina, hopes for accountability surged when there was an 
arrest of someone suspected of child abduction in the jcmta, and that one paper responded with the headline 
"God exists". The Mothers of the Disappeared were a public reminder that the yearning for reckoning never 
went away. There have been various legal challenges to amnesties, which display dissatisfaction with them, 
see, for example AZAPO v Tiuth and R&iziliation Cwcnrssion 1996 (4) SA 671. On this case see N. Boister & 
R. Burchill, "The International Legal Definition of the South African Armed Conflict in South African 
Courts: War of National Liberation, Civil War, or War at All? " (1998) 45 N. LL. R. 348. Scharf, supra n. 153, 
pp. 13-14 also questions whether States, rather than the victims themselves have the moral right to bargain 
away other's rights. 
161 T. J Farer, "Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal Law Help? " (2000) 22 H. R. Q 90, p. 115; 
Robinson, supra n. 67, p. 242. 
162 Supra n. 67. 
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are always concerns about the extent to which they are self-interested, or extorted. To the 
extent that there is no duty to prosecute the activities though, they are not necessarily 
Megal. 163 
Amnesties were not relevant for the two IMTs. In both situations there was no 
formal amnesty. What the existence of the IMT's did not do was prevent the later 
amnesties in Germany and Japan, and the early release of many of the defendants 
convicted in the subsequent proceedings. 164 As both of the IMTs prosecuted the top level 
offenders, the issue of amnesty could not arise as it has in national amnesties, where the 
highest level offenders negotiate their immunity from prosecution. In the debates 
preceding the Nuremberg M amnesty was unthinkable, all the options suggested 
involved some form of retributive activity. 165 
Amnesties were suggested as an option in Former Yugoslavia, particularly between 
1993 and 1995, when the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the conflict. Many, although by 
no means all, commentators dealing with the ICTY were dubious about the possibility of 
achieving both peace and justice (as the issue was often rather euphemistically framed). 166 
Shortly before the Dayton negotiations were entered into the political and military leaders 
of the Republika Spnka were indicted, and it is probable that this was the reason they were 
excluded from any peace negotiations. 167 Their exclusion may also have been one of the 
163 J. Dugard, "Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience" (1998) 8 Trxww Tonal L. & 
Contanjx racy Niia s 277, p. 285. 
164 See T. Bower, Blind Eye to Murder (London: Little, Brown & Co. 1995); R. J. Pritchard, "The Gift of 
Clemency Following the British War Crimes Trials in the Far East 1946-8" (1996) 7 Crnn L. F. 15. 
165 See, e. g. A. Kochavi, Prelude to Nurenlag Allied War Cranes Policy and the Quenon of Punislanoit (Durham: 
North Carolina U. P., 1998), passive. Outside the official realm, some thought there should not be a trial, but a 
political disposition, Lord Hankey, Politics, Triads and Ernm (Oxford: Pen-in-Hand, 1950). 
166 For some of this literature see K. A. Hochkammer, "The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: The 
Compatibility of Peace, Politics and International Law" (1994) 28 Vand J. T. L. 119; A. D'Amato, "Peace v 
Accountability in Bosnia" (1994) 88 A. J. I. L. 500 cmira the correspondence in (1994) 88 A. J. I. L. 717,717, & 
(1995) 89 A. J. I. L. 93, see also D'Amato's response, (1995) 89 A. J. I. L. 94 For a particularly controversial 
example, see Anonymous, "Human Rights in Peace Negotiations" (1996) 18 H. R. Q 249. Some countries may 
have felt this way, see Forsythe, supra n. 32, pp. 187-190; for a balanced view see 0. Schuett, "The 
International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the Dayton Peace Agreement: Peace Versus 
Justice? " (1997) 4 I. Peacekeeping 91. In favour of prosecutions, see L. Schmandt, "Peace With Justice: Is It 
Possible for Former Yugoslavia? " (1995) 30 Texas I. L. J. 335; P. Akhavan, "The Yugoslav Tribunal at a 
Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement and Beyond" (1996) 18 H. R. Q 259. 
167 DJ. Scheffer, "International Judicial Intervention" (1996) 102 Fon n Policy 34, p. 44; Akhavan, ibd p. 272. 
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reasons that the Dayton agreement did not contain any provision for amnesty. 168 It is 
possible that informal, personal amnesties were granted to at least some of the 
negotiators, 169 but the option of a formal amnesty seemed to be closed off, if not by the 
creation of the ICTY, then by its indictments. This was repeated in 1999 by the 
indictment of Slobodan Milosevic during the Kosovo campaign, with Prosecutor Arbour 
ensuring that no amnesty be given to the top Yugoslav leadership for their activity in 
Kosovo by indicting there. This would make any amnesty sought appear entirely self- 
interested, and demonstrably undercutting the rhetoric of reconciliation, which is already 
suspect. 170 It would also make it politically more difficult to get an amnesty for a different 
reason. It is considered a larger inroad into the independence of the judicial function to 
stop ongoing procedures than it is to prevent them being brought at all, thus an amnesty 
relating to particular, pre-existing cases is a larger political concession than one arising in 
the abstract, further stacking the deck against the acceptance of amnesties. 
Unsurprisingly, the issue of amnesties did not arise in relation to the ICTR Like the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, the ICTR was created after the close of large-scale 
hostilities by a defeat. The primary candidates for indictment were therefore in no 
position to attempt to bargain away their responsibility. Also, as there is a clear duty to 
prosecute genocide at least territorially or in an international criminal tribunal, an amnesty 
could be challenged on this basis. 
168 Scheffer, ibid p. 42 alleges that an amnesty was never suggested at Dayton, however the Anonymous 
H. KQ article is fiercely critical of ICTY prosecutor Richard Goldstone for suggesting Milosevic was a 
suspect during the Dayton negotiations, as "without a doubt this ran the risk of complicating the task of the 
peace negotiators". Bothe (supra n. 30, p. 586) speculates that the peace negotiations took no longer because of 
the threat of punishment, but this could be for a variety of reasons, including that informally the negotiators 
were promised immunity. 
169 As Forsythe notes "it appears highly likely that Slobodan Milosevic... was at least implicitly promised some 
type of immunity from prosecution in return for his reducing support to the Bosnian Serbs and agreeing to 
the Dayton and Paris Accords", D. Forsythe, "International Criminal Courts: A Political View" (1997) 15 
N. Q H. R 5, p. 11. If he was, his 1999 indictment shows the fragility of such informal deals. Also although no 
public indictment has been proffered against Milosevic the practice of the ICTY to rely on indictments that 
are not made public means that the absence of a public indictment is not indicative of there 
being no 
indictment at all. 
170 Supra n. 157. 
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The Rome Statute is ambiguous on amnesties. This is probably because the issue was 
deliberately not discussed systematically at Rome, partially at the insistence of NGOs. 111 
Arsanjani discloses that on its face, the Statute appears hostile to amnesties. 172 The 
preamble reads "affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished 
.... 
[and that States parties are] 
determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes". 173 There are 
claims that pursuant to Article 17(1)(b) a State could allege that it had investigated a crime 
and come to a decision not to prosecute if, for example an amnesty had been 
accompanied with a truth commission. 174 It could be, that such activity would fall under 
Article 17(2), i. e. that the proceedings were designed to shield the person from the 
jurisdiction of the court, or there is an unjustifiable delay in bringing the person to justice, 
such that the State's intent to bring the person to justice is questionable. 175 Arguments of 
this nature may miss the point, as Article 17 is probably referring to a criminal 
investigation, 176 and not a sweeping historical study of a series of events. For crimes (such 
as genocide) where there is an obligation to prosecute, '77 the court is unlikely to accept an 
amnesty in violation of international law as fulfilling the complementarity provisions. 178 
The prosecutor may have the option of taking an amnesty into account when 
deciding, under Article 53 that there are "substantial reasons to believe that an 
171 M. Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" (1999) 93 A. J. LL. 22, p. 38. G. 
Hafner, K. Boon, A Rübesame & J. Huston, "A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth 
Wedgwood" (1999) 10 E. J. I. L. 108, p. 109 assert that there were discussions on amnesties. If so, they were 
probably not extensive. For criticism of the way which the Rome conference dealt with amnesties, see R. 
Wedgwood, "The International Criminal Court: An American View" (1999) 10 E. J. LL. 93, pp. 95-97. 
172 M. Arsanjani, "The International Criminal court and National Amnesty Laws" (1999) 93 Pm c A. S. LL. 65, 
p. 67. 
173 Rome Statute preambular paragraphs 4-5 see Hafner et al., supra n. 171 pp. 110-111. 
174 D. Sarooshi, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court" (1999) 48 LCL. Q. 387, p. 393. 
175 A. O'Shea, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court" (1999) 116 S. A. L. J. 243, p. 251. 
176 A similar argument, arrived at independently, can be found in M. P Scharf, "The Amnesty Exception to the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court" (1999) 32 O mdI L. L. J. 507, p. 525. 
177 See above, pp. 114-115 and Hafner eraL, supra n. 171, pp. 111-112. 
178 Pursuant to Article 20 (on which see M. McAuliffe de Guzman, "Article 20" in Triffterer, supra n. 31,435), 
the ICC is to apply, in order, the statute, treaties and principles of international law, and "failing that" general 
principles of national law derived by the court from national laws... including, as appropriate, the national 
laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this statute and with international law". As international law is to be applied in a 
hierarchically superior way to general principles of national law (which amnesties are not in any case) the 
Court would be more likely to interpret the Statute in a way antithetical to the acceptance of amnesties. 
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investigation would not serve the interests of justice". 179 As this decision, if one must be 
taken, is one within the ICC, and reviewable by the Court, 180 the decision is not left to a 
single State. 181 Also, as Wedgwood notes as it is out of the provenance of any one State to 
decide, it makes threats of a return to military rule less likely. 182 
There is one way that an amnesty could be effected by States. This is if they could 
persuade the Security Council to pass a positive resolution, every 12 months, under 
Article 16, as part of a peace settlement. It is unlikely that the Security Council could 
obtain a majority with permanent five consensus on such a resolution for an indefinite 
period of time, although it is not impossible. To conclude on amnesties, the Rome 
Statute, although not entirely ruling them out a priori makes the possibility of wide ranging 
amnesties less feasible. 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
It is obvious that for prosecution, a pre-requisite is a functioning judicial system This 
may not be the case. In certain countries there simply is no judicial system, either due to a 
pre-existing absence, or destruction and looting of it by the old regime. 183 This situation is 
particularly acute in developing countries. For example, in Ethiopia, there was really no 
judicial system left to speak of, and there were a large number of defendants, this will 
probably lead to over-reliance on guilty pleas and amnesties, 184 both of which, as policies, 
are problematic. In addition, the Ethiopian authorities are effectively having to start from 
scratch, with inexperienced staff, and chronic underfunding for such a huge undertaking. 
179 On Article 53 see M. Bergsmo & P. Kruger, "Article 53" in Triffterer, supra n. 31,701. Arsanjani, supra 
n. 172, p. 67, Hafner et aL, supra n pp. 112-113, all agree that Article 53 could take amnesties into account. 
180 Under Article 53(3). 
181 Hafner et aL supra n. 171, p. 113. 
182 Wedgwood, supra n. 171, p. 96. 
183 It may also be the case that there is no judiciary which can be trusted, due to its complicity with the old 
regime. In El-Salvador, the UN Truth Commission suggested that trials not be undertaken, partly as the 
judiciary was part of the problem during the repressions, and recommended that the entire Supreme Court 
resign, Report of the UN Commission on Truth for El-Salvador, 15 March 1993, UN Doc. S/255500, 
p. 1177. The Nazi "people's judges" were prosecuted in the Justice Case, (US v Alstötter (1947) 15 A. D. 278) In 
the situation of a complicit judiciary, similar considerations apply as to when there is no judiciary, particularly 
as regards the ICC. 
184 See Ramer & Abrams supra n. 151, pp. 152-3. 
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In Ethiopia judges may be appointed with no formal legal training, and it is clear that the 
judges appointed are inadequately prepared. 185 The consequences of such inexperience 
and underfunding are frequently violations of human rights, in particular by virtue of 
extended holding without charge, as both people and evidence cannot be efficiently dealt 
with. 186 This is in spite of some international help and monitoring. 
These problems have been even more pronounced in Rwanda. In Rwanda the new 
regime was left with not even a skeletal judicial structure, the retreating regime had 
destroyed or removed every possible part of it, right down to office supplies. The 
genocide left no more than a minuscule number of professional lawyers. 187 There was no 
trained prosecutorial authorities or police. Due to this, in addition to the government's 
professed aim of trying those responsible, the military began to prepare case files and 
arrest suspects, despite a lack of constitutional authority. 188 As a result of inexperience, 
urgency and the upheavals in Rwanda, thousands of people have been, and are being held 
in Rwanda, having been arrested and detained with little respect for due process. 189 This 
has led to a huge problem, even though professional prosecutors have taken over, 
progress is slow, and due to the total inadequacy of the holding institutions, at least 2,000 
people have died in custody. 190 
Creating accountability for a tragedy of the magnitude of that which struck Rwanda 
would strain the most modem of judicial systems. In Rwanda, of 147 district courts in 
January 1996 100 were not functioning. More judges were only appointed from May 
1996.191 The situation is improving slowly, but at the same time over 100,000 people are 
185 J. Y. Mayfield, "The Prosecution of War Crimes and Respect for Human Rights: Ethiopia's Balancing Act" 
(1995) 9 Emo yLL. J. 553, p. 590. 
186 Ratner & Abrams supra n. 151, p 154. 
187 C. Ferstman, "Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Example of Rwanda" 
(1997) 9 R. A. D. I. C. 857, p. 859, at p. 870 she claims that at the start of trials, there were only sixteen practising 
lawyers in Rwanda. On the trials generally see M. Drumbl, "Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the 
Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials" (1998) 29 Cthonl is H. R. L. R. 545. 
Iss 
, 
p. 861. 
189 Ibid See also Ratner & Abrams supra n. 151, p. 155. 
190 Ratner & Abrams, ibid Article 14(3)(c) gives the right to trial "without undue delay". 
191 See generally R. Degni-Segui "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda" Report to the 
Commission on Human Rights e/cn. 4/1997/61.20 January 1997, paras 62-70. W. A. Schabas, "Justice, 
Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching or Solutions to Impossible Problems" (1996) 
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being held on remand in appalling conditions. Even the improvements are bringing their 
own problems. Given the urgency of getting the system running, judges who are to 
preside over genocide trials are lay persons, who are only given a four month training 
course. 192 This has led to many problems of due process, as inexperienced judges are 
having to learn the essentials of procedure whilst presiding over trials in which the 
defendants are on trial for their lives. 193 Violations are made much more likely due to the 
almost complete lack of defence lawyers in Rwanda. Trials began in December 1996, the 
Rwandan Bar was only set up in mid 1997, by which time a number of people had been 
sentenced to death. 194 These early trials have been the subject of an adverse Amnesty 
International report, 195 and there have been various violations of international standards. 
These include defendants not having lawyers at trial. 196 This has led to defendants being 
tried while being unaware of their right to call defence witnesses. 197 In addition, even 
where there has been legal representation, there has been insufficient time to prepare a 
defence, as they are only made aware of the particulars of the case against them at most a 
few days before trial. 198 Lastly, there are instances where prosecution witnesses have not 
appeared in person, thus were not subject to examination. 199 
Even the government of Rwanda admits that there has been shortcomings in the 
trials, but claims that improvements are being made. 200 This claim has only partially been 
borne out by recent reports. Improvements are being made, more witnesses are appearing 
7 Crvn L. F. 523,534 notes that no judicial system in existence could deal with the level of offences involved 
in Rwanda in 1994. 
192 Ferstman, supra n. 187, p. 862. 
193 See Degni-Segui, supra n. 191, paras 64-70. Unlike the ICTR, Rwanda has the death penalty for genocide. 
See Organic Law of 08.96. It is important to remember that the imposition of the death sentence following a 
trial which does not conform to the fair trial human rights also amounts to a violation of the right to life, See 
Mb gev Zaire (1983) SelamiDo sions of the H. R. C 76. 
194 See R. Coomaraswaamy, "Report of Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences" Addendum to "Report of the Mission to Rwanda on the Issues of Violence Against Women 
in Situations of Armed Conflict" e/cn. 4/54/add. 1.4. February 1998, para. 6. 
195 Rzwnd Ur fair Trials: Justice Dený (London: Amnesty International, 1997). 
196 In a genocide trial where the death penalty is a likelihood, this violates Art 14 (3)(d) ICCPR. There is only 
a duty to provide a free lawyer when "the interests of justice so require", A capital case is such an instance. 
See e. g. Robvuon v Jamaica HRC No 232/1987. See also M. Nowak (ed. ), CCPR Carrnraaztary (Kehl am Rhein: 
Engel, 1994) p. 260. 
197 Coomaraswaamy, supra n. 194, para 5. 
198 Ferstman, supra n. 187, p. 871-874. This amounts to a violation of Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR. See Nowack 
supra n. 196, p. 256. See also HRC General Comment 13,39 UNGAOR Supp. 40 A/39/40 annex VI. para. 9. 
199 Ni This probably amounts to a violation of Article 14 (3)(e). 
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in person, more time is being given to prepare cases and representation is increasing 
(especially where the NGO Adwxats sans Fromm is able to work). However there are still 
large problems in outlying areas, and sentencing rates still remain high enough to cause 
concern cm trials up to June 1997 70% of defendants were sentenced to death or life 
imprisonment). 201 
As can be seen, creating a justice system quickly may be important, but in fledgling 
systems human rights violations are a serious problem, as the inexperienced system 
struggles to learn how to live up to its own promises when both funding and experience 
are short. Things improve as more trials are completed, but this is at a high cost to those 
who are the guinea pigs of these judicial experimentations. 
The problem of a collapse of a judicial system was one of the factors that made the 
ICTR essential. This shows a way international criminal tribunals can help, by providing a 
forum for trial when prosecutions in &xus delitci are not possible because that State has no 
judiciary. This idea was taken up in the Rome Statute. One of the functions of the ICC is 
to step into the gap left in a national jurisdiction. The ICC's complementarity provision in 
Article 17, provides that one of the circumstances it may take jurisdiction over a case is 
where "due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial 
system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony 
or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings""202 
Neither the ICTR or the ICC alone are complete solutions. The number of offences 
they can prosecute is small, as they have limited judges themselves. So they cannot 
replace an entire national judiciary themselves. 203 Although their prosecutions may also 
spur other States to prosecute offences from the same conflict, in conflicts where there 
are huge numbers of perpetrators efforts must be made to support the re-creation of a 
200 Ibid. p. 870. 
201 See HRFOR "Report of the UNCHR" e/cn. 4/1998/61, HRFOR "Genocide Trials to 20th June 1997" 15 
July 1997. 
202 Article 17(1), as interpreted in Article 17(3). 
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national judiciary in the affected State (which is likely to be the State with the greatest 
interest in prosecution). This has happened in Rwanda, 204 but as the ICC is not yet 
functioning, any suggestion that it could assist in re-creating national judicial structures 
must be speculative. One way it may be likely to have a positive effect is if the Prosecutor 
is able to make timely investigations. Evidence perishes, and the Prosecutor is likely to be 
happy to share it with States with a bow fide wish to prosecute, but who could not obtain 
it in a timely fashion. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Until recently, the level of prosecution of international crimes has been a cruel joke. 
The gap between the rhetoric and practice of States in the field of international criminal 
law has been a chasm. 205 Even States who would seek to prosecute international crimes in 
utmost good faith have been put off by the difficulties involved and concerns based on 
grounds of sovereignty. Where there has been enforcement, its selectivity undermines the 
universal nature of the offences. The early international criminal courts (the two IMTs) 
were as open to criticisms of selectivity as any of the national proceedings, despite their 
universalist cant. The ICTY, for the early years of its mandate (pre-Kosovo), was not 
subject to these critiques, although there have been allegations of selectivity (made in 
good faith and otherwise) on the grounds that NATO actions are not being investigated. 
The ICTR has been criticised on the grounds that it could have been given jurisdiction 
over earlier offences. The primary critique of the nature of the two UN Tribunals, 
203 There is also the possible problem that the Rome Statute, in its co-operation provisions presumes the 
existence of a national legal system capable of compliance. 
204P. H. Sennett & G. P. Noone, "Working With Rwanda Toward the Domestic Prosecution of Genocide 
Crimes" (1997) 12 St-J. J. L. C 425. 
205 See H. von Hebel, The International Criminal Court-A Historical Perspective" in von Hebel et al (eds. ), 
supra n. 36,13, p. 14 "The apparent contradiction between the norms and non observances of these norms 
shows the need for better methods of enforcement". 
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though, is that they were reactive, and limited to single conflicts. Their creation raised 
memories of unprosecuted crimes elsewhere. Despite there being evidence of similar 
policies operating to prevent prosecution at the national and international level, the ICC 
will be the least selective attempt to enforce international criminal law to date and, despite 
its defects (such as Article 16) the promulgation of the Statute could amount to a 
Hegelian moment in the development of the international society/community. 
The international criminal courts that have been brought into existence by States 
have helped overcome some of the practical problems States have had in prosecuting 
international crimes. In addition to those discussed in chapter 3, problems of cost and 
judicial structures in post-atrocity societies have, in particular, been alleviated by 
international criminal courts, or will be (it may be hoped) by the ICC. These may not be 
the most important contributions that have been, or will be, made by international 
criminal courts. The creation of the international criminal tribunals has also operated at a 
deeper level, that of values. 206 As Simma has shown, one of the most certain methods of 
inculcating value is institutionalisation 207 The creation of the first two tribunals (the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs) served to raise the values enshrined in international 
criminal law from nebulous claims to the rank of particular aspirations, if nothing else. 
Although little concrete happened before the end of the Cold War, the activities of the 
Security Council in setting up the ICTY and ICTR provided impetus for the creation of 
the Rome Statute, which both reflects, and contributes to the entrenchment of these 
values, although they have not yet become fully integrated into the international 
community as yet, as the jurisdictional provisions of the Rome Statute show. 
The actions of the courts at the level of value can clearly be seen by the congruity 
between the loafs delictti of offences prosecuted internationally and nationally. Where the 
206 D. McGoldrick, "The Permanent International Court: An End to the Culture of Impunity" [1999] Dim 
L. R. 627, p. 654; A. Bos, "International Criminal Court: Recent Developments" in von Hebel et al (eds. ), ibis 
39, p. 45, "the adoption of the Statute means that as regards the most serious crimes that exist, international 
society has evolved into an international community" 
207 B. Ste, "From Bilateralism to Community interest in International Law" (1994) VI 250 R. dC 217, 
p. 285. 
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former have prosecuted, the latter have followed. Reflecting upon Simma's definition of 
community interests, 208 it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reificiation of the 
values underlying international criminal law prohibitions has begun. The old, sovereigntist 
concerns States have about enforcing international criminal law appear to fall away like 
old cobwebs in the wind when international criminal courts have prosecuted offences 
from a conflict. There are now signs (although no more than signs) that there is a 
spillover effect of these courts, prodding States into overcoming their sovereignty 
scruples for all international crimes. 
This is a giant leap forward for international criminal law, although whether it proves 
long enough to bridge the chasm between rhetoric and practice remains to be seen. There 
are some other positive indications, however. For example, there is an increasing trend 
away from amnesties, not only in terms of acceptability, but also it is now accepted that if 
such things are acceptable at all, the Rome Statute has internationalised their scrutiny to a 
greater degree than was the case. The ICC and its Prosecutor, should it be determined 
that any amnesty is not acceptable, will be able to proceed to act over the amnesty, and 
prosecute malefactors. Although human rights bodies have previously scrutinised 
amnesties, the ICC, if it allows amnesties at all represents the culmination of that process, 
showing that States are not entitled to dispose of liability unilaterally, thus vindicating, 
and reinforcing, the values enshrined in international criminal law. The subjection of 
amnesty to such scrutiny is particularly important, as these are normally attempted by 
regimes who have committed atrocities against their own populations. Thus unlike war 
crimes in international armed conflict, there is no inter-State victimisation. There is no 
room for triumphalism yet though, particularly with the current US hostility to the Rome 
Statute. Nor is this the only problem, even the ICC will not be able to prosecute offences 
on a universal basis without any selectivity. As will be seen in the next two chapters, the 
choices made on crimes for inclusion, and definitions of those crimes, (and principles of 
208 Ibid, p. 233, "a consensus according to which respect for certain fundamental values is not to be left to the 
free disposition of States individually or voter se, but is recognized and sanctioned by international law as of 
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liability) in the Rome Statute serve to render the law applied by the ICC selective when 
compared to customary law. 
concern to all States". 
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CHAPTER 5 SELECTIVITY IN 
THE LAW 1: DEFINITIONS OF 
CRIMES 
INTRODUCTION 
As this thesis concentrates on the enforcement of international criminal law, it is 
necessary to see the extent to which international criminal law has been incorporated 
both into national and international enforcement mechanisms. Charlesworth and Chinkin 
make the observation that "the practical value of international standards depends largely 
on their implementation into domestic legal systems". 1 It in no way devalues this insight 
to make the further comment that similar considerations apply to the international 
criminal courts which have had a disproportionately large role in the past in the 
enforcement of international criminal law. With the coming into being of the Rome 
Statute, which will have an important effect on national incorporation of international 
criminal law, there is a synergy forming between the definitions in the Rome Statute and 
those which are likely to be incorporated into national criminal codes. This chapter will 
evaluate both national and international enforcement mechanisms to evaluate the extent 
to which incorporated rules conform to international law. 
With respect to offences, such as genocide (under universal jurisdiction), crimes 
against humanity and war crimes not amounting to Grave Breaches it is difficult to 
conclude there is a definite, universal duty to prosecute. This is critical. If prosecution is 
discretionary, then although States may prosecute, they do not have to. This is relevant 
I H. Charlesworth & C. Chinkin, The Bosmdvies of Intemational Law: A Fenvnist Analysis (Manchester. MUP, 
2000) p. 113. Lucas Andrews criticises approaches centring on enforcement, arguing that they betray a 
yearning for Austinianism, L. Andews, "Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The International Tribunal 
for the 
Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory" (1997) 11 Emory I. L. R. 471. The answer to this is 
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for definitions of crimes for the following reason. In offences for which there is a duty to 
prosecute, defining a crime more narrowly than international law can lead to a violation 
of international law. This violation may arise as when the incorporated definition of the 
offence is narrower than the international law definition, acts falling under the broader 
definition but not the narrower incorporation will not be criminal at the domestic level. 
Therefore certain acts for which there is a duty to prosecute will either not be prosecuted, 
or the accused obtain an acquittal to which they would not be entitled to under the 
definition provided by international law. The same may not be true of those for which 
prosecution is discretionary, unless the offence bears so little relation to the international 
offence that it cannot be seen as similar enough to the international crime for 
international law to grant universal jurisdiction over the activities criminalised. 2 
This is not the case where broader definitions of existing crimes are adopted, or new 
categories of crimes are created ex post facto. These are liable to fall foul of the principles 
of legality Wolluri crvnen sine lese and Winn poora sine lege. 3 These are contained in all the 
major human rights treaties, and are also likely to be considered general principles of law 
in the sense of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. 4 
that although international law cannot rest on Austinian theory, international lawyers nonetheless do not 
reject the importance of the creation of compliance mechanisms, whatever they may be in the individual case. 
2 Of course, if the State prosecuting for such a crime did not have e. g. nationality or territorial jurisdiction, 
then prosecution would be ultra viva with respect to international law. A State is free to legislate on these 
grounds, the offence would, however, be a national offence only, not one under international law. In addition, 
it is highly likely that such an assumption of jurisdiction over a foreign State's nationals would violate the 
prosecuting States international obligations to the accused nationality state on the treatment of aliens, or 
amount to a violation of the principle of non-intervention. 
3 See 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNIS 177, Article 15; 1951 European 
Convention on Human Rights, 213 LINTS 221, Article 7; 1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, 
PAUTS 36, Article 9; 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights (1982) 211. L. M. 59 Article 7(2). 
4See R. Higgins, "Time and the Law, International Perspectives on an Old Problem" (1997) 46 I. CL. Q 501, 
pp. 507-508; M. C Bassiouni, Cremes Against Hornani y in International Crirrmlal Law (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2nd ed. 1999) chapter 3; S. R. Ratner & J. S. Abrams, Accountability for Hm m Rights Atn ities in 
International Law (Oxford: OUP, 1997) pp. 19-22. As they note, as international law relies on custom, as well as 
treaty law, this issue can be difficult (the relevant human rights treaties all accept that international law 
criminalises certain conduct and these laws are not necessarily treaty based). There are also difficulties of 
interpretation of the prohibition. Some, for example Ireland, seeing it as a strict principle prohibiting any 
retroactive penal measures (G. Ireland, "Ex Post facto From Rome to Tokyo" (1946) 21 Tanple L. Q. 27). 
Ratner & Abrams take a similar approach, stating that not only must the act be prohibited by law, but also the 
law must assign criminal responsibility for violation of that rule, (ibid, p. 21). Others, including the Nuremberg 
IMT see (or saw) is as a defeasible presumption of justice (IMT Judgment, (1947) 41 A. J. I. L. 173, pp. 216-7). 
Others take an interim position, saying that the prohibition is not violated if the act was clearly wrong (see T. 
Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities" (1995) 89 A. J. I. L. 554, p. 566, C. Greenwood, 
"International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 265, p. 281). This was also the position 
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To a certain extent the definitional problems are a result of the traditionally vague and 
incomplete nature of international criminal law. International criminal law norms have 
not traditionally been set down with great precision, thus definitions of at least some 
international crimes are open to interpretation and opinion. This leaves room for 
definitional debates in which national interests are often as important, if not more so, 
than fidelity to the 1aw. 5 
The jurisdictional reach of tribunals also create issues of legitimacy. As Franck notes, 
determinacy is a component of legitimacy, the more determinate a rule is, the greater its 
"compliance pull". 6 As will be seen, the definitions of certain international crimes have 
not traditionally scored highly on this count. Determinacy may not be enough here 
though. As Morris and Scharf note, excessively wide views of the ambit of international 
crimes undermine the legitimacy of that law, given that it is not seen as an impartial 
formulation, but based more on "considerations of political expediency or a result 
oriented approach". 7 A similar issue arises where the definition used is manifestly more 
limited than customary international law. In this instance, the impression given is that the 
definition is created, not as a result of an impartial survey of authority, but as a means to 
an end, i. e. exculpation of those accused. Both over, and under-inclusiveness, in 
definitions can amount to a form of selectivity, because they amount to a choice to render 
certain conduct criminal or not, on the alleged basis of international law, in an 
enforcement mechanism irrespective of whether international law does so. Frequently, as 
will be seen, definitions are broader when States are prosecuting "others" than when the 
definitions will also be jurisdictionally applicable to the authors of the laws also. This is 
of the European Court of Human Rights, in S. Wv UK, Decision of 27 November 1995, ECHR Reports, 
Series A, VoL335-B, and R. Higgins, ibid, p. 508. 
5 This led one commentator to suggest that it would be impossible to get agreement on the definition of any 
crimes, and that it would be "intellectually appealing but completely impractical" to attempt to define the 
crimes in the Rome Statute, as it took the ILC (which he claims is a "non political body") 50 years to reach the 
1996 Draft Code of Crimes. He suggests that the Statute should merely state the categories of crime, and leave 
it to the tribunal to decide their parameters-J. Dugard, "Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal 
Court" (1997) 56 Cnnbi4 L. J. 329, p. 332. As will be seen, this would be even less practicable given that it 
would amount to offering the tribunal a legislative power, a power States have jealously guarded where the law 
may be applied against their nationals. 
6 T. M. Franck, The Pour of LegitimacyAmong Nations (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p. 50. 
7 V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The International Crinnurl Tribunal forRumda (New York Transnational, 1998) p. 127. 
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clearest in international criminal courts. Hence discussion in this chapter and the next will 
centre primarily upon those courts, although it must be borne in mind that with the 
coming into force of the Rome Statute, national criminal laws based on international 
criminal law are likely to be modelled on the Statute. 
INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW INTO 
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
It would be simple if the status of international criminal law in national criminal law 
could be dealt with at the level of theory, namely in relation to the debate surrounding the 
monist/dualist positions. 8 If monism prevailed, questions of States' legislation's 
conformity with international law would not arise. Unfortunately, neither monist or 
dualist theory can adequately explain all the aspects of international law. Monism does not 
adequately explain aspects of international practice (for example the, UK and 
Commonwealth States' insistence on implementing legislation for treaties), 9 or the idea of 
non-self executing treaties. Dualism, on the other hand has been hard pressed to explain 
the practice of a great number of States, who apply customary international law, and 
treaties directly in the municipal sphere, 10 the rise of the EU, 11 and more importantly, the 
8 On this (arguably sterile) debate, see, e. g. H. Kelsen, Aiixiples of International Law (London: Stevens, 2nd ed, 
1967) pp. 553-88.; L. Ferrari-Bravo, "International and Municipal Law: The Complementarity of Legal 
Systems" in R. St. J. Macdonald & D. M. Johnson, Stnictwv and ßtxess of Intemativnal Law (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Njhoff, 1986) 715; A. Wasilkowski, "Monism and Dualism at Present" in J. Makarczyk, (ed. ), Thw»y of 
International Law at t/ Ihre , Jd of the 21st Ceway, (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 323; A. Boye, "The Application 
of the Rules of International Public Law in Municipal Systems" in M. Bedjaoui (ed. ), In icrnal Laur 
Ac/iimn em and ßvsp z (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 289; L. Erades (M. Fitzmaurice & C. 
Flinterman (eds. ), Interactions Betret'n International and Municipal Lam; A Ca nparatire Case Law Study (The Hague: 
T. M. C. Asser Instituut, 1993) pp. 549-945; A. Rubin, Ethics and Autly ity in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 
1997) pp. 83-124,150-162. On this point, Fitzmaurice's platitude that there is no common field of application 
for the two laws, and thus no possibility of conflict (G. Fitzmaurice, "The General Principles of International 
Law Considered From the Standpoint of the Rule of Law" (1957) II 92 R. dC 5, pp. 70-80) cannot apply here. 
The two theories lead to radically different results, in a common field, i. e. criminal liability for the individual, 
in a State without implementing legislation, monism would conclude there is liability which may be enforced 
by national courts, dualism would not. 
9 See Erades, ibrd, pp. 699-841 (a survey of various States' approaches), in particular pp. 840-1 (concluding that 
ex-British colonies almost all consider themselves to require implementing legislation). 
10 ]bid pp565-679 (survey of national jurisdictions) and p. 698 (concluding that almost all countries apply 
customary international law directly) 
11 See Wasilkowski, supra n. 8, pp. 323,328,333-35 
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place of individuals, 12 both as the bearers of rights (for example, in human rights 
legislation), and duties (under international criminal law). 13 A failure to implement 
international obligations domestically when there is a duty to do so in international law is 
a violation of international law. It does not, however, prevent individual liability arising 
under international law. International criminal law, it must be said, has an implicit monist 
bent, as its demands are directed to individuals, and liability arises irrespective of national 
law. The direct effect of international law was upheld by the Nuremberg IMT, 14 and has 
found acceptance in State practice. 15 In any event, as Erades notes, "practice does not 
need direct doctrinal pronouncement in order to exist", 16 and given the differing State 
practices, it is necessary to look at the methods they have used, and their conformity with 
international law. 
There are three ways in which States discharge their obligations to implement 
international criminal law. Some States, such as the UK, Canada, the US, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland, use implementing legislation, creating the offence in national 
law. Others rely on the direct applicability of international law in the national legal 
system, 17 whilst the remainder of those prosecuting merely use analogous national or 
military offences (for example the US in the prosecution of William Calley). 18 Not all 
these methods are necessarily acceptable. 19 When there is a duty to prosecute, national 
implementation of international crimes which are narrower than the definitions given in 
12 Jbid p. 528. 
13 The inability of strict dualism to explain international criminal law that lies at the basis of Rubin's rejection 
of international criminal law, Rubin, supra n. 8 
14 Which proclaimed "individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of 
obedience imposed by the individual state" IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 221. 
15 See for example, the British Manual of Military Law (Part III) (London: HMSO, 1958) para 1. It is 
worthwhile noting that this part of the manual was drafted by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, an unabashed monist. 
16 Supra n. 8, p. 857. 
17 In this respect, Malaysia has done this on at least one occasion, Stanislaw Kmftan v Pubic ßosamtor (1967) 1 
Malaysian L. J. 133. 
18 48 C. M. R. (1973), 22 U. S. C. M. A. 534 (1973). 
19 See A. Marschik, "The Politics of Prosecution: The European National Approach to War Crimes" in 
T. L. H. McCormack & GJ. Simpson (eds. ), 77 Larv of War Crimes (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 
, 
p. 73. For an 
extended discussion of the place of humanitarian law in national law see M. Bothe, T. Kurzidem & P. 
Macalister-Smith National bnplen n of Hwniv rnan Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990). The ICRC 
is of the opinion that "in most cases normal penal legislation... is inadequate to ensure repression of breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions" ICRC 1969 Comments, CE/Com/IV/14. 
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international law is a violation of that duty, as it could lead to acquittals which would not 
be warranted under international law. 
Some States have incorporated the Geneva Conventions in an acceptable fashion, 20 
but the legislation of some countries with respect to the Geneva and Genocide 
Conventions is non-existent or is otherwise unsatisfactory. 21 Indeed it has been said that 
there is an "alarming degree of failure" in legislative implementation of the Geneva 
Conventions. 22 Of those that have incoporated the Geneva Conventions, practice is, in 
the words of Bothe "so far... mediocre". 23 Many countries have not defined the crimes 
adequately or accepted jurisdiction widely enough. For example, the US legislation, was 
issued 40 years late, 24 and fails to embrace the universality principle, although the 
Conventions require it to. 25 
The same could be said for the Genocide Convention. For example by the time of 
the genocide in Rwanda (1994), and despite Rwanda's accession to the convention on 
16th April 1975, it had still not introduced national legislation prohibiting genocide. 26 In 
relation to genocide the US legislation is also insufficient. Whilst its claims of jurisdiction 
are wider than required under the convention (although not beyond was is permitted by 
customary law), 27 the legislation is seriously flawed in relation to the definitonal elements 
of the crime. This is when discussing the (already high) mezs rra requirement for genocide, 
to the formula of the convention "with intent to destroy, in whole, or in part" the US 
legislation adds a "substantial" qualification to "in part". As Paust notes, this creates a 
20 For example the UK Geneva Conventions Act 1957. 
21 Whilst legislation should be used, on at least one occasion, a court has simply applied them irrespective of 
national implementation, see supra n. 17. 
22 K. Drzewicki "National Legislation as a Measure for Implementation of Humanitarian Law" in F. 
Kalshoven & Y. Sandoz bnplanortation of Int ivnal Hwn mitanmz Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 
109 at p. 109. 
23 M. Bothe "National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law" in C. Swinarski (ed. ) Studies and 
Essays on International Hzonarritarian Law in Honowt of Jean Pitta (Geneva: ICRC, 1984), 31, p. 307. 
24 The US ratified the conventions in 1955, the legislation entered into force in 1996. 
25 See M. Zaid, "Remarks (1997) 91 ßnocA. S. I. L. 275. 
26 See C. Ferstman, "Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The example of Rwanda" 
(1997) 9 R. A. D. LC 857, p. 863. 
27 The US legislation provides for territorial and nationality jurisdiction. 18 USC 1091(d). 
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"nearly impossible threshold"28, which will make the possibility of prosecution in the US 
almost negligible. Paust goes as far as to claim that the US legislation "demonstrates that 
national legislative efforts can be quite disingenuous and dangerous". 29 A more obvious 
example of this is the notorious requirement in the French cases on crimes against 
humanity that the actions be undertaken on behalf of a State following a "hegemonic 
ideology". 30 A plausible explanation of the inclusion of this requirement was that it 
excluded (up until the Papon trial), those acting for the Vichy regime per se from liability 
for crimes against humanity. 31 This was a clear example of selectivity by definition. 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
The decisions on the offences included, their definitions, and the general rules of 
liability betray precisely the same policy choices as those relating to the structure and 
powers of international tribunals, and also to those underlying national implementation of 
international crimes. That is to say, when States are creating what Michael Bothe has 
termed a "safe" law enforcement mechanism (one which is unlikely to assert jurisdiction 
over their, or their nationals' activities), 32 a very different view is taken of the law than 
when there is the possibility of the tribunal exercising jurisdiction over those actions. 
Where there is a separation between the authority to create the tribunal, and the 
State(s) over whose nationals jurisdiction is going to be asserted, a far wider view of the 
law is taken, usually to the detriment of the (putative) defendants. The types of offence 
28 J. Paust Intema6bnal Law as Law of the Urmal States (Durham: North Carolina U. P., 1996), p. 294, on 18 USC 
1091(a) and 1093 (a). 
29 J. Paust "Threats to Accountability after Nuremberg: Crimes Against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and 
National Fora" (1995) 12 N. YL. S. J. H. R. 555, p. 562. See also, L 
. 
J. le Blanc, "The Intent to Destroy Groups in 
tue Genocide Convention: The Proposed US Understanding" (1984) 78 A. J. I. L. 369, p. 378, who describes 
the political "pettiness" of the debates in the US Senate relating to the ratification of the Genocide 
Convention but supports the US interpretation; B. Bryant & RE Jones, "The United States and the 
Genocide Convention" (1975) 16 Haranvi I. L. J. 683, who consider the proposed (at the time) interpretation 
as incorrect. 
30 See supra pp. 149-150. 
31 J 
32 M. Bothe, "International Humanitarian Law and War Crimes Tribunals: Recent Developments and 
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included, and their definitions are broadened, defences are limited. Either that, or all the 
law is merely left vague or unstated, and it is left for the court to determine what the 
international law on the subject is. The converse seems to be the case whenever there is 
the possibility of the court exercising its jurisdiction over its creators. 33 In addition, 
definitional precision is insisted upon, as although States may be content to allow a court 
to determine the law for other States, they are unwilling to concede to the court a power 
to make law binding themselves. 34 It must be remembered that the possibility of leaving 
definitions to the court was omitted from the ILC Draft Statute for precisely the reason 
that doing so would amount to giving the court a quasi-legislative ro1e. 35 
To achieve full comprehension of the approaches taken by States, it is necessary to 
understand their influences on the creation of the tribunals. For this, it is necessary to 
look at the drafting histories of the Statutes, differentiating a "safe" enforcement 
mechanism, from an "unsafe" one. 
DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE STATUTES 
SEPARATION BETWEEN DEFINING AUTHORITY AND POSSIBLE SUBJECTS 
This separation of authority was exceptionally clear in the post-War tribunals (the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs). In both courts, there was complete separation between 
those drafting the law and creating the tribunal, and its subjects. The Nuremberg Charter 
was drafted in the London Conference, which consisted of representatives of the big four 
Perspectives" in K. Wellens (ed. ) Intimnational Laux. ih »y and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) 581, p. 593. 
33 As Blakesley notes, the more crimes added to a court's competence, the greater the inroad into the 
sovereignty of the States subject to the reach of the court. C. Blakesley, "Obstacles to the Creation of an 
International Criminal Court" (1994) 18 FI. F. WldAff. 77, p. 77. The same can be said for wider definitions of 
existing categories of crime. A ready example is the expansion of international humanitarian law, which 
traditionally only applied between States in international conflicts, to regulation of a State's treatment of its 
own population in civil war. It is clear that in the gradual redefinition of the laws of war to include certain acts 
perpetrated in civil war, States have had their sovereignty limited. 
34 It is also noteworthy that detailed definitions are difficult to draft by consensus, and present huge 
opportunities for filibustering. 
35 See J. Crawford, "The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court" (1995) 89 A. J. I. L. 404, 
p. 411. 
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powers. 36 The possibility of having a German or neutral jurist at the conference was never 
even considered. In addition to this, due to the comprehensive defeat of Germany in the 
War, and the absence of any German government which could object to their 
formulations of international law, the representatives were free to pursue their objective 
of ensuring "the conviction and punishment for the Nazi defendants". 37 How much this 
dominance of the victors impacted itself on the law will thus be examined in the chapter. 
At this point it is worth mentioning the comments made by David Maxwell-Fyfe, 38 and 
those of Robert Jackson. Jackson criticised a Soviet proposal as "it seems to me to leave 
the tribunal in the position where it could be argued, and the tribunal might very 
reasonably say, that no personal responsibility resulted if we failed to say it when we are 
making an agreement between the four powers which fulfils in a sense the function of 
legislation. I think there is greater authority in us to declare principles as we see them now 
than there would be in a court to use new principles that we failed to declare in an 
organic act setting up the court". 39 
Although the details of the drafting of the Charter of the Tokyo IMT are far less 
available than for the Nuremberg Charter (nothing similar to the Jackson Report 
describes the birth of the Tokyo Charter), 40 certain points may be raised. The US Chief 
prosecutor, without consultation with the other Allies, never nand any neutral or 
Japanese representatives, drafted the Charter himself. 41 Also, the Charter, in relation to 
the law applied was very similar to the London Charter for the Nuremberg IMT, 42 so in 
36 See A. Kochavi, Prolude to Nurenk-T. Allid War Crones Policy and the Qua-tion of PunU rent (Durham North 
Carolina: Carolina U. P., 1998) pp. 222,226. 
37 M. Lippman, "Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later" (1991) 7 Com J. I. L. 1, p. 37. See also Bassiouni, 
supra n. 4, p. 16 ("The facts were to drive the law.. it was designed to produce a pre-ordained result"; Blakesley, 
supra n. 33, p. 80; B. F. Smith, ReachingJudgn it at Nuren1 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1977) p. 62. 
38 "I want to make clear in this document what are the things for which the Tribunal can punish the 
defendants. I don't want it left to the Tribunal to interpret what are the principles of international law that it 
should apply... it should not be left to the Tribunal to say what is or what is not a violation of international 
law... What we want to abolish at the trial is a discussion as to whether the acts are violations of international 
law or not. We declare what international law is.... " R. Jackson, Report of Rolert H Jackson: US Reprice to 
the lnxemakonal C, onferoxe on Military Trials (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1945) pp. 328-9,399. 
39 Ibid p. 311. 
40 The Jackson Report transcribed the details of the London Conference. 
41 S. Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial", (1950) 465 International Conciliation 478, p. 480. 
42 C. Hosoya, "Preface" in C. Hosoya, Y. Onuma, N. Ando &R Minear, (eds. ), The Tokyo TriaL" An 
Inwmatioa Sr Osiwn (Tokyo, Kodanasha, 1986) 1, p. 9. 
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many ways, similar policies and attitudes can be presumed to have been at work. As was 
the case in the London Conference, the law was drafted by the winning side in the war, 
for application to the opposing side in that war, who had little chance to complain about 
its nature. Together these two IMTs represent a pair. 
The drafting process for the ICTY Statute was partially different. The decision to 
create the ICTY was taken by the Security Council, which was not a party to the Yugoslav 
conflict, 43 nor (at the time) were any of its members. The decision to create the ICTY was 
formalised in Resolution 808 which asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
prepare a report on the creation of a tribunal, and to write its Statute. This is quite 
remarkable in some respects. The power to make the final decision on what was in the 
Statute was passed by the Security Council (and the States comprising it), to an entirely 
non-State based entity, the Office of the Secretary General, cm practice the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs (OLA)). 44 Bassiouni gives two reasons for this, first, that the members of 
the Security Council realised that they would have problems drafting it themselves. 
Secondly, they knew the OLA would be drafting it, so some States knew that they could 
influence the contents of the Statute, albeit confidentially. 45 The former is almost 
undoubtedly correct, the latter is open to question, given that the reports given by the 
States were public, and suggestions in their reports were clearly not all taken up 46 Of 
course, in an organ like the Security Council the possibilities of influence cannot be ruled 
out. That said, the Secretary-General was given an unprecedented power to determine the 
structure of the tribunal, and the body of law which it was to apply. Of course, even 
a3 That is not to say the Security Council had been silent on the Yugoslav conflict. 
44 See M. C. Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Crvninal Trihnal für Yugaslavia (N. Y: 
Transnational, 1996) pp. 221-225; D. Schraga & R. Zacklin, "The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia" (1994) 5 E. J. I. L. 360, pp. 361-262. The decisions of the Secretary-General on the law were, so long 
as they were not clearly capricious, final. This was because the report was intended to be passed without 
change, as the members of the Security Council knew that to open the Statute up to amendment would 
effectively open a Pandora's Box of possible amendments, and would ensure the non passage of the Statute (Bassiouni & Manikas, did, pp-225). 
as I p. 221. 
46 Reports, including suggestions for Statutes were given by France (UN Doc. S/25266), Italy (UN Doc. 
S/25300), the Islamic Conference (UN Doc. S/25512), the Russian Federation (UN Doc. S/25536), Canada 
(UN Doc. S/25594), the Netherlands (UN Doc. S/25716) and the US (UN Doc. S/25575). Most notable 
suggestion in a State report, which was not taken up in the Statute, was the US proposal that the Statute 
determine the conflict to be international. (S/25575. Article 10(a)). 
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though the Security Council was likely to adopt the fruits of the Secretary General's (and 
OLA's) labours, if the report went far beyond what was acceptable, it would not have 
been adopted. Either certain members of the Security Council or the UN generally would 
have (in the former case) either refused to pass the report, or (in the latter) actively 
opposed the ICTY (and sealed its fate by opposing its funding). 47 This limitation, along 
with the commitment of the UN to human rights, 48 perhaps led the Secretary-General to 
assert that "the application of the principle md/ion crane sine lege requires that the 
international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are 
beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence to some but 
not all States to specific conventions does not arise". 49 
UNITY OF DEFINING AUTHORITY AND POSSIBLE SUBJECTS 
Although the Rwanda Statute was created by the same body as the ICTY (the 
Security Council), the way in which the Statute was drafted was very different. Here the 
Statute was drafted by the US and New Zealand, with input from Rwanda, who, at the 
time, was a member of the Security Council. s° This is an exceptionally important factor, 
as not only did parts of the membership of the Security Council retain, in themselves, the 
right to draft the Statute, but also, the State who was to be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court was in a position to not only object to any particular formulation of the law, but 
47 It is perhaps an interesting aside to note that whilst it is now unlikely that the strenuous opposition of a 
small minority of UN members could seriously endanger the existence of the ICTY, at the time this possibility 
was substantially greater. In itself, this is strong evidence of how the continued existence of the ICTY has 
altered the perception of such bodies, and how this has led to the onus arguably now being on those to prove 
the case against such bodies, rather than (as seemed to be the case at the time of the creation of the ICIY) on 
those who sought to create them. 
48 See UN Charter Articles 1(1) & 55. 
49 Report supra n. 46, para 34. With respect, the comment of the Secretary-General here betrays certain elisions 
and misconceptions. He conflates the nu11on rrnnen principle with the adherence of all States to conventions, 
customary international law is more complex than that (see e. g. M. E. Villiger, Ctatcrna y International Law and 
Timms (The Hague: Kluwer, 2nd ed. 1997). In addition, he ignores the fact that the SFRY (and thus all its 
successors) were parties to all the relevant humanitarian law conventions (the four Geneva Conventions and 
both Additional Protocols). 
so See R. S. Lee, "The Rwanda Tribunal" (1996) 9 L. J. I. L. 37, p. 9; D. Schraga & R. Zacklin, "The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" (1996) 7 E. J. I. L. 501, p. 504. One point to note is that the Secretary-General's 
initial report on the ICTR (Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 UN Doc. 
S/1995/134) is not, like his report on the ICTY, the reflections of the drafter of the Statute, but merely his (or 
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also to attempt to influence the formulation itself. 51 As Rwanda was a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council, of course, it could not veto the creation of the ICTR, 
although it did vote against it. 52 Still, here we see the first example of the creation of an 
international criminal court where there was not a total separation between the authority 
creating the tribunal and the State (or nationals thereof) which was to be subject of the 
Tribunal. 
The most prominent example of unity between the authority to define the law and its 
possible subjects is the Rome Statute. Here, for the first time the Statute was not reactive, 
and all States' nationals at the Rome conference were, at least theoretically, potential 
defendants before the court. The negotiations themselves were particularly difficult, and 
in the end, the Bureau had to create a package deal on which States voted. 53 Due to this 
unity of authority, Robinson asserted that "given the interest of participating States in 
knowing the precise contours of the corresponding obligations... [definitions of crimes 
could be expected to be more detailed and]... one might expect the definition[s] to be 
more restrictive than previous definitions". 54 This would certainly seem to correspond 
with the opinions of certain delegations, at least some of whom agreed with the US 
spokesman who asserted: "[t]his court should not... be in the business of deciding even 
what is a crime. This is not the place for progressive development of the law into 
uncertain areas, or for the elaboration of new and uncertain international criminal law. 
the OLA's) opinion. Unlike the Secretary-General's report on the ICTY Statute, therefore, it cannot fulfil an 
analogous role to trauzux pi arazoirec of a treaty. 
51 Schraga & Zacklin, ibid p. 504, note that more than the ICTY Statute, the ICTR represented a negotiated 
outcome. It is instructive to note that one of the reasons Rwanda voted against the Resolution creating the 
ICTR (SC Resolution 955) was that it included crimes they did not wish to be included in the Statute. See 
S/PV. 3453, pp. 15. 
52 4 
53 See P. Kirsch & J. T. Holmes, "The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating 
Process" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 2, passim, particularly pp. 5-9. The fact that the US requested the vote creates an 
interesting parallel with the passage of Resolution 827, which was also considered imperfect by the US. 
Resolution 827 was supported very vociferously by the US, who did not wish to reopen the package, 
preferring to have the court set up. In Rome the US complained that the proposals they made to alter the 
package deal (which they knew was a take-it-or-leave-it deal) were not discussed and they were not at the 
centre of all the drafting of the Statute. See D. Scheffer, "The United States and the International Criminal 
Court" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 12, p20. 
54 D. Robinson, "Defining Crimes Against Humanity at the Rome Conference" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 43, p. 43. 
See also R. Higgins, "International Law in a Changing International System" (1999) 58 Cambridge L. J. 78, p. 88 
who agrees that the ICC will be subject to more political control on the definitions of crimes than the UN 
Tribunals. 
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The court must concern itself with those atrocities which are universally recognized as 
wrongful and condemned. "55 The extent to which these underlying facts have manifested 
themselves in the choices of crimes, and their definitions of those crimes is the subject of 
the remainder of this chapter. 
THE CRIMES 
AGGRESSION 
The first appearance of the crime of aggression was in the Statutes of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo IMTs. The formulation was basically the same. Article 6(a) of the London 
Charter criminalised the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishing of any of the foregoing. "56 This 
provision has caused a great deal of controversy, 57 so it is necessary to see the extent to 
which the crime had a basis in existing international law. 
55 Representative of the US to the General Assembly 23 October 1997 (Agenda Item 150), cited in N. Boister 
"The Exclusion of Treaty Crimes from the jurisdiction of the Proposed International Criminal Court" (1998) 
3 J. A. C. L 27, p. 28. Boister, ibid reports that the EC and others agreed with these sentiments. It is interesting 
to compare these comments with those of justice Jackson at the London Conference, supra n. 38. 
56 1945 London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, 82 UNTS 279. Article 5(a) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 2 Bevans 
20 is essentially the same. 
57 See, for example, M. C. Bassiouni & B. B. Ferencz, "The Crime Against Peace" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. )
Intemativnal Crvninal Law VoLL" Cri? w (New York: Transnational, 2nd ed., 1999) 313; B. B. Ferencz, "The Crime 
of Aggression" in G. G. McDonald & O. Swaak-Goldman (eds. ), Substur hx and Proarhnal Aspens of Intema&nal 
Criminal Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000) 33; S. Glueck, The Nuren1t g Trial and Aggressive War (N. Y: Knopf, 
1946) (in this he recanted his earlier rejection of the charge, and claimed that initiating an aggressive war was a 
customary crime prior to 1945); Q. Wright, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial" (1947) 41 A. J. LL. 38, p. 63; H. 
Lauterpacht (ed. ), C pp lx n's Intemational Law Vol II The Law of War (London: Longmans, 7th ed. 1952) p. 579; 
B. V. A. Röling, "Crimes Against Peace" in A. Cassese, (ed. ) The Cunt t Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986) 385; I. I. Lukashuk & J. F. Murphy "Crimes Against Peace" in G. 
Ginsburgs & V. I. Kudriavstev (eds. ), The NunrAig Trial irc International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1990) 121, (the above supporting the legality of the aggressive war charge). H. Ehard, "The Nuremberg Trial 
Against the Major War Criminals and International Law" (1949) 43 A. J. I. L. 223, pp. 236-239; H. Kelsen, "Wil 
the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law? " (1947) 1 I. L. Q. 153, 
p. 155-158; R. Minear, Vutor's Justice The Tokyo War Cri'n Trial (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1971) pp. 47-55.; G. 
Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applid by Intematizd Court and Tnhho ds: Vol II, The Law of Annas Conflux 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1968) pp. 485-494; S. Glueck, War &iwinals, their Prosaion and Pwnislvnerrt (New 
York: Knopf, 1944) pp. 37-38; R. K. Woetzel, The Nuronlvg Trials and International Law (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1962) pp. 163-171 L. Gross, "The Criminality of Aggressive War" (1947) 41 A. P. S. R. 205 (Claiming the 
charge not to be justified by the previous law). 
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In antiquity, there were precedents for trial of persons for waging aggressive wars. 
The first of these was in 1268, of Conradin von Hofenstafen. 58 Like the trial of Peter von 
Hagenbach, 59 this trial preceded the evolution of modern international law, so its 
precedential value is dubious. Similarly the US ( iriucvc of the Attorney Generalbi, s of little 
help. It related to the actions of private individuals. 61 The delegates at London never cited 
them as precedent to justify their decision to include the charge, and it is unlikely they 
were even aware of them. At that time, and certainly by the end of the 19th Century, a 
State's right to go to war was considered to be an attribute of sovereignty, and not 
regulated, other than procedurally, by international law. 62 The question of whether the 
initiation of an aggressive war was criminal was raised by the 1919 Commission, who 
answered the question in the negative. 63 It is instructive that the Treaty of Versailles 
limited itself to demanding the Kaiser be "publicly arraigned for a supreme offence 
against international morality", 64 not an offence against international criminal law. 
After the First World War, certain international documents did refer to aggressive 
war as an international crime. The first of these was the League of Nations sponsored 
1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which, in Article 1 proclaimed that aggressive 
war was an international crime. 65 It was never ratified. A year later the criminality of 
aggressive war was reasserted in the League Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes. 66 Again this remained unratified. In 1927, the League of Nations 
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution proclaiming that aggressive war was a 
58 See M. C. Bassiouni, "International Law and The Holocaust" (1979) 9 Cal W. I. L. J. 202, p. 206. Other 
examples are cited by Wright, ibid. p. 62. 
59 See p. 22. 
60 Opinion of 26 January 1797 (reprinted in J. Paust, M. C. Bassiouni, S. Williams, M. P. Scharf, J. Gurule & B. 
Zagaris, International Crbnirral Law. Cases and Materials (Durham, N. C.: Carolina U. P., 1996), p. 199. 
61 Liability for aggression has always been limited to high level governmental officials, see Y. Dinstein, "The 
Distinctions Between War Crimes and Crimes Against Peace" in Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory (eds. ), War Ciinz 
in International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) 1, pp. 5-6. 
62 See W. E. Hall, International Law (Oxford: OUP, 8th ed., 1924) p. 82; Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Sell- 
Ifoxe (Cambidge: Grotius, 2nd ed., 1994) pp. 69-80. 
63 Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement (1919), 
Reprinted in Morris & Scharf, supra n. 7, (Vol. 2) 419, pp. 439-440. 
64 Versailles Treaty of Peace, 28 June 1919,225 Consolidated T. S. 188, Article 227. 
65 Cited in IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 219. 
66 Ib. 
217 
crime. 67 This sentiment was repeated in a resolution of the Pan American Conference on 
18 February 1928.68 The cumulative effect of these draft treaties is controversial: Glueck, 
for example considers that from these documents "one may reasonably conclude that the 
time had arrived in the life of civilised nations when an international custom has 
developed to hold aggressive war to be an international crime". 69 Glueck's view has also 
been criticised by others, 7° and it seems unlikely that two draft conventions without a 
ratification between them, and two non-binding resolutions of non-universal international 
bodies, could be considered sufficient authority to ground an international crime in 
positive international law. It is interesting that the Nuremberg IMT did not actually assert 
that this was the case, instead limiting itself to saying they evidenced "the prohibition of 
aggressive war demanded by the conscience of the world", 71 and using them to interpret 
the only inter-war convention which really had a bearing on the matter. 
This was the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact). 72 Artide 1 of the Pact stated 
that the parties (of which there were 63)73 condemned recourse to war and renounced it 
as an instrument of national policy. It did not provide for individual criminal 
responsibility. The effect of this Treaty is subject to dispute. Judge Pal in the Tokyo 
IMT, claimed that it was not a legal instrument in the usual sense of the word, merely a 
pious expression of hope. 74 There were large numbers of reservations to the treaty, 
asserting a right of autointerpretative self-defence, which could deprive the prohibition in 
67 Ibid, 219-220. 
68 IM, p. 220. 
69 Glueck (Aggressire War), supra n. 57, p. 26. Kudriavtsev, (V. N. Kudriavstev, "The Nuremberg Trial and the 
Problem of Strengthening the International Legal Order" in Ginsburgs & Kudriavstev, supra n. 57,1, p. 2) 
perhaps goes the furthest of any scholar, asserting that these were only declaratory, and initiating an aggressive 
war was a crime in customary international law by the 1920s. The only other similar assertion was that of Lord 
Phillimore in the ICJ, which was not taken up by that body. (Lord Phillimore, "An International Criminal 
Court and the Resolutions of the Committee of Jurists" (1922-23) 7 B. YB. LL. 79, pp. 81-82). 
70 See, for example, W. Bosch, Judgwvrt On Nunmbag: American Attrt, dds Tom& the Major Gennv-z War Crim 
Triads (Durham, N. C: North Carolina U. P, 1970) p. 58.; Dissenting Opinion of the Member for India, Judge 
Pal, in Rj Pritchard & S. M. Zaide, The Tokyo War Cron Trial VoL 21: Separate Opinions (New York: Garland, 
198 1) pp. 70-76; Opinion of Judge Röling, ibid, pp. 14-26. 
71 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 220. The "conscience of the world" could not be assimilated to 
State based opmio juris. 
72 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, (1929) UKTS 29 
Cmnd. 3410. 
73 See M. Bowman &Dj. Harris, Multilateral Tr ies, Index and Cw7m Status (Nottingham: University of 
Nottingham Treaty Centre) & 11th supplement, Treaty 115. There are now 67 parties. 
74 Pal, supra n. 70, p. 90-102. 
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the Pact of some of its usefulness, but the prohibition was not considered wholly 
inchoate by its parties. 75 The problematic aspect of basing the international c7vnirrality of 
aggressive war on the Pact is that it does not expressly provide for it. The normal 
consequence of treaty violation is the violating State coming under a duty to make 
reparation 76 On the other hand, the silence of a treaty relating to individual responsibility 
does not determine whether or not the treaty concerned creates a crime. 77 The issue is 
one of intent of the parties. 78 Here the resolutions may be relevant. The problem with this 
line of argument is, as Glueck has noted "the great majority of expressions of 
contemporary public opinion... were far from regarding it as an international penal 
Statute". 79 The possibility of individual liability did not appear in the 1934 ILA 
Interpretative Articles for the Pact. 8° Furthermore it is highly questionable that the US, 
particularly in her isolationist period would have suggested or signed a treaty which could 
have led to individual liability8I There was no subsequent practice confirming individual 
liability and it is telling that Stimson said that the condemnation for violations of the pact 
was that the States (not individuals) were "law breakers", he did not refer to them as 
criminals. 82 
Perhaps the best evidence for the effect of the Pact is the position of the Allies 
during the war. During the war the crime was not under the mandate of the UNWCC, 
and it appears that "only one year before the London Conference three of the big four 
75 Support for the legal nature of the obligation may be taken from a statement of US Secretary of State H. 
Stimson in 1932, where he noted that due to the Pact, when nations go to war, at least one of them should be 
"denounce[d]... as law breakers" (cited in Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 218). 
76 C(xz'zow Factory Case 1 W. C. R. 646, pp. 664,667-8. 
n This is the case for the Hague Convention IV which does not contain a provision on individual liability, but 
violations of it generally considered to entail individual liability. That said, the laws of war have traditionally 
entailed individual liability, (see Smith, supra n. 37, p. 156). Thus the implication that the Hague convention also 
does so is not so difficult to make as for the Pact of Paris, which effectively extended the law in a novel way. 
78 Woetzel, supra n. 57, p. 166. 
79 Glueck, War Crnnrrrals, supra n. 57, p. 19. 
80 ILA-Report of the 38th Conference (Budapest, 1934) pp. 1-78, especially pp. 66-68. See P. Calvocoressi, 
Nu the Facts, the Law and the Consayaues (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946) p. 36. 
81 Lippman, supra n. 37, p. 44.70 years on its position on aggression (so far as it could relate to itself, rather than 
anyone else), was unchanged, see Ferencz, supra n. 57, p. 61. 
82 Stimson's statement is taken from the Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 218. Stimson later effectively 
admitted that the charge was new, defending it on the ground that it had "not been established 
in international 
law at the expense of any innocent lives" (H. Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law" (1947) 25 
Foreign Aff. 179, p. 188). 
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had gone on record that aggressive war was not in itself a crime. " 83 At the London 
Conference both the USSR and France were shocked by the suggestion of the inclusion 
of a charge of aggressive war, not considering it to be based on international law at all. 84 
The British were also dubious about the international law grounding of any such charge. 85 
This did not stop them signing the crime into being for the Nuremberg DvIT (and 
accepting it in Tokyo). At both the Nuremberg and Tokyo IlVITs the defence challenged 
the legality of the aggressive war charge. The Nuremberg IMT (with whom the Tokyo 
IMT majority concurred) could be seen to be a little uncomfortable with the inclusion of 
aggressive war as an international crime, the Nuremberg IMT's discussion of the ndLum 
crnnen sine 4 principle occurs in the section of the judgment relating to crimes against 
peace (aggression). Despite asserting that the London Charter was "decisive and 
binding"86 the Nuremberg IMT went out of its way to attempt to prove that the Charter 
was in accordance with international law. Their attempts to prove this relied on the 
resolutions cited above to show that with the Pact of Paris "the solemn renunciation of 
war... necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law, 
and those who plan and wage such a war... are committing a crime in so doing. ". 87 The 
view that violations of the Pact entailed criminal responsibility is rejected above. The 
Tokyo IMT judgments are interesting on this point, as the two dissenting judges asserted 
that the charge was not part of international law88 and one of the concurring judges 
preferred to base the offence on natural law 89 In all it is clear that this charge could only 
be accepted on the basis of an exceptionally broad view of the sources of international 
law and was, in reality, created ex post facto. 
83 Minear, supra n. 57, p. 50. These were the UK, France & the US. Various internal US memoranda (including 
one written by Francis Biddle, later the US judge at the Nuremberg IM1) adopted the position that aggressive 
war was not a crime. See Lukashuk & Murphy, supra n. 57, p. 141. 
84 Jackson report, supra n. 38, pp. 65-67,295,327,335. 
85 See Minear, supra n. 57, p48. 
86 Nuremberg IM T Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 216. 
87 Ibid, p. 218. 
88 Judge Pal, believing that it was not supportable, rejected the charge outright, Pal, supra n. 70, pp. 1,226. Judge 
Röling, although he did not consider it to be legally supportable as a charge claimed that there was a right to 
incarcerate peace breakers, thus it was an acceptable political action, B. V. A. Röling & A. Cassese, The Tok)o 
Trial and Be pd (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) p. 67. 
89 Bernard, supra n. 70, p. 10. 
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Given that the category of crimes against peace was not established by the time of 
the two IMTs, there is no point examining whether the definitions given comport with 
existing international law. Suffice to say that the formulation given to them was very 
vague, and open to "interested interpretation". 90 Only a small amount of help in 
determining the parameters of the offence are derivable from the judgments of the 
tribunals, 91 leaving the crime a vague one, with all the issues of legitimacy that entailed. 
After the two IMTs, the position in relation to aggression remained controversial. 
After the Nuremberg IMT the General Assembly promulgated Resolution 95, which 
"[a]ffirms the principles of international law Recognised by the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal". 92 There was some debate at the time about 
whether this amounted to an acceptance that the Nuremberg law was now customary. 93 It 
is almost universally accepted now that most of the London Charter represents customary 
international law, 94and it is difficult now to find a scholar or State who denies the 
customary nature of the Nuremberg Charter. 95 If any clarification on the Nuremberg 
IMT's Charter were required, both the Secretary-General and the ICTY have asserted the 
90 Pal, supra n. 70 p. 233. See L. Varadarajan, "From Tokyo to the Hague: A Reasessment of Radabinodh Pal's 
Dissenting Opinion at the Tokyo Trials on its Golden Jubilee" (1998) 38 Indimz J. I. L. 233 p. 236; L Kopelman, 
"Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial" (1991) 23 
N. Y. U. J. I. L. & Politics 373, pp. 378,431. 
91 See Lippman, supra n. 37, p. 31. 
92 G. A. Resolution 95 (I), UN Doc. A/64/Add. 1. 
93 H. Ehard said Resolution 95 was only a suggestion de lege f nda, supra n. 57, p. 242. It is difficult to square 
this with the language of Resolution 95. 
94 See M. Lippman, supra n. 37, p. 48; MC Bassiouni, "The Nuremberg Legacy" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ) 
International Crbnnal Law Vol III. 
" 
Enforrone2t (New York Transnational, 2nd ed. 1999) 195, p. 207; I. Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Forte (Oxford: OUP, 1963) pp. 191,193, cites the large number of official 
statements and items of correspondence accepting this. To these of course, we must add all those who 
considered the London Charter to be declaratory of customary international law prior to the Nuremberg Trial. 
In 1963 the Lord Chancellor in the UK told Parliament that the UK believed the Nuremberg Principles "are 
generally accepted among States and have the status of customary international law" 253 Hansard HL, col. 831 
12 December 1963. For other cases at least implicitly accepting the customary nature of the London Charter, 
Federation Natiormle des Dieportes et Internes Resistmtts et Patriots v Barbie (1984) 78 I. L. R. 125, p. 131-133; Public 
PmseaaorvMentaz (1997) 79 I. L. R. 331, p. 344 (which uses the Charter as precedent); Gaeser (1976) 74 I. L. R. 
700, p. 702-703; Public 1%s«utorvLeopo(dL (1967) 47 I. L. R. 464; US. vMitddl386 US 972, pp. 973-974; Kadr 
vKaradzic (1994) 100 I. L. R. 136, p. 154; In re Extradition ofDon injuk 612 F. Supp. 544,555. 
95 Two of those who could be considered possible rejectionists in this regard are Schwarzenberger (and then 
only in 1968), supra n. 57, p. 498-499, and A. P. Rubin, Ethics and Aut ority in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 
1997) pp. xiii-xiv. Both of these though, are wider in their critique, denying that international criminal law 
actually exists, see Schwarzenberger, "The Problem of an International Criminal Law" (1950) 3 C. L. P. 262; 
Rubin ibid. pp. xiv-xv. Another very notable possible "rejectionist" was H. Kelsen, "Will the Judgement in the 
Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law? " (1947) 1 LL. Q. 153. His views, coming so 
soon after the trial appear premature, and since have been shown to be so. 
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customary nature of the Nuremberg Charter-96 Additional support in relation to 
aggression may be derived from General Assembly Resolution 3314, which reaffirmed 
individual criminal responsibility for initiating wars of aggression. 97 
Nevertheless, neither the ICTY or ICTR Statutes contained a provision granting 
them jurisdiction over aggression. This is understandable for the ICTR, given that the 
conflict was essentially a civil war, and the prohibition of aggression is addressed to inter- 
State force. 98 This does not explain the absence of any provision in the ICTY Statute. 
There has been little comment on this matter, despite (or perhaps because of) the 
controversial question of the responsibility for the commencement of the Yugoslav wars 
of dissolution. " It was not mentioned in any of the State suggestions, or the Secretary- 
General's report. It is probable that given the contentious nature of the offence, the fact 
that the Security Council Resolutions leading up to Resolution 808 concentrated on the 
conduct of the war, not the causes, and its absence from State proposals for the ICTY 
Statute, led the Secretary-General to exclude it from consideration. 
The controversy over the inclusion of aggression in international criminal law was 
clearly manifested in the negotiations leading up to the Rome Statute. The inclusion of 
the crime, and its definition proved exceptionally controversial. 100 In the ad hoc 
Committee, various definitions were proposed, but some States quite simply did not want 
96 S-G report supra n. 46, para 34; Pmsautorv Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, IT-94-1-T, para 622. 
97 GA Res 3314, UN Doc A/9631, Article 5(2). This is an answer to C. Tomuschat's doubts about the 
customary status of aggression, "Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the Recalcitrant 3A 
State" in Dinstein & Tabory supra n. 61,41, p. 54. 
98 H. McCoubrey & N. D. White, Intemational Law and Amied Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992) pp. 39-51. 
99 The only notable mentions of it in the literature are a lamentation of its non inclusion by Howard Levie, 
"The Statute of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison With the Past and a Look at 
the Future" (1995) 21 Syracuse J.I. L. & Carrcre ire 1, p. 7, O' Brien's assertion that "the Tribunal is aimed at bad 
soldiers, not bad sides", J. O'Brien, "The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law in the Former Yugoslavia" (1993) 77 A. J. I. L. 639, p. 659 and Joyner's comment that it would be difficult 
to obtain evidence of such crimes (CC. Joyner, "Strengthening Enforcement of International Humanitarian 
Law: Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1995) 6 Duke J. C & I. L. 
79, p. 86). 
100 As Bassiouni states, both the inclusion, and definition of aggression are political issues. M. C. Bassiouni, 
"Observations Concerning the 1997-8 Preparatory Committee's Work" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ) The Intematicrnal 
Crinihral Court- Obseruztions and Issues Before the 1997-8 Pi Zratrny Ca'nnitta'; and Adrith7istra&e and Fi naraial 
Implications (Chicago: Eres, 1997) 5, p. 24. In the NGO community, the inclusion of aggression was one of the 
few issues on which the membership of the US Branch of the ILA was split, see L. Sadat-Wexler, 
"Introduction" in Bassiouni (ed. ), ibid 163, p. 166. See generally, A. Carpenter, "The International Criminal 
Court and the Crime of Aggression" (1995) 64 Nordic J. I. L. 223. For discussion of the background to, and 
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the crime included, whatever the definitionlol Similar arguments relating to the inclusion 
and definition of aggression, along with the putative role of the Security Council plagued 
the PREPCOM, 102 and by the Rome Conference the outlook for its inclusion looked 
bleak. 103 That said, although the same issues arose again in Rome there was strong 
support for the inclusion of aggression, 104but this was by no means universal, and those 
seeking its exclusion had a strong legal argument; the absence of a readily available, 
broadly acceptable definition. 105 The serious efforts by countries supporting inclusion to 
get a definition eventually failed, 106 and by the final week of the conference it looked as if 
aggression would not be included. 107 Jurisdiction over aggression was reincarnated (albeit 
only into a form of half-life) in the final package given at the end of the conference. 
The Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 108 
However, the ICC is not to assert jurisdiction over the crime unless and until a definition 
is included by way of amendment to the Statute. 109 This definition will probably have to 
ensure the Security Council is involved in the determination of an act of aggression (itself 
a problematic and contentious issue). 110 The controversy over its inclusion has still not 
debates in, the Rome conference, see H. von Hebel & D. Robinson, "Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the 
Court" in R. S. Lee (ed. ), The International Crnni al Court (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999) 79, pp. 81-85. 
101 Report of the Preparatory Committee in the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court 
UN GAOR Supp 22 A/51/22 Vol II p. 58. 
102 See C. K. Hall "The Third and Fourth Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal 
Court" (1998) 92 A. J. LL. 124, p. 128; C. K. Hall, "The Sixth Session of the Preparatory Committee for an 
International Criminal Court" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 548, p. 551; A Zimmerman "The Creation of a Permanent 
International Criminal Court" (1998) 2 Max Planck Y. B. UN. L. 169, pp. 198-204. A. Zimmermann in O. 
Triffterer, The Ranee Statute of the International Crbnmal Cow (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999) gives details of 
PREPCOM at pp. 23-24, detailing attempts based around GA Resolution 3314 UN Doc. A/9631, and the 
German attempts to draft a new definition. 
103 M. Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court" (1999) 63 A. J. LL. 22, p. 29. 
104 Ibid p. 30. 
105 The US was against inclusion, and its elements of crimes proposals did not include it. 
106 For these efforts see A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 37, L. 38, L. 39 (these two being exceptionally wide (see 
Zimmerman, supra n. 102, p. 25)), L. 56. 
107 L. 59, the second Bureau Proposal gave a one day deadline for agreement on a definition, which was (as the 
Bureau knew) entirely unrealistic. This proposal was really a pretext to justify dropping the crime. 
108 Rome Statute Article 5 (1) (d). 
109 Rome Statute Article 5(2). By virtue of Articles 121 and 123, the Statute can only be amended after 7 years 
of the Rome Statute being in force. In addition, any amendment (which must be passed by at least 2/3 of the 
State Parties (Article 121(3)) will not come into force until 7/8 of the State Parties have ratified it (Article 
121(4)). Any of the Remaining 1/8 may opt out of it for both its territory and its nationals (Article 121(5)). D. 
Sarooshi, "The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court" (1999) 48 LCL. Q 387, p. 401 notes this 
means any State not liking the definition need not accept it. 
110 GA Resolution 3314, UN Doc. A/9631, a non binding aid for the Security Council took over 20 years to 
draft, and is notoriously vague. See J. Stone, "Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression" 
(1977) 71 A. J. I. L. 224. 
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abated, "' and the Statute has a high threshold for alteration, 112 so it is unlikely that a 
definition will be forthcoming in the near future. The crime of aggression is (as has been 
shown) a very controversial area, not least as although it is generally accepted as 
customary, no definition of the offence has received broad support. This is problematic, 
but instructive. For Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, the drafters were happy enough (in the 
end) to enact it, without precedent or definition, in the IMTs' Charters, 113 while in the 
Rome Statute, even though its customary nature was far more certain, a definition was 
considered central. No State would have allowed the crime into the Rome Statute and left 
the Court to determine its parameters, which is precisely what the IMTs creators did for 
their two progeny. 114 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
The first time crimes against humanity were made expressly subject to the jurisdiction 
of an international criminal tribunal was in the Nuremberg Charter, Artide 6(c) of which 
criminalised "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated. "115 
111 Scheffer, for example asserts it should have been removed, supra n. 53, p. 21, Cassese, on the other hand 
welcomes it cautiously, A. Cassese, "The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections" (1999) 10 E. J. I. L. 144 pp. 146-148. 
112 Zimmerman, supra n. 102, p. 26, ibid p. 23 he asserts that although it is de jure included in the Statute, it is de 
facto excluded, its mention being a sweetener for the package for some States. 
113 Both of which could not be used against heir authors. 
114 It is sad to note that at least one of those powers (the US) was probably the most negative about the 
inclusion of aggression, and while insisting on detailed definitions of all crimes, made no effort to assist in 
achieving such a definition for aggression. 
115 On crimes against humanity generally, see M. C. Bassiouni, Crnn6 Against Hwnanity in International Cranirmal 
Law, supra n. 4; M. Lippman, "Crimes Against Humanity" (1997) 17 B. CTWL. J. 171; E. Schwelb, "Crimes 
Against Humanity" (1946) 23 B. YB. LL. 178; Y. Dinstein, "Crimes Against Humanity" in J. Makarczck (ed. ), 
supra n. 8,891; R. S. Clark, "Crimes Against Humanity at Nuremberg" in Ginsburgs & Kudriavtstev, supra n. 
177; Ratner & Abrams, supra n. 4, chapter 3; Robinson, supra n. 54, J. Rikhof, "Crimes Against Humanity, 
Customary International Law and the International Tribunals for Bosnia and Rwanda" (1996) 6 N. J. CL. 233; 
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Precedents for crimes against humanity are thin on the ground before the 20th 
Century. There have been claims that the uzt Hag'nba h trial provides a precedent here, 116 
a rejection of that view appears above (p. 22). The first time an analogous concept was 
used in an international document was in the 1907 Hague Convention IV, 117 in the 
famous "Martens clause". This clause, which can be found in the preamble reads, "in 
cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them the inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of 
nations, as they result from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience. " The possibility of implying criminal responsibility exists from this clause to a 
small degree, but has been subject to serious criticism. 118 There are two primary 
arguments against such an interpretation. The first is that the Convention itself does not 
expressly state that there is criminal responsibility for violations of it. As seen above, this 
is not determinative. The other is that although there has traditionally been penal liability 
for violations of the laws of armed conflict, including those parts of it in the Hague 
Convention, this does not apply to the part of the Convention dealing with the laws of 
humanity. After all, they are only mentioned once, in the preamble. 
These arguments seem not to have concerned many of the Allied side in the First 
World War. In 1915 the Russian, French and British governments protested to Turkey 
that Turkish massacres of Armenians amounted to "crimes of Turkey against 
humanity". 119 McCormack states that this was "more a political reaction... than the first 
step in a clearly articulated process for the punishment of alleged perpetrators according 
M. C. Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity" in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 57,521; O. Swaak-Goldman, "Crimes 
Against Humanity" in McDonald & Swaak-Goldman (eds. ), supra n. 141; WJ. Fenrick, "Should Crimes Against 
Humanity Replace War Crimes? " (1999) 37 Cj.. TL. 767; B. van Schaack, "The Definition of Crimes Against 
Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence" (1999) 37 CJ. TL. 787; R. Dixon, C. Hall & M. Boot, "Article 8" in 
Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 102,117. 
116 Schwarzenberger, supra n. 57, p. 466. 
117 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (1910) UKTS 9 Cd. 5030. 
118 M. C. Bassiouni "International Law and the Holocaust" (1979) 9 CaL W. I. L. J. 209, p. 210. See now the 
excellent discussion of the Martens Clause by A. Cassese, "The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf, or Merely Pie in 
the Sky? " (2000) 11 E. J. I. L. 187. 
119 W. G. Sharp to Bryan, (28 May 1915), Foreign Relations of the United States 1915: The World War. On this 
generally, see V. Dadrian, "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I 
Armenian Case and its Contemporary Ramifications" (1989) 14 Yale J. I. L. 221. 
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to established legal principles". 120 He may be correct, but post-War events saw the 
beginnings of the crystallisation of the law. The 1919 Commission reported that "[a]ll 
persons belonging to enemy countries... who have been guilty of offences against the 
laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution. ". 121 
The US members of the Commission dissented on this part, saying that the laws of 
humanity were too vague to create a judicially enforcable standard. 122 Much has been 
made of their dissent, but theirs was a dissenting opinion, and their views have not 
escaped criticism. If favour of the dissenters, though, it must be said that these were, 
effectively undefined ideas. 123 The possibility of trial for these was expressly contemplated 
in the Treaty of Sevres124 It was never ratified. Its successor, the Treaty of Lausanne, 125 
did not contain a similar provision on punishment. It did contain a declaration of 
amnesty. This may support the idea of penal responsibility in that if there is no crime 
there is no reason for amnesty. Overall, it seems that there were the beginnings of a rule 
of criminalisation of such offences, although no definition or precedent existed and there 
were dissenting voices. Perhaps the only limit that can be determined on the definition of 
crimes against humanity is from their context. So far as the Hague Convention and the 
Armenian correspondence both related to wartime acts, peacetime acts were still in the 
preserve of State sovereignty. 126 
In the London conference, there was great debate on crimes against humanity 
amongst the delegates. Although little dissent was recorded on their inclusion, their 
definition was controversial. 127 There was disquiet about the applicability of such 
prohibitions in peacetime, which were mollified by Jackson's inclusion of a limit upon 
120 T. L. H. McCormack, "From Sun Tzu, to the 6thCommittee: The Evolution of an International Criminal 
Law Regime" in McCormack & Simpson, supra n. 19,31, p. 45. See also Swaak-Goldman, supra n. 115, p. 146, 
referring to its use there "in its non technical sense". 
121 Supra n. 63, p. 438. 
122 Ibid' pp. 451-452. 
123 See Lord Wright, "War Crimes Under International Law" (1946) 62 L. Q. R. 40, p. 48. 
124 TS No. 11 (1920). 
125 (1923) 8 LNTS 11. 
126 See P. Malanczuk, Akehurt's ModemInmxb, ction to International Law (London: Routledge, 7th ed. 1997) pp. 354- 
5. In relation to wartime acts, there is a possibility that there was an arguable claim for customary status, in 
WWII the Germans issued various books documenting "violations of the laws of war and humanity". See A. 
de Zayas, The Weh nacht War Crimes Buwau 1939-1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) p. 186. 
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them to those linked with other crimes in the jurisdiction of the court (war crimes or 
crimes against peace). 128 As war crimes law applies only during times of armed conflict, 
and aggressive war was only retroactively criminal, the idea that the proposal overcame 
the questions of ex post facto creation of offences is unconvincing, and the argument 
served more to placate fears of some Allied nations about the international criminality of 
their own actions in relation to domestic minorities. 129 Nuremberg relied heavily on the 
link to wartime, or crimes against peace, not accepting that all pre-1939 acts could be 
classified as crimes against humanity. 130 Although the Nuremberg IMT convicted 
defendants for actions before (but related to) the war, 131 it clearly had some doubts about 
this aspect of the crimes against humanity charge, at least insofar as it did not overlap 
with war crimes. 132 
Judges in the early cases after the War were ready to accept that crimes against 
humanity (as defined at Nuremberg) were a pre-existing category of crime, 133 but in 
recent years, opinion has been split about the criminality of crimes against humanity by 
1945. The Australian Court in DPP v Poly ikhovk split 4-3 on the matter, coming out in 
favour of the existence of these crimes before the war. 134 The Canadian Supreme Court in 
Rv Finta found, by the same majority, that crimes against humanity were retroactively 
criminalised, 135 and in the UK, the Hetherington-Chalmers Report said that it was not 
certain that crimes against humanity were illegal at the time-136 It is interesting that the 
Tadic judgment effectively adopted the position that crimes against humanity were 
retroactive in 1945.137 Academic opinion is split on the pre-1945 situation, 138 but due to 
127 See Lippman, (1997) supra n. 115, pp. 178-186. 
128 See Report of Robert H Jackson, supra n. 38, p. 384; Lippman, supra n. 37, p. 24. 
129 Jackson, ibid, p. 381. Although the UK and France may have had concerns about their actions in their 
colonies and Stalin's internal repression would dearly fall foul of the prohibition, the US also had reason to 
fear their formulation. It was, of course, still a segregationist State at the time. 
130 IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 249. 
131 See Lippman (1997), supra n. 115 p. 270; B. V. A. Röling, "The Law of War and National Jurisdiction" (1960) 
100 R. CCC. 329, p. 347 claims this was only the case for Streicher. 
132 Lippman, supra n. 37, p. 34 states that they mixed war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
133 US v Oh1eizcbf 4 T. W. C. 411, p. 499; in re Rauter (1948) 16 A. D. 553 said the offences were pre-existing. 
134 DPPvPolyukhovic (1991) 101 AIR 545, TooheyJ (majority) pp. 661-662, Brennan J (minority) p. 597. 
135 Rv Finta 112 DIR (4th) 513, Cory J (majority) p. 638, La Forest J (minority) p. 556. 
136 T. Hetherington & W. Chalmers, Repast of the War Crones Inquiry (London: HMSO, 1989) p. 62. 
137 Tadic supra n. 96, para 618. 
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Resolution 95(1) and the various cases since the war it is now accepted that crimes against 
humanity are criminal under contemporary customary international law. 139 
The definition of crimes against humanity in the Tokyo Charter appeared, on its face, 
to be almost identical to that in the London Charter. Indeed, it was adopted as such 
initially. 140 Then, three days before the trial opened, the Prosecution decided to alter the 
Charter, 141 removing the words "against any civilian population". This was done purely so 
the prosecution could assert that all killings in an illegal war were themselves illegal. They 
did this by charging, in Counts 39-43 and 45-52 of the indictment, the defendants with 
crimes against humanity for the unlawful killing of soldiers. Frankly, this action was 
legally perverse. It cuts directly across the entire basis of international humanitarian law, 
which is based upon the idea of privileged belligerency. 142 The position in international 
law is correctly asserted by Bothe to be "acts of homicide performed in accordance with 
the laws of armed conflict do not constitute homicide in the legal sense, or constitute 
justifiable homicide". 143 If the converse were the case, there could effectively be no 
international humanitarian law, as it would only be relevant to one side, the aggressor 
would have no reason to comply with the laws of war, as their actions would be illegal 
anyway. As US v List correctly determined, identification of one party as an aggressor or 
otherwise is irrelevant for humanitarian law. l44 The Tokyo IMT rejected these charges, 
138 See Akehurst, supra n. 126; Schwarzenberger, supra n. 57, pp. 498-499; F. Morrison, "The Significance of 
Nuremberg for Modern International Law" (1995) 149 Militmy L. R. 207, pp. 210-211; L. Gross, "The 
Prosecution of War Criminals: The Nuremberg Trial" in L. Gross, Selectai Essays on International Law and 
Organi anon (New York Transnational, 1984) p. 133. All the above are dubious about their status prior to 1945; 
Lippman, supra n. 37, p. 39 inclines to this view; Schweib, supra n. 115, p. 178 refers to them as "novel", see also 
Dinstein, supra n. 115, p. 891 "only in 1945 was the terminology embraced by positive international law". Comu 
Bassiouni, supra n. 4, chapter 4; Woetzel, supra n. 57, pp. 172-18 1; Wright, supra n. 57, pp. 61-62; R. S. Clark, supra 
n. 115,177; A. Cassese, Violeze and Law in the Modem Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1984) p. 108; Kochavi, supra n. 36, 
Chapter 5 gives a very interesting survey of governmental positions at the time. 
139 Pros or v Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 
1995, IT-94-1-AR72, para 141; Secretary-General's Report, supra n. 46, para 47; The only person who 
continued to reject crimes against humanity as customary international law was Schwarzenberger, il d 
140 Article 5(c). the only (original) difference was the removal of the religious ground of persecution, probably 
as there was no evidence of such persecutions in the Pacific sphere (See Bassiouni, supra n. 4 p. 33). 
141 See B. V. A. Röling &A Cassese, The Tok}o Trial and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) pp. 56-57. 
142 In the UK, for a charge of murder, the victim must be killed "under the King's peace", this excludes enemy 
combatants killed in battle, Rv Page [1953] 2 All ER 1355. 
143 M. Bothe, "War Crimes in Non International Armed Conflict" in Dinstein & Tabory (eds. ), supra n. 61,293 
p. 295. See also Fenrick supra n. 103, p. 783. 
144 15 A. D. 532. On this point generally see C. Greenwood, "The Relationship Between the lus ad Bellwn and 
Jus in Bello (1983) 9 Rev. I. Studies 221, especially p. 229. 
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albeit rather half-heartedly, merely claiming that they were subsumed under the crimes 
against peace charge. 145 Their reasoning is a matter of concern, for it would effectively 
justify all crimes against humanity by the non aggressor, 146 and did not deal with the thesis 
straight on. On the basis of its theory the Tokyo IMT left itself able to convict on these 
charges if a defendant was acquitted of a crime against peace. This aspect of the Charter 
was entirely unjustifiable, and its late addition does nothing but underscore the 
Prosecution's subjection of the definitions of law to its strategy in Tokyo. This aspect was 
never adopted by any other body, which is a good thing. 
The problem with crimes against humanity post-Nuremberg is not their basis in 
customary international law, but the contours of their definition. The Nuremberg (and 
Tokyo) Charter and judgment left many issues uncertain. To some these matters were of 
such a fundamental nature as to require a multilateral convention to settle them. 147 As the 
controversy in the three tribunals since 1990 has related to the scope of crimes against 
humanity, it is advisable to clarify the requirements, both accepted and controversial in 
the definitions of crimes against humanity, prior to the creation of these tribunals. 
Reference will be made to judgments of the ICTY & ICTR here, as they discuss custom, 
but it must be remembered that these clarifications were not available prior to the 
creation of the ICTY, or ICTR (although many were prior to the drafting of the Rome 
Statute). The various State proposals for the definition of crimes against humanity 
preceding the Secretary-General's report on the ICTY betray a lack of consensus on the 
requirements for liability, 148 but from these criteria choices were made about inclusions in 
the ICTY Statute, and those choices that were made may give us insights into the 
attitudes of the actors in the field. 
145 Tokyo IMT Judgment, supra n. 70, Vol 20. " Jud it, pp. 48,452-48,453; Judge Jaranilla dissented on this, supra 
n. 70, pp. 9-10. Röling & Cassese, supra n. 141, p. 57 claim that the Tokyo ITT did reject the charges. Levie, 
though, asserts that they came perilously close to accepting them, H. Levie, Tanvri9n in War. The Law of 
War 
Cranes (New York: Oceana, 1992) p. 147. 
146 Jaranilla, ibld 
147 M. C. Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a Specialized Convention" (1994) 31 C. J. T. L. 
457. 
148 V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, An Insida-'s Guide to the Intemruhnal Crininal Tribunal for the Former Yugos&aria (New 
York: Transnational, 1995) p. 77. 
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LINK TO ARMED CONFLICT 
The Nuremberg definition, requiring a link to war crimes or crimes against peace, has 
led to questions about whether or not there is a necessary link to armed conflict, or if the 
limit in Nuremberg was jurisdictional rather than substantive. This has been controversial 
from the start; at least one of the Tokyo judges thought that the limit was jurisdictional 
alone. 149 One problem with this reasoning is that Jackson's justification of the charge 
implies that the nexus was the essence of the definition of the offence. Since then, though 
the trend has strongly been against seeing the link as necessary. 150 However, prior to the 
Tadic ruling, 151 there had been no authoritative pronouncement that the requirement was 
not part of customary international law for crimes against humanity. 
WIDESPREAD/ SYSTEMATIC NATURE 
It is generally accepted that, from the Nuremberg definition requiring "against a 
civilian population", crimes against humanity must be large scale ("mass"), and/or 
systematic. This means that that isolated acts are not crimes against humanity. 152 The 
problem is that the law, as it stood in the early 1990s, was not clear as to whether these 
requirements were conjunctive or disjunctive. 153 The Tactic judgment made it clear that 
customary law requires them in the alternative. 154 In the PREPCOM and at Rome 
149 Röling & Cassese, supra n. 141, p. 56. Röling's view was that the requirement of link to an offence in an 
armed conflict was purely a restriction on the courts' jurisdiction, rather than it being a part of the definition 
of a crime against humanity. 
150 CCL10 did not have it; the Genocide Convention, which deals with a particularly egregious type of crime 
against humanity states, in Article I that genocide is a crime in time of peace or war. The Apartheid 
Convention & 1968 Convention on the Non Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humniaty, accept peacetime application of these crimes, as do the ILC Draft Codes of Crimes of 
1954,1996, Ratner & Abrams, supra n. 4, p. 56 assert that there is almost no-one who would now assert the 
nexus. At PREPCOM, however, certain States did (Russia and China (Zimmerman, supra n. 102, p. 177, Report, 
supra n. 102,21-23. ) At Rome, those asserting the requirement of a nexus were in the minority (Robinson, supra 
n. 54, pp. 45-46); von Hebel & Robinson, supra n. 100, pp. 92-93. 
151 Tadk AR 72, supra n. 139, para 141. 
152 As the second Tadic appeal made clear, crimes against humanity can be committed for personal motives, 
but they must be related to a widespread or systematic attack, and the accused knew that the crimes were 
related to that attack, Prouutorv Tadic, judgment, 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, para 271. 
153 See Ratner & Abrams, supra n. 4, pp. 57-60. 
154 Td Judgment (Trial Chamber), supra n. 96, paras 645-646. 
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though, there were calls for a conjunctive definition. 155 It is perhaps relevant to mention 
that it is possible (and perhaps better) to view these requirements a different way, that 
they are actually evidential matters for the proof of a policy requirement. 
POLICY 
There is strong support for the idea that there is a definitional requirement that the 
acts are committed pursuant to a policy. It is not certain though, whether this is not really 
the underlying requirement for which the mass/systematic requirements are actually 
merely the forms of proof. 156 More important though are suggestions that the only 
entities capable of having such a policy (or systematic element) are States. This would 
exclude acts of individuals, but also those sub-State entities which have the requisite de 
facto power to muster forces etc. sufficient to commit such offences. This includes sub- 
State belligerents in civil wars, which could create a worrying asymmetry in such a 
conflict, where government officials could commit crimes against humanity, but the 
rebels could not. 157 Tadic was explicit that non State entities are capable of committing 
such acts. 158 
155 Report, supra n. 101,1 121-23; Hall, supra n. 102, p. 127, Zimmerman, supra n. 102, pp. 173-176. Pmsautor v 
Nikolic, Rule 61,20 October 1995, IT-94-2-R-61 para 26 "Crimes against humanity must, to a certain extent, 
be organised and systematic". At Rome there were still deliberations about this, Arsanjani, supra n. 103, p. 31; 
von Hebel & Robinson, supra n. 100, pp. 94-95. 
156 Tadic, supra n. 96, para 653 said that a policy could be inferred from the widespread or systematic nature of 
offences, this supports the view that the widespread/systematic criteria are actually evidential methods of 
proving the policy requirement. For cases insisting on the requirement see US v Alstötter 
(1947) 14 A. D. 278, 
p. 284, US v Flick 9 L. R. T. W. C. 1, p. 40. 
157 For those accepting that non-State entities may commit crimes against humanity, see, Shakranarv Cmlada 
[1994] 1 F. C. 433, p. 444. Polyukhovic, supra n. 134, p. 617, The ILC dropped the requirement in 1987 ((1987) 
YB. LL. C vol. 2, part 2, p. 14) 
. 
It was absent from both Article 21 of the 1991 Draft code (Report of the ILC 
on the Work of its 43rd Session, p. 266) and Article 18 ILC Draft Code of Offences 1996; see Zimmerman, 
supra n. 102, p. 74- 
158 7adk, supra n. 96, para 654. 
231 
MENS REA 
It is generally accepted that for a crime against humanity to be committed, the 
perpetrator must have knowledge of the widespread or systematic attack, 159 but this is not 
the end of the matter in relation to mar rea. 
Despite the Nuremberg IMT Charter separating off two types of crimes against 
humanity, those of the "murder" type and those of the "persecution type", 160 there is 
some support for the idea that crimes against humanity require an intent on the part of 
the perpetrator to discriminate against the group to which the victims belong. 161 The Tactic 
case stated that customary international law did not require such a motive. 162 This did not 
prevent some States in PREPCOM expressing a preference for the inclusion of such a 
requirement, 163 and some States had included the requirement in their suggestions for the 
ICTY Statute. 164 
ACTUS REUS/ THE ENUMERATED ACTS 
This is perhaps the least controversial part. The classic definition, that of the 
Nuremberg IMT Charter, in addition to the named grounds, included a catch all, of 
"other inhumane acts". This entered customary international law with the Nuremberg 
DAT Charter, and thus adding acts, so long as they are clearly inhumane can be seen in 
most cases as a mere clarification of this provision. Because of the possibility of further 
inhumane acts coming to light is always present, there are arguments in favour of the 
159 Robinson, supra n. 54, p. 52. Tadic AR 72, supra n. 139, paras 656-659. 
160 Ratner & Abrams, supra n. 4, pp. 60-64. 
161 See Ratner & Abrams, bid, pp. 60-64, Report of the ILC, 1954 Article 2(11) pp. 151-152; ICTR Statute, 
Article 3; The CSCE, US and Netherlands suggestions relating to the ICTY Statute contained the 
requirements, none of the others did (see the summary in Morris & Scharf, supra n. 148, pp. 380-383). There is 
also controversy about the grounds upon which this can happen. 
162 Tadic Judment, supra n. 96, paras 651-652; This was upheld on appeal, which, however overturned the Trial 
Chamber finding that the requirement had been included in the ICTY Statute, Prusaz for v Tadic supra n. 152. 
paras 273-305. 
163 C. K. Hall "The First Two Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal Court" 
(1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 177, p. 180. 
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approach taken in the London Charter, but it cannot be ignored that it is a vague 
formulation, for which a price may be paid in legitimacy. The price, of course, may be 
worth paying to ensure that innovative methods of committing mass/systematic atrocities 
are criminal. 
THE DEFINITIONS 
The definition in the ICTY Statute is relatively short, providing that "[t]he International 
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes 
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and 
directed against any civilian population: (a) murder, (b) extermination, (c) enslavement, 
(d) deportation, (e) imprisonment, (f) torture, (g) rape, (h) persecutions on political, racial 
and religious grounds, (i) other inhumane acts. "165 
Certain things are clear from the above definition. The first is that there is a limit to 
crimes committed in armed conflict. The requirement was put in, according to Morris and 
Scharf, because the Security Council had taken jurisdiction over Yugoslavia as an armed 
conflict, not that the Secretary-General considered this to be one of the criteria for a 
crime against hu nanity. 166 It must be noted though that this amounts to a clear limitation 
on the ICTY definition. 167 In relation to the requirements for the enumerated acts to be 
considered crimes against humanity the Statute is not very helpful, resembling, as it does, 
the delphic Nuremberg definition. 
One question revolves around what is meant by "directed against a civilian 
population. " It may be possible to draw some assistance from the Secretary-General's 
report containing the ICTY Statute. In paragraph 48 of his report, he said "[c]rimes 
164 See » fra. pp. 234. 
165 ICTY Statute Article 5. 
166 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 148, p. 79-80; See also L. Johnson, "The International Tribunal for Rwanda" (1996) 
67 Rev 1. de ßr. Penal 211, p219. The Secretary General's report bears this out, as it asserts (supra n. 46, para 47) 
that crimes against humanity are applicable irrespective of the existence of an armed conflict. 
167 See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 148, pp. 82-83. 
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against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, 
torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds... such inhumane acts 
have taken the form of so-called `ethnic cleansing' and widespread and systematic rape 
and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitution". 
The Secretary-General's comments could be seen as answering various questions. 
They relate to the inclusion of persecution as a criterion for all crimes against humanity, 
and (by omission) accepting that entities other than States can be the bodies creating a 
policy. There are problems with his commentary. His comments are inconsistent with the 
language of the Article, which, as shown in relation to the nexus does not reflect the 
language above. Secondly they are inconsistent within themselves. For example, in the 
first sentence, he uses "widespread or systematic", but with a persecution requirement. 
Then in the second sentence, he refers to rape as being committed in a "widespread and 
systematic" way, without mentioning the persecution element. In addition, accepting the 
persecution requirement would make a nonsense of the crime against humanity in Article 
5(h) which expressly has the crime of persecution and lists the grounds upon which the 
persecution must occur separately from the other acts. It may be that the difficulties 
involved here meant those drafting the report for the Secretary-General were unhappy 
with the absence of consensus on the issue of the requirements, and therefore effectively 
hedged their bets by not putting them into the Statute, but ambiguously placing them in 
the commentary. Morris and Scharf assert that the reason the commentary and Statute do 
not conform is that due to the controversy over the criteria of liability for crimes against 
humanity, the Statute was changed very late on, to conform to Article 6(c) of the London 
Charter, while the factual part of the Secretary-General's report remained the same. 168 
This could be the case, but it would amount to a very serious oversight to have allowed 
the report go out without checking its congruity with the Statute. 
168 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 7 p. 199. 
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On adoption of Resolution 827, the US, French and Russian representatives all 
mentioned that they interpreted crimes against humanity as requiring a discriminatory 
intent. 169 Relying on these, the Trial Chamber in the Tactic Case controversially interpreted 
the Statute to require the element of discriminatory a;, rn for all crimes against humanity 
even though it did not agree that the requirement was a part of customary international 
law. 170 This aspect of the decision has been criticised, 171 and on appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber spent a great deal of time expressly overturning this part of the Trial Chamber's 
decision. This brought their interpretation of the ICTY Statute into line with their view 
(and that of the Trial Chamber) that customary international law does not require a 
persecutive intent. 172 Perhaps more important than the decision in that case is that the 
decision was left to the ICTY, as were the decisions on other questions relating to the 
parameters of liability, e. g. on whether the conditions of widespread/systematic nature 
were cumulative or disjunctive. 
The enumerated acts were uncontroversial. Given that the list in the London Charter 
was illustrative rather than exclusive, a certain degree of leeway is acceptable in adding to 
the list of modalities by which crimes against humanity can be committed. The list adds 
imprisonment, torture and rape. 173 These were present in the Control Council Law 10 
definition of crimes against humanity, and it would be all but impossible to deny that 
these acts were inhumane. 174 As with the London Charter, the list is not closed, therefore 
the ICTY has been granted the opportunity to add more inhumane acts in practice. 175 
169 S/PV. 3217 pp. 16,11,45 respectively. The Appeals chamber in Tactic supra n. 152, paras 298-304 discuss the 
meaning and import of these statements, and rejects the idea that they are controlling here (para 304). 
170 Tafte, supra n. 96, para 652. 
171 C. Greenwood, "The Development of International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia" (1998) 2 Max Planck Y. B. UN. L. 97, p. 135 supports the decision; Johnson, supra 
n. 166, p. 219 says this is what the Statute required; whereas Robinson, supra n. 54, p. 46 claims that this finding is 
crying out for reversal on appeal. This was done. 
172 Tad c, supra n. 96, paras 273-305. 
173 Article 5, See Joyner, supra n. 99, p. 86. 
174 See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 7, pp. 188-190. 
175 K. A. Hochkammer, "The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: The Compatibility of Peace, Politics and 
International Law" (1994) 28 Vandafiilt J. T. L. 19, p. 162 considers leaving the list open to be problematic, as it 
is undefined. 
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Unlike the ICTY Statute Artide 5, the ICTR Statute's definition of crimes against 
humanity makes the answers to various liability questions far more explicit, and 
correspondingly, limits the powers of the ICTR to disagree with the drafters (who, in this 
case, were States). The ICTR definition repeats the list of acts in the ICTY Statute, and 
defines them as amounting to crimes against humanity "when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, 
ethnic, racial, or religious grounds". 176 This decides certain issues. The first of these is that 
it is now clear that there is no required nexus to armed conflict. 17 Although prior to the 
ICTR Statute the absence of the requirement was almost certainly customary international 
law, this is a welcome development. The second issue decided is that instead of using the 
vague "directed at a civilian population" standard, Rwanda requires the acts to be part of 
a "widespread or systematic attack". This clarifies that they are not conjunctive 
requirements. Morris and Scharf criticise this as possibly being a higher standard than 
required in the ICTY. 178 This is unlikely to be the case in practice, given that in Tactic 
neither side argued on the presence of those requirements under the ICTY Statute, but 
rather on their cumulative or disjunctive nature. 179 
This is not the most important part of the definition. In stark contrast to the ICTY 
Statute, the ICTR Statute explicitly provides for the requirement of a discriminatory 
intent. Although some thought this to be a part of the ICTY definition, 180 it is very 
dubious on international legal grounds, for the reasons given above, and has been roundly 
criticised. 181 There was no explanation of this addition in the Security Council, 182 and 
theories have abounded. Meron claims that it was inadvertence on the part of the Security 
176 ICTR Statute Article 3. 
In See Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities" (1995) 89 A. J. I. L. 554, p. 557; MM. 
Wang, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Opportunities Clarifiication, Opportunities for 
Impact" (1995) 27 Coban/ a H. R. L. R. 177, p. 216. 
178 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 148, pp. 194-5. 
179 Tadic Judgment, supra n. 96, paras 645-646. 
180 Johnson, supra n. 166, p. 219. 
181 See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 7, pp. 196-199. 
182 Johnson, supra n. 166, p. 219. 
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Council. 183 This is possible, but given the controversy relating to crimes against humanity 
before the creation of the ICTY, and the likelihood that the ICTR Statute would be 
adopted without change, it is perhaps more apposite to look at the identities of the 
drafters. As the US was intimately involved, it is surely more than coincidental that the 
requirement was added, as the requirement was in its suggestions to the Secretary-General 
for the ICTY Statute. 184 Little can be inferred from New Zealand's position on the 
matter. In relation to the Rwandan government, their interests in avoiding prosecution 
would certainly be best served by a restricted definition of crimes against humanity, as 
unlike for genocide, there was a possibility that some of the victorious Rwandan 
government forces were guilty of crimes against humanity (and war crimes). 185 Indeed 
Rwanda voted against the Statute partially on the basis that those offences were put into 
the ICTR Statute. 186 It is not impossible that in negotiations a higher standard was agreed 
to as the US believed that to be the standard anyway, and Rwanda was concerned about 
RPF forces being tried before theICIR. 187 
In Rome, it was generally accepted that crimes against humanity should be 
included, 188 but almost all the elements were the subject of disagreement. 189 The end 
result was a compromise between those States seeking a very narrow definition, and those 
States (and NGOs) working for a broad, effective definition of the crimes. It is perhaps 
here that some States showed a surprising level of acceptance of a broad definition, 
although they were by no means unopposed. The final result, as will be seen, is in some 
ways a positive development, 190 in others, a more conservative provision than customary 
international law requires. 
183 Meron, supra n. 177. p. 557. 
184 Supra n. 168. 
185 Schraga & Zacklin, supra n. 50, p. 503. 
186 See supra p. 44, n. 159. 
187 J. Paust, "Panel Discussion" (1995) 89 Proc A. S. I. L. 311, p. 311 asked whether the reason was that States, 
realising that a permanent international court was more likely, sought to limit the definition more generally. 
188 Zimmerman, supra n. 102, p. 172. 
189 See von Hebel & Robinson, supra n. 100, pp. 98-103. 
190 Not least, in being the first generally drafted definition of this notoriously vague crime. A definition such as 
this probably provides more Franckian legitimacy that the previous caselaw and doctrine. 
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The definition in Article 7 of the Rome Statute is as follows: 
"[a crime against humanity is] any of the following acts when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
(b)Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender... or other grounds as are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph, or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) the crime of Apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or physical health. " 
As can be seen, this definition is significantly clearer than previous formulations. It is 
clear, for example, that it does not include any nexus to armed conflict. Also there is no 
mention of any requirement of persecutive intent, except for the crime of persecution. 
That said, and although the definition appears to adopt the mass or systematic criteria 
simpliciter, there may have been a slight raising of the threshold for crimes against 
humanity. This is because "attack directed against a civilian population" is defined as "a 
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts... against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such an attack". 191 As Robinson notes, this amounts to compromise between those 
191 Article 7(2)(a). One important clarification is that "organizations" other than States are capable of 
commission of such offences. Less certain is precisely what organisations come under this definition. 
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wanting the requirements disjunctively and those wanting them cumulatively. 192 It 
effectively introduces an additional set of requirements, a "course of conduct" and a 
"policy". These require further explanation. They come into play in addition to the 
requirements of widespread nature or systematicity. They are both actually based on those 
requirements, "course of conduct" being based on the "widespread" criterion, whilst the 
policy requirement is modelled on the systematicity requirement. 
Thus, if a widespread set of acts is pleaded, then the Prosecution must also prove that 
a policy existed. This is problematic; although the existence of a policy is said by 
Robinson to have a lower threshold of proof than a systematic act this may well not be 
the case. 193 If so, it is the introduction of the conjunctive requirement through the back 
door. If a systematic set of acts is alleged, then the Prosecutor also has to show a course 
of conduct involving multiple commission of such acts. Robinson asserts that this is an 
acceptable reading of the jurisprudence here. The weakness in his argument is that it runs 
against the Tactic decision, which said that "if acts occur on a widespread or systematic 
basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts". 194 The Tadk judgment also said, in 
relation to the requirement that the acts are directed against a civilian population "either a 
finding of widespreadness... or systematicity 
... 
fulfils this requirement". 195 It would 
appear that the threshold is slightly higher, the Tactic judgment said that although it is 
correct that isolated, random acts should not be crimes against humanity, "[e]ven an 
isolated act can constitute a crime against humanity if it is the product of a political 
192 Robinson, supra n. 54, p. 47. 
193 Ihd, p. 48-50. This may supported by the ICTR, who, in Akayesu said that systematic acts require 
"thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common plan on the basis of a 
common policy involving substantial public or private resources" ProseaerrvAkayesu, judgment, 2 September 
1998, ICTR-96-4-T, paras 580. See also Robinson, ibid, p. 50. He asserts that a policy is more flexible, given 
that Tadic said a policy need not be formalised. Even so, Tadic also took the view that systematicity means 
"that a pattern or methodical plan is evident" (supra n. 96, para 648), and importantly, that either the 
widespread or systematic nature of the acts demonstrate a policy to commit them (para 653). Also the ILC 
commentary to the draft code of 1996 claimed "in a systematic manner mean[s] pursuant to a preconceived 
plan or policy" Report of the ILC on the work of its Forty-Eighth Session, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/L. 527/Add. 10, 
p. 94, See Tadic, ihid, para 648. For a similar argument to this, achieved independently see P. Hwang, "Defining 
Crimes Against Humanity at the Rome Conference " (1998) 22 Foniham I. L. J. 457. Van Schaack, supra n. 115, 
p. 845, criticises those who suggest that the requirement is a higher one than a purely disjunctive formula, on 
the grounds that it is a lower threshold than some requested. This is no answer to the criticism that the 
formula is narrower than customary international law. 
194 7adk, iM, Para 653. 
195 Tadic, ibid, para 648. 
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system based on terror or persecution". 196 This is not the case under the Rome Statute. 
That, in addition to the inclusion of a policy requirement does in fact raise the threshold 
from that asserted by Tadic, the most recent and most authoritative pronouncement on 
the matter. The Rome approach may not be entirely unsupportable in international law, 
but it certainly shows a narrower view than could have been the case. It is notable that 
the US expressed the view that the threshold was relatively high here. 197 If the view is 
taken that the requirements of widespread or systematic nature are methods of proof of 
the policy requirement, then it is clear that this aspect of the Rome Statute has raised the 
threshold. It separates off a concept from its forms of proof, to require a higher level of 
proof than exists under customary law or the ICTY Statute. 
The enumerated acts, 198 on the other hand seem to represent a broadening of 
coverage, but it must be remembered that these were included against the background of 
the heightened threshold. It must also be noted that, in contrast to all previous definitions 
of the crimes, many of the acts which may amount to crimes against humanity are defined 
in the Statute. The enumerated acts begin by following the well established path of the 
London and Tokyo Charters, Control Council Law 10 and the two UN Tribunals, 
mentioning murder, extermination, enslavement and torture. 199 To the well accepted 
modality of crimes against humanity, of deportation, the Statute adds "or forcible transfer 
196 Ibid para 649, citing the Report of ILC Special Rapporteur D. Thiam, (1986) YB. LL. C Vol II, UN Doc. 
A/GN. 4/466, para 89. On Tadic here, see W j. Fenrick, "The Development of the Law of Armed Conflict 
through the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1998) 3 
J. A. CL. 197, pp. 215-219. 
197 Scheffer, supra n. 53, p. 16. 
198 On which see, for pre-Rome discussion, Zimmerman, supra n. 102, pp. 179-186, Hall, supra n. 102, pp. 126- 
127. For the Rome negotiations and for commentary see Robinson, supra n. 54, pp. 52-56. 
199 Article 7(1)(a)(b)(c)(e). Extermination is said to include "intentional infliction of conditions of life interalia 
the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population" (based partially on a Cuban suggestion A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 30). See generally Hall & Boot, in 
Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 115, pp. 49-55. Enslavement is said to be "the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children". This is slightly wider than existing specialised treaty prohibitions on 
trafficking which tend to focus only on women and children, (Hall, Ad pp. 80-81). In another way, it may be 
more limited that customary international law. In the general part, by focusing on the act of enslavement 
rather than the slavery type of status, it excludes various slavery-type practices previously accepted as crimes 
against humanity, see Hall, ibid p. 54. Torture is fairly broadly defined, (Artide(2)(e)) excluding, for instance 
the Torture Convention requirements of purpose behind the torture and it being committed by, or with the 
consent of a State official. (1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, (GA Resolution 39/46, UN Doc. A/39/51), see Hall, ibrd p. 84. One possible limit 
is that it is said not to apply to "lawful sanctions". This has been taken, in the final analysis, to mean lawful 
under international law, not merely national law, (See Hall, ibid, p. 84). 
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of population". This may be a positive development, given that it includes forcible 
internal displacement, in addition to deportation across international boundaries. 200 It is 
likely that this was the case already, given the condemnation of "ethnic cleansing". 201 
There is one possible problem In the definition of this crime (Article 7(2)(d)), the 
deportees/transferees must be transferred "from the area in which they are lawfully 
present, without grounds permitted in international law". It is to be hoped that "lawfully" 
in the definition refers to international legality, as otherwise it would enable the national 
law of the State to declare they were not there legally and effectively exempt themselves 
from liability. 202 
In addition to rape, Article 7(1)(g) also prohibits "sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other sexual violence of comparable gravity". There can be 
little doubt that these acts amount to inhumane acts and their express inclusion is 
welcome, but in no way goes beyond existing international law. Both the ICTY and ICTR 
in the various cases have stated that serious sexual assaults were prohibited as other 
inhumane acts. 203 In addition, sexual slavery comes under the clearly existing heading of 
slavery; all the acts mentioned in 7(1) (g) are likely to come under the heading of torture, 
some may also be forms of genocide. 204 One possible limit in the definitions is that forced 
pregnancy is only included if it involves "the unlawful confinement, of a woman made 
forcibly pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population 
200 See Hall, ibid. pp. 55-57, pp. 81-82. 
201 A. De Zayas, "International Law and Mass Population transfers" (1974) 16 Haravd I. L. J. 207, pp. 252-257, 
thinks they probably would already come under the Nuremberg Principles, but is not totally sure. This, though 
was the position over twenty five years ago, and the specific condemnation of ethnic cleansing militates in 
favour of this being merely a clarification of the "inhumane acts", if not deportations part of the Nuremberg 
definition. 
202 Hall, supra n. 115, pp. 81-82, states that the "lawfully present" must refer to international law, if this is so, the 
drafters could have been more explicit. On the other hand, it is dear from the "lawful sanctions" part of the 
definition of torture, this refers ultimately to international aw. See Hall. iläd p-84- 
203 K. D. Askin, "Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: 
Current Status" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 97, pp. 102-103 claims Tadicwas convicted of a crime against humanity for 
his part in assaults some of which may have had a sexual nature (supra n. 96, paras 729-730). although the 
particular assaults they mention are not all sexual, it is clear they accepted that these could amount to crimes 
against humanity. They certainly accepted this in Prmsautorv Funmdzijä, judgment, 10 December 1998, IT-95- 
17/1-T, paras 168-69,186 and Akaynsu, supra n. 193, paras 690-692, See generally Askin, ibid pp. 99-115. 
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or carrying out other grave violations of international law". This intent requirement was 
placed in the Statute to avoid an impasse between the Vatican and certain womens' rights 
groups due to its possible effect on abortion laws. 205 Avoiding such an eventuality was 
certainly right, but to add an intent requirement dangerously close to a discriminatory 
intent, or to make it contingent on being related to other violations of international law, 
may have been a step too far in diluting the prohibition. 
The last express examples of the "murder-type" crimes against humanity206 are 
contained in Article 7(1)(i) and 7(1)(j). The crime of "enforced disappearance of 
persons"207 is beyond doubt a crime against humanity. It was described as such in the 
1992 UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, 208 
and was included in the 1996 ILC Draft Code. 209 In reality, disappearances have a longer 
history as crimes against humanity. In Nuremberg, Keitel was convicted for promulgating 
the "Nacht und Nebel" decree, which essentially instituted a system of disappearances. 210 Its 
inclusion is welcome, but it is in no way in advance of international law. 
Article 7(1) 0) creates the crime of Apartheid, which had been declared (by the General 
Assembly) a crime against humanity in 1965.211 It was included in both the Non- 
204 Hall, supra n. 115, pp. 62-63. Rape has been accepted as torture for example in Akaypsu, supra n. 193, para 597, 
Funaxdzija, supra n. 203, paras 158-164; Pms«utorvDelalic, Mucic, Delic, & Landes, judgment, 16 November 1998, 
IT-96-21-T, (Celebici) paras 494-496. Enforced sterilization, within the idea of genocide as measures intended 
to prevent births within the group. US v Brandt 3 T. W. C. 171 accepted that sterilization experiments were 
crimes against humanity. (See Hall, ibid. 
205 von Hebel & Robinson, supra n. 100, p. 100. See also Article 7(2) (f), which also states that it does not affect 
national abortion laws, to avoid conflict with the Holy See. 
206 It is generally accepted that there are two types of crime against humanity, the "murder type", which are 
made up of those correlating to the crimes mentioned in Article 6(c) of the London Charter before the phrase 
"before or during the war" and the "persecution type crimes against humanity, which are those appearing after 
that phrase which are subject to a different intent requirement. See Schwelb, supra n. 115, p. 190 (although 
Schwelb is doubtful if this differential is helpful here). 
207 Defined in Article 7(2) (i) as "the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, 
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention 
of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time". The last part may 
be an 
unnecessary addition. The UN Declaration does not include the requirement of a "prolonged period of time". 
208 GA Res 47/133, UN Doc. A/RES/47/133. See also UN Doc E/CN. 4/1995/36 para 45, Inter American 
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons 9 June 1994, (1994) 33 I. L. M. 1529. 
209 See generally, Hall, supra n. 115, p. 72. 
210 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 229, See Hall, ibid., p. 71. 
211 GA Resolution 2054, UN Doc. A/6014 p. 16. 
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Applicability, 212 and Apartheid Conventions213 as a crime against humanity. There were 
doubts about its customary nature, but it was included in the 1991 draft code. 214 Even 
with its dubious claim to customary status, its inclusion in the Statute, as forurrilated, is 
probably not in advance of international law. Apartheid is defined in Article 7(2) (h) as 
"inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in 
the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by 
one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention 
of maintaining that regime. " This is narrower than the Apartheid Convention 
definition, 215 and it is difficult to envisage any crime covered under this definition that 
would not be caught under the other "murder-type" or "persecution type" crimes against 
humanity. 
The final "murder-type" crime against humanity is the catch-all provision in 7(1) (k) 
of "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or mental or physical health". This is in accordance with the 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, ICTY and ICTR Statutes. Equally, this formulation adds the 
condition beginning "intentionally causing great suffering". 216 This is in accordance, inter 
alia, with understanding of its Statute by the ICTY in the Tadic case, which does not 
expressly include the requirement. 217 It is narrower than the ICTY's formulation in the 
Celebici case however, omitting the additional protected characteristic of human dignity. 218 
The Celebici judgment may not represent international law here, and the Statute is 
probably broadly coterminous with international law on this point. 
212 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, GA Resolution 2931,754 UNIS 75, Article 1(b). This caused much controversy in the negotiations 
and is partially responsible for the relatively low number of ratifications this convention has achieved. See R. H. 
Miller, "The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity" (1971) 65 A. J. I. L. 476, pp. 491-492. 
213 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1015 
UJ%M 245, Article 1. 
214 See L. S. Sunga, The Emerging Systen of Intemational Cranmal Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) pp. 119-123. On 
Apartheid generally see R. S. Clark, "Apartheid" in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 57,643. 
215 Hall, supra n. 115, pp. 87-90. 
216 See Hall ibid, pp. 75-78. 
217 Tadk supra n. 96, para 730. 
218 Ibid para 509 See Hall, supra n. 115, p. 79. 
243 
The Statute also covers the other, "persecution-type" crimes against hum nity. 219 
Article 7(1) (f) defines them as "[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity 
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender... or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any 
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court". The 
definition is at once both codificatory, a positive development, and possibly a little 
retrogressive. The codificatory part is clear from the inclusion of political, racial, religious 
or ethnic grounds. 220 There are two new categories, and a new catch-all provision. The 
first of these is cultural grounds: this had previously only appeared in the 1954 and 1991 
Draft Codes, but not in the 1996 Code or any Tribunal Statute. 221 The second is gender, 
which has never appeared previously in definitions of crimes against humanity, although 
its appearance was overdue. The final ground is a catch-all, albeit one with a high 
threshold. 222 This threshold is new. There were concerns in Rome though, that an activist 
court could use this crime to delve very deeply into the policies and acts of States, 
becoming, in effect, a human rights guardian rather than an enforcer of international 
criminal law. 223 So a limit was introduced. To be prosecutable under the Statute the acts 
must be connected to acts referred to in the rest of the paragraph, or any other crime in 
the jurisdiction of the court. 224 This requirement is probably not present in customary 
international law, although it is not without support. Still, it is unlikely that it will be of 
practical import unless the court began to act in a very adventurous way. 225 
In all, the definition of crimes against humanity in the Statute is a curious mixture of 
progressive development, regression and codification. The introduction of new express 
acts such as disappearances is welcome, if only as it clarifies their inclusion. The increased 
219 Their inclusion was not controversial, as they had previously appeared in the London and Tokyo Charters, 
the 1954 and 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes, and the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. See Boot, supra n. 115, pp. 66-67. 
220 Except ethnic, (which only appears in the ICTR Statute (but is subsumed under racial (Boot, ilid, p. 69. )) 
These all appear in the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs' Charters, and both UN Tribunal Charters. 
221 Boot, ibid. p. 68- 
222 ibid p. 70-71. 
223 Robinson supra n. 54, p. 53-54. 
224 See Boot, supra n. 115, pp. 71; Robinson, ibid, pp. 54-55. 
225 Robinson, ibid, p. 55. 
244 
protection on grounds of gender and protection from sexual crimes is particularly 
welcome. Against this must be placed the definitions of some of the offences, which are 
more restrictive than current customary international law. Although, by virtue of Article 
10 the definitions in the Statute are said not to affect custom, it is likely that they will do 
so, or at least affect the domestic incorporations of the offences. The Statute definitions 
will in all likelihood become the accepted definitions of offences, particularly as they are 
the first widely drafted expressions of the offences. 
Still, the definition could have been worse, and it has been generally welcomed as a 
"modernized and clarified" definition, which provides a sound basis for prosecution. 226 
What can be seen, even if this is accepted, is an increased desire by States to restrain the 
ICC from exercising autonomous judgment on what amounts to a crime against 
humanity. Creating a detailed elaboration of almost all aspects of crimes against humanity 
did this, although it cannot be doubted that in many areas, definitional precision was 
required. Crimes against humanity were the most ill defined of international crimes, low 
in legitimacy by the yardstick of determinacy. There was a price to pay for this clarity 
though, in particular the raising of the threshold for all crimes against humanity means 
that the definition is less inclusive than customary international law. Therefore States can 
be seen to have taken a very different approach in drafting the Rome Statute to that taken 
in the ICTY's Statute drafting and (to a lesser extent) that of the IC R, where the 
Tribunals were given the power to explore the parameters of responsibility here. It is also 
clear that a far less expansive view of customary law was taken than in 1945 for the IMTs, 
where the very vague definitions were imposed, arguably in excess of the international law 
existing at the time. 
226 ibid pp. 56-57. 
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GENOCIDE 
Genocide was not expressly included in the jurisdictional provisions of first two 
IMTs. It was mentioned in the Nuremberg indictment, and some of the Prosecutors' 
speeches, 227 but was not charged separately to crimes against humanity, and there was no 
mention of the word in the IMT judgment. 228 General Assembly Resolution 96(1) began 
the official process of expressly creating the offence of genocide in its own right, 229 
declaring that "genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims 
of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world". 230 The Genocide 
Convention was promulgated in 1948, and within three years the ICJ had declared it 
reflective of custon1231 
Given the Convention's background and the conflicts leading up to their creation, 
the inclusion of genocide in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes was not only uncontroversial, 
but inevitable. Both Statutes adopted zerbzt n the definition from Article II of the 
Genocide Convention. 232 The largest difference of opinion involved in the creation of the 
ICTR's jurisdiction was the Rwandan contention to the Security Council that genocide 
should be the only crime in the ICTR's jurisdiction. "' In the negotiations leading up to 
the Rome Conference there were a few suggestions that the groups against which the 
227 M Shaw, "Genocide and International Law" in Y. Dinstein (ed. ) Intemathnal Law at a Tine of Perplexity (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989) 797, notes, p. 799,1 Nuremberg IMT Proceedings (Nuremberg, 1947) 
pp. 43-44. 
228M Lippman, "The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Fifty Years Later" (1998) 
15 Arizona J. I. & CL. 415 pp. 426-427, see also J. Kunz, "The United Nations Convention on Genocide" (1949) 43 A. J. I. L. 738; le Blanc, supra n. 29; Bryant & Jones, supra n. 29; Ratner & Abrams, supra n. 4, Chapter 2; 
A. K. Kuhn, "The Genocide Convention and State Rights" (1949) 42 A. J. I. L. 498; M. Lippman, "The 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Forty-Five Years Later (1994) 8 Tenple I. & 
CL. J. 1; D. D. Ntanda-Nsereko, "Genocide, A Crime Against Mankind" in McDonald & Swaak-Goldman 
(eds. ), supra n. 141; M. Lippman, "Genocide" in Bassiouni (ed. ), supra n. 589. Interesting reviews of the UN 
tribunal's jurisprudence may be found in A. K. A. Greenawalt, "Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a 
Knowledge Based Interpretation" (1999) 99 Colwnbia L. R. 2259 and G. Verdirame, "The Genocide Definition 
in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals" (2000) 49 LCL. Q 579. 
229 The groundbreaking work of Raphael Lemkin, in Axis Rule in Qxupiei Europe (New York: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1944) was, of course the work of a private individual. 
230 GA Resolution 96(I), UN Doc. A/64/Add. 1 p. 189. It is important to note that the groups protected by the 
prohibition of genocide in Resolution are wider than those in the Genocide Convention, as the resolution 
includes "political or any other groups", a phrase absent from Article II of the Genocide Convention, which 
has a closed list, not including, inter at a, political groups. See Lippman (1994), supra n. 228, pp. 27-30. 
231 Rmnanbw to the Concrrnion on tl e Pnwakn and Pr i4yr at of the Crone of Genaide Case (1951) ICJ Rep. 15. 
232 ICTY Article 4, ICR Article 2. See Secretary-General's Report, supra n. 46, para 35. 
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discriminatory intent must rest should be extended to cover other groups, such as those 
defined by reference to gender, culture or social criteria. 234 Although these proposals have 
some merit, 235 it was considered that the Convention definition was too settled to reopen 
now, and thus at the Rome Conference a "quick and unanimous" decision was taken to 
define it as in the convention. 236 The only difference between the Rome Statute and 
Genocide Convention definitions is that the ancillary crimes in Article II of the Genocide 
Convention are separated off into a separate section in the Statute. 237 Here there is little 
to comment upon, except that the post-1948 history of genocide shows how a 
convention, which arguably contains a definition of an offence narrower than previous 
formulations, will supersede the wider previous law, and become the accepted definition. 
Once this has occurred, it is very unlikely that such a definition will be reopened, as those 
seeking to reopen the definition will be countered with a "Pandora's box" counter 
argument. 
WAR CRIMES 
NUREMBERG AND TOKYO IMTS 
The first provision relating to war crimes in this study is Article 6(b) of the London 
Charter. This granted the Nuremberg IMT jurisdiction over war crimes, which it defined 
as "violations of the laws and customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be 
limited to, murder, ill treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war 
233 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 7, p. 164 said this was rejected as it would be one sided, and RPF atrocities had to 
also be at least theoretically under the ICTR's jurisdiction. See also Schraga & Zacklin, supra n. 50, p. 508. 
234 Politi, supra n. 102, p. 124, Hall, supra n. 160, p. 180, Hall supra n. 102, p. 126, Report, supra n. 101, Vol II pp. 56- 
57, Vol I, p. 17). 
235 See e. g. Lippman (1998), supra n. 228, pp. 464-465, antra Shaw, supra n. 227, p. 808-9 who notes that they are 
not immutable groups. He has a very powerful argument, but one problem it raises though, that racial/ethnic 
or religious conflicts can all too easily be alleged to be political, he accepts the problem, but does not appear to 
give much weight to it. 
236 Arsanjani supra n. 103, p. 30. 
237 Article 25. See Sarooshi, supra n. 109, p. 397. 
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or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. " 
This was the least controversial charge at the Nuremberg IMT: no one questioned its 
legality. 238 The law of war crimes has a very long and rich history. 239 Humanitarian law's 
penal aspects had been consistently reaffirmed prior to World War II. 240 For example, it 
was accepted by the 1919 Commission that war crimes were punishable by belligerents, 241 
a position taken up by the Treaty of Versailles (Article 228). In the Leipzig trials, the 
German Supreme Court accepted that international law created liability for war crimes. 242 
During WWII, at one point the Wehrmacht asserted that the Hague regulations imposed 
only State liability, but Germany tried (or planned to try) Allied soldiers of various 
nationalities for war crimes during the war. 243 In relation to the definition two things must 
be noted. First, the listed acts are basically uncontroversial, they generally reflect acts 
identified in the 1919 Commission report as war crimes. 244 Secondly, the list is open- 
ended and thus the Nuremberg IlVIT was entitled to add all other violations of the laws 
and customs of war it thought were applicable245 The Tokyo Charter granted even 
further powers to the Tokyo IMT to determine what amounted to a war crime, as its 
jurisdictional provision defined war crimes as "violations of the laws and customs of 
238 Wright, supra n. 157, p. 59. 
239 See, for example, H. McCoubrey, buematianal Hu, narutar&m Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2nd ed., 1998) pp. 8- 
32; C. Greenwood, "Historical and Legal Basis" in D. Fleck (ed. ) Handlok of Hwitmtarian Law in Annd 
Cor its (Oxford: OUP, 1995) 1, pp. 12-23; L. C. Green, The Contenporary Law of Annd Co4ict (Manchester. 
MUP, 2nd ed., 2000) chapter 2. 
240 G. Komarow, "Individual Responsibility Under International Law: The Nuremberg Principles in Domestic 
Legal Systems" (1980) 29 LCL. Q 21, p. 22 is only exaggerating a little when he asserts that it has been 
recognised "since time immemorial". Vitoria, Grotius, Moser and Wolff all supported this position, see H. 
Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Criminals" (1944) 21 B. YB. LL. 58, p. 61. In 
the late 19th Century, the Institute of International Law confirmed there was individual liability for violations 
of the laws of war, as did Holland (the writer), see Lauterpacht, ibid. p. 62. 
241 1919 Commission, supra n. 67, pp. 434-436. 
242 Llandomy Castle (1921) 15 A. J. I. L. 708 See McCormack, supra n. 120, p. 50; On the trials generally, see 
Woetzel, supra n. 57, pp. 31-34; S. Glueck (WarCrinvzals), supra n. 57, pp. 31-34. 
243 See A. de Zayas, supra n. 126, pp. 91-92; This refrain relating to the alleged non criminal nature of violations 
of the Hague Convention and Regulations was repeated by some German authors after the war, but has been 
generally rejected. See K. R. Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the 
Yugoslav War Crimes Trials" (1995) 14 Dickinson J. I. L. 57, pp. 71-72. See Oppenheim 7th ed. supra n. 57, p. 579 
244 Supra n. 67, pp. 435-436. The killing of hostages is not expressly included, but could be covered by others in 
their list (particularly imposing collective penalties). 
245 This they did, for example claiming that all the Hague Regulations were customary, Nuremberg IMT 
Judgment, supra n. 4 p. 248. 
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war". It can be seen that the provision left the decision relating to what amounted to a 
war crime, and the definitions given to them, entirely to the discretion of the court. 246 
ICTY 
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute grants the ICTY jurisdiction over: 
"persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or 
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: 
(a) wilful killing; 
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; 
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly 
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile 
power; 
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and 
regular trial; 
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; 
(h) taking civilians as hostages". 247 
246 It is perhaps, therefore ironic that they took a less expansive view of customary international law, stating 
that only parts of the Hague Rules and 1929 Geneva Convention were customary see Tokyo IMT Judgment, 
p. 48,442. McCoubrey notes that the Tokyo Charter definition may actually be the best of the existing 
definitions, H. McCoubrey "War Crimes Jurisdiction and a Permanent International Criminal Court: 
Advantages and Difficulties" (1998) 3 J. A. CL. 9, p. 18. 
247 This basically adopts the language of Article 147 GCIV (Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 44, p. 487), but 
interestingly, as Joyner, supra n. 99, p. 83 notes although retaining the phrase "persons or property protected" in 
the definitions of acts, the phrase "protected person" is replaced by "civilian". This could be a problem, in that 
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If Article 2 is taken (as it has been by the I( YM248 as applying in the same way as the 
conventional Grave Breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions (in international 
armed conflicts alone) then from the viewpoint of conformity with customary 
international law it must be seen as utterly unobjectionable. It is beyond doubt that the 
examples in Article 3 represent customary war crimes. 249 It is perhaps unfortunate that 
the Grave Breach provisions of Additional Protocol I (APY) were not added here, as 
Yugoslavia was a party. However, as API was not considered undoubtedly customary, it 
was not put in the Statute. 250 There is an area of controversy relating to Article 2. Some 
(such as Joyner) assert that Article 2 is intended to apply to any internal conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia. This was supported by the Trial Chamber in the Tadic case, but it was 
overruled on appeal (with Judge Abi-Saab dissenting). 251 It is possible that if it was meant 
to apply in internal conflicts then it would be more difficult to bring into line with 
existing customary international law, 252 but the application of Article 2 to all conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia may have been what was intended. 
the phrase "protected person" is wider (see Articles 49-51 GCI, 50-51 GC II, 129-130 GCIII). It may be that 
Joyner was correct in asserting it showed as desire for it to be applied irrespective of the characterisation of 
the conflict. It is not, though, the interpretation taken by the ICIY. 
248 With the notable and mounting exceptions of the Trial Chamber in Plusautor v Tadäc, Decision on the 
Defence Motion on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 10 August 1995 IT-94-1-T, paras 50-53. and Abi-Saab in 
Tadic AR 72, supra n. 139, Separate Opinion; ( thici supra n. 204, para 202 and Separate Opinion of Judge 
Rodrigues in Prosa aor v Aleksot ki Judgment, 27 June 1999, IT-95-14/1-T, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Rodrigues. Most academic opinion supports the idea that it applies in international conflict alone, see 
Hochkammer, supra n. 175, p. 157; Fenrick supra n. 197, pp 199-202. S. D. Murphy, "Progress and Jurisprudence 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1999) 93 A. J. H. 57, pp. 69-70 shows some 
discomfort with the approach of the Tactic appeal here, and asserts their approach was "narrow" and "perhaps 
reasonable minds can differ on the interpretation of Article 2" ibid p. 70, Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 44, 
pp. 441-479 look at the conflict and say it should be treated as international. 
249 Secretary-General's Report, supra n. 46, para 37 Tadic AR 72, supra n. 139, para 83; Fenrick, supra n. 197, 
p. 199, T. Meron, "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law" (1987) 81 A. J. I. L. 348. 
250 Schraga & Zacklin, supra n. 44, p. 364. 
251 Note that in the decision of the Supreme Court (Chile) Rol 469,9 September 1998 the Chilean Supreme 
Court determined the Geneva Conventions Applied to the (internal) situation in Chile as an internal decree 
had declared a state or time of war. 
252 This was the bone of contention between judge Abi-Saab and the majority in Tadic AR72, supra n. 139, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab. It was also the position of the US in its ani is curiae brief in the Tactic 
case, see Tactic, ibid, para 83. See also S. Boelaert-Suominen, "Grave Breaches, Universal Jurisdiction and 
Internal Armed Conflicts: Is Customary Law Moving Towards a Uniform Enforcement Mechanism for all 
Armed Conflicts? (2000) 5 J. CS. L. 63. 
250 
The Statute studiously avoids characterising the conflict as international or internal, 253 
and a plausible interpretation of the changing of the words "protected person" to 
"civilian" (and prisoner of war) was a way of perpetuating the purposeful silence of the 
Statute on this point. 254 This, in turn could amount to a subtle hint that the Article was 
meant to apply irrespective of the nature of the conflict(s). On the other hand, the 
Secretary-General's report did assert that the Grave Breaches provisions were the "core 
of customary international law applicable in international armed conflicts". 255 Even so, as 
was seen above, the commentary does not always reflect the provisions of the Statute, 
and his later comment that the Security Council had reaffirmed that persons ordering 
such violations "in the territory of the former Yugoslavia"256 were potentially liable could 
be seen as a counterbalance to the earlier reference to international armed conflicts. It is 
possible that due to the agreements reached between the parties to apply various parts of 
the Geneva Conventions, and the Commission of Experts conclusion that the conflict 
should be treated, as a whole, as an international armed conflict, 257 meant that the drafters 
of the ICTY Statute thought that the Grave Breach provisions could be taken as applying 
throughout Yugoslavia. It is interesting that although the Appeals Chamber in Tadic 
limited the application of Article 2 to international armed conflicts, the ICIY has been 
assertive in its claims that the various aspects of the conflicts in Bosnia were international 
armed conflicts, thus ensuring Article 2 remains of use. 258 
If it is the case that Article 2 was only intended to apply to international armed 
conflicts, the same cannot necessarily be said for Article 3, which grants the ICI'Y 
jurisdiction over: 
253 See Article 5 which claims crimes against humanity are criminal in international or internal armed conflicts. 
Nowhere in Statute is the conflict determined to be one or the other, and the US suggestion that the conflict 
be determined to be international was not adopted (i/iLL). 
254 The Appeals Chamber in Tadic, supra n. 139, did not deal with the alteration of language to from that of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
255 Supra n. 46, para 37. 
256 Ibid para 39. 
257 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to SC Resolution 780,49 UN SCOR 
Annex, UN Doc. S/1994/674, paras 42-44. 
258 See, for example, Tadic appeal, supra n. 152, paras 146-162. For a critique of the ICTY's early approach see 
T. Meron, "Classification of Armed Conflict in Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout" (1998) 92 A. J. LL 
236. 
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"persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but 
not be limited to: 
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering; 
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity 
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings or buildings; 
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works 
of art and science 
(e) plunder of public or private property". 
The enumerated acts, drawn as they are from the preamble of the 1868 St Petersburg 
Declaration and the Hague regulations259 are beyond doubt reflective of customary 
international law. 260 They are, as Fenrick says, also rather outdated. 261 Unlike Article 2 
though, omissions from the list of acts are not dispositive. In Article 3, as with the 
Nuremberg definition, the list included is illustrative only, and the ICTY is thus 
empowered to add such crimes at it considers to be within in the term "violations of the 
laws or customs of war". 262 There are different views as to the extent of the discretion 
vested in the ICY. Bassiouni and Manikas claim that the principles of legality mean that 
259 St. Petersburg Declaration renouncing the use, in times of war, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grams 
Weight 58 B. F. S. P. (1867-1868) pp. 16-17; Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV, UKTS 9 (1910), Cd 
5030. (Article 23(a), (e), 25,27, and 47). 
260 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 4, p. 248 ; Secretary-General's Report, supra n. 46, paras 41-44. On 
Article 3 see, H. McCoubrey, "The Concept and Treatment of War Crimes" (1996) 1 J. A. CL. 121, pp128-131; 
Morris & Scharf, supra n. 148, pp. 69-72; Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 44, pp. 509-511; 0 Brien, supra n. 99, 
p. 646, W. Fenrick, "Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1995) 6 DukeJ. C & I. L. 103, pp105-108. 
252 
the ICTY could not go beyond close analogies to the acts listed. 263 This betrays a rather 
conservative approach to the principles of legality, which prohibit retroactive criminality. 
There seems no reason to extend the limits further than that. If the violation of the laws 
and customs of war was already criminal in customary international law, or in that 
country (for example, here by virtue of Yugoslavia's ratification of Additional Protocol 
1) 264 then there is no violation of the principles of legality when that act is prosecuted. 
The more common view of the discretion expressed in Article 3 is that it extends at least 
to all serious violations of the customary law of armed conflicts which entail individual 
liability. 265 This is the view taken by the ICTY in the Tadic case. 266 They also said that the 
applicable treaty rules were prosecutable under Article 3. This amounted to a "creative 
and progressive" view, 267 but one that seems clearly referable to the text of the Statute. 
The Secretary-General's report could militate against such an interpretation. He 
asserted that the basis of the Article was the Hague rules as interpreted by the Nuremberg 
IMT. 268 If this was the case, the provision should have been so formulated in the Statute. 
It would be unconscionably retrogressive to limit a definition of violations of the laws 
and customs of war in the last decade of the 20th century purely to violations of one 
convention drafted in the first decade of that century, and interpreted once by a tribunal 
nearly half a century before the ICTY. Too much development in both treaty and 
customary law has occurred in the interim. In the Security Council, several States 
expressed the view that Article 3 included all the law applicable to the Yugoslav 
conflicts. 269 Perhaps the most important consequence of this, though, is that Article 3 has 
been seen as granting the ICTY the right to effectively determine, at least for its purposes, 
what that customary international law is. It is the ICTY's determinations relating to what 
261 Fenrick, ibid p. 107. 
262 O'Brien, supra n. 99, p. 646. 
263 Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 44, p. 510. 
264 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 29 August 1949,1125 UNTS 3. 
265 See Morris & Scharf supra n. 148, p. 72; Fenrick, supra n. 196, pp 210-211; J. J. Paust, "Applicable Substantive 
Law" (1994) 88 Arty A. S. I. L. 241, p. 242. 
266 Tdk AR72, supra n. 139, para 94. 
267 W. J. Fenrick, "International Humanitarian Law and Criminal Trials" (1997) 7 Tra matzonal L. & 
Contartporary 1),, 97n 23, p. 35. 
253 
is customary that have occasioned controversy. This controversy mostly surrounds its 
iconoclastic determination, in the Tadic interlocutory appeal, that the "laws and customs" 
of war entailing criminal responsibility now included certain violations committed in 
internal armed conflicts, over and above the prohibitions in Common Article 3.270 The 
criminality of such violations was contested in some quarters. 271 
It is difficult to disagree with McCoubrey that the formulation in Article 3 of the 
ICTY Statute "has much to commend it", 272 and in passing to the ICTY a discretion to 
determine the extent of the customary law of armed conflict, it enabled the ICTY to 
make a lasting contribution to the law. 
268 Secretary-General's Report, supra n. 46, paras 41-44. 
269 S/PV. 3217, pp. 11,15,19. 
270 TadicAR72, supra n. 139, paras 96-136. 
271 Schraga & Zacklin, supra n. 44, pp. 363-365 The Tadic interlocutory Appeal Judgment has generated a huge 
amount of literature and controversy. Although most commentators accept the desirability of the law de lege 
f nda some seriously question whether the ICTY's position was truly de l lata. Supporting the decision see 
C. Greenwood, "International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case" (1996)7 E. J. I. L. 265; Greenwood, supra 
n. 171, pp128-133 G. H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia" (1996) 90 A. J. I. L. 64, pp. 65-67; Fenrick supra n. 196, p. 40, T. Meron, "The Continuing Role of 
Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law" in T. Meron, War Crimes Law Cares of Age (Oxford: OUP, 1998) 262, pp263-268 (claiming that (p. 268) most will accept the legal position as correct. ). T. 
Meron, "Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization? " (1998) 8 E. J. I. L. 18, p. 26 "a combination of 
assertive statutory interpretation and enlightened analysis of customary law"; L. G. Maresca, "The Prosecutor v 
Tactic: The Appellate Decision of the ICTY and Internal Violations of Humanitarian Law as International 
Crimes" (1996) 9 L. J. I. L. 219; C. Warbick, "The United Nations System: A Place for International Criminal 
Courts" (1995) 5 Transnational L. & Contenp»rary Pm Mans 237, pp. 257-260 (more cautiously describing it (p. 257) as "carefully made, but ambitious"). For opinions against the decision, see K Koschorreck & M. 
Müller, "Report on the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia" (1996) 39 Genuni YB. I. L. 409, p. 428; 
P. Rowe in C. Warbrick & P. Rowe, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The Decision of 
the Appeals chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction in the Tadic Case"(1996) 45 LCL. Q 691, 
697, p. 701 "its interpretation... sends a coach and four between the traditional distinctions between an 
international and a non-international conflict. "; G. R. Watson, "The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War 
Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction in 1- 
-awrtorv Tadic" (1996) 36 V. J. LL. 687, pp. 709-728. (Watson is probably the 
commentator least supportive of the decision, describing it (p. 709) as "as bold as it is ill founded"). It is 
notable that in this case judge Li dissented on this point, saying it amounted to an "unwarranted assertion of 
legislative power" by the Tribunal ibid Separate Opinion of Judge Li, para 13. This author's position is that the 
ICTY was generally correct, at least in accepting that certain violations of the law applicable in internal 
conflicts entailed criminal responsibility. It is too easily forgotten that the creation of the ICTR (by the 
Security Council), with penal jurisdiction over violations of the law applicable in internal conflicts preceded the 
Tadic decision by almost a year, and there is no principled reason why there could not be such liability (see infra 
p. 257). There is some possible doubt about some of the particular acts they refer to as being customary, but 
the level of supporting evidence they gave was generally higher than has traditionally been given by tribunals 
applying humanitarian law (see Meron bid, pp. 263-265, Fenrick, did, p. 40) On the acceptability of the use of 
opmio juris and practice in an interchangable way. see F. Kirgis, "Custom on a Sliding Scale" (1987) 81 A. J. I. L. 
pp. 146. As the Rome Statute showed the decision had a remarkably positive reception from States, and the 
Tadic judgment now stands as a landmark in international humanitarian law. Perhaps, like with the Nuremberg 
criminalisation of crimes against humanity, the extreme desirability of the position adopted overshadows any 
possible legal failings. It is also relevant that the controversial aspects of this case were outer, Tadic was neither 
charged or convicted for the violations of humanitarian law they mentioned which have been the subject of 
most of the adverse commentary. There is no possibility of this now for Tadic as the Appeals Chamber, 
(Tadic 
Appeal) supra n. 152, paras 83-171 determined the conflict he was involved in was international. 
272 Supra n. 246, p. 19. 
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ICTR 
The controversy relating to the classification of the conflict in Yugoslavia, 273 played 
itself out in the ICTY Statute and the discussions around it. This is not the case in 
relation to the ICTR Statute as the Rwandan conflict was clearly viewed by the Security 
Council as an internal conflict. 274 
The ICTR Statute's provision on jurisdiction over war crimes grants it jurisdiction 
over: 
"persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War 
Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall 
include, but shall not be limited to: 
(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well being of persons, in 
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of 
corporal punishment; 
(b) Collective Punishments; 
(c) Taking of Hostages; 
(d) Acts of Terrorism; 
(e) Outrages on Personal Dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
(fl Pillage; 
273 On which, see C. Gray, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State Conflict? Characterization and 
Consequences" (1997) 68 B. YB. LL. 155. 
274 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 148, p. 142. 
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(g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples; 
(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts". 275 
Some doubts have been expressed about the inclusion of this provision. Although 
Common Article 3 is generally accepted as being customary international law, and 
probably jus cis too, 276 the same cannot be said for Additional Protocol II. zn There are 
also arguments asserting the non-criminal nature of the humanitarian law applicable to 
internal armed conflicts. 278 The first argument can be dealt with quickly. Even if neither 
Common Article 3 or APII were customary international law, this would be irrelevant in 
the case of Rwanda. Rwanda was (and remains) a party to the four Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol II. There is no legal reason why the Secretary-General had to 
limit himself to law "beyond doubt" customary for the ICTY Statute. The principle nuiwn 
cthnen sine lege would not have been violated if he had asserted that the ICTY was to 
enforce all humanitarian law applicable in the conflict. The US and UK, in their 
comments to the Security Council, expressed the view that this was what Article covered, 
including the not fully customary API. 279 It is perhaps then, unsurprising that when the 
US was involved in drafting the ICTR, the resulting article reflected its view on what 
international tribunals could do, i. e. enforce the humanitarian law applicable to the 
relevant conflict. 
275 ICTR Statute Article 4. The enumerated acts are drawn from Article 4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(g)(h) of Protocol II 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- 
International Armed Conflicts 1125 UNTS 609. 
276 GAw Cnc hg Military and Parmnilita y Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) Merits (1986) ICJ 
Rep 4. p. 114, M. von Sternberg, "A Comparison of the Yugoslavian And Rwandan War 
Crimes Tribunals: 
Universal Jurisdiction and the `Elementary Dictates of Humanity- (1996) 22 Brooklyn J. I. L. 111, p. 134; T. 
Meron, Hwrum Rights and Hwnanitanan Nonns as Cust 'n vy Nonns (Oxford: OUP, 1989) pp. 27-37; Report of the 
Commission of Experts on Rwanda S/1995/1125 para 87. 
277 See Meron ibitLpp. 71-74, C. Greenwood, "Customary Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols" in A J. M. 
Deli ssen & G. J. Tanja, Hwnanitarian Law of Annas Conflict hall Ahead (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 
93,112-113; the Secretary-General's Report on the ICTR Statute (supra n. 50, para 12). 
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The second argument requires further enquiry. Although it is now (partially as a result 
of the Tadic ruling, the ICTR and the Rome Statute) accepted that the humanitarian law 
applicable in internal conflicts has penal characteristics, this may not have been the case 
in 1994. This has led to questions of it the use of these provisions for Rwanda was ex post 
facto legislation. It was not. Neither Common Article 3 or APII have provisions expressly 
making their violation criminal, but the laws of war have been traditionally considered to 
involve individual criminal responsibility. As Christopher Greenwood aptly points out "if 
violations of the international laws of war have traditionally been regarded as criminal 
under international law, there is no reason of principle why, once those laws came to be 
extended (albeit in attenuated form) to the context of internal armed conflicts, their 
violation in that context should not have been criminal, at least in the absence of a clear 
indication to the contrary. "280 The absence of a provision criminalising breaches is not 
determinative of the matter. This, for example was the position in relation to the Hague 
Rules prior to the Nuremberg Trials. 281 On a similar note, as Müllerson notes, even the 
hallowed Grave Breach provisions, which are accepted as undoubtedly constituting war 
crimes under international law do not actually expressly bring this result about. The 
Grave Breach provisions create an obligation on parties to criminalise Grave Breaches in 
their domestic law. 282 They are silent about criminalisation by international law (unlike, 
for example the Genocide Convention). Meron advances a similar argument, saying that 
those rejecting the criminality of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II "confuse 
criminality with jurisdiction and penalties"283, and just because Common Article 3 and 
APII do not come under the Grave Breaches regime of mandatory extradition or 
278 D. Plattner, "The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Non- 
International Armed Conflicts", (1990) 278 I. R. R. C. 409, p. 414. 
279 Supra n. 265. 
280 C. Greenwood, supra n. 271, pp. 280-281. 
281 Indeed the analogies here are worth remembering, there the laws of war, although criminal, were not 
expressly said to be so in the Hague Convention. Although there was no reason in theory why these would not 
be criminal, State practice was not abundant. The determination in the Nuremberg ITT that they were 
criminal was generally accepted. Almost half a century later, an almost identical situation arose in relation to 
treaties extending the laws of war to internal conflict. 
282 R. Müllerson, "International Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts" (1997) 2 J. A. CL. 109, pp. 123-124. 
283 T. Meron, "International C'riminal»ation of Internal Atrocities" (1995) 89 A. J. I. L. 554, p. 561. 
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prosecution does not mean that they are not criminal under international law. 284 In 
relation to Common Article 3 it should also be noted that the authoritative ICRC 
commentary notes that Common Article 3 was based on the national criminal laws of all 
States, thus increasing their claim to be understood as involving criminal liability. 285 
Still, it is the case that State practice in this area was fairly rare, although not entirely 
absent. 286 As a result; although this provision does not violate the principles of legality, it 
was a progressive interpretation of the law287 In relation to the listing itself, it is 
exceptionally important to note that despite the list being illustrative, it is bounded by the 
provisions in Common Article 3 and APII. This limits the ICTR's discretion. It cannot, in 
contrast to the ICTY, decide on violations of customary international law (or say what 
they are) beyond the provisions in the two documents. As a result it may be expected that 
the ICTR's jurisprudence on this may be of less precedential value in this area. 
Icc 
War crimes were an exceptionally controversial aspect of the Rome Statute, and were 
settled only in the final Bureau proposal. 288 This is unsurprising. While a State may be 
fairly confident that its officials will not commit genocide or (as defined in the Rome 
284 Ibid., pp. 568-570. As he notes, (p. 569) this is also supported by the ICRC Commentary, which says that for 
violations other than Grave Breaches, "[States] should at least insert in their legislation a general clause 
providing for the[ir] punishment". J. de Preux (ed. ) Cv vitmy on the Genew Co nvobn Rdath to the Tiaaneit of 
Prisoners of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1960) p. 624. 
285lbid p. 36. 
286 For some examples see the Belgian Law 16 June 1993, Nicaraguan Penal Code Libro II Titulo XIV Article 
551, Nigerian Geneva Conventions Act, 1960 (with Operational Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed 
Forces), Spain, Penal Code 10/1995,23 November 1995 Libro II Titulo XXIV Article 608, Norwegian 
Military Penal Code Sec. 108, (as amended by Law No. 65 12 June 1981) With great relevance to the ICTY, 
s. 142 of the Criminal Code of former Yugoslavia also includes violations of humanitarian law in internal 
conflicts, see Bothe, supra n. 143, p. 297. The US, German, UK and (probably) New Zealand military manuals 
can be read as accepting the criminal nature of the laws of war applicable in internal conflict, see Talk AR72 
supra n. 139 para 131. 
287 Morris & Scharf, supra n. 7, p. 127 say that the international community had not expressly made them 
criminal. However, as they also note, during the Rwandan conflict the Security Council affirmed individual 
responsibility for violations of humanitarian law in that conflict in PRST/1994/21 and Resolution 935. 
288 For the Pre-Rome discussions and controversies see Politi, supra n. 102, pp. 132-133; Report, supra n. 102, 
Vol II pp. 59-66, Vol I pp. 20-21; Hall, supra n. 160, p. 178, Hall, supra n. 102, pp. 128-129; C. K. Hall, "The Fifth 
Session of the Preparatory Committee for an International Criminal Court" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 331, pp. 332- 
333; Zimmerman, supra n. 102,187-195. For Rome proposals see A/CONF. 183/2. Add. 1 & 
A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 10, L. 4, L. 5, L. 11, L. 13, L. 26, L. 33, L. 40, L. 53 (Article 5), L. 59 (Article 5quater), L. 62, 
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Statute) crimes against humanity, the same cannot be said for war crimes, which are an 
omnipresent danger in times of armed conflict. The controversies raged around various 
issues, and it is best to deal with them in turn. First, in relation to the approach taken 
overall, the Rome Statute takes an entirely different track to the great preponderance of 
previous attempts to pass jurisdiction to international tribunals. Not least, it expressly 
covers both international and internal conflicts (albeit not in the same paragraphs, or 
form). Most importantly, it contains a closed list, thus there is no discretion in the court 
to add any further war crimes, irrespective of their applicability to the conflict either by 
virtue of treaty or customary international law. There is no possibility of a Tadic type 
decision in the ICC. 289 In addition to this, as a closed list, it can only be altered by an 
amendment to the Rome treaty, and this has a very high threshold. Thus when evaluating 
the definition, it must be remembered that it will also be the only one for the foreseeable 
future 290 
The first definitional issue is the &Vpau: Article 8 grants the ICC jurisdiction "in 
respect of war crimes, in particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as 
part of a large scale commission of such crimes". This was a compromise between the US 
who wanted the court to only deal with war crimes when they were committed as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such offences, and most of the 
rest of the conference, which wanted no such limit. 291 The result is that the court is to 
take jurisdiction primarily only over such offences, but is not limited to them. This limit 
has been welcomed by various authors, 292 and it is probably consistent with the general 
L. 72, L. 74, L. 89, L. 94. For discussion of the Statute see M. Cottier, W. J. Fenrick, P. Viseur-Sellers & A. 
Zimmermann, "Article 8" in Triffterer (ed), supra n. 102,173. 
289 The importance of this cannot be overestimated, much of the customary international law of armed 
conflicts has arisen as a direct result of decisions by tribunals, quite simply, saying that a particular rule is 
customary. Sarooshi, on the other hand commends the list, as it shows where war crimes law stands today 
supra n. 109, p. 399. The problem is, the definition is for the future, no matter how it looks now, how we must 
question how it will look in twenty or thirty years. Also, in some respects, quite simply, it does not represent 
current thinking on the law of war crimes. 
290 The Rome definition effectively freezes the definition of war crimes for its purposes, and like as occurred 
with the Genocide Convention, this may become a straight jacket to future development of the law. 
291 Von Hebel & Robinson, supra n. 100, pp. 107-108. 
292 Scheffer, supra n. 53, p. 16; R. Wedgwood, "The International Criminal Court: An American View" (1999) 10 
E. J. I. L. 93, p. 94; Cassese, supra n. 111, p. 149, (who states it would have been a welcome addition to the ICIY 
Statute). 
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limit of the court to the "most serious offences of international concern". 293 It was right 
that the US proposal was rejected, as it collapses the definition of war crimes into that of 
crimes against humanity too easily and would have led to the court having to prove the 
additional elements, which are not present in war crimes law, to assert jurisdiction over 
the offence. 294 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
The first set of offences over which the Court is granted jurisdiction was not 
controversial. Almost all agreed that Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions should 
be included for international armed conflicts. 295 They were. 296 The inclusion of other 
Grave Breaches was controversial. One of the controversies revolved the inclusion of 
rape expressly as a Grave Breach. It is accepted that rape falls within the Grave Breaches 
provisions as "torture or inhuman acts", 297 but some thought it advisable to make its 
inclusion express. This was not done. The second area of contention was the inclusion of 
the Grave Breaches in API, which the ICRC asserted were mostly customary. 298 These 
were also not included in this part. This is not necessarily a problem, since both rape and 
many Grave Breaches of API are included elsewhere in the definition of war crimes. Here 
it is clear that those offences included in this part are beyond doubt customary, 299 and a 
necessary part of the jurisdictional arsenal of the ICC. 
The second set of crimes consists of twenty-six "serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the framework of international 
law, namely... ". 300 Before examining some of the enumerated acts, it is worthwhile 
pondering the meaning of the phrase "within the established framework of international 
293 Rome Statute preamble, Article 1. 
294 See Zimmerman, supra n. 102, p. 186-187; jj Paust, "The Preparatory Committee's Definition of War 
Crimes" (1997) 8 Cron. L. F. 431, p. 432; Hall, supra n. 288, p. 332; Arsanjani, supra n. 103, p. 33. The c *au 
prompted the ICRC into issuing a public statement of its concerns See A/CONF. 183/INF/10. 
295 See Hall, supra n. 160, p. 178, Hall, supra n. 102, p. 332; Zimmerman, ibid, p. 187. 
296 Article 8(2)(a). 
297 T. Meron "Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law" in T. Meron, supra 204, p. 207. 
298 Hall, supra n. 102, p. 128. 
299 See supra p. 251. 
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law". When this provision was suggested in the PREPCOM, Paust criticised it as 
"unnecessary and confusing", given that the article deals with the laws and customs of 
war. 301 Nevertheless, the phrase remains. It is probable that it is intended to mean that 
matters such as military necessity and proportionality remain relevant, 302 but there 
remains the possibility that it means the enumerated crimes are only prosecutable by the 
Court to the extent that they are already demonstrably custom, which would limit the 
court even further, as well as go against the idea of the Rome Statute as a self-contained 
legal regime. 303 
Turning to the acts, certain parts clearly reflect customary international law, for 
example Article 8 (2) (b) ()dx) restates the prohibition of expanding bullets in Hague 
Declaration 3304while Article 8 (2) (b) (v, vi, xi-xvii) restate provisions of the Hague Rules. 305 
There are some problems here though, primarily in the refusal of the drafters to update 
the language of some of the provisions to put them in accordance with modem 
customary international law. 306 For example, Article 8 (2) (b) (v) prohibits "attacking, or 
bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are 
undefended and which are not military objectives". When a similar provision was put in 
the ICTY Statute, it was criticised as "very limited". 307 It probably does not represent the 
customary international law on the subject, which grants wider protection to areas not 
making a direct military contribution to their State's war effort. 308 A similar thing may be 
said in relation to Article 8(2)(b)(ix). This adopts the prohibition of attacks "against 
300 Article 8(2)(b). "namely" indicates that this is a closed list. 
301 Paust, supra n. 294, p. 434. Fenrick, supra n. 288, pp. 185-6 notes the vague nature of the provision, but does 
not consider it to introduce a requirement of proof of customary status. 
302 Arsanjani, supra n. 103, p. 33. A more controversial issue may be that of reprisals. 
303 See Cassese, supra n. 111, pp. 151-152. He asserts that it is possible it was put in to emphasise that these 
acts were already contrary to customary international law. 
304 1899 Hague Declaration 3 Concerning Expanding Bullets, 32 UKTS (1907) Cd. 3751. This is definitely 
customary international law, see McCoubrey, supra n. 239, pp. 232-233. 
305 Hague Rules, Annex to Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 9. 
UKTS (1910) Cd. 5030, Articles 25,23(1)(c)(b)(d)(g)(h)(23(2)), 28,23(1)(a) respectively. On their customary 
nature, see above, p. 150. 
306 For discussion in relation to PREPCOM, see Hall, supra n. 288, p. 332-333. 
307 W. J. Fenrick, "Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offence" (1997) 7 Duke J. C & I. L. 539, 
p. 549. It matters less in the ICTY Statute, as Article 3 allows the ICTY to use broader customary definitions. 
308 W J. Fenrick, "Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1995) 6 DukeJ. C & I. L. 103, pp. 108-109. 
261 
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected". This has its basis in the 
Hague Rules, 309 although there are two differences between Article 27 of the Hague Rules 
and the Rome provision. First, buildings dedicated to education are added, but there is no 
advance here, since they are not military objectives. Also, this protection is granted only 
"provided they are not military objectives", this grants less protection than the Hague 
Rules, which apply so long as the buildings "are not being used for military purposes". 310 
In accordance with GCIV Article 28 and API Article 51(7) (both of which are 
regarded as customary)311 using protected persons to render an area immune from attack 
is considered a war crime for the purposes of the Statute (Article 8 (2) (b) (xxiii)). 312 These 
acts have been a depressingly familiar part of modem conflict. Equally familiar, but more 
difficult to apply, is the matter of collateral damage (or, less euphemistically, the killing of 
innocents as an "unintended but proportionate consequence"313 of an attack on a military 
target). The customary rule is that stated in Articles 51(5)(b) and 85(3)(c) API. 314 This 
prohibits "[launching] an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated". The 
ICC will have jurisdiction over "intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that 
such an attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects or widespread, long term and severe damage to the natural environment which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated". A positive development is the addition of "widespread, long term and severe 
309 Although also relevant are the 1954 Cultural Property Convention and Articles 53 and 85(4)(d) API, see 
Arsanjani, supra n. 103 p. 33. 
310 Arsanjani, supra n. 103, p. 33. 
311 Greenwood, supra n. 277, p. 49, mntin Meron, supra n. 276 p. 66. 
312 In going beyond civilians, it goes beyond the previous provisions, Fenrick, supra n. 288, p. 253, but bearing 
in mind the protections of protected persons, this is unobjectionable. 
313 M. Koskenniemi, "Faith, Identity and the Killing of Innocents: International Lawyers and Nuclear 
Weapons" (1997) 10 L. J. LL. 137, p. 142. 
314 On their customary status see Greenwood, supra n. 171, pp. 123-125. On the pre-Rome discussions see 
Zimmerman, supra n. 102, pp. 190-191. 
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damage to the natural environment". The provision is based on Article 35(3) of API, the 
customary status of which has been controversial. 315 
A less welcome pair of additions to the definition is the change from the language of 
API which is "which may be expected" to "in the knowledge" and of the final part to 
"clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated". It is true, as Wedgwood says that proportionality is a concept that is difficult 
to apply, 316 but that is no excuse for raising the threshold. Taking the change of the 
requirement from one "which may be expected" to it being made "in the knowledge" that 
it would violate proportionality, turns the objective part of the test into a subjective 
one. 317 This is made clear by the express derogation from the usual interpretation of 
knowledge in the Elements of Crimes. Normally, the requirement of "knowledge" does 
not require that a value judgment be made. 318 For this war crime, the value judgment (that 
it be "clearly excessive") is required to be proven by the prosecution. 319 
There are two other issues raised by the wording of the provision, the "overall 
military advantage", and the requirement that the damage be "clearly excessive" to that 
315 On the controversy, see (in favour of at least a core customary status, or being close to it) C. Greenwood, 
"Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict" in P. Rowe (ed. ) 
7l. e Gulf War 1990-1991 in Intenrationzl and English Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell/Routledge, 1993) 68, 
pp. 86-88; A. Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and 
Customary International Law" (1984) 3 UCL. A. P. B. L. J. 55, pp. 76-77; G. H. Aldrich, "Prospects for United 
States Ratification of Additional Protocol I" (1991) 85 A. J. I. L. 1, p. 14; (against), Meron, supra n. 276, p. 66; A. 
Roberts, "Failures in Protecting the Environment in the 1990-1991 Gulf War" in Rowe, ice, 111, pp. 125-127; 
R. Zedalis, "Burning of the Kuwaiti Oilfields and the Laws of War" (1991) 24 Vanderbilt J. TL. 711; L. C. 
Green, "the Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare" (1991) 29 CY. B. I. L. 222, p. 232; S. Oeter, 
"Means and Methods of Combat" in D. Fleck (ed. ), The Hwnanitarim Law Applicable in Annas Wuts(Oxford: 
OUT, 1995) 105, p. 118; K. Hulme, "Armed Conflict, Wanton Ecological Devastation and Scorched Earth 
Policies: How the 1990-1991 Gulf Conflict Revealed the Inadequacies of the Current Laws to Ensure 
Effective Protection and Preservation of the Environment" (1997) 2 J. A. C. L. 45, pp. 60-61. An overview of 
the various positions is given by G. Plant, Envirorrmntal Pmtation and the Law of War (London: Bellhaven, 1992) 
pp. 15-16,21-27. The ICJ, in the Nuclear- Wegpans opinion reasserted the view that this aspect of API were not 
customary, ((1996) ICJ Rep. 4 para 31. ) see D. Akande, "Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the 
Nuclear Weaporu Opinion of the International Court" (1997) 68 B. YB. I. L. 165, pp. 186-187. The US 
Department of Defence Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix 0, the Role 
of the Laws of War (1991) (1992) 31 I. LM. 612, p. 636 did not consider this part of API customary, but like 
much of the literature not accepting the customary status, it is now approaching a decade old. The past decade 
has seen increasing focus on the protection of the environment, and it may well now be customary. 
316 Wedgwood, supra n. 292, p. 103. 
317 The latter is a higher standard and limits the article further than required by customary international aw, by 
turning what is ostensibly an objective test into a subjective one, with a higher threshold. For a discussion of 
this issue in relation to earlier formulations of the Statute see L. Sadat-Wexler (ed. ), Model Draft Statute for the 
Inte, n icnal Crinriral Court Basal on the Preparatory Qn nitre's Text (Chicago: Eres, 1998) pp. 18-20. 
318 PNICC/2000/INF/3/Add. 2, p. 5. 
319 p. 25. 
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overall military advantage. This will lead the court into very wide and difficult questions 
of "overall military advantage". It could lead to a dilution of the prohibition: the further 
away from the individual attack focus lies, the more collateral damage may be thought 
acceptable. 320 The formulation in the Statute of overall military advantage is not 
unwarranted, it is in accordance, for example, with a number of "understandings" such as 
the UK's, which state that "the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended 
to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only 
from isolated or particular parts of the attack". 321 The Elements of Crimes promulgated 
under Article 9, though could represent a move away from the customary standard, by 
not requiring the "concrete and direct overall military advantage" to be "temporally or 
geographically related to the object of the attack". 322 
Moving on to the nature that it be "clearly" excessive, this is a raising of the 
threshold. Fenrick defends this on the basis that prosecutors would be reluctant to 
prosecute unless the provision was clearly breached. 323 This may be the case, but this does 
not justify the formulation in Article 8(2)(b)(iv). The reasons he gives are the difficulties 
in determining proportionality, and the need to give some discretion to commanders. 324 If 
anything, Article 8 (2) (b) (iv), by expanding the military advantage, has made it more 
difficult to determine proportionality, and there may be reason to suspect that 
prosecutors will only prosecute when the higher threshold provision of Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) 
is itself very clearly breached, which would create a double upsurge in the limits on 
liability. The discretion could have been accomodated by adopting, as the ICTY 
320 It indicates the difficulties inherent in this area, particularly where "overall military advantage" 
is concerned. 
Bolton's comments show the politicisation here, even after their dilution: "A 
fair reading of these provisions 
leaves one unable to answer with confidence whether the United States was guilty of war crimes 
for its aerial 
bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan in World War H. Indeed, if anything, a straightforward reading 
of the language probably indictees that the Court would find the United 
States guilty. A fortiori these provisions 
seem to imply that the United States would have been guilty of a war crime 
for dropping atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki", J. Bolton, "Courting Danger What's Wrong with the 
International Criminal Court" 
(1999) 55 The National Into t 60, p. 63. It is interesting how, for many, the actions of their own countries are 
seen as apodictically legal. 
321 Reproduced in A. Roberts & R. Guellf, on the Laws of War (Oxford: OUP, 3rd. ed., 2000) p. 511, 
the German declaration is substantially similar, see Ad- p. 505. 
322 UN. Doc. PNICC/2000/INF/3/Add. 2, p. 24. 
323 Fenrick, supra n. 288, p. 197. 
324 I'M 
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prosecutor has, the test of the reasonable military commander. 325 Lastly, for parties to 
API, violations of that Protocol's (broader) formulation are Grave Breaches, thus there is 
a duty to prosecute all violations of it. This creates an interesting question of whether the 
Rome Statute is consistent with the obligations of parties to API under that protocol. It is 
relevant in this context to look back at the Kosovan conflict, which showed that States 
can limit their entire engagement with the enemy to air warfare, traditionally a fairly 
unregulated form of warfare. 326 This makes it imperative to maintain the integrity of what 
regulation there is. This has not been done in the Rome Statute. Prosecution of this 
offence will be very difficult indeed, and may well be rendered impossible by the 
provisions on documents whose surrender could implicate national security. 327 Decisions 
on military advantage and the nature of targets requires intelligence gathering, and States 
may refuse to hand over information relating to this, on the grounds that it would damage 
national security. The Rome Statute does not create a duty to hand over such 
information, 328 which could be the death knell to any prosecutions under this provision. 
In respect of the denial of quarter, the Statute (Article 8(2) (b) (xii)) adopts the 
language of the Hague Rules rather than Article 40 of API, which has a strong claim to 
customary law status. 329 The same applies to the treacherous killing of an enemy (Article 
8 (2) (b) (xi)), as defined in the Hague Rules, rather than the customary definition of perfidy 
in API. 330 Article 8 (2) (b) (vii), which adopts the Hague Rules' prohibition of misuse of 
flags and symbols (which it updates to include the UN symbol) is apparently narrower 
than the Hague Rules in requiring (as does API Article 85(3)(f)) that the misuse causes 
325 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (undated), para 48. 
326 See C. of Jochnick & R. Normand, "The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the 
Laws of War" 
(1994) 35 Haruvd I. L. J. 49, pp. 77-79,81-87; O. Schachter, "UN Law in the Gulf Conflict" (1991) 85 A. J. I. L. 
452, pp. 456-467. 
327 See Chapter 2, p. 77. 
328 J 
329 T. Meron, supra n. 276, p. 63; C. Greenwood, supra n. 277, p. 106; Cassese, supra n. 315, p. 79. 
330 Article 37, see Meron, ibid p. 63; Greenwood, ibid p. 104-105. 
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death or serious personal injury. 331 In reality, this was probably the position under the 
rules, and is the current customary law. 332 
Other parts of customary law included in the Statute are the provisions based on the 
Geneva Conventions or the customary parts of API, such as Article 8(2)(b)(x). 333 Sexual 
crimes are covered in Article 8(2) (b) (xxi. i), namely "committing rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy as defined in Article 7(2)(f), enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the 
Geneva conventions". 334 Rape and other sexual offences have long been accepted as war 
crimes, 335 despite being shamefully ignored in practice. This provision essentially develops 
Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV (GCIV). 336 Its additions are sexual slavery, forced 
pregnancy and enforced sterilization (which would in all likelihood also fall under 
8 (2) (b) (x)). All are probably caught under GC IV Article 27's catch all clause of "any form 
of indecent assault", or the Grave Breach provisions of that Convention ((Article 147) as 
torture or inhuman treatment... [or]... wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health"). Their express inclusion is helpful, and overdue. In a similar, although 
not identical, vein, 8 (2) (b) (xxi) contains the prohibition, from Article 75(2)(b) API of 
outrages on personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment. This is 
one of the parts of API accepted as customary. 337 
Article 8 (2) (b) (xxiv) deals with "intentionally directing attacks against buildings, 
material, medical units and transport and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the 
Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law". This is essentially based on 
Articles 19(l) GCI, 18(l)(5) GCII, 11(1) API, which are considered to state the 
331 See Hall supra n. 102, p. 333. 
332 See S. Oeter, supra n. 315, pp. 201-202. 
333 Subjecting persons in the hands of an adverse party to mutilations or scientific experiments not in their 
interest, and which cause death or seriously endanger health. Based on Article 13, GCHI This is definitely 
customary, (see Meron, supra n. 276, p. 45)) On experimentation, see H. McCoubrey & M. Gunn, "Medical 
Ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict" (1998) 3 J. A. CL. 133, pp. 147-148. 
334 The latter effectively adds little to Article 8(2)(a). 
335 See T. Meron, "Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law" supra n. 271, p. 204- 
336 On its customary status see Meron, supra n. 276, p. 46. 
337 Meron, ibid p. 65; Greenwood, supra n. 277, p. 103. 
266 
customary rule. 338 There are other welcome additions from API such as intentionally 
directing attacks against civilians, civilian populations or civilian objects. 339 Another 
provision drawing on that treaty is Article 8(2) (b) (xxv) which provides that, "intentionally 
using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects 
indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for 
under the Geneva Conventions. " This is based on Article 54(1) and the core of Article 
54(2) of API; both are likely to be customary. 340 The latter part ("wilfully impeding... ") is 
based on the Security Council's assertion in relation to Yugoslavia that interference with 
humanitarian supplies is contrary to Article 23 of GCIV. It is probable that this is not in 
advance of customary international law, and it is a useful clarification of the law here. 341 
The position of UN personnel raised an interesting issue at the Rome Conference. 
Some States wanted the inclusion, as a separate crime, of attacks on UN personnel, which 
had recently been the subject of the 1995 Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel. 342 As the Convention itself may not yet represent customary 
international law, and there was some opposition to inclusion, 343 a compromise was 
reached. Article 8(2) (b) (iii) prohibits "intentionally directing attacks against personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as 
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the 
international law of armed conflicts". This fulfils a dual purpose. It makes express that 
these persons are protected by the law, and ensures that the Statute remains firmly 
grounded in existing international law by limiting protection to when UN personnel are 
338 Meron, ibid p. 45. 
339 Article 8(2) (b) (i) (ii) repeat the Grave Breaches in API Article 85(3)(a) the customary status of which is 
beyond question. 
340 Greenwood (Rowe), supra n. 315, p. 81. 
341 See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 148, pp. 71-72, and the Security Council action cited therein, (especially 
Resolution 771). 
342 GA Resolution 49/59.49 UN Doc. A/RES/49/59. 
343 M. Cottier, supra n. 288, pp. 187-188. 
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entitled to protection as civilians. 344 Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) covers "[c]onscripting or 
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using 
them to participate directly in hostilities. " This comes from Article 77(2) API, which is 
probably customary international law. 345 One limit is in excess of API. That is the limit to 
"national armed forces", which was added so it would not cover such militias as the 
Intr ada. 346 This has no precedent in international law, and only serves to exempt certain 
States' or non State entities', practices from the scrutiny of the ICC. 
A particularly controversial addition to the Statute (for at least two States) was Article 
8 (2) (b) (vii): "the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts of its 
own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all 
or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory'. This 
inclusion of this led Israel to vote against the Statute (for obvious reasons)347 and some 
commentators to criticise the Rome negotiations as politicised. 348 This provision is based 
on Article 49(6) of GIV, which represents customary international law. 349 The difference 
is the addition of "directly or indirectly". Wedgwood asserts that this may not be a 
permissible gloss on the GCIV provision 350 Hafner et al respond by taking the narrow 
view of the "in the framework" phrase, and asserting that it is not ruled out by the 
Conventions. 351 Their argument does not go far enough. The addition merely makes 
express an interpretation of the GCIV provision almost universally shared by States. This 
can be shown in reference to the Israeli policy of settlements (which are an indirect form 
344This also ensures that it would be inapplicable to any military enforcement action undertaken under 
Security Council auspices. As Cottier, ibid, notes it means that it does not criminalise anything not caught 
under other provisions. 
345 See Meron, supra n. 276, p. 66; Greenwood, supra n. 277, p. 110. J. Kuper, Inxemational Law Q»ia uiig Child 
Civilians in Amami W kt (Oxford: OUP, 1997) pp. 125,127. Cottier, ihid, p. 259 notes how easy it was to agree 
inclusion of the crime, although agreeing the minimum age was more difficult. 
346 Arýjaniý supra n. 103, p. 34, Cottier, ibid, p. 261. 
347 See Wedgwood, supra n. 292, p. 99 Zimmerman, supra n. 102, p. 191. 
348 see Bolton, supra n. 320, p. 46. ("an excellent example of the politicization of what is masquerading as a 
purely legal process") Two comments may be made about this. First, as will be seen, in fact, this formulation is 
in accordance with international law. Secondly he makes no reference to the US inspired limitations on the 
law. Bolton, it seems, considers the process "politicized" when the US did not get its way on something. 
349 Zimmerman, supra n. 102; Meron, supra n. 276, p. 46. For proof of the customary prohibition of deportations 
prior to this, see T. Meron, "Deportations of Civilians as a War Crime Under Customary International Law" 
in Meron, supra n. 142. 
350 supra n. 292, p. 99. 
351 G. Hafner, K Boon, A Rübesame & J. Huston, "A Response to the American View as Represented by 
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of transfer, as the government does not forcibly transfer its population, but instead makes 
relocation to the Occupied Territories economically attractive). 352 Over a course of years, 
the General Assembly has condemned the Israeli policy as contrary to GCIV, in a series 
of resolutions passed by overwhelming majorities. 353 Thus there is little said in this part of 
the Rome Statute which has not been said by almost all States before. 
The Statute grants jurisdiction over violations of the (customary) 1925 Gas Protocol, 
insofar as it covers "axphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices". 354 It is almost inconceivable that this provision would not be put in, 
but there are problems surrounding the inclusion of it. Although the Gas Protocol 
provides the core of the customary prohibition of chemical weapons, it is incomplete, as 
there are questions over its application to non-lethal gases such as lachrymose agents or 
herbicides. 355 In addition, if the narrower interpretation of the "in the established 
framework of international law" is taken, the possible limitation of the prohibition to first 
use of chemical weapons could become relevant. 356 Both of these problems would have 
been overcome had reference been made to the 1993 UN Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons, 357 which 
prohibits use "under any circumstances" (Article 1(1)) and expressly covers irritants and 
herbicides. Reference to the 1993 Convention had been made throughout the conference, 
Ruth Wedgwood" (1999) 10 E. J. I. L. 108, p. 120. 
352 See also E. Benvenisi, The Intematianal Law of Ox trvn (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1993) p. 140 refers to 
the Israeli government as having "planned and nurtured" the settlements. 
353 A. Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupations: The Israeli Occupied Territories 1967-1988" in E. Playfair, 
(ed. ) The Aeration of Territories in Internat onal Law (Oxford: OUP, 1992) 25, pp. 66-68, for example, 
cites resolutions 31/106A, 35/122B and 39/95C. For more more recent resolutions of a similar nature see GA 
Resolution 51/133 UN. Doc. A/RES/51/133, GA Resolution 52/66, UN Doc. A/RES/52/66, GA 
Resolution 53/55 UN Doc. A/RES/53/55. The Security Council in Resolution 465 asserted the same point. 
Controversially, the US voted for, then later claimed the right to retract its vote for the resolution. The US 
position is that the settlement policy is contrary to Article 49 of GCIV, see Letter of H. J. Hansel], Legal 
Adviser, Dept. of State to House Committee on International Relations 21 April 1978, (1978) 17 I. L. M. 777. 
On this generally, see Roberts, ibid, especailly p. 67, asserting that the Israeli policy "was big, planned, 
encouraged and financed... [and]... quite simply, contrary to international law". Fenrick, supra n. 288, p. 214 
notes that the great majority of States viewed indirect transfer of population to violate GCIV. Von Hebel & 
Robinson, supra n. 100, p. 112 note that only Israel and "to a certain extent" the US. 
35+ Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xviii). Cassese, supra n. 111, p. 152 seems to accept that this could be enough. 
355 Oeter, supra n. 242, pp. 147-148; Cottier, supra n. 288, p. 241. 
356 Due to the large number of reservations relating to second use of such weapons, custom may be that 
second use is not contrary to law, see McCoubrey, supra n p. 242; Oeter, ibrd, p. 149- 
357 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, (1993) 32 LL. M. 800, Article 1(5) and preamble. On these provisions see 
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and its inclusion seemed certain. 358 Its exclusion in the final compromise package was as 
part of the quid pro quo for States who were pressing for the inclusion of nuclear weapons 
in the Statute. 359 They argued that if nuclear weapons were not included, then nor should 
the poor States' weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. 360 One 
important reason why these should be in is, unlike nuclear weapons, both chemical and 
biological weapons are the subject of a long standing express, treaty based prohibition. 
The compromise excluded all three. 
Chemical weapons are, at least, partially covered (by the included parts of the Gas 
Protocol), but in one of the most significant omissions, (which came about because of the 
final compromise), biological weapons are not covered at all in the Statute. The omission 
flies in the face of the prohibition, which was included in the 1925 Gas Protocol, and the 
comprehensive prohibition in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, 361 and being a 
staple of the Statute from the beginning of the Rome conference. 362 Their exclusion is a 
serious, unconscionable omission from the Statute. The exclusion of biological weapons 
is a specific case of a more general malaise in the Statute when dealing with weaponry. 
There is a crippling conservatism on this matter in the Statute. Article 8(2)(b)(xx) 
prohibits "employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently 
W. Krutzsch & R. Trapp, A Can' mrrtmy on the Cheni: al Weapons ConvVion (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 
pp. 6-19. 
358 See A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1 Article 5c)(o) Options 1,2 & 4; A/CONF. 183/2. C. 1//L. 53, Article 5(o)(v) 
Options 1&2 (these are the only options); L. 59, Article 5(o)(v). 
359 See Cottier, supra n. 288, p. 244; Kirsch & Holmes, supra n. 53, p. 7. As he notes, "it was well known, 
including by the promoters of the inclusion of nuclear weapons, that such a move would permanently deprive 
to court of essential support and render it powerless" (ibid). This shows another interesting method used by 
those seeking to undermine the court, by making the prohibitions so strong that they were unacceptable to 
others. The inclusion of nuclear weapons was an incredibly controversial part of the conference, particularly as 
the ICJ opinion was, basically, inconclusive on the matter (supra n. 315; See D Akande, supra n. 315; D 
Kritsiotis, "The Fate of Nuclear Weapons After the 1996 Advisory Opinions of the World Court" (1996) 1 
J. A. CL. 95), States on both sides could plead it in aid. (for earlier discussion on legality see I. Pogany (ed. ) 
Nuclear Weapons and International Law (Aldershot: Avery, 1987); G. Schwarzenberger, 7TH Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons in International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958); N. Singh & E. McWhinney, Nudmr Wezpwu and 
Cornonp racy International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989)). 
360 Cottier, ibid On the controversies see von Hebel & Robinson supra n. 100, pp. 113-116, especially p. 116. 
361 1972 UN Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological, 
Biological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, 1015 UNTS 164. It does not expressly mention use, but 
clearly implies it see Green, supra n p. 131. 
362 See A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1, Article 5(o)options 1,2 &4 (iv); A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 53 Article 5(o) options 
1&2 (v); L. 59 Article 5(o)(v). 
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indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such 
weapons are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to 
this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in 
Articles 121 and 123. " The prohibition of unnecessary suffering is a cornerstone of 
humanitarian law, underlying many of the particular rules, and being, in itself a customary 
law prohibition on such methods or weapons. 363 The prohibition does not only apply to 
those particular instances, such as have been defined by treaty, for example the Gas 
Protocol. 364 
Unfortunately the Rome Statute turns this on its head. By requiring the pre-requisites 
of a comprehensive prohibition and inclusion in the annex for the specific methods, 
weapons etc. with a prohibitively high threshold for addition, 365 States have essentially 
robbed the phrase of any autonomous meaning. It is limited to only what States have, in 
particular instances, specified as covered by the general phrase. This amounts to a radical 
inversion of the concept. Essentially, States have refused to pass to the court any power 
to declare any weapons as contrary to the provision, keeping all the power over the 
possibly controversial application of the general principle to themselves. 366 Although this 
provision makes the outlook for the prohibition of weapons look bleak, it must not be 
forgotten that even if the use of a weapon is not expressly forbidden in the Statute, it will 
still come under the jurisdiction of the ICC if it is used in a manner such that it falls 
under the other provisions. 
363 In addition to the customary 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, Article 23(e) Hague Rules contains the 
prohibition and is undoubtedly customary. See Oeter, supra n. 242, pp. 111-116; H. McCoubrey, "Mines, Lasers 
and Unnecessary Suffering" (1995) 2 LL. & A. CC. 33; Note that the Rome language here in one respect is 
forward looking, altering "calculated to cause" to "of a nature to cause". This development is rendered 
nugatory by the rest of the definition. 
364 This was the position of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case, supra n. 315, paras 78,85, see Kritsiotis, supra 
n. 359, p. 109. 
365 Cassese, supra n. 111, p. 152 states that due to the threshold it seems unlikely that any weapons will be 
included. 
366 The interpretation of the general principle is not easy or uncontroversial, and the possible implications of a 
determination by a tribunal that such a weapon falls within the prohibition are huge. For example if the ICTY 
(not limited as the ICC is here) were to declare that landmines were illegal as violating this principle, the 
repercussions for States, the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 1999 UKTS 18 (and the ICTY) would be 
huge. The debate on particular weapons, such as landmines, blinding laser weapons, was controversial, see 
Wedgwood, supra n. 292, pp. 98-99. Arsanjani, supra n. 103, pp. 34-35 notes that many States were dubious about 
an open ended provision here, preferring to limit it. 
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NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
As mentioned above, the Rome Statute does not restrict itself to international 
conflicts, but also provides for the prosecution of certain war crimes committed in 
internal armed conflict. The inclusion of provisions relating to internal armed conflicts 
was controversial, at least for prohibitions extending beyond Common Article 3.367 That 
said, the matter was far less controversial than it would have been ten years ago. The 
creation of the ICTR expressly for internal armed conflict, together with the Tadic 
jurisdiction judgment have revolutionised the law in this area, making some kind of 
provision almost inevitable. 368 Given the level of acceptance, and support for inclusion of 
Common Article 3, its presence Cm Article 8 (2) (c)) is unsurprising, but no less helpful for 
that. It is clearly custom, and probably jus cngMs, 369 thus its inclusion is entirely legally 
warranted 
One limit not express in Common Article 3, but included in the Rome Statute is 
present in Article 8(2)(d) which adds, to the Common Article 3 standard of "armed 
conflicts not of an international character" the following: "and thus does not apply to 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence or other acts of a similar nature". This language is taken from Article 1(2) API, 
not Common Article 3. APII is traditionally seen as having a higher threshold of 
applicability. It does, but the higher threshold comes from Article 1(1) of APII which 
requires the insurgent force to be under responsible command, and control territory such 
that they can implement the Protocol and carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations. The language in Article 8(2)(d) probably adds little to the requirement of "an 
armed conflict not of an international character". 37° 
367 For pre-Rome see Zimmerman, supra n. 102, pp. 196-197; Hall, supra n. 102, p. 336; 
for the controversy at 
Rome see Kirsch & Holmes, supra n. 53, p. 7. 
368 On Tadic see Politi, ibid, also see Meron, (continuing Role) supra n. 271, p. 269 "a constructive evolution 
toward the blurring of the dichotomy between and internal armed conflicts. " 
369 See Zimmermann, supra n. 288, p. 288. 
370 For the criteria used by the ICRC to determine the existence of such a conflict, see J. Pictet 
(ed. ), 
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Although the inclusion of Common Article 3 in the Rome Statute was not 
particularly controversial, the same cannot be said for the inclusion of "the laws and 
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character". One of the 
major obstacles to recognition of customary law here has been the widely held view that 
APII, the only treaty solely dealing with the law of non international armed conflict, does 
not represent customary international law 371 This view is by no means universally 
accepted: for example, Tadic is diametrically opposed to this position, because the Appeals 
Chamber asserted that "many provisions of this Protocol can now be regarded as 
declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary law or 
else having been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles". 372 The 
Tactic view is at least partially correct, as Matheson said in 1987: "the basic core of 
Protocol II is, of course reflected in common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and therefore is, and should be, a part of generally accepted customary 1aw". 373 That said, 
the first authoritative announcement of rules of customary international law applicable to 
non-international armed conflicts came in the Tadic case. 374 The effect of this case in the 
garnering of support for this category of offences cannot be overestimated. The inclusion 
of offences occurring in internal armed conflict but not under Common Article 3 is a 
positive step. This inclusion occurs in Article 8 (2) (e), which grants the ICC jurisdiction 
over "serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law... ". A 
closed list of 12 violations follows, many of which are "parallel or identical" to those in 
Field (Geneva: ICRC, 1952) p. 49. 
371 See, for example, Cassese, supra n. 315, p. 109-110. 
372 Tadic AR72 supra n. 139, para 117. 
373 M j. Matheson, "Remarks" (1987) 2 A. U. J. I. L. & Policy 419, pp. 430-431. This is concurred with by, e. g. 
Ratner & Abrams, supra n. 4, p. 95, Meron, supra n. 276, p. 72; Greenwood, supra n. 315, pp. 112-113 R. Abi-Saab 
perhaps goes the furthest, claiming that "the rules laid down in Protocol II develop and complete those in 
Common Article 3. It could be regarded as an "authentic interpretation" by the diplomatic conference on the 
content of common article 3". R. Abi-Saab, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts" 
in 
D. Warner (ed. ) Hwnan Rights and Hwnanitarian Law The Quest for Unit alily (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1997) 107, p. 113. 
374 Although the Leiber Code was in force during the US Civil war, in that particular conflict there had been a 
recognition of belligerency, thus the conflict was more akin to an international conflict. 
See L. Moir, "The 
Historical Development of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts to 1949" (1998) 47 
I. C. L. Q 337, pp. 338-350. 
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Article 8(2)(b). 375 These violations are said to come under the jurisdiction of the ICC, as 
for Article 8(2)(c) not when part of riots etc. In addition to these requirements Article 
8(2)(e) is said to apply only to "armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State 
when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups. ". 376 This iss in all likelihood, a correct formulation 
of the customary test, 377 which is broader than that enunciated in APII. APII also requires 
that an insurgent group controls territory, and is limited to conflicts between 
governments and insurgents. 378 
The acts included in Article 8(2)(e) must also be evaluated. 8 (2) (e) (i) prohibits (like 
8 (2) (b) (i)) intentionally attacking civilian populations. This provision is beyond doubt 
customary, it is implicit in Common Article 3 (1) (a), Article 4 APII, and express in Article 
13 (2) APII. It was also declared customary (with adequate support) in Tadic. 379 Article 
8 (2) (e) (ü) prohibits (in a parallel provision to 8 (2) (b) (ii)) intentionally targeting buildings, 
etc. using the Geneva Convention emblems. 380 It is likely that this is in accordance with 
custom. In Somalia the commander of UNOSOM accepted that hospitals, etc. were 
generally not legitimate targets, even though APII did not apply as there were no 
government forces in the field. 381 As in international conflict, UN personnel are protected 
so long as they are entitled to civilian status. 382 As discussed above in relation to 
international armed conflicts this can be justified as they are considered civilians. In 
relation to practice, it is clear that killing of peacekeepers in internal conflict is a crime 
under customary international law. The Security Council, in resolution 837383 mandated 
the Secretary-General to arrange for the trial of those killing peacekeepers, and no protest 
375 Arsanjani, supra n. 103, p. 32. This is an answer to Cassese's criticism that the Statute is retrogressive in not 
providing for a common core of law applicable to both types of conflict (supra n. 111, p. 150). The Statute does, 
they are merely placed in different sections. This does not alter their nature. 
376 Rome Statute Article 8(2)(0. 
377 It adopts, almost verbatim, the test enunciated in TadicAR72, supra n. 139, para 70. 
378 Article 1(1) APII, see McCoubrey, supra n. 239, p. 257. This was an unfortunate lacuna, which the Rome 
Statute does well to address. 
379 TadicAR72, supra n. 139, paras 100-102,110-113. 
380 This is contrary to Article 9(1), 11(1) & 12 APII. 
381 McCoubrey, supra n. 239 p. 263. Also, attacking a hospital would in all likelihood amount to attacking a non 
military objective, which is contrary to customary law, see Cassese, supra n. 315, p. 105. 
382 ade 8(2)(e)(1)" 
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has accompanied Belgium's assertion of universal jurisdiction over the killings of its 
peacekeepers in Rwanda. 384 Article 8 (2) (e) (iv) is identical to Article 8 (2) (b) (ix). For 
hospitals and "places where the sick and wounded are collected" it is customary as 
described above. Also to the extent that the rest overlaps with the 1954 Hague 
Convention of Cultural Property, it may be accepted as custom. 385 
Pillage is forbidden, both by the customary law of internal armed conflicts, 386 and the 
Rome Statute (Article 8 (2) (e) (v)). Sexual offences are dealt with in Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) in a 
similar way to 8(2)(b)(xxii), the only difference being that the final part substitutes "article 
3 common to the four Geneva Conventions" for "a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions". As the reference implies, this is little more than an elaboration of the 
customary standard in common Article 3,387 thus unobjectionable from that point of view 
and an important addition to the Rome Statute. Given the universal condemnation of the 
practice of "ethnic cleansing" in former Yugoslavia, 388 which was not necessarily an 
international conflict, it is probably acceptable to claim that Article 8 (2) (e) (viii), which 
covers "[o]rdering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the 
conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so 
demand" is based on widely accepted custom. 389 One of the more controversial aspects 
of the Tactic decision was its inclusion of perfidy in its survey of the rules applicable to 
internal armed conflict 390 It has, nonetheless been included in the Statute, in 8 (2) (e) (ix) 
(which uses the Hague Rule formulation of "killing or wounding treacherously a 
383 SC Resolution 837, UN. Doc. S/RES/837. 
384 The reason for the withdrawal of the indictment in the Ntw ihaga Case was that Belgium wished to try him 
385 This convention applies irrespective of the classification of the conflict. 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 UNTS 240 Article 19. In addition see 
Tadic, supra n. 139, para 127. 
386 The prohibition of pillage is expressed in Article 4(2)(g) APII, which Greenwood considers customary, 
supra n. 277, p. 113. 
387 Rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault are mentioned in Article 4(2)(e), which is viewed as an 
elaboration of Common Article 3 (see Greenwood, ibid. On the other acts, see above, at the very least they 
would all come under Common Article 3's prohibition of outrages on personal dignity, humiliating and 
degrading treatment, or cruel treatment. 
388 See D. Petrovic, "Ethnic Cleansing: An Attempt at Methodology" (1994) 5 E. J. I. L. 342. 
389 The language itself is taken from Article 17 APII, which the pre-Yugoslavia literature had not accepted as 
customary, due to the lack of practice (Greenwood, supra n. 171, p. 113). Yugoslavia probably supplied that 
practice. In addition see Tadic, supra n. 139, para 111-112, on GA Resolution 2675 UN Doc. A/8028, p. 75, 
which prohibits such transfers. 
390 Greenwood, supra n. 171, p. 129. 
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combatant adversary"). Of almost certain customary status is the prohibition in Article 
8 (2) (e) (x). This is the prohibition of mutilations or non-therapeutic medical/scientific 
experimentation. This can be seen as an elaboration on Common Article 3(1)(a) (the 
prohibition of violence to life and person, mutilation and cruel treatment), not least as it 
is clearly covered by Article 4(2) (a) APII. 
Article 8 (2) (e) (vii) prohibits "conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 
fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities". It is probable that this article is reflective if not of long established custom, 
then the emergence of a recent consensus, at the latest at the Rome Conference, that 
under 15s are not to be used in armed conflicts. 391 The denial of quarter is criminalised by 
Article 8(2)(e)(x). There is little to go on in determining the customary or otherwise 
nature of this prohibition, but the ICTY in Tactic clearly alluded to this being the position 
under customary law. 392 "Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded but the necessities of the conflict" is 
included in the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of Article 8 (2) (e) (xii). The customary 
nature of this prohibition in non-international armed conflicts has never been fully 
discussed. It may be thought that such a position could be extrapolated from the Tactic 
opinion, 393 but that may be reading that opinion too widely. Equally, as the rule 
concerned is one with at least nearly a century of applicability in international conflict and 
which is based on the avoidance of unnecessary destruction, it is likely that if the question 
391 On the possibility of treaty drafting giving rise to custom see Cassese, supra n. 315, p. 60. See, also, for 
example, 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, (1989) 28 L. L. M. 1448, Article 38; ILO Convention 182 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Adopted by the Conference at its Eighty-Seventh Session, Geneva 17 June 1999. In S/PRST/1998/18, the 
Security Council "strongly condemn[ed]... recruitment and use in hostilities [of children] in violation of 
international law, and call[ed] upon all parties concerned to put an end to such activities", this may show an 
acceptance that the use of under 15s in conflict is in contravention of international law, the Council continued, 
and "cal[ed] upon all parites concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under international law, in 
particular their obligations under the Geneva Conventions... the Additional Protocols... and the UN 
convention on the Rights of the Child, [and] stresse[d] the obligation of all States to prosecute those 
responsible for grave breaches of international humanitarian law. ". The use of "in particular" implies that 
there is other (customary) international law on the subject. 
392 Tadic AR72 supra n. 139, para 102, they mention this as contained in Mao Tse-Tung's orders to his army in 
the Chinese Civil war. 
393 7adk, AR72 ibid also mentions that Mao Tse-Tung ordered the insurgents not to "damage crops". 
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were to arise before a court, it would accept that the rule was applicable in internal 
conflicts by virtue of custom. 
What is more important in relation to the provisions covering internal armed 
conflicts though, is what is not included. The Tactic case devoted a large amount of space 
to displaying how the law on the means and methods of warfare had developed in custom 
for internal armed conflicts, with specific reference to the prohibition of chemical 
weapons. 394 None of this is included in the Rome Statute. 395 This is a serious omission, as 
it is in the case of international armed conflict, but here there is not even an analogous 
provision to Article 8 (2) (b) (xx). As the Tactic case asserted, "elementary considerations of 
humanity and common sense make it preposterous that the use by States of weapons 
prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves be allowed when States try to put down 
rebellion by their own nationals on their territory. What is inhumane and consequently 
proscribed, in international wars cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil 
strife". 396 Similarly unjustifiable absences in the Rome Statute in the provision for 
international armed conflicts do not excuse their exclusion here. Finally, there is no 
provision relating to indiscriminate attacks or collateral damage. It is clearly not the case 
that customary international is silent on this matter, 397 and modern internal conflicts are 
replete with examples of civilians being caught up in fighting. These absences are 
exacerbated by the fact that most modern conflicts are internal, and it is in these conflicts 
that conduct is in need of limitation. 
CONCLUSION ON WAR CRIMES 
The provisions relating to war crimes occur at the sharp end of the definitional 
debates, as war crimes are the international crimes which it is the most likely that State 
representatives may commit. Even democratic States, with well disciplined armies, are 
Aid, paras 119-127. 
395 For criticism see Cassese, supra n. 111, pp. 152-153. 
396 Tadic, AR72 supra n. 139, para 119. 
397 See Cassese, supra n. 315, p. 105, Tack, ibicL, para 127. 
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likely to have to deal with some actions of their forces or representatives which could 
come under the prohibitions in the laws of war. Liability for war crimes does not depend 
upon the widespread/systematic/policy driven elements of crimes against humanity, nor 
do they have the specific intent requirement of genocide. Thus their commission can 
occur without State support or acquiescence to a far greater extent than the other two 
crimes. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters both displayed a high degree of faith in the 
ability of the Tribunals to determine what the laws and customs of war prohibited. These 
charges were the least controversial in terms of existing international law. Unlike the 
other two substantive offences contained in the London and Tokyo Charters, these had a 
clear background in international law. This should not occlude the fact that the Allies 
were prepared to promulgate a very vague definition, leaving a wide discretion in the 
Tribunals to declare what amounted to war crimes. 398 A similar approach was taken by 
the Secretary-General (i. e. by the OLA) in respect of the ICTY. Again an illustrative list 
was given (in Article 3). 399 The discretion inherent in an open list has been fully used in 
the ICTY, in particular in the Tactic case. 40° Those States drafting the ICTR Statute, whilst 
taking a fairly broad view of the criminality of the laws of war applicable in internal armed 
conflicts (which they were justified in doing) reigned in the ICTR more, by limiting it 
strictly to violations of Common Article 3 and APII. 
By far the most detailed provision on war crimes, albeit in a closed list, is given in the 
Rome Statute, where States, as they were to come under the jurisdiction of the ICC 
themselves, 401 were entirely unwilling to grant the ICC any power to determine what 
conduct amounts to a war crime when it is possible that it could use that law against heir 
own nationals. It is also noteworthy that the list is almost all demonstrably within 
398 To a certain extent, of course, this was limited by what the Prosecution (who were controlled by the Allied 
governments) were prepared to contend were war crimes. 
399 A closed list was, of course given in Article 2, but as there was also the open list in Article 3. The existence 
of another, dosed list in the same document does not remove the broader power in the open 
list, to declare 
what amounts to a war crime. The list of war crimes included in the ICTR Statute must be considered, 
for the 
most part, an afterthought. 
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customary international aw, indeed many of the provisions are open to the criticism that 
they are more narrowly drawn than customary international law provides, particularly in 
relation to targeting, i. e. in one of the few areas where the law is clearly important to air 
campaigns. It is also the case that the list is woefully inadequate in relation to prohibited 
weapons, where the Statute is manifestly remiss in not providing for the prohibition of 
certain weapons whose prohibition is beyond doubt a part of customary international law. 
As this is a definition which, for the foreseeable future, the Rome Court will be stuck 
with, this is a cause for great concern. 
OTHER CRIMES 
Before the Rome conference there was only one other crime included in an 
international criminal court. This was the provisions on criminal organisations placed in 
the London Charter. 402 By virtue of these, any organisation declared criminal by the 
Nuremberg IMT was to be considered so by the signatories to the Charter, who then had 
a right to bring any person to trial and convict them purely for membership in that 
organisation (Article 10). It is undisputed that there was no precedent or basis for this in 
international law 
. 
403 Its addition was a practical response (so the authors of the Charter 
thought)404 to the large scale criminality which surrounded the Nazi regime. The IMT 
itself accepted that this was new, and approached it with great caution, describing it as "a 
far reaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless perfectly safeguarded, may 
400 To a certain extent, of course, the ICTY will have to stay within the bounds of what the Prosecution assert 
to be war crimes within the ICTY's jurisdiction, but here, there is a large difference to the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Prosecutions. The ICTY OTP is an independent, international body, not subject to governmental 
control. 
401 Unless, they opt-out of the war crimes provisions, for a period of seven years, by virtue of Article 124. 
402 London Charter, Articles 9& 10. See S. Pomorski, "Conspiracy and Criminal Organisations" in Ginsburgs 
& Kudriavtsev, supra n. 57,213; Woetzel, supra n. 57, pp. 190-217. 
403 See J. F. Murphy, "Norms of Criminal Procedure at the International Military Tribunal" in Ginsburgs & 
Kudriavstev, ibid, pp. 68-69. 
404 For a highly critical view of the Allies' later actions relating to denazification see T. Bower, Blind Eyre to 
Munter (London: Little Brown & Co., 1995) passim. 
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produce great injustice. "405 As a result, they tailored their findings so to ensure proof of 
voluntary membership and knowledge of criminal purposes for a conviction to be 
recorded in any national proceeding. 406 They also acquitted three of the six indicted 
organisations. 407 
Despite the (arguably) analogous organisations in Japan (primarily the KenZ), 408 no 
such provision was included in the Tokyo Charter. There was one proposal to include 
organisational criminality in Rome, 409 it received very little support and was quite rightly 
dropped. 410 
In relation to the permanent court, the possibility of other crimes was on the table 
from the beginning. It must be remembered that the initial revival of the idea was by the 
Caribbean states looking for a court to act against large scale drug traffickers. 411 The 
original ILC drafts all focused on other crimes, in addition to the core crimes, which at 
times seemed rather sidelined. 412 At the pre-Rome PREPCOMs the developing countries 
argued strongly for the inclusion of drug trafficking and terrorism in the jurisdiction of 
the court 413 One reason for the non-inclusion of terrorism was fairly simple: there is, as 
yet no clearly acceptable definition of such an international crime in customary 
international law (or treaty law) 414 It is interesting that this argument did not prevail in 
405 Nuremberg IMT judgment, supra n. 4 p. 250. See generally Lippman, supra n. 37, p. 35, Schwarzenberger, supra 
n. 57, p. 506. 
406 Ibid p., 251. 
407 The SA, Reich Cabinet and High Command. They convicted the SS, Leadership Corps of the Nazi party 
and the Gestapo/SD, ibid, pp. 268-271. 
408 On which see Y. Tanaka, Hidden Harns, Japanese War Cranes in Word War 11 (Boulder. Westfield, 1998) 
pp. 26-27. 
409A/CONF. 183. C. 1/L. 3. 
410 The primary, and fatal criticism of the idea is, as the Nuremberg IMT correctly identified (IMT Judgment, 
supra n. 4, p. 250), it is very questionable on grounds on individual liability, and is open to abuse. See K. Ambos, 
"Article 25" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 102,475, p. 478. 
411 R. S. Lee, "Introduction" in Lee (ed. ), supra n. 100,1, p. 2. 
412 See J. Crawford, "The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal" (1994) 88 A. J. I. L. 140, 
pp. 143. See also Levie, supra n. 99, p. 8, who declares that any permanent court must also have piracy, slavery, 
terrorism, hijacking, and drug crimes; K. Ambos, "Establishing and International Criminal Court and an 
International Criminal Code: Observations from an International Criminal Law Viewpoint" (1996) 7 E. J. LL. 
519, p. 524, who worries about trivialising the court, by having, e. g. trafficking in obscene materials. 
413 See Politi, supra n. 102, p. 122. Boister, supra n. 55, p. 27. 
414 This remains the case despite the 1997 International Convention on Terrorist Bombings, (GA Resolution 
52/164, UN Doc. A/RES/52/164), which is not yet in force, never mind reflective of customary international 
law. 
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the debate on aggression. A better argument against its inclusion is that terrorism, is not, 
currently, criminal under international law as an autonomous crime. 
The arguments on drug trafficking were different. The developed countries (in 
general) were strongly against the inclusion of drug trafficking in the Rome Statute. 415 The 
primary reason for exclusion of drug trafficking was probably not legal (although its 
opponents did place their arguments in legal form), 416 but because the existing system of 
national obligations to extradite or prosecute enshrined in the 1988 Vienna Convention 
privileges their interests. 417 Due to the opposition of many States, and the possibility that 
the Court could be "swamped" with cases better left to national jurisdictions, it is 
probably better that drug trafficking was not included. 418 Due to the strength of support 
for them though, both drug trafficking and terrorism were included in the Final Act of 
the Rome conference as possible additions to be considered at any review conference. 419 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Having considered the jurisdictional competence of international criminal tribunals, 
the trends suggested above are more than evident. Let us take the Tribunals in turn. First 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs. For the offences included, with the exception of the 
war crimes charges, it can be seen that the Allies engaged in a "tendentious reading of 
international law". 420 Crimes against humanity, although morally clearly justifiable, were at 
best an emerging principle during WWII, and it is very unlikely that crimes against peace 
415 The US was express about this, see Scheffer, supra n. 53, p. 13. 
416 One such argument was that the crimes in the 1988 Vienna Convention were too vague 
(see Boister, supra 
n. 55, p. 33) the answer to which is that the conference was capable of drafting definitions, there was the 1988 
definition, which had been incorporated nationally without alteration by many States (See Boister, ilicl p. 32). 
417 Boister, ibid. p. 36. With remarkable frankness, Scharf (a former US State Department lawyer) admits that 
the US opposition to the inclusion of drug crimes came at least partially from the US Justice 
Department, who 
did not wish to lose the revenue they received as a result of expropriation of 
drug related moneys, M. P. Scharf, 
"The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court" (1995) 6 DukeJ. C & LL. 167, p171. 
418 Cassese, supra n. 111, p. 146 describes the decision as "wise". 
419 Final Act of the Rome Conference, C/CONF. 183/ 10 Annex I Resolution E. See Kirsch & 
Holmes, supra 
n. 53, p. 7, Arsanjani, supra n. 103, p. 30. 
420 Chaney, supra n. 243, p. 75. 
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were referable to existing international law. The Tokyo IMT went even further, defining 
crimes against humanity in such a broad way as to be subversive of the entire laws of 
armed conflict, and even the Allies' hand picked judges refused to follow the dictates of 
the Tokyo Charter. When it came to the principles of liability and defences, the Charters' 
provisions existed solely to expand the former and deny the latter. Beyond these, 
discretion was left in the court to determine, for example, what the laws and customs of 
war entailed. As there was no Axis government capable of effectively resisting the 
imposition of the IMTs' Charters, the Allies clearly felt able to decide precisely what the 
law they wished to use to prove the guilt of the Axis persons in their control. Their 
attitude towards the promulgation of the Charters was simply speaking, "pass first, ask 
(legal) questions later". 
When the ICTY was set up, slightly different policies were afoot, although again, 
none of those involved in creating the ICTY were likely to be subject to its jurisdiction. 
Because of this the Security Council was happy enough to leave the drafting of the law to 
a third party, the Secretary-General (i. e. the OLA) (although they retained influence by 
giving their suggestions). Here it is not simple to see if there was a wide view taken of the 
law or not. The law at the time, with the exception of the settled definition of genocide, 
was the subject of some debate. As a result, the Secretary-General, perhaps not wishing to 
include anything which could be considered as taking sides on various parts of 
definitional debates, simply left most decisions to the ICTY itself, allowing the ICTY to 
decide, and be the "laboratory" of the law. 421 This is not only the case for the defences 
and principles of liability the Secretary-General noted, but also, and very importantly, the 
laws of armed conflict by virtue of the open-ended Article 3. As the Security Council 
members were not concerned about the ICTY working against their nationals (or indeed, 
some might say, at all), they were happy to leave the decisions on the applicable law to the 
Court, in a similar way as they had been happy to leave it to the Secretary-General. They 
421 See P. Rowe, "Duress as a Defence to War Crimes After Erdemovic: A Laboratory for a Permanent 
Court? " (1998) 1 YB. LH.. L. 210, pp. 225-228. 
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were happy to adopt the Statute, leaving many questions begging, and limit themselves to 
suggestions, even where they disagreed with the law in the Statute, as evidenced by the 
US positions on superior orders. 
With the ICTR, again there was a different context because this time the definers 
were States, and one of those asked for its comments was the State over which the ICTR 
was to have jurisdiction (even though the government was the successor government to 
that which perpetrated the genocide). In addition, as it was to be linked to the ICTY (by 
the common Appeals Chamber) differences in the law not warranted by the different 
situations (Rwanda being considered a civil war, Yugoslavia of uncertain classification) 
were best avoided. The classification of the Rwandan conflict as non-international, for 
example explains why express reference was made to Common Article 3 and APII in the 
ICTR Statute. Even so, criminalising these provisions involved an enlightened view of the 
law, but there are important differences between the approaches taken in the Statutes 
beyond this. The ICI Statute does not have an open-ended provision like Article 3 of 
the ICTY Statute, thus there is far less power in the ICTR to develop the law. This is 
related to the second point. The ICIR war crimes provision (Article 4) is not, and is not 
intended to be, reflective of customary international law (at least as far as it relates to 
APII). This means that the judgments issued by the ICTR are not of such universal 
relevance as those of the ICTY relating to the customary law of armed conflicts. 
Here the US's ideas that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute covered all the applicable law 
in former Yugoslavia came through in the ICTR Statute, with the difference that they did 
not intend it to relate to custom to nearly the same extent. The (probable) imprint of the 
US can also be seen in the higher threshold given to crimes against humanity in the ICTR 
Statute, which corresponded to their suggestion to the Secretary-General for inclusion n 
the ICTY Statute. Rwanda, as may have been expected, voted against the ICTR Statute as 
it included crimes other than genocide, ostensibly on the ground that the ICTR should 
not waste its resources prosecuting such offences. In reality, this was more to do with 
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the new government wishing to ensure that offences committed by them (as the RPF) 
which were thought to amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, were not 
included in the mandate of the IC R. As Rwanda did not have the power to prevent the 
creation of the ICTR, its view was not taken up. Even though the drafters of the ICTR 
Statute did not take up the Rwandan government's view, it is notable that there have been 
no trials of RPF members before the ICTR, which needs the co-operation of Rwanda for 
the discharge of its mandate in regard to genocide charges against the old Hutu regime. 
The Rome Statute was where the true attitudes of States were shown. Here States 
were not merely setting down law to deal with anyone else, but law that applied to 
themselves and their allies. Also, this law is to be enforced by a court who is to be 
independent of the creating States. This meant that the way to rein in the court was by 
ensuring that all the law to be enforced was defined by the States themselves, leaving as 
little discretion as possible in the Court itself. This setting down of the law need not 
necessarily be unwelcome, primarily because parts of international criminal law had, at 
least up until recently, been rather open-textured, and without authoritative 
interpretations, were low in legitimacy. 
The problem with the Rome Statute is that definitions of crimes are sometimes 
narrower than customary international law permits (or, in some cases, requires). This is 
particularly the case for war crimes, where with the closed list of frequently limited 
definitions. As Cassese notes, the drafters seemed fully aware of the more limited nature 
of the definitions in the Rome Statute, including in Article 10 the provision which is 
intended to deny the Statute any impact on the development of customary international 
law. 422 Cassese is correct; it seems clear that the Statute sets up what is intended to be a 
parallel regime, which presumes a large overlap between that law and the pre-existing 
customary regime. 423 The problem lies in the fact that there is, at least at the present time, 
several parts of the law of the Statute which are clearly in retrogression from customary 
422 Cassese, supra n. 111, p. 157. 
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international law 424 In addition, the two sets of law reintroduce some confusion into the 
law, obviating the gains in legitimacy from the codification, as international criminal law 
was achieving a coherent form through the judgments of the two UN Tribunals. 
This may be a problem now, but the long-term aspect is a problem in another way. It 
is likely that the gap between the two sets of law will become smaller, not because the 
Statute is brought into line with customary international law, but because it is likely that 
the Rome Statute definitions will come to represent customary international law. This 
may come about as the definitions of the Statute and decisions of the Court are likely to 
be accepted as precedents, 425 and the definitions of crimes are likely to be those 
incorporated into national law by signatories to the Rome Statute. The cost of increased 
legitimacy in there being a codified body of law is offset by (for the time being) the two 
sets of law set up, and (both now and later) the clear limitation of liability included in the 
Statute as a result of the demands of certain States, in which others were prepared to 
acquiesce. 
Overall, a clear parallel can be seen to the problem of selectivity in national 
jurisdictions, where the law is expressly made to apply solely to those not associated with 
the current elite, or the crimes are defined in such a way as to exclude the criminality of 
those persons. On the international stage, a far wider view have been taken of the law by 
States when the application of that law will be limited to others. This is particularly in 
evidence in the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, where, in particular the crimes against 
peace charge was in advance of existing law, and could, if unrestricted, inculpate at 
least 
one of the prosecuting nations. It is also present in the ICI'Y, where large 
discretion is 
given to the ICTY to determine the law, a power States have been entirely unwilling to 
423 Ibjd 
424 As Cassese notes, ibid if the Statute is ambiguous, the Court is entitled to apply general 
international law, 
the problem is, that in many areas the Statute is not ambiguous, and, as Cassese says, 
(iWid) the Statute is 
paramount for the Court. 
425 Cassese, supra n. 111, p. 158. 
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grant to tribunals which have jurisdiction over their nationals. 426 Although the ICTR's 
discretion is bounded, it is still there, especially in relation to crimes against humanity, 
liability and defences. Also a progressive view of the criminality of violations of the law 
applicable in internal conflicts was taken. The voting on the ICTR is also probative, with 
the Rwandan government doing its best to exempt itself from liability in the ICTR by 
supporting removal of crimes which they may have committed from the jurisdiction of 
that court. 
The Rome Statute is the clearest evidence of the selectivity by definitional restraint. 
The Rome Statute is capable of acting against the nationals of all signatories, and for 
offences on its territory. As may be expected, a moderately conservative view of the law 
was taken, certainly more conservative in relation to the lex lata than had been taken for 
any of the other international tribunals. Certain provisions are clearly more narrowly 
drawn than custom, and there are some unconscionable omissions. The discretion of the 
ICC was deliberately taken to the lowest extent possible, to prevent the court from 
independently appraising the law. With the addition of the defences as discussed above, it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the law, in particular in relation to war crimes, has 
been structured to minimise the possibility of conviction on some counts. These include 
those of most relevance to major powers, whose airforces are even less regulated than in 
customary law. That is not all though, States have, as a result of extraordinary cynicism on 
the part of many powers, left themselves free to utilise many weapons clearly illegal, to all 
intents and purposes, with impunity. 
426 As McCoubrey said, in relation to the 1994 ILC Draft statute, which had a definition similar to that 
in the 
Tokyo IMT Charter, "Whether quite so open ended a `definition' could now be considered adequate, 
especially in so politically sensitive an area, must... be considered 
debatable" McCoubrey, supra n. 246 p. 9. 
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CHAPTER 6: SELECTIVITY IN 
THE LAW 2: DEFENCES AND 
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
As can be seen, the attitudes of States are made clear through the definitions of 
crimes. This is also the case for defences and the "general part" of criminal law. ' This 
should come as no surprise, after all, both definitions and the general part are essentially 
part of the same process, that of determining criminal liability. The creators of 
international criminal courts have consistently taken a wider view of liability (and 
consequently, a narrower view of applicable defences) or have been happy for the court 
to determine the principles when there is a separation of the authority between the 
creators and the subjects, and uwm-sa when there is no such separation. To illustrate this, 
it is worthwhile to examine both defences and principles of liability. National jurisdictions 
have also been selective in both over-and under-inclusive ways, depending on who is on 
trial. 
Examples of this at the national level come from Argentina and the US. In Argentina, 
when prosecutions became politically inexpedient, two measures were taken: a time bar 
was imposed, then, to ensure all ongoing cases were brought to a close, the Ley de 
1 M. C. Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugos&th (New York 
Transnational, 1996), p. 339 defines the "general part" as "(1) definitions of the terms used in the special part 
of the statute; (2) constitutive elements of the crimes which include definitions of the material, mental and 
causal elements; (3) definitions of inchoate offences, such as attempt, solicitation and conspiracy; (4) 
conditions of exoneration, such as excuses and justifications; and (5) factors to be considered in mitigation of 
punishment, as well as additional remedies, such as compensation for victims. " 
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O encia Debida was passed. 2 This created a very broad form of the superior orders 
defence, designed to lead all the ongoing trials to acquittals or abandonment. 3 
The second example, that of the US, is best shown by contrasting two decisions, the 
Yanaashit and Mee1ma5 cases. Unlike Argentina, it was caselaw rather than statute that 
was selective in this instance. It is unclear precisely which level of knowledge the Military 
Commission required to ground liability in Ynnashita. 6 The Commission either decided 
that Yamashita did know of atrocities, or that he should have known.? This is probably 
the standard of liability in custom, 8 even if the Commission's interpretation of the facts, 
or application of the test is contested. 9 These interpretations need not detain us overlong 
here, although the Commission's decision does not seem to be reconcilable, on the facts, 
with the far-better received Toyoda case. 10 It is clear that the standard applied in the 
Yamashita case (and, in fact, those in the other post-War cases) was not applied when the 
US military justice structure was evaluating the conduct of the US army in the Vietnam 
war. In the case of Ernest Medina, the instructions to the jury by the presiding officer 
2 Law No. 23521, June 4,1987, reprinted in (1987) 8 H. R. L. J. 477. 
3 Ambos opines that the ley "perfected the policy of impunity" K. Ambos, "Impunity in International 
Criminal Law: A Case Study on Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina" (1997) 18 H. R. L. J. 1, p. 11. 
4 US v Tarn)uki Yamashita 4 L. R. T WC 1 (US Military Commission, Manila); 327 US 1 (US Supreme Court). 
5 US v Medina (1971) 43 C. MR243. The Medina case is the subject of a article written by the chief Prosecutor 
in that case, W. G. Eckhardt, "Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard" (1982) 97 
Military L. R. 1. His defence to the charge (made by Telford Taylor "The Course of Military Justice", NY 
Tuns 2 February 1972, p. 37) that the US was propounding different standards for itself to those it applied to 
others, is that the "should have known" test is "too broad and one that would subject the commander to 
after-the-fact judgments concerning what he should have known" (ibid, p. 18). This, of course is exactly the 
criticism made of the Ynnashita case, and goes no way to refuting Taylor's charge. 
6 W. Hays Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes" (1973) 62 Military L. R. 1, pp. 22-38, especially 
pp. 30-32. 
7 Parks, ibid This was the interpretation of the ICIY in Prosa rv Ddalic, Mucic, Delic & Landzo, judgment, 
16 November, 16 November 1998, IT-96-21-T. (C, ei(ebicz), para 384. 
817f4 p. 308. 
9 For opinions casting doubts upon the interpretation of the Military Commission, see M. C. Bassiouni, Cries 
Against Hwnanity in International Cri al Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2nd ed., 1998), pp. 427-431; A-M Prevost, 
"Race and War Crimes: the 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita" (1992) 14 H. R. Q. 303, 
pp. 318-319. See also, in the Supreme Court, Justice Murphy, supra n. 4, pp. 39-40, Parks, supra n. 7, pp. 33-34. 
The interpretation of the facts appeared to take the test dose to the "absolute liability" standard that some 
suggested it set down in law (for an example of this mistake see Bassiouni, i&d, p. 432). Parks notes (iäd, 
p. 62) that the Control Council Law 10 Trials are "of greater value than Yamashita in that the respective 
opinions rendered therein are the product of judicial minds rather than lay jurors, and prepared under less 
emotive circumstances; the blaze of war had died sufficiently to permit juristic scholarship providing 
necessary light for future interpretation rather than mere heat". This, from one of the Commission's 
defenders, must raise the serious possibility that there was bias in the tribunal, and of the wisdom of trying 
enemy nationals "in the heat of war". 
io US v Saneyu To yak Transcript. On Toyoda, see Parks, supra n. 7, pp. 69-73; Prevost, i&d, pp. 330-335; R. J. 
Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and the Allied National War Crimes Trials in 
East Asia" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), International Crininal Law VoLIIL" Enfrnnw? att New York: Transnational, 2nd 
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required actual knowledge of violations of the laws of war. i I Not only was this contrary to 
existing jurisprudence, but also the US Army Manual, which embodies the customary rule 
of "known or should have known". 12 It would appear that the Colonel giving the 
instructions was impressed by the argument of the defence in the Medrna case, that "I 
don't think that what is done to a Jap in the heat of vengeance after World War II can be 
done to an American on an imputed theory of responsibility". 13 
As can be seen, the narrow or broad drawing of defences or principles of liability can 
be as important, if not more so, than the definition of the offence, therefore, we might 
expect to find similar considerations applying to the general contours of liability criminal 
as to the definitions of individual defences. They do. 
DEFENCES 
Focus will first turn to defences. Defences here are those which apply at the merits stage 
of any proceedings. They do not include immunities from jurisdiction, which are not 
defences in this sense, hence are dealt with earlier in the thesis, in the sections on 
jurisdiction. 14 
ed., 1999) 109, p. 143 "The Trial of Admiral Toyoda Soemu is an excellent example of an American War 
Crimes Trial that impresses me greatly because of its qualities of justice". 
11 Instructions to Court Members, Unitd States v Medi 7a Appellate Exhibit XCIII, p. 18. See L. C. Green, 
"Command Responsibility in International Law" (1995) 5 Transnational L. & Contejrary Pivbleru 319, pp. 353- 
354. From the quotation given in Green, it could also be that the formulation required a causation element, 
which is also not required, see infra. pp. 311-312. 
12 US Department of the Army. Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual, 27-10,1956, para 501. 
13 Cited in Prevost, supra n. 9, p. 329. The racist phrasing used in the defence counsel's statement gives 
credence to Prevost's claim, did, that much of the Yamashita decision was partly based on racial prejudice, 
even though some of her assertions about the standard of liability in Ynnashita are overstated. 
14 Supra pp. 103-114. Dinstein deals with the two together, Y. Dinstein, "Defences" in G. K. McDonald & 0. 
Swaak-Goldman (eds. ), Substxuir e and Pmc&ural Aspect of Intemational Cri'nvnal Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000) 
369, pp. 384-388, terming them "defences based on official position". They are not defences at all, they do not 
go to the merits of a case, but to the question of jurisdiction. Eser makes a similar distinction to this author, 
A. Eser, "Defences in War Crimes Trials" in Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory, War Crm in International Law (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1996) 251, p. 253 They are also waiveable by States, irrespective of the views of the accused, 
which is inconsistent with the nature of a defence. 
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SUPERIOR ORDERS 
The issue of superior orders has traditionally been a difficult one, 15 although to read 
the Nuremberg IMT Charter on the matter, those thinking it to be simple may be 
forgiven. This is because the Nuremberg IIMT Charter simply provides: "[t]he fact that 
the defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free 
him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment of the 
Tribunal determines that justice so requires. "16 
The 1919 Commission effectively ducked the issue of superior orders, leaving it to 
any subsequent court to decide. 17 In truth, the case law from the pre-WWII era tended to 
support the "manifest illegality" test (i. e. that although superior orders may constitute a 
defence, this is only the case where the order is not to commit an act which is manifestly 
illegal). 18 This was the position adopted by most States and doctrinal commentaries in the 
period, 19 and it is difficult to fault the conclusion of Dinstein, that "here and there it is, 
admittedly, possible to find... traces of a trend to exclude the doctrine of repazdeat supenor, 
15 On those generally see A. Cassese, VIolaxe and Law in t/ Modem Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984) ChVII; 
Y. Dinstein, The Ifoxr of Obaiierxe to Superior Onlas' in Intemational Law (Leyden: Sitjhoff, 1965); L. C. Green, 
Superior Orders in Nat nal and Intemational Law (Leyden: Sitjhoff, 1976); Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 1, pp. 374- 
409; M. Lippman, "Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defences to Violations of the Humanitarian 
Law of War" (1996) 15 Dickimon JILL. 1, pp. 4-58; V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal 
forRwaida (New York: Transnational, 1998) pp. 262-268, J. W. Grayson, "Superior Orders and the International 
Criminal Court" (1995) 64 Noniic J. I. L. 243; P. Gaeta, "The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Versus Customary International Law" (1999) 10 E. J. I. L. 172. An interesting 
socio-legal approach is contained in M j. Osiel, : »yivzg ()das. Atrocities, Military Discipline and d Law of War (New Brunswick. Transaction, 1999). Eser, it-id p. 252 suggests a reason why there has not been enough work 
on developing approaches to defences (superior orders is an exception), there may be "psychological 
reservations" about thinking about excluding liability for crimes as serious as war crimes. That is no excuse for 
not looking into such questions, as Eser correctly notes. 
16 Nuremberg IMT Charter, Article 8. 
17 Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and Enforcement, reprinted in 
Morris & Scharf, (Vol. 2), supra n. 15, p. 438. 
18 See Rv Smith (1900) 17 SCR 561; C 'ai ru m1th ex m' Wad vrth v Shortall (1903) 55 AtL 952; Riggs v State (1866) 43 Tenn. 85. The classic cases adopting this view are the Dozer Castle Case (1922) 16 A. J. I. L. 704 and 
the Llandaa, 7y Castle Case (1922) 16 A. J. I. L. 709. 
19 See the survey by Lippman, supra n. 15, pp. 4-16. There is at least one case where the defence was refused, the 
infamous Fryztt case (see Dinstein supra n. 15, pp. 160-162). The case was heavily criticised. On the other side of 
the debate, the first edition of Oppenheim claimed there was not liability at all if an order had been given, 
irrespective of its illegality, manifest or otherwise. L. Oppenheim, International Law Vol II (London: Longman, 
1906) pp. 264-265. This was very famously changed, by Lauterpacht in 1944 (H. Lauterpacht (ed. ), Op bein's 
Innenrational Law VoL II (London: Longmans, 6th ed., 1944) pp. 452-453. 
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but these traces are somewhat blurred and indistinct, and the trend is too uncertain to 
serve as a beacon in this issue. "20 
Both the US and UK altered their military manuals during WWII, as they initially 
provided for the Oppenheim-type position of the absolute protection of orders. 21 They 
were altered, in the British case to a version of the manifest illegality principle, 22 whilst the 
US manual seemed to accept superior orders as a possible defence or mitigation23 
Against this background, it seems quite clear that the Nuremberg provision (which was 
repeated in Article 6 of the Tokyo IMT Charter) went beyond existing international law in 
refusing reliance on superior orders in any situation. 24 There is one other possibility, 
which could bring it within the fold of the manifest illegality test. This is to view Article 7 
as being limited to the situation, amounting to a pre-determination that the orders 
involved were manifestly unlawful. 25 The problem with this approach is not only that it 
would have amounted to an entirely unwarranted intrusion into the fact finding powers 
of the Nuremberg IMT (although this does not mean the Allies did not intend that) but 
also that it may not reflect the discussion surrounding the matter in the London 
Conference. 26 
Like the prosecution when they argued before it, 27 the Nuremberg IlVIT itself showed 
some uncertainty relating to this aspect of the Charter. It gave the conclusionary 
declaration that "the provisions of this article are in conformity with the law of all 
nations... the true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most 
20 Dinstein, ibicL, p. 103. These traces include The Treaty of Washington in Relation to the Use of Submarines 
and Noxious Gases in Warfare, (1922) 16 A. J. I. L. Supp. 57, never in force. See Dinstein, ilk, pp. 97-100. Eser, 
supra n. 14, p. 255 believes that there was no custom prior to the start of World War II, which, given the 
practice cited, seems over cautious. The debates surrounded what the rule was, not if one existed. 
21 Oppenheim, supra n. 19. See Dinstein ibid, pp. 46-48; Lippman, supra n. 15, p. 21. 
22 Amendment 34 to the Manual ofMrlitmy Law (London: HMSO, 7th ed 1944). 
23 Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare, Change No 1.15 November 1944. See also Bassiouni & 
Hanikas, supra n. 1 p. 375, "the military regulations of almost all States prior to the IMT Charter essentially 
had 
provided for an absolute or qualified defence of superior orders". 
24 See Dinstein, supra n. 15, p. 117, ibid, p. 118 he describes it as "high handed and sweeping". 
25 See H. McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2nd ed., 1998) p. 302. 
26 Dinstein, for example claims that it grants too much subtlety to the drafters' intent, supra n. 15, p. 
129, 
Garroway, on the other hand, makes much of a statement by Nikitchenko who asked if with such major 
criminals it was an issue of principle. C. Garroway, "Superior Orders and the International 
Criminal Court: 
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nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether in fact moral choice was in fact 
possible. "28 The assertion that it is in conformity with the law of all nations is patently 
false. More obscurely, it seems to add the requirement hat there was no "moral choice" 
to the test relating to superior orders. 29 Dinstein gives the best explanation for this. He 
claims that in reality the Tribunal was accepting that superior orders were not, in and of 
themselves, a defence under the Nuremberg IMT Charter, but expressing their view that 
the existence of superior orders was relevant to other such defences as coercion 
(duress). 30 A further complication is that the Nuremberg IMT, when discussing the case 
of Jodi, came rather close to accepting that the test for superior orders as a defence was 
manifest illegality. 31 
Still, both Control Council Law 10 and the "Nuremberg Principles" asserted the view 
that superior orders were not a defence (Principle IV). 32 This is possibly the "Nuremberg 
Principle" around which most controversy has centred. A major reason for this has been 
the relatively low uptake for this position in national 1aws. 33 This need not be fatal to the 
claim that the Nuremberg provision represents the law, but the position is weakened by 
the presence of contrary practice. This contrary practice began in the Nuremberg 
"subsequent proceedings", in which US tribunals, in the Einsatzgruppe "4 and High 
(Sb rgnX05 Cases seemed to express the manifest illegality test, as did certain other 
judgments in the direct post-War period. 36 Expressions of that test have continued in 
Justice Delivered or justice Denied? " (1999) 3361. R. R. C 785, p. 787. There is no evidence that his view was 
accepted, and it was not by the Nuremberg IMT. 
27 See Gaeta, supra n. 15, p. 180. 
28 Nuremberg IMT "Judgment and Sentences" (1947) 41 A. J. I. L. 171, p. 221. 
29 See e. g. M. Greenspan, The Modem Law of Land Warfare (Berkley: University of California Press, 1959) p. 493. 
30 Dinstein, supra n. 15 p. 152. This is supportable by the judgment in relation to Jodl, Nuremberg IMT 
Judgment, supra n. 28, p. 316, see Lippman, supra n. 15, p. 19. 
31 IMT Judgment, ibid 
32 GA Resolution 177, UN Doc. A/ 1316. 
33 Gaeta cites (supra n. 15, p. 179), Argentina, Austria, Iran, Romania and the UK. Also to some extent, France, 
Norway and the Netherlands (ibid. pp. 179-180). Also the Israeli Law (on Nazi Crimes) rejects the defence 
Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 1950,57 Sefer Hachukim, 9 August 1950,281. 
34 US v Ohlendrnf 4 T. W. C. 411 pp. 470-471. 
35 USvwn Leeb 12 T. WC 1 pp. 88-89. 
36 For example, US v Masuda (The Jaluit Atoll Case) 1 L. R. T. W. C. 71, see Lippman, supra n. 15, p. 35. For more 
of such cases see generally, Green, supra n pp. 283-348; Lippman, ibid, pp. 21-34; Gaeta, supra n. 
15, p. 177. 
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various cases up to the present day, 37 although the defence was generally rejected, on the 
facts at least. 38 In the sphere of international legislation, suggestions were made to include 
provisions relating to superior orders. All were rejected as they did not gather enough 
support. 39 The ILC has wavered on the total exclusion of the defence, 4° and academic 
opinion has been split. The schism is between those asserting the manifest illegality test, 41 
and those adopting the position that superior orders are never a defence per se, but may be 
a relevant factor for other defences, such as duress. 42 In practice, the difference may not 
be particularly important as the orders in cases coming to trial will probably be considered 
manifestly illegal. 43 That does not mean it will never be so, particularly in matters such as 
targeting, where the application of the rule to the facts may be difficult. By the early 
1990s, the simple fact was that either position could be asserted and receive a fair level of 
support. 
When the ICTY was created the only State's comment addressing the issue which did 
not reject the manifest illegality test was that of the US 44 The ICTY Statute, in Article 
7(4) adopts the Nuremberg-type position, that superior orders are not a defence 
(although it is now accepted that they may be relevant for other defences). 45 The US was 
unhappy about this, and both in the Security Council, 46 and in its draft Rules of 
37 See the US Cases of US vYindler (1953) 14 CMR 742, US v Galley (1973) 48 CMR, (1973) 22 U. S. C. M. A. 
534, Pnebke Rome Military Court of Appeal 7 March 1998. Lippman, goes as far as to say the cases show 
"coherence and consensus" on manifest illegality, ibid. p. 52. 
38 See Gaeta, ibid, pp. 183-184 It is wrong, however to consider this to be evidence of the rejection of the 
manifest illegality test, there is a conceptual difference between rejecting the application of a test, and applying 
the test, but finding that the facts do not fall within it. 
39 In the Genocide Convention, a provision excluding superior orders was defeated (A/C. 6/215/Rev. 1) The 
vote was 28-15-6 See Lippman, supra n. 15, pp. 51-53; Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 1, p. 401. In both the 
Geneva Convention negotiations and those leading up to the 1977 Additional Protocols, no agreement could 
be reached, but ICRC proposals including a conditional liability (manifest illegality) approach were rejected. 
See Gaeta ibid, pp. 187-188. 
40 See the history of the ILC's approaches in 0 Triffterer, "Article 33" in O. Triffterer (ed. ) Ca»rvttary on the 
Raw Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999) 573, pp. 574-576. They latched on to 
the "moral choice" aspect, thus, if Dinstein's approach is followed, not accepting the defence. 
41 The primary proponent of this view is L. C Green, supra n. 15. See also McCoubrey, supra n. 25, pp. 298-303; S. 
Ratner & J. Abrams, Acrowztability for Hwrlma Rights Arnxities in Intemational Law (Oxford: OUP, 1997) pp. 121- 
123; Lippman, supra n. 15, p. 52. 
42 This view is almost synonymous with Dinstein's classic The DVaue of `Obaik= to Superior Orders' in 
International Lain, supra n. 15; see also A. P. V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (Manchester: MUP, 1996) p. 144-146. 
43 Gaeta, supra n. 15, pp. 183-186. 
44 S/25575, Article 11(a). 
45 On this see V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, An Insiders' Guide to the International Cninmal Tribunal for the Forney 
Yugoslavia (New York Transnational, 1995) pp. 101-103. 
46 S/PV. 3217, p. 16. 
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Procedure, 47 it attempted to bring the ICTY into line with its acceptance of the manifest 
illegality test. Partially as this ran directly counter to the express provisions of the ICTY 
Statute, this did not work. The ICTR has an identical provision on superior orders. 48 
It might be thought that the rejection of the manifest illegality approach in two 
international tribunals would settle the issue for the Rome Conference. It certainly 
strengthened the case for such an approach to the extent that the onus must have been 
on the proponents of the manifest illegality test to prove its continued international 
relevance. But of course, the situations surrounding the creation of (and thus State 
concerns about being the subject of) these two tribunals were very different to the 
circumstances and policies surrounding the creation of the ICC. 49 This is not to say that 
there was no support for the approach in the existing tribunals' statutes. A strong 
coalition of States (led by Germany) supported that position. Opposition came from 
another group led by the US, who clung to the manifest illegality test, as the position, lex 
lata. 50 The result was a compromise, and not a comfortable one. 51 
Article 3352 provides that: "1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a government or of a 
superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal 
responsibility unless: 
(a) That person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government 
or the superior in question; 
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and 
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful 
47 US Suggestions on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/14,17 November 1993, Rules 25.14(A). 
48 Article 6(4) See Morris & Scharf, supra n. 45, pp. 266-268. 
49 Gaeta, supra n. 15, p. 178 admits that the possible reason surrounding the adoption of the 
Nuremberg type 
approach in all international tribunals prior to Rome may well have been the result of them all 
being set up to 
try non-nationals of the creating States. The one arguable exception would be the ICTR. 
so Gaeta, ibid pp. 188-189. 
51 Per Saland, the Chair of the Working group that drafted it describes the Article's drafting as 
"very difficult" 
P. Saland, "International Criminal Law Principles" in R. S. Lee (ed. ), The International Cram ial Cact (The 
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2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity are manifestly unlawful" 
Cassese avers: "Article 33 must be faulted as marking a retrogression with respect to 
existing customary international law. "53 This may be the case, in particular after the 
creation of the two UN tribunals in the 1990s which adopted the opposite position. 54 
Even if it is not, 55 it shows that in the case where States are legislating for themselves, 
rather than for others, they are either supporters of, or prepared to accept, a more lenient 
corpus of law. In addition, there are certain other issues. Although Article 33's acceptance 
of the manifest illegality test is (presumably) meant to be limited to war crimes (by Article 
33(2)), 56 the wording is infelicitous. "Orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity" is an ambiguous phrase. In the case of genocide, the special intent is of the 
essence of the offence. Here, this intent is presumably that of the orderer. The orders 
themselves will most likely be to commit certain acts, not to "commit genocide". 
Therefore, it is possible that if the orderer can be proven to have genocidal intent, even if 
this cannot be shown for the subordinate, the order will be taken to be manifestly illegal. 
This could be the case even if the subordinate is charged with a war crime. Even if the 
court does not adopt such an approach, Article 33 runs against the grain of the idea of a 
Hague: Kluwer, 1999) 189 p. 211. Aid p. 212 he notes "the article is very difficult to read and is bound to be 
debated". 
52 On which see, Triffterer supra n. 40. 
53 A. Cassese, "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections" (1999) 
10 E. J. LL. 144, pp. 157. See also Gaeta, supra n. 15, p. 190 describing it as having departed from customary 
international law without reason. 
sa Another possible problem (although one which, for the moment must remain speculative) is that if (as may 
well occur) any existing caseload of the ICIY or ICTR is passed to the ICC upon the abolition of those 
bodies, the applicable law will be different. 
ss See Garroway, supra n. 26. 
56 Admittedly 33(2) does not include aggression in this list, but this is probably a reflection of a mistake, 
aggression was added at the last minute. Anyway, unless and until aggression is defined, war crimes are the 
presumed beneficiary of 33(1). 
295 
coherent set of laws which applies to all international crimes; it creates a defence 
applicable only to one sort of crime. 57 
OTHER DEFENCES 
With the above provisions we reach the end of the defences which were express in 
any of the statutes prior to Rome. It certainly gives pause for thought that, particularly in 
Nuremberg, the only mention of defences was to exclude the application of those most 
likely to be asserted. It is unfortunate that this was the pattern that was followed until the 
Rome Conference. Equally, when the ICTY was created at least the Secretary-General 
recognised that other defences would be relevant. In his report on the ICTY he left 
decisions on the applicability and definitions of these to the ICTY itself though: "the 
International Tribunal will have to decide on various personal defences which may relieve 
a person of individual criminal responsibility, such as minimum age or mental incapacity, 
drawing on principles of law recognised by all nations. "58 The same authority was granted 
to the ICTR. Between them, both Tribunals have developed substantial bodies of 
jurisprudence in relation to these matters. 59 States were not prepared to allow the ICC to 
act in such a fashion. 60 For the ICC, States insisted on defining the substantive defences 
themselves. 61 This is not necessarily a bad thing, as it provides for the first time an 
express statement of the defences which may be presented in a trial of international 
57 That there are more defences for war crimes than the others also may well be probative of governmental 
fears that they, whilst highly unlikely to be charged with genocide or crimes against humanity, may well see 
themselves, or their nationals charged with war crimes. This is implied also by Gaeta, supra n. 15, p. 189. 
58 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, UN. Doc. 
S/25704, para 58. Leaving it to the ICTY has not gone uncriticised, see C. Blakesley, Atrocity and its 
Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda" in T. L. H. McCormack & G. J. 
Simpson, The Law of War Cranes: National and International APDnads (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 189, p. 204. 
59 The most famous of these must remain the controversial Erde no k decision, which 
has been the subject of 
much criticism. See S. Linton, "Reviewing the Case of Drazen Erdemovic: Uncharted 
Waters at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1999) 12 L. J. I. L. 251; R. Cryer, "One Appeal, 
Four Opinions, Two Philosophies and a Remittal" (1998) 2 J. A. CL. 193; P. Rowe, "Duress as a Defence to 
War Crimes After Erdemovic: A Laboratory for a Permanent Court? " (1998) 1 YB. LH. L. 210 D. Turns, 
"The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The Erdenoric Case" (1998) 47 I. CL. Q 461; 
0. Swaak-Goldman, "International Decisions: Prosecutor v Erdemovic" (1998) 92 A. J. I. L. 282. 
60 President McDonald, has described the tribunal as a "laboratory" for the law here (ICTY Press Release 
CC/PIO/272/E 9 December 1997) cited in Rowe ibid Not only were many States happy to use the results of 
these experiments, but were unwilling to give such powers to the ICC, which could use their nationals as 
Guinea pigs. 
61 Saland, supra n. 51, p. 206 notes that this was not an easy thing to do. On Article 31 generally, see 
Saland, ibis 
pp. 206-210; A. Eser, "Article 31" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 40,537. 
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crimes, 62 providing at least a form of Franckian legitimacy. Most of the defences are 
probably supportable by existing law. These are mental illness, 63 duress, " necessity, 65 
intoxication, 66 and mistakes of fact (if, and only if, such mistakes of fact operate to negate 
nvis rea). 67 Two defences included are the subject of controversy. Self-defence, although 
in itself not generally considered unacceptable (albeit most are at a loss to explain in what 
circumstances it could be raised)68 is defined in Article 31(1) (c) in a way that gives cause 
for concern. That a person who "acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another 
person" should not be liable is not contested. 69 Article 31(1) (c) goes beyond this, 
providing, for war crimes, /0 that a person acting reasonably to defend "property which is 
essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential 
for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force" has 
a defence. The last part of 31(1)(c) has never been seen before in humanitarian law, and 
"this extension is manifestly outside the lex later and may generate quite a few 
misgivings". 71 The other is the defence of mistake of law, contained in Article 33(2). 
Antonio Cassese is highly critical of this provision, on the grounds that this has never 
been a defence in national law, and has only the most tenuous claim to a place in 
62 See Cassese, supra n. 53, p. 153. 
63 Rome Statute, Article 31(1)(a) see Eser, supra n. 61, pp. 545-546, who notes that this was not a controversial 
matter. 
64 1M Article 31(1)(d)(i). This is a notable change from the Erdan tk Case's rejection of the defence. As 
mentioned above though, this case has been the subject of much negative comment and probably did not 
represent the law on the matter. In addition Erdarms only rejected the defence for killings, not all offences. In 
addition see Eser, supra n. 14, pp. 263-265. Dinstein (Y. Dinstein, "International Criminal Law" (1985) 20 Israel 
L. R. 206, pp. 232-235) thinks that duress cannot be a defence to killing, or genocide. 
65 Ibid Article 31(1)(d)(ii). See Eser, ibid, pp. 261-263; Eser, supra n. 61, p. 550 criticises Article for mixing duress 
and necessity in one provision. In the Aleksor ki Appeal, I%seaaorv Aleksouki, judgment, 24 March 2000, IT- 
95-14/1-A, the Appeals Chamber decided they did not need to express an opinion of in necessity is a defence 
in international law. If it was not, then the Rome Statute would have created a defence previously unavailable. 
66 Article 31(1)(b). Some were a little unsure on this, but it is probably the case that it represents a general 
principle of criminal law, at least for involuntary intoxication, see Saland, supra n. 51, p. 207. 
The bigger 
problem was that some States wanted the inclusion of voluntary intoxication, the end result 
"which had the 
benefit of not satisfying anyone" (Saland, ibid), excludes it in most circumstances. See also Eser supra n. 61, 
546-548. 
67 Article 32(1). O Triffterer "Article 32" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 40,555, pp. 555-568. As he notes, (ilid, 
p. 567) it merely states the obvious where there is no mss rea there is no offence. For previous acceptance of 
this see Eser, supra n. 14, pp. 267-268; Dinstein, supra n. 64, pp. 235-236. 
68 See Eser, ibid, p. 263. 
69 The wording is from Article 31(1)(c). It is admittedly difficult to imagine where acting "reasonably" could 
amount to an offence in the jurisdiction of the court though. 
70 Again we see a specialised regime being created for these offences. 
71 Cassese, supra n. 53, pp. 154-155. He also notes (p. 155) that the phrasing is vague. Saland, supra n. 51, p. 208 
informs us that this was the most difficult provision in the working group, and 
it runs against the principle 
they tried to work to that the general principles were applicable to all the crimes. 
Eser, supra n. 61, pp. 548-550, 
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international law. 72 As the Rome Statute sets the relevant law out itself, this provision 
"amounts to a serious loophole... and may eventually be misused for the purpose of 
perpetrating crimes clearly prohibited by international law". 73 He may be being too harsh 
on Article 33(2). As Triffterer points out, there are very few possible situations in which 
this could apply. 74 The article does not apply to situations where the person merely does 
not know the crime is under the jurisdiction of the court, 75 nonetheless, it does raise 
serious issues of principle. With crimes of such a serious nature, ignorance of the law is a 
dubious defence. 76 
These are all the exclusions of liability expressly provided for in the Statute. 
However, the Court, in an extraordinary provision, is entitled, by Article 31(2), to refuse 
to apply a particular ground from Article 31, in the case before it? 7 Saland reports that 
the article was necessary for negotiating purposes, primarily, as delegations were unhappy 
with various formulations of the defences, so this discretion was necessary to get 
agreement 78 As some of the definitions are more widely drawn than customary law, this 
may work to limit the problems, but it may raise important questions of nuYwn crnnen sine 
4.79 0n the other hand, the ICC will be constrained by Article 21, which will require it 
to work within the bounds of international law. 80 It is indicative of serious problems that 
States felt they had to add a provision allowing the Court to disapply part of the Statute if 
needs be, as the definitions were flawed. 
That does not dispose of all possible defences, such as reprisals, and, for certain war 
crimes, military necessity. 81 The impossibility of getting agreement on these led to the 
inclusion of Article 31(3), which allows the Court, with Article 31(2), "to consider a 
especially p. 549 is the most sanguine, tying it back to notions of military necessity, but also notes the 
difficulty 
in limiting it. 
72 Ibid p. 155-156. For interpretation of the provision, see Triffterer supra n. 67, pp. 568-569. 
731bid p. 156. It also could amount to a disincentive to dissemination (i&d). 
74 Supra n. 67, p. 569. 
75jb 
76 Supra n. 72. 
77 Article 32(2), see Saland, supra n. 51, p. 208-9. 
78 JW 
79 Saland, ibid 
80 Triffterer, supra n. 67, p. 553. 
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ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those referred to in paragraph 1 
where such a ground is derived from the applicable law as set forth in article 21". It is 
ironic that the only discretion granted to the ICC may be to create new grounds of 
excluding liability. 
PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY 
Principles of liability are the counterpart of defences, as they too relate to the 
parameters of liability. They are traditionally an area of responsibility that has been little 
discussed by States and have played a limited role in the statutes of international criminal 
courts. This has caused many problems and was a gaping hole in international criminal 
law. As Cassese has said, aptly: "it is well known that the current rules of international law 
on individual criminal responsibility make up a body of law that is still fairly rudimentary 
and unsophisticated". 82 This is not to say that there is no law on the subject at all, 
particularly as certain principles may be derived from general principles of law, it was just 
that little effort had traditionally been expended discovering such principles. 
The Nuremberg IMT Charter included provisions on the principles of liability. The 
Charter provided that "leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy... are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan. " This was complimented by Article 
6(a) which stated that liability existed for "participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of the above [crimes against peace]. " This latter phrase is absent 
from both Article 6(b) and 6(c). As a result, it is difficult to see whether the final clause in 
Article 6 was intended to create a separate, free standing charge of conspiracy, or if it was 
81 Which also possibly arises under Article 8(2)(b). 
82 Supra n. 53, p. 148. 
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merely an aspect of the crime against peace charge in Article 6(a). 83 The reason for this 
vagueness is simple, the Charter was a compromise on this issue. 
The concept of conspiracy is a creature of the common law, unknown to the civil law 
systems at the time. 84 This fact is fatal to any claim of conspiracy being a part of 
international law by virtue of it being a general principle of law. In addition, there were no 
precedents for this in international law, so any claim for customary status must also fail. 
The reason for its inclusion at all was US insistence, their entire plan for dealing with 
Germany was based on the assumption that there was a wide-ranging conspiracy, and its 
plans for dealing with the large number of putative defendants began with the idea of this 
conspiracy. 85 
In the Nuremberg IMF Judgment on the conspiracy count, despite the US 
prosecutors insistence that conspiracy covered all of the crimes in Article 6, it was 
determined that the conspiracy crime only related to the charges under 6(a). 86 Even this 
was controversial, both of the French judges and one of the US judges wanted to reject 
the charge in its entirety. 87 Even the charge that remained was limited. For proof of 
conspiracy, the Nuremberg IMT required "the conspiracy must have been clearly outlined 
in its criminal purpose. It must not be too far removed from the time of decision and of 
action... a concrete plan to wage war [must have] existed and [the IMT be able to] 
determine the participants in that concrete plan. "88 The Nuremberg IMT also were quite 
83 See Murphy, "Norms of Criminal Procedure at the International Military Tribunal" in G. Ginsburgs & VN. 
Kudriavtsev, The Nuranl ig Trial and Intemational Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) pp. 68-69. 
84 H. Ehard, "The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major German War Criminals and International Law" (1949) 
43 A. J. I. L. 223, p. 227; Murphy, ihid, p. 64; T. Taylor, The Anatany of the Nurn1 Triads (New York: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1992) p. 36; S. Pomorski, "Conspiracy and Criminal Organisations" in Ginsburgs & 
Kudriavtsev, ibid, p. 219. The French and Soviet delegates to the London Conference were said to be shocked 
by the idea of conspiracy when it was explained to them, Pomorski, ibid R. K. Wcetzel, The Nunm1 ig Trial in 
International Law (London: Stevens, 1962) p. 215 sums up the position well, "there is very little, if any, basis for 
assuming that the concept of conspiracy was part of international law prior to the Nuremberg 
Trial. " See also 
R. Minear, Vuam'Justicn" The Tokyo War Crim Trial (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1971) pp. 36-42. 
85 This was the basis of the original "Bernays" plan, which shaped US ideas on the trial of the 
Germans. See 
Taylor, ibid, pp. 35-36; H. Levie, Tenorism in War. The Law of War Cranes (New York Oceana, 1992) pp. 405- 
411. 
86 I MT Judgment, supra n. 28, pp. 223-224. 
87 B. F. Smith, ReadringJudgnnitat Numdeg (London: Andre Deutsch, 1977) p. 129, Taylor, supra n. 84, p. 550. 
88 IMT Judgment, supra n. 28, p. 222. 
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strict on the requirement of actual knowledge of the plan. 89 Despite this, the Tribunal did 
not define the acts that amounted to participation, and was not consistent in the 
individual judgments. 90 Conviction on this count seemed irrelevant in the sentencing. 91 
Perhaps that is indicative of the Nuremberg IMT's distinct antipathy to this charge. 
Article 5 of the Tokyo IMT had a provision for our purposes identical to that in 
Nuremberg, but its handling of the charge was far less subtle, and the majority did little to 
demonstrate any discomfort with this novel charge. 92 Although two of the judges in 
Tokyo expressly rejected the crime of conspiracy, saying it had no basis in international 
law, 93 the majority proceeded to take an exceptionally wide approach, going far beyond 
the Nuremberg limits, and disregarding "even the bounds set by Anglo-American 
jurisprudence". 94 
After the Nuremberg IMT's judgment, the ILC adopted "Nuremberg Principles" 
which recognised that "[a]ny person who commits or is an accomplice in the commission 
of an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor... [and 
liability may arise for]... Complicity in the commission of a crime. "95 The problem with 
the cumulative effects of these was that although the Nuremberg principles recognised 
complicity, it was far from settled exactly what crimes "complicity" entailed. A close 
reading of the Nuremberg judgment only helps a little. The most succinct expression of 
what can be derived from the Nuremberg IMT judgment, although it is not totally 
accurate, is given by Lippman, who asserts that it required that "the evidence `sufficiently' 
connected the defendant to the planning, ordering, inciting, or commission of war 
89 See Pomorski, supra n. 84, p. 234. 
90 See I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Fore by States (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) pp. 196-199. 
91 Pomorski, supra n. 84, p. 235. 
92 The majority agreed with the Nuremberg IMT, see RJ. Pritchard & S. M Zaide, The Tokyo War Crim Trial 
Vol 20. 
" 
Judgnazt (New York: Garland 1981) p. 48,439. Judge Bernard and Judge Jaranilla both expressly upheld 
the charge for all Crimes in Article 5, (ibid Vol 21 Separate Opinions (of Bernard & Jaranilla) pp. 4-7,1-7 
respectively). 
93 Judge Webb, and Judge Pal (ibid pp. 475,491). 
94 Brownlie, supra n. 90, p. 203; J. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979) p. 212 
sums up their approach admirably, showing "a misplaced determination to 
force, after the fact, unrelated and 
fortuitous events into a preconceived thesis. " 
95 GA Resolution 177 supra n. 32. 
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crimes... mere knowledge of crimes, communication of orders, or a failure to prevent 
commission of such acts was not sufficient. "96 
When the ICTY was created, more attention was paid to the matter. Almost all of the 
State comments dealt with principles of liability. 97 The relevant Article in the ICTY 
Statute (to which Article 6(1) of the Rwanda Statute is identical in all material respects) is 
Article 7(1). This provides that "[a] person who plans, instigates, orders, commits or 
otherwise aids and abets in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime incurs 
individual criminal responsibility. " This list is probably no more than customary. Not only 
did the State comments basically agree on this matter, 98 but also the customary nature of 
Article 7(1) has been confirmed by the Trial Chambers on several occasions (with 
adequate support), 99 and was accepted by the Appeals Chamber. 100 In addition, no 
defendant has challenged the acceptability of this provision, debate has merely raged over 
interpretation. With respect to genocide, Article 4 gives the ICTY jurisdiction over the 
inchoate crimes given in Article III of the Genocide Convention. This is customary, as a 
part of that convention. 101 
As the Rome Statute, for the first time, sets out in detail the principles of criminal 
liability in international criminal law, it "undoubtedly constitutes a major advance in 
international criminal law". 102 In particular it has made the Statute watertight from the 
point of specificity, and not subject to the criticisms levelled at the ad hoc Tribunals' 
statutes. There was never any dispute that such specificity should be in the Rome 
96 M. Lippman, " Nuremberg Forty-Five Years Afterwards" (1991) 7 Comxcdao J. I. L. 1, p. 33. Some questions 
may arise about his assertion on the passing on of orders, and prevention of crimes, see 
infra, p. 306. 
97 See the summary of proposals in Morris & Scharf, supra n. 45, pp. 364-366. 
98 
99 1-ms« itorv Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, IT-94-1-T, paras 663-669; citing, 
interalia, Wager, 3 
L. R. T. W. C. 24,40-42,94-95; Weiss, 11 LR. T. W. C. 5 and three national laws on war crimes. ); Prosautnr v 
Funmzija, judgment, 10 December 1998, IT-95-17/1-T, paras 193-216, (using various post-WWII trials to 
derive definitions of aiding and abetting); Celebici supra n. 7, paras 319-321; citing Tadic and Article 2 of the 1LC 
Draft code (1996), and (for the crime of ordering offences), the Geneva Conventions. 
On the crime of 
ordering international crimes, this crime was recognised far 
before that time, its genesis is traceable at least 
back as far as the Hague regulations, see L. C. Green, "Command Responsibility 
in International Law" supra 
n. 11. On all the others, they are also present in similar form in the 1991 
Draft Code (Article 3) (importantly 
predating the ICTY, unlike the 1996 Draft), and the 1954 Code. (Article 2(13)) 
loo Prosxarv Tadic, judgment, 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, paras 186-189. 
101 Morris & Scharf 
, 
supra n. 45, p. 96. 
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Statute, 103 but full praise must be reserved until an examination its provisions can be 
undertaken. 
Article 25(3) sets out the principles. It reads: 
"A person shall be criminally responsible and liable for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court if that person, 
(a) Commits such a crime... ; 
(b) Orders, Solicits, or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact 
occurs or is attempted; 
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets, or 
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing 
the means for its commission; 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such 
contribution shall be intentional and shall either 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of 
the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime; 
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to 
commit genocide; 
102 Cassese, supra n. 53, p. 153. 
103 See C. K. Hall "The First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the International Criminal 
Court" (1997) 91 A. J. I. L. 177, p. 181, C. K. Hall, "The Third and Fourth Sessions of the Preparatory 
Committee for the International Criminal Court" (1998) 92 A. J. LL. 124, pp. 129-130. 
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(fl Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of 
circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However a person who 
abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the 
crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit 
that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose". 
A few points may be noted. 104Article 25(3)(b) raises slight concerns. For liability to 
accrue under the Rome Statute for ordering a crime, that crime must be at least 
attempted. This requirement is not present, for example, in either the ICTY Statute or the 
Geneva Conventions. This addition is unnecessary, and adds a burden to the Prosecution, 
who will not only have to prove the existence of the order, but now that the crime itself 
occurred or was attempted and quite possibly that the crime was referable to the order. 
Article 25(3)(d) is probably the most controversial of these provisions. It is basically a 
form of liability for conspiracy. Although such an offence is probably (as a result of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IM'Ts' judgments) part of customary international law, its 
inclusion was still controversial, as it remains primarily an offence particular to common 
law systems. 105 Perhaps to sweeten the pill for those countries not having municipal 
crimes of conspiracy, the wording for the definition of the crime is taken directly from 
the International Convention on Terrorist Bombings. 106 It may, however, have defined 
this form of liability more narrowly than customary law. It requires the accomplice to 
either know that the offence is the point of the common purpose (Article 25(3)(d)(i)), or 
know that the offence will be committed. This latter part is more limited than the 
104 On this see K. Ambos, "Article 25" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 40,475; Saland, supra n. 51, pp. 198-200. 
Generally see F. Malekian, "Individual Criminal Responsibility" in M. C. Bassiouni (ed. ), International Crnniml 
Law Vol b Crz'ne (New York: Transnational 
, 
2nd ed. 1999) 153, K. Ambos, "Individual Criminal 
Responsibility in International Criminal Law" in McDonald & Swaak-Goldman (eds. ), supra n. 14,1. 
105 Ambos (m Triffterer), ibid., p. 483. 
106 GA Res, 52/164. UN Doc. A/RES/52/164 See M. Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court" (1999) 63 A. J. I. L. 22 p. 36. 
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customary test enunciated in the Tadic appeal, b07 which only requires "foresight that those 
crimes outside the criminal common purpose were likely to be committed". 1o8 
In one situation, the Rome Statute may cast the net of liability wider than customary 
law, for aiding and abetting. Article 25(3)(c) gives liability when a person, "for the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets, or otherwise assists in 
its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its 
commission. " Customary international law probably requires the assistance to be 
"substantial". 109 However, the Article also introduces a purposive, motive requirement 
that is not required by custom (under which knowledge suffices). '10 Thus the crime is not 
defined in accordance with customary law, but it is difficult to say whether or not it will, 
n 
in practice, be broader or more narrow. 
In relation to mots rea, Article 30 of the Rome Statute requires that (unless otherwise 
declared in the Statute (one example of which may be genocide)) for a conviction to be 
recorded, the defendant must have acted with knowledge and intention. "' For the 
majority of crimes, this is correct. 112 For certain crimes, such as initiating attacks with the 
possibility of excessive incidental damage, recklessness has traditionally been seen as 
enough, so the Rome Statute is narrower than existing custom113 
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
There is one special principle of liability which merits separate treatment. That is 
command responsibility. Command responsibility is the liability of a superior for crimes 
107 Ambos also makes this point, referring to earlier jurisprudence, supra n. 104, p. 486, but distinguishes them 
on the grounds that they are dealing with responsibility under the analogue to Article 25(3)(c). 
'°8 pyo v Tadic, supra n. 100, para 229. 
109 See Ambos, supra n. 104,481-483. This has been confirmed by the Tadic Appeal, ilid 
110 Ambos, ibid., p. 483, this, again has been confirmed by Tadic, ibid. 
111 See Saland, supra n. 51, pp. 206-207; D. K. Pigaroff, "Article 30" in Triffterer (ed. ) supra n. 40,527. 
112 Knowledge is defined as "aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events" which overcomes the 
possible problem that a requirement of subjective absolute certainty of consequences could imply. 
113 See Cassese, supra n. 53, p. 154. Again here we may have seen a dilution of prohibitions with particular 
relevance to aerial warfare, thus for those countries with strong air forces. In addition, see supra pp. 264-265. 
where it is noted that the knowledge requirement for this crimes is also higher than is applicable. 
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committed by forces not ordered by that superior, but tolerated by him 114 In the Cd bici 
case, the ICTY elaborated the threefold requirements of the concept, as being first a 
superior/subordinate relationship; secondly, the "mental element" (that it defined as 
"knew or had reason to know")115 and thirdly a failure to take reasonable measures to 
prevent or punish violations of international criminal law. 116 This triumvirate has been 
adopted by the UN tribunals since and is a helpful list of the requirements. 117 The 
definitions of these requirements have been the subject of debate, but discussion will be 
limited here only to those elements necessary for an understanding of State approaches to 
principles of liability. 
The principle of command responsibility was not directly mentioned in the 
Nuremberg or Tokyo IMTs' Charters, although the principle was certainly relied on, if 
not widely at Nuremberg, then certainly at Tokyo. The Nuremberg judgment mainly dealt 
with ordering of offences, although at times, for example in the judgment on Frick, the 
IMT seemed to hold defendants responsible for not bringing to an end offences they 
were aware of. 118 Mostly, though, it is as Green says, "the Nuremberg Tribunal's findings 
were only concerned with command responsibility in the most indirect fashion". 119 The 
Tokyo IMT's judgment on war crimes, on the other hand, dealt almost entirely with 
negative criminality and command responsibility. Its discussion is particularly interesting 
for the reason that it dealt not only with military superiors (to which it was generally 
114 See generally, Green, supra n. 11; Parks, supra n. 7; Eckhardt supra n. 5; CN. Crowe, "Command 
Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The Chances for Successful Prosecution", (1995) 29 URich L. R. 191; 
I. Bantekas, "The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" (1999) 93 A. J. I. L. 573; J. J. Paust, "My Lai 
and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility" (1972) 57 Miditmy L. R. 99; T. Wu & Y-S. Kang, 
"Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its 
Analogues in United States Law (1997) 38 Harn. I. L. J. 272. 
115 On the interpretation of this, see infra. p. 308. 
116 C ici, supra n. 7, paras 344-400. 
117 See for example, the Aleksowki, supra n. 5, para 72; Prosautor v Kays/4 na & Ruzindana, judgment, 21 May 
1999, ICTR-95-1-T, para 209; Prrmseawtarv Blaskic, Judgment, 3 March 2000,1 T-95-14-T, para 294. 
118 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra n. 28, pp. 293. 
119 Ibid p. 333. W 
. 
J. Fenrick, "Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1995) 6 Duke J. C. & I. L. 103, p. 112 claims this 
was as the degree of participation of those on trial was clear and they 
did not need to go to negative 
criminality. Some German war criminals were held responsible under this 
head though. See Green, supra n. 11, 
pp. 333-335; See also the Abbe Ardenne Case 4 L. R. T. W. C. 97. Green, i&d p. 
341 seems to consider that they 
were based on the customary law of war, although they differed in standard. 
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accepted command responsibility in some form attached), 120 but it also imposed liability 
on civilian officials under this head, which was at least at the time, uncharted territory. 121 
Until 1977, the development of the principle of command responsibility was primarily by 
jurisprudence, not all of which was reconcilable. 122 There have been various attempts to 
rationalise the judgments, in particular on the mental element. The most elaborate of 
those preceding the formation of the UN tribunals, that of Major Parks, 123 concluded that 
the requisite mental element was present if the commander "failed to exercise the means 
available to him to learn of the offence and under the circumstances, he should have 
known and such failure to know constitutes criminal dereliction". 124 This statement has 
now received judicial confirmation. 125 1977 saw the adoption of API, 126 which provided, 
in Articles 86-87 for command responsibility, which some writers consider customary in 
at least some respects. 127 
Article 86(2) reads, "[t]he fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal 
or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information 
which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he 
was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all 
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach". 
120 Supra n. 92, pp. 48,443-48,445. Although even this was not uncontroversial, Pal was highly dubious of such 
an offence, keeping liability very narrow (pp. 1,124-1,127), and Röling differed on its conditions of application (ibid, pp54-61). Parks is quite dear that some such offence did exist prior to 1945, although there were only a 
few instances of implementation, WE Parks, supra n. 7, pp. 2-20, On the Tokyo Trial here, see Parks, 
ibidpp. 62-69. At the very least, it can be traced to Article 1 of the Hague Rules. The 1919 Commission 
accepted the principle (supra n. 17, pp. 441-442), (although the Japanese members dissented on this), it-it, 
pp. 467. 
1211bid See Fenrick, supra n. 119, pp. 117-118. 
122 For discussion of this case law (of which the most (in)famous is the Yanashita case, which was one of the 
first cases to expressly turn on the doctrine), see Parks, supra n. 7, pp. 22-77; Lippman, supra n. 15, pp. 77-83. See 
also Cdebici, supra n. 7, paras 359-378. 
123 Supra n. 7. 
124 I/, p. 90. 
125 Blask 
, 
supra n. 117, para 322. 
126 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 8 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims in International Armed Conflict, 1125 UNTS 3. 
127 See Cdbici, supra n. 7, paras 340-341,390-393. Fenrick, supra n. 119, p. 119. Jia, though 
does not seem to think 
that this is the position, B. B. Jia, "The Doctrine of Command Responsibility 
in International Law" (1998) 65 
N. I. L. R. 325, pp. 346-347. The Trial Chamber in Blaskic, supra n. 117, para 324 considered that the mental 
element was not custom, if it was thought that the mental element 
included the requirement that there be 
specific information in the possession of the accused. 
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This has to be read together with Article 87(1), which requires commanders "with 
respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under 
their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent 
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol". 128 
The ICTY Statute, in a formulation differing from Articles 86-87 API, 129 deals with 
command responsibility in Article 7(3). 130 This states that "the fact that any of the acts 
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does 
not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that 
the subordinate was about to commit such acts and had done so and the superior failed 
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish 
perpetrators thereof'. 
As Fenrick says, this provision is unhelpfully worded, 131 and leaves many of its terms 
undefined, 132 (which, of course leaves resolution of the controversies to the court). The 
approach of the ICTY has been to treat it as having imported the customary law on the 
subject into its jurisdiction, thus giving it the right to determine what that is. 133 
The Rome Statute is far more verbose (but not necessarily the worse for it). Article 
28 is controlling on the ICC, imposing liability on: 
128 On the requirement that they be read together see Y. Sandoz (ed. ), Gmmv7ty y on the Additional Amtttr1s of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneve Con moons of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: ICRC, 1986) p. 1011. This has been expressly 
adopted by the ICTY in Blaskic, ibid, para 329, as has their comment (i&d p. 1022) that this "obliges them to 
be constantly informed of the way in which their subordinates carry out the tasks entrusted to them, and to 
take the necessary measures for this purpose". Bantekas, supra n. 114, p. 589 agrees that the provisions must be 
read together, and that this was the intent of the Conference drafting API. 
129 See H. Levie, "The Statute of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison With the 
Past and a Look at the Future" (1995) 21 Syraause J.I. L. & Garde 1, p. 13, who claims it comes closer to the 
stand taken in the Yxnashita case as it uses the formula "knew or had reason to know" rather than Article 
86(2) "knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the 
time". The latter may be a more stringent test. The ICTY has interpreted Article 7(3) of its Statute to require 
possession of information which would put the superior on notice of crimes, Cdebici, supra n. 7, paras 383,393, 
but see now Blaskic, supra n. 117. 
130 The ICTR Statute's Article 6(3) is to all intents and purposes identical. 
131 Fenrick, supra n. 127, p. 111. See also Bassiouni & Manikas, supra n. 1, p. 344 who note that it does not 
elaborate the actual test. 
132 Jbid p. 112. 
133 Fenrick, ibid, p. 123 appears to adopt this view. See also the ICTY in Cdhi i supra n. 7, para 390-393. Its 
interpretation of the information required, is that it need not show offences were occurring, or were about to, 
but merely enough to put the commander on notice that something was happening, i. e. it "indicated the need 
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"1. A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander.. 
. 
[is responsible for crimes]... committed by forces under his or her 
effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, 
as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces where: 
(a) that military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or 
about to commit such crimes; and 
(b) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution" 
2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph 1,... [such superiors are liable for crimes]... committed by subordinates 
under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such forces where: 
(a) The superior either knew or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; 
(b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility 
and control of the superior and, 
(c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his 
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. "34 
for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences were being committed or about to 
be 
committed" (Ibid, para 393), is not as broad as the preferable standard in Blaskic which is in line the official 
ICRC commentary. 
134 See generally, W. J. Fenrick, "Article 28" in Triffterer (ed. ), supra n. 40,515; Saland, supra n. 51 pp. 202-204. 
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A difference in wording, at least for military leaders, is the formulation of the Rome 
Statute of the knowledge requirement, which requires that the defendant "knew, or, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known" of existing or imminent 
violations. This removes the express requirement of having "had information which 
should have enabled them to conclude" that appeared to be present in API, but which 
Blaskic interpreted insofar as it represented custom as inferring that "if a commander has 
exercised due diligence in the fulfilment of his duties yet lacks knowledge that crimes are 
about to be committed, such lack of knowledge cannot be held against him. However 
taking into account his particular position of command and the circumstances prevailing 
at the time, such ignorance cannot be a defence where the absence of knowledge is the 
result of negligence in the discharge of his duties". 135 The Trial Chamber did this by 
reading the two provisions of API (Articles 86 & 87), which is substantially the right 
approach. 
In another respect though there could be a significant addition to the requirements 
entirely unwarranted by customary international law. The Rome Statute contains the 
qualifying phrase that the superior is responsible for crimes only where they are 
committed "as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces. " 
It is possible that this could be interpreted as the introduction of a causation requirement, 
the existence of which was expressly rejected by the ICTY in Cdebici, 136 as it makes a 
135 Blaskic, supra n. 117, para 332. This formulation appears highly satisfactory, with one exception, the level of 
negligence is probably higher, at gross negligence. Bantekas' (pre Blaskic) comment is still relevant, we are 
dealing with very serious crimes, thus negligence svnpliciter should not suffice, Bantekas, supra n. 114, p. 590. 
136 Supra n. 7, para 398, the Trial Chamber note that the only assertion of such a requirement by any academic 
had been by Bassiouni, ihid Relying on Cdehici Bantekas asserts that there is a requirement of causation. supra 
n. 114, pp. 592-594. With respect, this is based on a misunderstanding of Cdiici, which is admittedly rather 
badly phrased. In para 399 the Chamber states, after rejecting causation, "this is not to say that, conceptually, 
the principle of causality is without application in the doctrine of command responsibility insofar as it relates 
to the responsibility of superiors for their failure to prevent the crimes of their subordinates. If fact, 
recognition of a necessary causal nexus may be considered to be inherent in the requirement of crimes 
committed by subordinates and the superior's failure to take the measures within his powers to prevent them. 
In this situation, the superior may be considered to be causally linked to the offences, in that but for his failure 
to fulfil his duty to act, the acts of his subordinates would not have been committed. " The Chamber would 
appear to be postulating a requirement of causation, but it was not. The Chamber was making the (rather trite) 
observation that if the superior had lived up to his responsibilities, the subordinates would not have been able 
to commit the crimes. This is in accordance with the next paragraph, (400) which reads "the very existence of 
the principle of superior responsibility for failure to punish, therefore, recognised under Article 7(3) and 
customary law, demonstrates the absence of a requirement of causality as a separate element of the doctrine of 
superior responsibility" The Chamber did not differentiate the two, and thus denied the element for both. 
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nonsense of liability under command responsibility for failure to punish offences. 137 Here 
the Rome Statute runs directly contrary to existing law. 138 
The final problem relates to the separate provision for civilian superiors. This has 
been a matter of debate for a long time, as there has been little authority on the matter. 139 
It has been generally accepted that civilian superiors can come under the concept, 14° but 
the extent of control that they need to exercise and the standard to which they are to be 
held has been a matter of controversy. Both of these have recently been central in the 
Cdebici Case. In Celebui the Trial Chamber determined that civilians could be liable under 
the principle, but only when they "exercise a degree of control over their subordinates 
which is similar to that of military commanders". 141 This is probably the same standard as 
is elucidated in the Rome Statute, as both de facto military and non-military commanders 
are under the requirement of their having "effective authority and control". To ensure 
this, for civilian superiors to become liable, the crimes must concern "activities that were 
within the effective responsibility and control of the superior". Despite the requirements 
of the superior/subordinate relationship being at least as onerous as for military 
personnel, the mens rea requirement for civilian is different. Whereas military commanders 
are responsible if they "knew or, in the circumstances, should have known", civilians are 
only responsible if they "knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated" crimes had been, or were about to be, committed. This runs counter not only 
to common sense, but also to the finding in Celebiri (and contained in the UN Tribunal 
Statutes) that once the qualifications to become subject to the standard are complete, 
This is borne out by the failure of the Trial Chambers to apply such a condition in the C&bici case or the 
Blaskic case. G. Vetter, "Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International 
Criminal 
Court (ICC)" (2000) 25 Yale J. I. L. 89, p. 119 claims that the Trial Chamber hedged its bets a little in paragraph 
399. It appears, since the Chamber in Cdebici did not apply any such element, that 
it merely expressed itself 
infelicitously. 
137Ibid para 399. 
138 For another formulation see the UK Manual of Mali ary Law (London: HMSO, 1958) para 631. 
139 It is true that the Tokyo IMT did make some findings in that respect, (supra n. 120) but the contours of the 
opinion have not been taken up, in particular the liability of "departmental officials". 
140 See Cddn i, supra n. 7, paras 356-363 and the cases cited therein. 
141 Ibid para 378. It supported this by noting this was the approach taken by the ILC in the 1996 
Draft Code. 
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then the mots rea standard is the same. 142 Another retreat from the requirements of 
customary international law can be seen here. 143 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Principles of liability, including defences are an interesting aspect of the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals. For a long time, they have been shamefully overlooked, and 
treated as secondary to definitions of crimes. This is odd, as they are part of the same 
overall process, that of determining criminality. As can be seen, similar policies come into 
play in this aspect of liability definitions as do in the definition of crimes simpliciter. 
For both the Nuremberg and Tokyo IlVITs, their Charters did not deal with the 
question fully. The only assertions related to the creation of a legally insupportable 
liability for conspiracy (which later passed into customary law), and denying the defences 
liable to be raised. 144 When it came to the UN Tribunals, the silence of the two IMT's 
Charters meant that there was little that the Secretary General (or OLA) who drafted the 
ICTY Statute (which the ICTR Statute follows) could do without being seen as legislating 
new law. That did not need to be a problem however, as the problems were expressly left 
to the ICTY, who could (and would have to) create a body of principles of liability. The 
controversies on international criminal liability were left to the Court. The Security 
Council was happy to allow this to occur, and leave the power in the ICTY to do this, 
probably as none of the States on the Security Council thought themselves to be likely to 
come under the mandate of the Tribunal. Up until this time, and due to the absence of 
international legal instruments dealing with the issue of liability, the law was basically only 
142 IM paras 379-393. 
143 This has also been discovered, independently, by Vetter, supra n. 136, pp. 123-124. Saland, diplomatically 
refers to this part of the article as "debatable", supra n. 61, p. 204. Fenrick, supra n. 134, p. 521 also notes 
it is a 
higher standard. 
144 The best thing that can be said for the exclusion of the superior orders defence was that the defence would 
probably have been inapplicable even if correctly formulated according to international 
law. Most, if not all of 
the defendants were convicted of either giving orders, or following ones which were not only manifestly 
unlawful, but they knew were unlawful. 
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existent in general principles and custom that had not been studied to any extent. In this 
respect, the granting of the power to determine this law to the UN Tribunals gave the law 
another form of legitimacy. As Franck notes, if a law is, in itself vague, legitimacy is not 
denied to it if there is `judicially supplied process determinacy", 145 ie. a court which is 
authorised to authoritatively determine what the law actually is. In this way then, the 
ICTY and ICTR, despite having Statutes which are generally less determinative of issues 
than may be ideal, are not totally inadequate. 
When the Rome Statute came to be drafted, no such sanguine view of a court's 
competence was taken by States, who insisted on defining the law themselves. 146 In this 
way, the law did become more clearly determinate, but along the way lost coverage in 
some places. The definitions of previously existing principles are quite consistently wider 
where defences are involved, 147 and narrower on inculpatory doctrines, at times in 
manifest contradiction to existing international law. This is because not only were States 
far more unwilling to grant the ICC any legislative power over themselves, but also were 
prepared to accept a lowest common denominator approach towards the principles. 
145T. Franck, The Pozerrof Legitanacy Among Nations (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p. 64. 
1% Leaving only Article 30(3) where the ICC can create defences in custom, which serves to exculpate an 
accused. 
147 Although these are now subject to Article 30(2). 
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CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A 
NEW INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL ORDER? 
As concluding remarks have been made at the end of each chapter, this conclusion 
will be confined to more general comments, in which an evaluation will be given of the 
extent to which an effective and credible integrated system for the prosecution of 
international crimes has been created, and the extent to which the values underpinning 
international crimes have been adopted within the international systern. 
Back in the 1970s, there were confident assertions of another form of global justice, 
albeit of a distributive, rather than corrective, nature. This was the declaration of the 
"New International Economic Order" associated with General Assembly Resolution 
3821 CXIX). 1 This was intended to redress the imbalance between developed and 
developing States, in particular by creating obligations on developed States to grant 
development aid to developing States. Due to the opposition of several developed States, 
the programme never moved beyond the realm of rhetoric and soft law. 2 Is this the future 
which awaits the incipient system of international criminal law? A tentative response of 
"no" is warranted, and this conclusion will attempt to show why, although it will also 
sound notes of caution. 
The modem system of international criminal law is, at the most, around a century 
old, beginning with the Hague Conferences, and, in particular the Hague Regulations. In 
that time, massive progress has been made towards accepting that there is a body of 
substantive international criminal law. Anfter World War I, the Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement accepted that for war 
crimes, punishment was possible. However, this acceptance remained unsupported by 
1 (1974) 131. L. M. 715. 
2 See A. Cassese, Intematronal Law in a Dei, dcd World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) pp. 366-367. 
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international action. The only trials at the end of the war were the notorious Liepzig trials, 
and some rather pointless in absentia proceedings by the UK. The real history of 
international criminal law began after W WH, and is often a history of institutions. The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, despite not being models for international co-operation in 
criminal law enforcement, as they were integrated for enforcement purposes into the 
occupation regimes of Germany and Japan, are the institutional beginnings of this history. 
Nonetheless, the Nuremberg IMT, if not its Tokyo sibling, gave rise to a body of 
international criminal law accepted fairly promptly as customary, and gave rise to the 
universalist ideas of international criminal law which continue to this day. Of course, the 
Allies, were clothing the selective enforcement of the law in the language of universals, 
and international criminal law. What is important though is that they did do so. If the 
Allies had chosen to deal with the Nazis by a summary execution, or even by national 
proceedings, then international crimes as we currently understand them may not have 
moved forwards at all since 1919. The law they used to convict the defendants in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs was, with the exception of the charges based on war crimes, 
innovative and reactive. Yet few would deny the importance of having such laws. Those 
laws also conflicted with sovereignty. The idea which lay behind crimes against humanity 
was that there are certain activities which are so egregious, the principle of sovereignty 
must give way, and international law must step in, even when the behaviour is directed 
against a State's own citizens. 3 
The Cold War put an end to any attempt to internationalise enforcement of 
international criminal law, although, particularly in the aftermath of the Eichmann case, 4 
there was an increasing acceptance of universal jursidiction in theory, if not supported by 
sufficient practice to assert that the exercise of such jurisdiction was mandatory outside of 
particular treaty based duties to prosecute. States were unlikely to respond well to 
3 The implications of this, and some of the contradictions which arise between this and crimes against peace 
are discussed at length in David Luban, Legal Modemism 
(Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1994) 
chapter 7. 
4 (1961) 36 LL. R. 5,277. 
315 
exercises of such jurisdiction over their nationals, and it was the glue of the universal 
condemnation of Nazism that held international criminal law together. Actions, such as 
the abduction of Eiclmarm and the irregular rendition of Klaus Barbie to France, also 
showed the limits of the bilateral system in enforcement of international crimes. 
The tide began to turn in the 1980s, when common law jurisdictions such as the UK, 
Australia and Canada began to investigate alleged Nazi war criminals in their territories, 
and prosecutions in France of Vichy officials for crimes against humanity began to come 
to fruition. Prosecutions still remained selective concentrating almost entirely on Nazis, 
the prosecution of whom no State would take as insulting to its dignity. Up until this time 
amnesties were also still many States' responses to offences by their own officials. 
Examples include the French in Algeria and Indochina or the Military juntas in South 
America. The raising of the idea of an international criminal court in 1989 was a separate 
development to the prosecutions of Nazis as it was initially intended as a forum for the 
trial of drug smugglers, who were often as powerful and influential as the governments 
who sought to prosecute them. The abortive calls for prosecution in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War showed that there was still insufficient support for international action. 
The two developments (international criminal law and the idea of an international 
criminal court) joined hands in 1993, when the Security Council decided to set up the 
ICTY in lieu of intervening to forcibly halt the atrocities that were ongoing in Yugoslavia 
at the time. The motives of the Security Council may not have been pure, but as with the 
Allies at Nuremberg, the turn to international criminal law itself was important. The 
States in the Security Council may not have believed in the universal enforcement of 
international criminal law, but spoke as if they did, and in determining that atrocities were 
a threat to international peace and security, 5 began the process of proper integration of 
the values into the international system. The Security Council did this by characterising 
violations of international criminal law as threats to the international system and thus as a 
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matter for collective international action. The extraordinary powers granted to the 
Security Council in the aftermath of WWII allowed the Council to grant wide-ranging 
powers to the ICTY, enabling it to completely break with the traditional bilateral system 
for co-operation in criminal matters, recognising that it would be inadequate, not least as 
it is optional, and some of the States whose co-operation was most needed would be 
likely not to exercise their option to co-operate. 6 Even if they did, they would be likely to 
try to evade transfer of their nationals by the manipulation of the extradition process, so 
extradition law limits to surrender were determined to be inapplicable. The traditional, 
bilateral mechanism was completely rejected as an inadequate response to the 
international crimes in former Yugoslavia. 
The ICTY was open to some charges of selectivity, in that it was an ad bac response 
to a single conflict, and the Security Council's actions highlighted its silence on other 
atrocities. The universal nature of international criminal law was a odds with such 
piecemeal enforcement. A chance to refute these arguments came with the creation of the 
ICTR, which shows the momentum created by international criminal tribunals. This 
momentum is also in evidence in the national prosecutions that have occurred of 
offenders from former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Despite the creation of the ICTR, 
selectivity was still present, the ICTR, no less than the ICTY was a limited, reactive 
response to atrocities. The tension between the universal nature of the law espoused and 
the limited primary jurisdiction, was part of the reason for the increased support for the 
creation of a permanent international criminal court. Another explanation for the 
increased support for such a body is that by their existence and operation, the two UN 
Tribunals demonstrated that international criminal law could be enforced at the 
international level. The momentum they achieved led, in part, to the adoption of the 
Rome Statute with only seven negative votes in July 1998. 
5 On this process see R. Cryer "The Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to Coherence? "
(1996) 1 
J. A. C. L. 161, pp181-182. 
6 This underlies the necessity of the Security Council imposing a duty to co-operate on States, see the 
Report 
of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resoluton 808, 
S/3754, para 20. 
317 
With the Rome Statute, sovereign concerns reasserted themselves in several ways. 
First, this time, an interim position between the bilateral regime of co-operation and the 
supranational system was created. Although most of the bars to extradition are removed, 
there are still impediments to transfer, such as diplomatic immunities or immunities 
deriving from agreements between States.? This last limitation was a large concession to 
States, and could easily lead to de facto selective application of the law even amongst States 
party to the Rome Statute. The exclusion of a duty to hand over sensitive information 
privileges States, possibly at the expense of prosecutions before the Court. Also the 
parameters of liability are more limited than those in customary law. This contraction of 
liability is a result of States taking a different view on the scope of the Court's powers to 
declare the law when that law was likely to apply to them than they have done when the 
law is to be applied to the practices of others. Examples of this are not merely related to 
the limitation of the rules on collateral damage, but include the insistence of some Middle 
Eastern States that indirect transfer of a population into an occupied territory be included 
in the Statute, ' but that any possibility of liability for the recruitment of children into the 
Intifada be excluded. Similar comments can be made about the definitions of defences and 
the principles of liability. 9 
As a treaty-based regime, the Rome Statute only imposes obligations to co-operate on 
States party, and it does not impose any duty upon them to co-operate inter se. The Court 
can only exercise nationality and territorial jurisdiction on behalf of its States party, unless 
the Security Council decides to refer a situation to it, so the Court will not have universal 
7 The national analogue to this is the acceptance that State immunity does not attach to international crimes, 
which accepts that in certain circumstances, sovereignty gives way to the need to enforce international 
criminal law, but that diplomatic and head of State immunity remains to prevent enforcement against 
diplomats and current heads of State. In the latter case, sovereignty wins out over the imperatives of 
enforcement. 
8 Although this is a war crime in customary international law, it was dearly directed at Israeli practices, see 
chapter 5, p. 269-270. 
9 It must be remembered that codification is not always a positive development in an area of 
international 
law. See R. R. Baxter, "The Effects of Ill Conceived Codification and Development of International Law" in 
Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneve (ed. ), Ra ii J d'Etudes de Dmit Intema nal en 
Harrnnagea Paul Gugg n/l n (Geneva: in Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneve, 1968) 
146; H. W. A. Thirlway, International Q&anmy Law vxd Qd#uatz'vn (Leyden: Sitjhoff, 1972) chapter 9; a more 
sanguine view is given by K. Wolfke, "Can Codification if International Law be Harmful? " 
in J. Makarczyk 
(ed. ), Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Marqai Lachs (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 313. 
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coverage. Proposals for universal jurisdiction were defeated in Rome. The role of the 
Security Council in passing a matter to the ICC, and more obviously, its role in 
"deferring" prosecutions could, and are likely to, lead to assertions of selectivity, which 
are likely to continue to plague the enforcement of international criminal law. 
On the positive side, the ICC is the first institution created to exercise jurisdiction 
over the States that bring it into being. b0 The creation of the UN tribunals and the Rome 
Statute in the 1990s heralded a huge upsurge in interest in international criminal law, and 
it is now an aspect of international law that States cannot afford to ignore. The rising 
numbers of prosecutions of offences from Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in national 
jurisdictions shows how the creation of an international criminal tribunal legitimises 
international interest in prosecution of these offences (as evidenced by the Nuremberg 
IMT also). This shows an increasing acceptance of the values of international criminal 
law, as it is on all fours with Simma's understanding of the acceptance of a value (see 
supra p. 10). When this is taken together with the creation of the Rome Statute, which, its 
flaws notwithstanding, represents a leap forward in the enforcement of international 
criminal law we can see that the enforcement of international criminal law is likely to 
achieve its historically greatest level, and purely because this will not be entirely universal 
we should not reject it entirely. The turn to international criminal tribunals may also have 
led to a swing towards enforcement of international crimes on a more universal basis at 
the national level. The Pincrhet and Habre cases are examples of this as is the increasing 
trend away from amnesties, and the increasing extent to which they are to be scrutinised, 
if not outlawed. At the international level the increasing likelihood of mixed 
national/international tribunals in Cambodia and Sierra Leone" show that 
international 
criminal law enforcement is maintaining vitality. As the Rome Statute 
in particular creates 
a powerful national interest in prosecution of international crimes, an 
increased level of 
10 The ICTR, of course, was created at the request of Rwanda, but their wish was for it to prosecute the old 
Hutu regime, not the new government for its activities as the RPF. The RPF actions, although at times rising 
to the level of international crimes, are in no way comparable to those of the Hum 
interim government it 
overthrew. 
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national enforcement may be postulated, at least for States party to the Rome Statute. As 
national enforcement mechanisms, when dealing with offences by their own officials, 
have the advantages of being integrated into a State's enforcement regime, considerable 
benefits append to this approach. 
This national interest will come about as a result of the complementarity regime, 
which emphasises the tandem relationship between national and international criminal 
tribunals. Primacy, as it exists in the relationship between national jurisdictions and the 
ICTY and ICTR has several advantages. The power the two Tribunals have to take a case 
effectively when they want it, means that when important questions of law or particularly 
egregious offences committed by a high level government officials, which may be more 
appropriately tried at the international level, arise the UN Tribunals can take them at will. 
This may not be the case with the ICC, although the lack of enforcement of the UN 
Tribunals' orders by the Security Council means in practice, the difference in practice may 
not be as wide as might be thought. 12 The advantages of the `vertical' cooperation regime 
they enjoy compared to the more `horizontal' approach taken by the drafters of the Rome 
Statute have been canvassed in chapter 2. 
Despite these advantages, complementarity has advantages over primacy which go 
some way towards offsetting the attractions of primacy. Importantly, complementarity 
puts the focus on national prosecutions of international crimes. National prosecutions 
not only benefit from the prosecuting State's enforcement mechanisms, but have other 
advantages. International criminal tribunals cannot prosecute all the international crimes 
committed in the World, practical constraints militate in favour of the 
involvement of 
national courts. Also, justice at the international level may appear too abstract to the 
victims in the States where the atrocities have occurred. National courts may appear more 
11 See now Security Council Resolution 1315, UN Doc. S/RES/1315, which mandates the 
Secretary General 
to negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone for such a Tribunal. 
12 This argument is the theme of Bartram Brown, "Primacy or Complementarity: 
Reconciling the Jurisdiction 
of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals" (1998) 23 Yale J. I. L. 383. 
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legitimate to such victims. 13 Complementarity, by focusing on national prosecutions 
serves an important function in emphasising to States that prosecution of international 
crimes is their concern, whereas primacy can give the impression that international crimes 
should be prosecuted by "someone else", i. e. international criminal courts. This focus, in 
addition to the fact that States will not wish to have international crimes committed by 
their nationals prosecuted in a very public forum (the ICC) gives, for the first time, a 
strong reason for a State to prosecute international crimes diligently. 14 By prosecuting 
international crimes occurring on their territories or by their nationals themselves, States 
can avoid transfer of proceedings to the ICC, and the embarrassment a trial before the 
ICC will engender. At the same time, the existence of the Rome Statute and the ICC 
serves to further vindicate the international interest in international crimes, and may 
already have had a spill over effect, leading to a greater level of prosecution of 
international crimes in general. 
Support for the Rome Statute is wide; 112 States have signed the Rome Statute. 15 But 
it is not universal. The United States is, in its most sanguine moments, antipathetic to the 
Rome Statute, and its hostility to the ICC, should it materialise, could yet serve to break 
the Court. On the other hand, the unanimous support for the Rome Statute in the EU 
shows that powerful groups of States are prepared to put their weight behind the court. 
This justifies a very cautious optimism that, in the words of E. P. Thompson, though "the 
law may be rhetoric... it need not be empty rhetoric". 16 By turning to the law, States have 
become caught up in the logic of that law, and the gap between the universal ideas 
underlying international criminal law and the practice surrounding their enforcement is 
beginning to narrow. Thus we are tottering towards an integrated system where national 
13 For a lengthy argument to this effect see J. Alvarez, "Crimes of Hate/Crimes of State: Lessons 
From 
Rwanda" (1999) 23 Yale J. I. L. 365. 
14 Even treaty based duties to extradite or prosecute have remained honoured primarily in the breach, as often 
there has been insufficient reason for upholding the duties in the face of countervailing arguments in 
favour 
of benign neglect. 
15 Ratifications currently stand at 20 (15 September 2000), but this lower number is referable, partially, to the 
length of time taken to get the complex implementing legislation through national legislatures. 
16 E. P. Thompson, Whags and Hunter (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990 (1975)) p. 263. 
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and international courts both operate in tandem to prosecute international crimes. 17 The 
system may not be completely effective, and not totally credible because of its selectivity, 
but we have some cause for optimism In distinction to a decade ago, we have institutions 
dedicated to enforcing international criminal law, and we can see the beginnings of such a 
system. 
17 The latter operating where the former are "unwilling or unable" to prosecute suspects themselves. 
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